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This study explores the role of what I call metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC) in 
the processes of utterance interpretation, and in some cases expression interpretation. 
MSC is so-called because it is grounded in a speaker’s explicit knowledge of (or beliefs 
about) the lexically-encoded meanings of individual words. More specifically, MSC 
derives, in part, from having concepts of words—or conceptsW as I distinguish them—
whose representational contents, I propose, are corresponding items in a speaker’s mental 
lexicon. The leading idea is that once acquired speakers use their conceptsW to form 
explicit beliefs about the meanings of words in terms of which extralinguistic concepts 
those words can (and cannot) coherently be used to express in ordinary conversational 
situations as constrained by their linguistically-encoded meanings. Or to put the claim 
differently, I argue that a speaker’s explicit conception of word-meanings is a direct 
conscious reflection of his/her tacit understanding of the various ways in which lexical 
meanings guide and constrain without fully determining what their host words can (and 
cannot) be used/uttered to talk about in ordinary discourse. Such metalinguistic 
knowledge, I contend, quite often plays crucial role in our ability to correctly interpret 
what other speakers say. The first part of this work details the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying MSC against the backdrop of a Chomskyan framework for natural language 
and a Fodorian theory of concepts and their representational contents. The second part 
explores three ways that MSC might contribute to what I call a speaker’s core linguistic-
semantic competence. Specifically, I argue that MSC can help explain (i) how competent 
speakers acquire conceptually underspecified words with their lexical meanings, (ii) the 
contextual disambiguation of inherently polysemous words, and (iii) the informativeness 
of true natural language identity statements involving coreferential proper names. The 
philosophically relevant conclusion is that if any of these proposals pan out then MSC 
constitutes a proper explanandum of semantic theory, and hence any complete/adequate 
theory of semantic competence. 
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1.1. On utterance interpretation and semantic competence 
Consider the nonce sentence in (1), excerpted from Lewis Carroll’s Through the 
Looking Glass (1871): 
(1) All mimsy were the borogoves 
In tribute to Carroll, (1) is an example of what language researchers call “Jabberwocky” 
sentences. Such constructions are often used in developmental and neuroimaging studies 
to diagnose how ordinary yet fully competent speakers parse and interpret various 
sentence-types in relative isolation from knowledge of the precise meanings/denotations 
of their open-class lexical constituents. Most relevant to my purposes here, such 
examples are occasionally invoked by philosophers of language to demonstrate our 
capacity to assign a coarse layer of meaning to such sentence-types based solely on our 
understanding of their grammatical structure and/or logical form. 
Adapting an idea first advanced by Gilbert Harmon (1974), James Higginbotham 
(1988) has argued, for instance, that while we may be ignorant of the intended 
denotations/extensions of the nonce words ‘mimsy’ and ‘borogoves’, any competent 
speaker of English knows—if only tacitly—that (1) above has the same basic “logical 
skeleton” (i.e., grammatical structure) as a more familiar sentence such as (2): 
(2) The plates were all broken 
More specifically, the empirical evidence suggests that even very young native English 
speakers will know that ‘borogoves’ is a plural count noun that designates some class of 
things, or other, and that ‘mimsy’ is an ordinary adjective/predicate that describes some 




knowledge of the logical skeleton of (1) provides young language learners with tacit 
clues about what these words cannot mean. Higginbotham (ibid.: 166) notes, for instance, 
that “the child knows that the word 'mimsy' could not mean tree, and 'borogove' could not 
mean run.” By hypothesis, this competence is adducible to what the child antecedently 
knows, which is (i) the formal grammatical structure of (1), (ii) the semantic principles by 




The relevant point, which ultimately owes to Noam Chomsky, is that our tacit 
knowledge of the various ways in which the purely formal properties of linguistic 
expressions constrain without determining what those expressions can and cannot be 
used/uttered to express in ordinary discourse seemingly involves a fundamentally 
different aspect of linguistic competence as required to learn/understand the norm-
governed denotations of their lexical constituents, and hence the thoughts/propositions 
(or truth conditions) that those expressions are customarily used/uttered to express. 
More generally, utterance interpretation is commonly thought to depend on at least 
three distinct aspects of semantic competence: what I will call linguistic-semantic 
competence (LSC), conceptual-semantic competence (CSC), and pragmatic-semantic 
competence (PSC). First, I take LSC to be roughly what Chomskyans refer to simply as 
linguistic competence—competence grounded in a largely tacit (i.e., sub-personal, sub-
doxastic) representational knowledge of the purely formal semantic properties of words 
together with the rules of grammar that collectively underwrite a speaker’s ability to 
                                                 
1
 As Lust (2006: 185) explains, “Functional categories provide a critical mechanism by which we map the 
speech stream to the secret skeleton, just as we do for “Jabberwocky”… Children must link content words 
to the skeleton… When words are linked to the skeleton, children can label phrases; e.g., nouns will head 




generate and understand any of the infinitely many generable (i.e., possible) expressions 
of his/her native language. In terms of comprehension, LSC is manifest in a rather vague 
recognitional awareness of the various ways in which the meanings of expressions so-
generated guide and constrain without fully determining what they can and cannot 
coherently be used/uttered to denote, describe, refer to, or otherwise talk about in 
ordinary discourse. For instance, LSC is posited to explain how it is that competent 
speakers of English—again even very young ones—seem to tacitly know that a nonce 
word such as ‘borogoves’ in the context of (1) above does not and indeed cannot 
designate, say, a substance such as water, or an event such as running. 
CSC, by contrast, relates to a speaker’s conceptualized world-knowledge of what 
his/her native language expressions are customarily used to talk about (i.e., factual 
knowledge about individuals, properties, relations, events, states of affairs, etc.). At the 
lexical level, we might think of CSC as subsuming a speaker’s norm-governed ability to 
correctly align her words with the concepts that others in her local linguistic community 
customarily use those expressions to express. Lastly, as most theorists agree what I am 
calling PSC, or pragmatic-semantic competence, involves the Gricean ability to correctly 
infer from what is “literally” said/asserted by means of a linguistic utterance the 
thought/proposition that its utterer intended to convey or otherwise communicate in virtue 
of having said what she did relative to the context in which the utterance was produced. 
So distinguished, the aim of this study is to demonstrate that the three aspects of 
semantic competence just outlined, either alone or in tandem, fail to exhaust one’s core 
semantic competence—i.e., that body of linguistic information that one must know, or 




language user. Specifically, I argue that whatever else semantic competence consists in, it 
depends, in addition, on what I call metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC). MSC is 
so-called because it is grounded in a speaker’s explicit (i.e., consciously accessible) 
conceptual knowledge of or beliefs about the purely formal, intrinsic semantic properties 
of linguistic expressions, and in particular the meanings of individual words. 
Importantly, MSC owes neither directly to our tacit knowledge of 
language/meaning (LSC), nor to our conceptualized world-knowledge of the things we 
ordinarily use expressions of natural language to talk about (CSC), nor to our pragmatic 
conversational knowledge of a speaker’s communicative intentions (PSC). Rather, MSC 
derives from having concepts of words—or conceptsW as I shall distinguish them—whose 
representational contents, I propose, are corresponding items/entries in a speaker’s mental 
lexicon. The leading idea is that once acquired speakers use conceptsW to form explicit 
beliefs about the meanings of words (or lexical items) in terms of the constraints that 
their linguistically-encoded semantic properties impose on which extralinguistic concepts 
those words can (and cannot) coherently be used to express in ordinary conversational 
situations. Or to put the claim differently, what I will call a speaker’s explicit conception 
of a word’s meaning is by hypothesis a direct conscious reflection of his/her tacit 
understanding of the various ways in which its linguistically-encoded semantic properties 
guide and constrain without fully determining what that word can and cannot be 
used/uttered to denote, describe, refer to, or otherwise talk about in ordinary discourse. 
Unlike most other discussions of semantic competence, my overarching thesis is 
that in certain cases MSC plays a constitutive role in utterance interpretation, and 




consequence, I contend that certain aspects of MSC should be treated as an integral 
component of a speaker’s core linguistic competence, and more specifically what I am 
calling his/her linguistic-semantic competence (LSC). Moreover, I maintain that if MSC 
does in fact play a constitutive role in utterance interpretation then any explanatorily 
adequate semantic theory for natural language must account for the relevant aspects of a 
speaker’s MSC. However, I readily grant that certain aspects of MSC, such as knowing 
how to spell a word, and which merely contributes to a speaker’s functional literacy, is 
beyond the purview of semantic theory. Yet I will be focusing on the stronger thesis 
throughout—that at least one aspect of MSC—viz., our explicit knowledge of word-
meanings—in at least some cases contributes directly to a speaker’s “core” semantic 
competence and therefore constitutes a proper explanandum of semantic theory. 
That’s the project in a nutshell. The remainder of this introductory chapter is 
devoted to sharpening the relevant questions/issues and briefly sketching my proposed 
responses to them while postponing the finer details for later chapters. To help frame the 
proposal, I begin by trying to get clear about the fundamental goals of semantic theory, 
the nature of semantic competence, and the relationship between the two. Following the 
lead of a growing number of language theorists, I conclude that a semantic theory for 
natural language can more or less double as a theory of semantic competence. The 
relevant consequence is again that if MSC does in fact play a constitutive role in 
utterance interpretation, then any complete theory of semantic competence, and by parity 
of reasoning any explanatorily adequate semantic theory for natural language, must 




1.2. On semantic theory and semantic competence 
Natural languages are distinguished by the expressions their native speakers utter 
and understand, where to understand an expression is pretty much by definition to grasp 
its meaning. Granted this characterization, the present challenge is twofold. First, one 
wants to know what this “grasping” consists in, which is traditionally the target of a 
theory of semantic competence. Second, one must specify the nature and structure of 
linguistic meaning; i.e., that which is presumably grasped when understanding occurs.
2
 
This latter question falls squarely within the domain of a semantic theory for natural 
language.
3
 Or as more broadly construed Larson & Segal (1995: 1) suggest that 
“Ultimately, its goal is to provide theoretical descriptions and explanations of all of the 
phenomena of linguistic meaning.” The wider aim of semantic theory, in other words, is 
to describe and ultimately explain the relevant semantic facts of understanding a 
language. So what are the relevant semantic facts? Well, this seemingly depends on the 




As a way of escaping the impending circle, however, many language theorists 
nowadays seem willing to grant the following two more or less a priori claims: 
(i) that linguistic expressions are the bearers of linguistic meanings, and 
                                                 
2
 What I am calling ‘grasping’ might itself be cashed out in any number ways; e.g., ‘knowing’, 
‘comprehending’, ‘cognizing’, ‘representing’, or ‘instantiating’, to name but a few.  But for the moment I 
will rely on our intuitive conception of what it is to understand the meaning of a linguistic expression. 
3
 I will say more about the nature of  linguistic meaning in Chapter 2. 
4
 For example, most language theorists still operate under the traditional assumption that linguistic 
meanings are best characterized in terms of an expression’s truth, reference, or satisfaction conditions. On 
this view, semantic theory is tasked, more specifically, with providing a recursive specification of the 
compositionally determined truth conditions for each sentence of the object language. Others, however, 
take meanings to be sets of Lewisian or Stalnakerian possible worlds, or alternatively structured Russellian 
propositions, or perhaps Fregean senses/thoughts. In each case the core explanandum is the relation 
between meaning and truth. In radical contrast, still others maintain that there are no such things as 




(ii) that linguistic meanings are the primary objects of understanding (i.e., 
semantic competence). 
Of course, difficult questions remain regarding the exact nature of linguistic expressions 
themselves, and the ontological status of languages more generally. But under the 
plausible assumption that linguistic understanding can be characterized as a cognitive 
state of language users, it seems to follow that a semantic theory for natural language is 
again a theory of whatever competent speakers must know, or cognize, or otherwise 
mentally represent in order to grasp the meanings of their native language expressions.
5
 If 
correct, it then becomes largely an exercise in empirical psychology and/or scientific 
epistemology to ascertain what, exactly, is the cognitive relation between speakers and 
the languages they are said to understand, and hence what, at bottom, semantic 
competence consists in. Furthermore, one assumes that the outcome of this endeavor will 
impose (possibly stringent) empirical constraints on the form that any explanatorily 
adequate semantic theory for natural language can take. 
Here again difficult questions loom large. But according to an increasingly popular 
and empirically well-motivated movement among formal semanticists and philosophers 
of language, a semantic theory for natural language can perform double-duty as a theory 
of linguistic understanding, which is to say a theory of semantic competence. On its 
weakest construal, the task is to identify those semantic facts whose grasp would in 
principle suffice for an idealized speaker to understand the language under investigation. 
Others maintain, however, that a more explanatorily adequate semantic theory is one 
whose structure and content faithfully mirrors the structure and content of the semantic 
                                                 
5
 Although Wittgenstein evidently believed that understanding is not a cognitive process. Nor should being 
in a state of understanding be construed as a mental state. But frankly I don’t know what sense can be made 




psychology of actual language users.
6
 Yet whichever approach one finds most satisfying, 
somewhat deeper questions persist about the relation between speakers (whether actual or 
ideal) and the languages they are said to understand, or indeed whether semantic theory 
should even concern itself with such matters.
7
 
Among those who are concerned with such matters, Michael Dummett notably 
argued that “To understand an expression is to know its meaning,” as “an individual 
speaker’s mastery of the language […] requires the notion of knowledge for its 
explication.”
8
 Upon first inspection Dummett appears to be using the locution 
“knowledge of language” in the traditional philosophical sense of possessing 
propositional knowledge of an expression’s meaning, as traditionally cashed out in terms 
of knowledge of its truth, reference, or satisfaction conditions—what he sometimes refers 
to as a “full-blooded” theory of meaning.
9
 Elsewhere, however, Dummett qualifies:
10
 
I shall reserve the phrase "a theory of meaning" for a theory thus conceived as something 
known by the speakers. Such knowledge cannot be taken as explicit knowledge [my 
emphasis], for two reasons. First, it is obvious that the speakers do not in general have 
explicit knowledge of a theory of meaning for their language; if they did, there would be 
no problem about how to construct such a theory. Secondly, even if we could attribute to 
a speaker an explicit knowledge of a theory of meaning for a language, we should not 
have completed the philosophical task of explaining in what his mastery of the language 
consisted by stating the theory of meaning and ascribing an explicit knowledge of it to 
him. Explicit knowledge is manifested by the ability to state the content of the 
knowledge. 
                                                 
6
 Advocates of this latter view are part of what Paul & Stainton (2009: 474) call the “New Philosophy of 
Language.” 
7
 Davidson (1986, 1990) held that the theoretically interesting relation holds between the theory (or 
theorist) and the language under investigation as manifest in the interpretive behavior of its speakers—i.e., 
that a theory of meaning is a third-person description of the practice of using a language. However, I find 
such a view to be theoretically dissatisfying. And in spite of its potential historical/contrastive value, I will 
not consider it here. 
8
 Dummett (1976:110, 113), my emphasis. 
9
 Dummett (1974). 
10




As Dummett suggests here, ordinary speakers are typically incapable of articulating the 
compositional rules that govern assignments of meanings to expressions. Hence, these 
speakers presumably lack explicit propositional knowledge of any semantic theory that 
purports to describe and/or explain such knowledge. Rather, Dummett construes a 
speaker’s mastery of a language as a practical ability “to employ the language on a 
certain occasion,” yet which is nevertheless the manifestation of his/her implicit 
knowledge of meaning. For he adds (ibid., 118, 120): 
What an individual speaker's understanding of his language consists in is a legitimate 
philosophical enquiry; and it may be that, to explain this, we must invoke the notion of 
implicit knowledge […] This account can only be given in terms of the practical ability 
which the speaker displays in using sentences of the language; and, in general, the 
knowledge of which that practical ability is taken as a manifestation may be, and should 
be, regarded as only implicit knowledge [my emphases]. 
On the other hand, given his allegiance to Frege, Dummett is often accused of defending 
a thoroughly anti-psychologistic account of semantic competence—one which eschews 
appeal to the semantic psychology of actual language users. For there is a reading of 
Dummett according to which he is merely offering a rational reconstruction of language 
use as a social practice. In fact, I find Dummett difficult to pin down on this question (but 
then I am no Dummett scholar). However, as Antony & Davies (1997: 179) observe: 
Dummett often highlights what he takes to be the explanatory nature of a meaning-
theory, encouraging the impression that he is looking for a psychologically realistic 
account of the means by which speakers master and deploy their languages. 
Yet whatever is the correct interpretation of Dummett, so called “full-blooded” accounts 
of semantic competence face serious difficulties when it comes to explaining empirical 
facts related to language acquisition and thus how actual language learners ever manage 




For this and other reasons, full-bloodedness has been most seriously challenged by 
Noam Chomsky’s internalist/rationalist conception of linguistic competence as grounded 
in a tacit computational state of the mind-brain; cf. Chomsky (1986, 2000). More 
specifically, on Chomsky’s view to “know” a language
11
 is to possess an I-language—an 
effective computational procedure that generates infinitely many meaningful linguistic 
expressions from a finite stock of basic constituents according to a recursively specified 
set of grammatical rules.
12
 In short, to know a language is to instantiate an I-language—a 
generative procedure, implementable by human biology, that enables its possessor to 
generate/represent and thereby understand the expressions of his/her native I-language. 
Linguistic understanding in turn depends on an interpreter’s ability
13
 to compute the 




The knowledge/competence in question is characterized as “tacit” because again 
from a first-person perspective it manifests itself in a capacity to judge the various ways 
in which certain intrinsic semantic properties of expression-types constrain what their 
                                                 
11
 Notice that the locution “knowledge of language” carries no epistemic weight here as traditionally 
understood. But to avoid any unintended epistemological implications Chomsky nowadays employs the 
technical term ‘cognize’ as a replacement for the verb ‘to know’. Thus, for readers who have qualms over 
my use of ‘know’ in this context feel free to substitute the technical term ‘cognize’. 
12
 Recursion (with respect to language) refers to the capacity to embed one clause, or complete sentence, 
within another in the same hierarchical (syntactic) structure, without limit, except as practically constrained 
by the limited cognitive resources of actual speakers. I will work through some of the details of Chomsky’s 
notion of an I-language in the next chapter. 
13
 Pace Dummett, by ‘ability’ I mean the exercise of a speaker’s sub-doxastic linguistic competence, 
understood in the Chomskyan sense of biologically instantiating a stable computational state of the mind-
brain, as opposed to a learned practical ability. 
14
 While Chomsky does not distinguish linguistic competence from semantic competence (or what I am 
calling linguistic-semantic competence), this kind of distinction is often invoked by semanticists who 
believe that an independent compositional semantics can be given for natural language (i.e., a semantic 
theory divorced in certain respects from a theory of syntax). So distinguished, and as clarified below, I will 
assume that semantic competence is a proper subset of a speaker’s core linguistic competence in 
Chomsky’s sense. Thus, purists are free to omit the word ‘semantic’ in my use of the expression ‘linguistic-




token-utterances can (and cannot) mean. To borrow an example from Chomsky, consider 
the following sentences which on the surface differ only in the verbs ‘eager’ and ‘easy’: 
(3) Max is eager to please 
(4) Max is easy to please 
Any competent speaker of English knows, on the basis of highly impoverished evidence, 
that (3) unambiguously means that Max is eager to please others whereas (4) 
unambiguously means that Max is easily pleased by others. Yet one can imagine a 
language in which (3) and (4) mean just the opposite, or are both ambiguous as between 
the two possible readings. For compare (5) which on the surface has the same basic form 
as (3) and (4) yet is two-ways ambiguous: 
(5) Max is ready to please 
Specifically, (5) has a reading according to which Max is prepared to please others and 
another by which Max is prepared for others to please him. 
By common hypothesis these strings of words are assigned syntactic representations 
(or structural descriptions) that contain covert (unpronounced/unarticulated) syntactic 
elements called traces. Specifically, a standard analysis of (3) and (4) are given in (3') 
and (4'): 
(3') Max1 is eager [t1 to please] 
(4') Max2 is easy [t1 to please t2] 
In (3'), the idea is that the surface subject, ‘Max’, is initially generated as the grammatical 
subject of the verb ‘to please’. However, in order to satisfy certain structural constraints 
‘Max’ is moved to the surface subject position leaving behind the trace ‘t1’ that behaves 




codependency. The same goes for (4') except that in this case ‘Max’ is base-generated as 
the direct object of ‘to please’, indicated by ‘t2’, and where ‘t1’ represents an 
unpronounced grammatical formative that is tacitly understood to mean something like 
‘others’, as in “others1 to please Max2.” 
This difference in syntactic configurations of (3) and (4) is again posited to explain 
their different yet unambiguous meanings. Similarly, the ambiguity of (5) is explained on 
the assumption that English grammar allows this particular string of words to be assigned 
more than one syntactic representation as posited in (5')/(5''), 
(5') Max1 is ready [t1 to please] 
(5'') Max2 is ready [t1 to please t2] 
where the same grammatical principles that govern the interpretation of (3') correspond 
with those of (5'), and where (4') likewise corresponds with (5''). Indeed, similar 
examples abound in all spoken languages. The upshot is this: While competent speakers 
seem to “know” such facts they are again generally incapable of reporting the linguistic 
principles that govern their interpretive judgments, ex hypothesi because these principles 
are “known” only tacitly (i.e., sub-personally/sub-doxastically). 
In any case, I propose to not get bogged down here in a lengthy debate over the 
virtues of a Chomskyan conception of language, as nothing I have to say will win over 
detractors.
15
 Rather, I will just adopt an I-language perspective without further argument. 
In regard to the question of semantic competence, I am disposed to follow the lead of 
theorists such as Evans (1981, 1982), Higginbotham (1989, 1991), Larson & Segal 
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 However, my core thesis, which I shall detail momentarily, is in many respects compatible with an 
externalist view of meaning. Furthermore, adopting an internalist/rationalist perspective of language is in 
principle no barrier to being an externalist about linguistic meaning (i.e., by individuating meanings 
externally). Indeed, there appears to be an ever-growing legion of truth-conditional philosophers of 




(1995), Antony & Davies (1997), Smith (1992, 2006), and Pietroski (forthcoming), the 
consensus among whom is that appeal to the semantic psychology of actual speakers is 
indispensable in the construction of an empirically adequate theory of semantic 
competence. By parallel reasoning, Smith (1992: 114) adds that “What a plea for the 
relevance of psychological findings would ensure is that the form of a theory of meaning 
be treated as an empirical hypothesis.” Taken a small step further, one is given to 
conclude that a semantic theory for natural language can, for most theoretical purposes, 
double as a theory of semantic competence. As such, one would expect a correct semantic 
theory to play a role in the explanation and hence theory of linguistic understanding. 
1.3. On metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC) 
More to my immediate concerns, while one might agree with Chomsky that our 
knowledge of grammar is largely tacit, and thus generally unavailable to introspection, 
Smith (2006: 947-8) observes that “There is a vast amount of specific knowledge the 
speaker has and about which he is authoritative: including knowledge of what his words 
mean.” And this is to suggest that “Our knowledge of word meaning is conscious and 
first-personal.” Now, by authoritative Smith does not mean infallible. Rather, I take him 
to mean that, by and large, competent speakers have reliable and indeed quite often 
empirically justified beliefs about what their words mean. In particular, a speaker’s 
explicit knowledge of word-meaning constitutes part of what I am calling his/her 
metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC). Yet despite Smith’s plea, MSC is typically 
dismissed by language theorists as a mere epiphenomenon—as being parasitic on the 
facts of knowing a language rather than partly constitutive of those facts. It is again the 




of a Chomskyan conception of words and their lexically-encoded meanings. But making 
this case requires first saying more about the nature of words and their lexical meanings. 
1.3.1. A Chomskyan conception of words and their meanings 
I will elaborate on these remarks in Chapter 2, but in brief outline Chomsky 
describes linguistic expressions as related collections of phonological, syntactic, and 
semantic properties, or “features” as they are often called. At the lexical level in 
particular we can think of word-meanings as intrinsic (again non-relational, language-
internal) semantic properties of words that are tacitly understood by interpreters as 
linguistically-specified rules or “instructions” to activate one among possibly several 
semantically related extralinguistic concepts. The net result is that the meanings of 
words, so understood, guide and constrain without fully determining what those words 
can and cannot coherently be used to talk about in ordinary discourse. 
Consider the word ‘dog’, for example, which typical English speakers initially 
lexicalize as an ordinary count noun and in turn use to express their concept of dogs; call 
this DOG(x). So understood, from the perspective of a speaker’s semantic psychology, and 
to a rough first approximation, we might specify the meaning of ‘dog’ as follows, 
(6) CON(dog) = activate@DOG → DOG(x) 
where ‘dog’ indicates the lexical root, as represented in a speaker’s lexicon, 
corresponding to what we pre-theoretically think of as the word ‘dog’. ‘CON’ is the name 
I give to a particular aspect of its context-invariant meaning, again as qualified in Chapter 
2. The element ‘@DOG’ in the metalanguage (i.e., on the right-hand side of the meaning 
assignment) represents a pointer to (address of) the concept DOG(x) in the speaker’s long-




activate@DOG is tacitly understood by interpreters as an instruction to activate their 
DOG(x) concept.
16
 By hypothesis, however, DOG(x) is a language-external mental 
representation and thus strictly speaking not itself part of the meaning of the word ‘dog’ 
as encoded by its lexical entry. Rather, I include the expression ‘→ DOG(x)’ as part of the 
specification of (6) for expository purposes to keep track of which concept typical 
English speakers associate with the meaning of ‘dog’. And in the general case, the 
concept DOG(x) is located at the mental address specified by @DOG, where the arrow ‘→’ 
should be read as “points to.” In short, and strictly speaking, the meaning of ‘dog’ should 
be specified as (7), 
(7) CON(dog) = activate@DOG 
where we can think of activate@DOG as the linguistically-encoded meaning of ‘dog’. In 
turn, the meaning of ‘dog’ as specified in (7) will be understood as an instruction to 
activate the concept located at the address specified by @DOG. So qualified, I will 
nevertheless continue the practice of (6) for expositive clarity; the chief reason being that 
(ex hypothesi) for any given open-class word/lexical item there will typically be multiple 
concepts at the location specified by ‘@<address-name>’. 
To briefly motivate this last point, observe that in appropriate contexts the word 
‘dog’ can also be used as a transitive verb meaning something like ‘to bother 
relentlessly’, as in (8): 
(8) Max dogged Minnie for a date until she finally relented
17
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 The notion of lexical meanings being understood as instructions to activate semantically related concepts 
is illustrative for present purposes. In chapter 5, however, I will trade in the notion of activation for one of 
retrieving or “fetching,” to borrow the term of its inventor; cf. Pietroski (forthcoming). 
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 Ironically enough, as I was writing this chapter I noticed the following headline in the New York Times 





In this case, ‘dog’ (or the lexical root dog) is used to express the two-place concept 
DOG(x, y), which is analytically related to DOG(x) but expresses a dyadic relation between 
an event and its two event participants. Moreover, I take it that most competent English 
speakers know that (8) is a legitimate use of ‘dog’, presumably based on its “core” noun-
ish sense together with the linguistic context in which it occurs. In other words, I trust 
that most competent English speakers would readily endorse the following entailment: 
(9) If Max dogged Minnie, then Max behaved as dogs sometimes do 
This observation in turn suggests that the two senses of ‘dog’, while both formally and 
conceptually distinct, are analytically (or semantically) related, which to introduce a 
technical term is to say that they are polysemes. 
In general, there is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that the semantic 
relationship between most if not all open-class words/lexical items and the concepts (or 
senses) they can be used to express in ordinary discourse is one-to-many.
18
 In light of 




(10) CON(dog) = activate@DOG → {DOG(x), DOG(x, y)} 
In this case @DOG serves as a pointer to a set or “family” of analytically related concepts 
in a speaker’s long-term conceptual memory (again keeping in mind that DOG(x) and 
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 Cf., e.g., Copestake & Briscoe (1995), Pustejovsky (1995), Klein & Murphy (2002), Beretta, et.al. 
(2005), Pylkkänen, et.al.(2006), and Klepousniotou, et.al. (2008). See also Chapter 5. 
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 I say most competent speakers because not every speaker lexicalizes the same concepts under the same 
words, where getting things “right” is part of what I above characterized as part of a speaker’s conceptual 
semantic competence (CSC). However, as I argue in greater detail below, CSC in the sense of knowing 
what particular words denote is not directly relevant to a speaker’s linguistic semantic competence (LSC). 
That is, one can deviate from local norm-governed standards regarding which words map to which 
concepts and still be a semantically competent language user, strictly speaking. The relevant claim, in other 





DOG(x, y) are not strictly speaking part of the lexical entry for ‘dog’).
20
 With respect to 
comprehension, (10) reflects the hypothesis that a typical utterance of ‘dog’ will be 
naturally understood by most competent English speakers as an instruction to activate one 
of either DOG(x) or DOG(x, y). What I am suggesting, in other words, is that while the 
word ‘dog’ has a single lexical entry with a univocal meaning it can nevertheless be used 
in different contexts to express different concepts (or senses/polysemes), though as 
constrained by its linguistic meaning. 
One would of course like to know what determines which concept (or perhaps in 
some cases concepts) is selected for activation in a given context, which I take to be an 
open empirical question. However, the so-called process of “sense selection” doubtlessly 
involves both linguistic and extralinguistic cognitive mechanisms. More specifically, one 
assumes, in the general case, that the contextually-salient sense of an inherently 
polysemous word is determined in part by the linguistic context in which that word 
occurs and in part by the interpreter’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative 
intentions.
21
 I will defend this hypothesis more thoroughly in Chapter 5. Yet for now I 
propose to set the question of sense selection to the side. 
At this point I anticipate murmurs that I am losing touch with psychological reality. 
For if you ask an average English speaker what the word ‘dog’ means, he/she will surely 
not make reference to things like pointers, instructions, and concepts. Rather, a more 
intuitive response will be something to the effect that ‘dog’ means, or denotes, or refers 
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 Think here “family” in the sense of Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblance,” where in this context 
the relatedness of concepts is semantic, which is to say analytic. 
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 In the present example the linguistic context alone should suffice to disambiguate the intended sense of 
‘dog’ according to whether it is used as a common noun or a transitive verb. However, as I qualify in the 
next chapter open-class lexical items typically carry additional semantic features that impose more fine-




to dogs (i.e., things that roll over and say “woof”). Indeed, I take it that such 
commonsense intuitions are in part what motivate semantic externalists to presume that 
lexical meanings can (and should) be specified in terms of a word’s truth, reference, or 
satisfaction conditions, as indicated in (11):
22
 
(11) [[dog]] = x.T iff x is a dog 
The double-bar notation here indicates the semantic value of the enclosed expression as 
specified on the right-hand side of the assignment, which depending on one’s theoretical 
commitments may or may not be identified with its meaning. In short, (11) can be read as 
stating that the word ‘dog’ is true of all and only those things in the domain of discourse 
that are dogs. However, if (11) is posited to represent or otherwise be strictly determined 
by the meaning of ‘dog’, then what are we to make of the equally commonsense intuition 
that the same word can also be used as a transitive verb meaning ‘to bother relentlessly’? 
A standard externalist rejoinder is to say that ‘dog’ is in fact homophonous, and 
more generally that the semantic relationship between words and their lexical meanings is 
strictly one-to-one. And this is to suggest that speakers encode two lexical entries with 
distinct meanings that have same phonology/pronunciation. To represent this hypothesis 
in externalist fashion we therefore need two lexical-semantic axioms, as in (12) and (13), 
(12) [[dog1]] = x.T iff x is a dog 
(13) [[dog2]] = x.y.T iff x dogged y 
where the numerical subscripts reflect the presumed status of ‘dog1’ and ‘dog2’ as distinct 
words/lexical entries. This proposal is problematic for a number of reasons, however. 
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 Considerations of semantic compositionality are also typically cited as motivations for a truth-theoretic 
conception of meaning. However, semanticists such as Paul Pietroski (2005, forthcoming) have been 
making headway in demonstrating that truth-theoretic models are not the only way, and indeed perhaps not 




First, if the entailment in (8) above is sound then ‘dog’ is clearly not homophonous as 
that notion is commonly understood but rather polysemous.
23
 And as compared with (10), 
meaning axioms such as (12) and (13) fail to capture the semantic relatedness of these 
two senses of ‘dog’. More generally, truth-theoretic meaning axioms fail to capture a 
range of relevant generalizations about the semantic relations between words that, by 
common measure, are proper explananda of semantic theory.
24
 As described next, 
however, there is a way to accommodate externalist intuitions about a word’s truth, 
reference, or satisfaction conditions yet without supposing that words are internally 
represented as encoding these conditions. 
1.3.2. On the nature of metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC) 
What traditional meaning axioms like (12) and (13) come close to capturing—
collectively, and save the biconditional—is a typical English speaker’s considered beliefs 
about of the various ways in which the meaning of ‘dog’ constrains what it can and 
cannot be used/uttered to denote, refer to, or otherwise talk about in ordinary discourse. 
While the details here matter, the basic idea is straightforward. One of the few original 
yet less interesting claims of this work is that as speakers acquire new open-class words 
(i.e., lexical items), they also naturally acquire concepts of those words, or again to keep 
ideas straight what I will distinguish as conceptsW. Once acquired, speakers then use their 
conceptsW to form explicit beliefs about the meanings of those words. More specifically 
still, and more interestingly, I suggest that explicit knowledge of or beliefs about lexical 
meanings are the conscious reflection of a speaker’s tacit understanding of which 
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 As I demonstrate in the next chapter, a Chomskyan-like specification of words and their lexical meanings 




concepts are coherently expressible with which words in which contexts, again as 
constrained by their lexically-encoded meanings. Collectively, these beliefs underwrite 
what I am calling a speaker’s metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC). 
Consider, for example, that as a competent English speaker I know (or anyhow 
firmly believe) that in appropriate contexts the word ‘dog’ can be used, inter alia, either 
as a common count noun to designate dogs or as a transitive verb to mean something like 
“to bother relentlessly.” In each case, I evidently used my conceptW of the word ‘dog’ to 
form my explicit beliefs about what that word means, though specified in terms of what I 
take to be among its legitimate uses in ordinary discourse. Let’s call this conceptW 
DOG(w) whose representational content, I propose, is the property of being the English 
word ‘dog’ as that word is instantiated in my lexicon. The relevant claim, in short, is that I 
have acquired the conceptW DOG(w) and used that conceptW, inter alia, to form certain 
explicit beliefs about what the word ‘dog’ means. But more specifically, I take it that my 
explicit beliefs about the meaning of ‘dog’ is the direct reflection of my tacit 
understanding of the various ways in which the linguistically-encoded meaning of ‘dog’, 
as encoded in my lexicon, guides and constrains without strictly determining which 
extralinguistic concepts that word can and cannot be used/uttered to express in ordinary 
discourse. 
With respect to notation, underlining indicates that DOG(w) is essentially 
metalinguistic in nature—it is again ex hypothesi a conceptW of the word ‘dog’. And the 
variable ‘w’ in DOG(w) indicates, more specifically, that formally speaking it is a 




in a speaker’s I-language/lexicon and in turn as physically manifest in verbal discourse, 
whether it be speech, sign, inscription, or what have you.
25
 
Thus, to repeat, my considered beliefs about (or conception of) the meaning of 
‘dog’ is a direct conscious reflection of my tacit understanding that the word ‘dog’ can in 
appropriate contexts be used/uttered to express either the monadic concept DOG(x) or the 
dyadic concept DOG(x, y), again as constrained by its lexically-encoded meaning. Such 
beliefs can be specified in a number of ways. But I find it illuminating to think of their 
mind-internal representations along the lines of (14) and (15) below, or what I like to 
think of as their psychological forms:
26
 
(14) w [DOG(w) & EXPRESSES(w, DOG(x))] 
(15) w [DOG(w) & EXPRESSES(w, DOG(x, y))] 
By hypothesis, the higher-order concept EXPRESSES(w, C) designates a relation between a 
certain word, w, and a certain concept, C, that is tacitly known or otherwise believed to 
be coherently expressible with w in ordinary discourse. Thus, in paraphrase (14) reflects 
my tacitly held belief that the English word ‘dog’, which is to say the lexical item that my 
conceptW DOG(w) represents (or is a conceptW  of), can be used to express my concept 
DOG(x), whereas (15) reflects my belief that ‘dog’ can also be used in appropriate 
contexts to express DOG(x, y). In short, (14) and (15) together represent my tacit 
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 While one could construe conceptsW as having singular contents that refer to word-types, I will assume 
for purposes here that conceptsW range over word-tokens. 
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 This representation is admittedly highly speculative. I take it to be an empirical question what, precisely, 
are the underlying psychological forms of such beliefs. However, I trust that the formalism above conveys 




understanding that either DOG(x) or DOG(x, y), in appropriate contexts, can be expressed 
with the same word.
27
 
Notice further that the word ‘dog’ can also be used self-reflexively in reference to 
the word ‘dog’ itself, as in (16), 
(16) The English word ‘dog’ can be used to denote dogs 
where to employ traditional terminology we can say that the word ‘dog’ is first mentioned 
and then used. Or equivalently, we can say that a speaker of (16) is using the word ‘dog’ 
twice over to express two different concepts.
28
 Namely, the first occurrence of ‘dog’ 
expresses DOG(w) whereas the second expresses DOG(x). And from this it follows that 
both DOG(w) and DOG(x) are proper constituents of the belief expressed by (16), which is 
essentially that represented by (14). Put differently, what an utterance of (16) expresses is 
more or less equivalent to the belief represented by (14), which is again that DOG(x) is 
expressible with ‘dog’. Similarly, (17) represents a subject’s belief that ‘dog’ can be used 
self-reflexively to express DOG(w): 
(17) w [DOG(w) & EXPRESSES(w, DOG(w))] 
In other words, (17) corresponds to a subject’s explicit belief that ‘dog’ can be used to 
refer to itself—i.e., to talk about the word ‘dog’. In short, under present assumptions (14), 
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 I am not suggesting that such beliefs are consciously entertained by their subjects in terms of the 
semantic relations between concept-names and what these mental symbols express. Rather, from the 
subject’s conscious perspective these beliefs are again understood in terms of what a given word can 
coherently be used/uttered to designate, refer to, or otherwise talk about in ordinary conversational 
situations. 
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 Compare sentences such as, 
 (i)   Giorgione was so called because of size 
 (ii)  Slim is so called because he is slim 




(15), and (17) collectively constitute what we again might think of a typical English 
speaker’s conception of what the word ‘dog’ means.
29
 
The idea, quite generally, is that this sort of lexical polysemy is explicitly tracked 
by language users through the formation of multiple metalinguistic beliefs about which 
concepts are coherently expressible with which words in which contexts as constrained 
by their lexical meanings. As a way of capturing this most recent observation, I propose 
to extend the meaning axiom in (8) as follows: 
(18) CON(dog) = activate@DOG → {DOG(w), DOG(x), DOG(x, y)} 
Specifically, (18) represents the fact that the context-invariant, lexically-encoded 
meaning of ‘dog’ facilitates the use of that word (in appropriate contexts) to express one 
of either DOG(w), DOG(x), or DOG(x, y). Another way of putting the point is that (18) is 
posited to indicate that its owner has lexicalized three concepts under (or with) the word 
‘dog’, where the process of concept lexicalization establishes a fixed semantic 
relationship between a word’s lexical entry and a veritable range of extralinguistic 
concepts that is known (or anyhow believed) to be coherently expressible with that word 
in ordinary discourse. In the reverse direction, speakers will naturally understand the 
meaning of a word as an instruction to activate one of the possibly many concepts that it 
lexicalizes, again as mediated and constrained by its lexically-encoded meaning.
30
 In this 
way, I hope to have demonstrated how the meaning of a word can guide and constrain 
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 Of course, conceptions may vary from speaker to speaker and which may not always align with the 
norm-governed conventions of one’s local linguistic community. 
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 I will summarize the details in Chapter 3, but I am assuming that all lexicalizable concepts, including 
metalinguistic conceptsW, are Fodorian atoms, which is to say syntactically unstructured, semantically 




without strictly determining what that word can and cannot be used to denote, refer to, or 
otherwise talk about in ordinary discourse.
31
 
Having introduced much of the technological apparatus that undergirds my core 
thesis, I devote the remainder of this chapter to a selection of potential applications of 
MSC while again postponing the finer details for later chapters. Specifically, I argue that 
MSC plays a constitutive role in the interpretation of syntactically simple proper names. 
Granted this assumption, I will then demonstrate how MSC can be used to explain 
Frege’s classic puzzle about the informativeness of true natural language identity 
statements of ‘ is ’, where ‘’ and ‘’ are coreferential proper names. Lastly, I will 
attempt to show, more generally, how MSC is implicated in a speaker’s acquisition of 
lexical meanings.
32
 The upshot, again, is that should any of these proposals succeed then 
MSC can no longer be swept aside as a mere epiphenomenon but rather should be 
regarded a proper explanandum of semantic theory, and hence any complete/adequate 
theory of semantic competence. 
1.4. On MSC and proper names 
1.4.1. On the semantics of proper names 
To my mind, the most obvious and direct role for MSC in utterance interpretation, 
and indeed in expression interpretation, arises in connection with proper names (or proper 
nouns, if you prefer) under the independently motivated assumption that names behave 
semantically as ordinary one-place predicates of individuals, which is to say predicates of 
nameable things, or of things so-called. Understood in this way, names are semantically 
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 As I argue in Chapter 4, a word-learner’s conception of word-meanings will typically fluctuate over time 
as he/she sorts out which concept are coherently expressible with which words in which contexts. 
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 There are doubtlessly other interesting applications of MSC in the processes of utterance interpretation 




equivalent to common nouns (or cast in truth-conditional terms, expressions of type <e, 
t>). As I explain below, this is not to deny that names can be used/uttered to refer 
uniquely and rigidly to particular objects/individuals. Rather, I contend, in good 
company, that the otherwise institutionalized assumption that names are nothing more 
than labels for objects is disguised by the fact that when used referentially names 
combine, syntactically, with a covert index to form a complex lexical expression—and 
specifically an indexed noun phrase—that facilitates their use as devices of direct 
singular reference (i.e., as entity designators of type <e>). 
While controversial, such a view is not without adherents; cf., e.g., Kneale (1962), 
Burge (1973), Katz (1994, 2001), Geurts (1997), Bach (1981, 1987 2002), and Larson & 
Segal (1995).
33
 Specifically, I endorse a view according to which the meaning of a proper 
name (or proper noun) is best characterized as expressing the property of being called by 
the name ‘PN’, or perhaps more accurately being called by the phonological form of 
‘PN’,
34
 where we can think of “calling” as a kind of referring—i.e., as a kind of speech 
act. Now, if what I suggested earlier is on the right track, then like any other word the 
meaning of a name is understood by competent speakers as an instruction to activate a 
semantically related concept. And given present assumptions we might predict that the 
relevant concept is something like IS-CALLED(n) where the restricted variable ‘n’ ranges 
over names. I think this is basically correct. However, instead of an individual variable 
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 For some cross-linguistic evidence to this basic conclusion, see also Izumi (2012). 
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 The qualification here is to suggest, in the first instance, that intuitively speaking “callings” are a kind of 
speech act done with sounds. In the second instance, being called by a name is not a property of its bearer, 
per se, but is rather a property of those who use that name in reference to its bearer (or bearers as the case 
may be). And while I use the expression “bearer of the name ‘PN’,” on my view while names have 
meanings they do not have bearers, or referents, as those terms are commonly understood. Rather, 
following others I take referring, like calling, to be a kind of speech act—something that people do with 




my proposal is that the argument to IS-CALLED(_) is more usefully construed (or anyhow 
for certain theoretical purposes) as a conceptW of the name in question. 
By way of example, consider the name ‘Aristotle’ whose meaning, in my view, is 
best characterized as expressing the property of being called by the name ‘Aristotle’ (or 




 Coupled with a Chomskyan conception of 
linguistic meaning, I propose to specify the meaning of ‘Aristotle’ as follows: 
(19) CON(aristotle) = activate@ARISTOTLE → IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)) 
As before, CON(aristotle) is a way of representing a particular intrinsic semantic feature 
of the name/word ‘Aristotle’. More specifically, by hypothesis the meaning of the name 
‘Aristotle’ functions as a pointer, specified by ‘@ARISTOTLE’, to the extralinguistic 
conceptW IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)). With respect to comprehension, we can again think 
of ‘activate’ as a lexical-semantic operation that instructs interpreters to activate one of 
possibly many concepts located at the address specified by ‘@ARISTOTLE’, which given 
present assumptions includes the metalinguistic conceptW IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w).  
To repeat, my hypothesis is that IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)) expresses the property 
of being called by the name ‘Aristotle’, or for brevity just being called ‘Aristotle’. It then 
follows from its constituent structure that IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)) derives its content, 
in part, from the conceptW ARISTOTLE(w), which again ex hypothesi expresses the 
property of being the name (or word) ‘Aristotle’. I will again qualify these comments 
elsewhere. But in short my proposal is that is that (19) is way of representing what the 
name ‘Aristotle’ means. In turn, we can say that the conceptW IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)) 
is what an utterance of the name ‘Aristotle’ expresses. 
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 I wish to remain neutral on whether it is the name itself or merely its phonological form that is most 




I emphasis name as such because like most other open-class words of natural 
language it strikes me as apparent that names have multiple uses, only one of which is to 
refer uniquely and rigidly to particular objects/individuals. Specifically, I assume that like 
‘dog’ ‘Aristotle’ can also be used self-reflexively in reference to itself, as in (20): 
(20)  ‘Aristotle’ is used to refer to an ancient Greek philosopher 
Notice, however, that in this context ‘Aristotle’ is not being used with its meaning, as 
such. Rather, it is being used to express its utterer’s conceptW ARISTOTLE(w), which is 
only part of the meaning of the name ‘Aristotle’. In turn, I propose that the speaker’s 
belief that ARISTOTLE(w) is expressible with ‘Aristotle’  can be specified as follows: 
(21) w [ARISTOTLE(w) & EXPRESSES(w, ARISTOTLE(w))] 
In paraphrase, (21) represents a speaker’s tacit belief that there exists a word, w, that is 
‘Aristotle’, and that w can be used (in appropriate contexts) to express the conceptW 
ARISTOTLE(w). 
There are also contexts in which names can be used predicatively (or attributively) 
in reference to no one in particular, as with a sentence like (22):
36
 
(22) Every Aristotle I know hails from Greece 
(22) can be paraphrased as expressing the thought: For every x I know called ‘Aristotle’, 
x hails from Greece. Thus, I assume that what one expresses with ‘Aristotle’ in this 
context is simply its linguistically-encoded meaning as specified in (19), which again by 
hypothesis can be characterized as expressing the property of being called ‘Aristotle’. 
Under present assumptions, in other words, I take it that the name ‘Aristotle’ as used in 
(22) expresses the metalinguistic conceptW IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)). 
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At this point I have suggested that ‘Aristotle’ can be used to express at least two 
distinct conceptsW, ARISTOTLE(w) and IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)), as exemplified by (20) 
and (22), respectively. And these two uses correspond, respectively, with metalinguistic 
and predicative uses of the name ‘Aristotle’. To reflect these two of ‘Aristotle’ uses we 
should update the meaning axiom in (19) as follows: 
(23) CON(aristotle) = activate@ARISTOTLE → {ARISTOTLE(w), IS-
CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w))} 
Thus, observe that if the present hypothesis is on the right track even proper names 
exhibit a degree of lexical polysemy. Or in terms of a speaker’s semantic psychology, I 
am suggesting that the meanings of names are associated with a range of extralinguistic 
concepts that those names can coherently be used to express in ordinary discourse. In 
general, for any syntactically simple proper name, ‘PN’, the range of expressible 
concepts will always include the metalinguistic conceptsW PN(w) and IS-CALLED(PN(w)).  
With respect to semantic competence, my proposal is that if (23) is at least roughly 
what competent speakers grasp when they understand the meaning of ‘Aristotle’, then 
from the perspective of a speaker’s semantic psychology, the ability to understand what 
‘Aristotle’ means requires at a minimum: 
(i) having recorded the name ‘Aristotle’ in one’s lexicon, 
(ii) having generated the meaning axiom specified by (23), which entails 
(iii) having a conceptW of the name ‘Aristotle’, and 
(iv) knowing, more generally, the semantic role that names play in the grammar, 
which includes knowing that the meaning of any syntactically simple proper 




Stronger still, on my view (i)-(iv) is sufficient to understand ‘Aristotle’, and hence to be a 
competent user of that name. And this is to suggest that speakers can be competent users 
of a name such as ‘Aristotle’ without knowing who or what that name is customarily used 
to denote/refer to—that is, despite the fact that such speakers may not be regarded a 
competent user of that name.
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1.4.2. Referential uses of proper names 
Now, this is again not to deny the commonsense view that names have referential 
uses. I readily agree, for instance, that ‘Aristotle’ can be (and commonly is) used in 
reference to a particular individual, such as the philosopher of Greek antiquity, the 
contemporary Greek shipping tycoon, and so on.
38
 Or put in conceptual terms, I am 
happy to agree that ‘Aristotle’ can be used to express the singular concepts 
ARISTOTLEPHIL, ARISTOTLETYC, and so forth. In these contexts, however, there is reason to 
believe that the name ‘Aristotle’ combines syntactically with a referential variable or 
index to form a non-terminal lexical expression that contains the name ‘Aristotle’ as a 
proper constituent. 
Specifically, my proposal (which I accept largely on authority of notable experts)
39
 
is that when used referentially the name ‘Aristotle’ will occur as a constituent of a lexical 
expression (LE) such as (24), 
(24) [[NP [PN Aristotle]][xi]] 
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 This point plays a crucial role in my proposed solution to Frege’s puzzle of informativeness as detailed in 
Chapter 7. Recall, however, that if Kripke is right a speaker can nevertheless succeed in using ‘Aristotle’ to 
refer to Aristotle so long as his/her referential intentions are in the right place. 
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 Precisely which ‘Aristotle’ is referred to in a given context is, I assume, determined by the speaker’s 
referential intentions. I further assume that when the same name is used multiple times in the same context 
to refer to distinct individuals, tokens of the LEs that contain those names will be non-coindexed (i.e., they 
will combine with distinct Tarskian sequence variables). 
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whose context-sensitive, compositionally-determined denotation (or semantic value) is 
specified below in terms of its Tarskian satisfaction conditions (where g is an 
interpretation function that assigns values to variables relative to a sequence, ): 
(25a) g(xi)

 = (i), i > 0 
(25b) g([[NP [PN Aristotle]][xi]])

 = x: x satisfies ‘Aristotle’ iff x = (i) & (i) is 
called ‘Aristotle’ 
According to (25b), the semantic value of (24) relative to any sequence, , of entities in 
the domain is the i-th object in . The category label ‘PN’ attached directly to the name 
‘Aristotle’ its tokens apply only to objects in the sequence/domain that are in fact so-
called (without offering a theory of what it is to be so-called). In this way, when the name 
‘Aristotle’ is interpreted as the proper constituent of an indexed LE it will be understood 
as referring uniquely and rigidly to a particular ‘Aristotle’.
40
 
However, under present assumptions—and this is crucial—in order to understand a 
referential/singular use of ‘Aristotle’ one must interpret the bare (i.e., non-indexed) 
nominal expression ‘[NP [PN Aristotle]]’ as having the meaning specified in (23) above. I 
will again be working through these details more carefully in Chapter 2. But the relevant 
claim is that when speakers use the name ‘Aristotle’ referentially they are at once 
expressing the property being called ‘Aristotle’—i.e., the meaning of the name 
‘Aristotle’—and using that name to refer uniquely and rigidly to a particular 
contextually-salient individual. In turn, I contend that if listeners recognize the speaker’s 
referential intentions as such, they will understand the name ‘Aristotle’ as having been 
used in just this way. 
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In summary, I see at least three distinct uses of a proper name. As just suggested, 
‘Aristotle’ can be used referentially to rigidly designate a particular individual, in which 
case this use of ‘Aristotle’ will be understood, in part, as expressing a singular concept of 
the individual in question; e.g., ARISTOTLEPHIL, ARISTOTLETYC, etc. In other words, we can 
think of singular uses of ‘Aristotle’ as expressing the property of being Aristotle-the-
philosopher, or Aristotle-the-tycoon, and so on for each individual who is (or anyhow is 
believed to be) properly so-called. However, in the context of a sentence such as (20) 
‘Aristotle’ can be also used to express the metalinguistic conceptW ARISTOTLE(w), whose 
content is the property of being the name ‘Aristotle’. Lastly, in purely predicative 
contexts such as (22), I take it that ‘Aristotle’ is used to express its context-invariant 
meaning, which by hypothesis speaker’s tacitly associate with the conceptW IS-
CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)) whose representational content is the property of being called [by 
the name] ‘Aristotle’. 
Furthermore, I have suggested that a speaker’s ability to represent the meaning of 
‘Aristotle’ requires having a metalinguistic conceptW of the name ‘Aristotle’. And while 
it may be true that speakers who have acquired the name ‘Aristotle’ (have recorded that 
name in their lexicon) are typically familiar with at least one its bearers, (23) indicates 
that being so-acquainted with one or more of its bearers is not a precondition of 
understanding the meaning of ‘Aristotle’. This point bears emphasis because as Kent 
Bach (2002: 76) remarks: 
…one’s knowledge about particular bearers of particular names does not count as 
strictly linguistic knowledge. Rather, it is in virtue of one’s general knowledge about 
the category of proper names that one knows of any particular name that when used 
in a sentence (whether as a complete noun phrase or part of a larger noun phrase) it 




Similarly, Segal (2001: 550) states that “It is part of our semantic competence to know, in 
general, what it is for something to bear a name.” On my view, more specifically, to be a 
linguistically competent user of a proper name requires knowing only: 
(i) what words of that grammatical category contribute to the meanings of the 
sentences in which they appear, and 
(ii) how the meanings of those sentences restrict the range of thoughts they can be 
used to express. 
And if what I said above is correct, what names contribute the meanings of sentences in 
which they appear is the property of being called by that name. If this were not the case it 
would be difficult to explain how we manage to acquire, deploy, and understand names 
(a lá Kripke, 1979) in the absence of a concept of who or what those names refer to. 
Indeed, I believe the principles in (i) and (ii) apply not just to proper names but to all 
open-class lexical categories. 
To be clear, I am not denying that semantic theory is responsible for specifying the 
meanings of words, or what we might think of as their I-meanings.
41
 Yet as understood 
here I-meanings are purely formal properties of expression-types that impose semantic 
constraints on how their token-utterances can (and cannot) be used in ordinary discourse. 
At the lexical level, there is good reason to suppose that many such properties are 
lexicalized when a word is acquired, and specifically those semantic properties that 
establish the initial boundary conditions on the range of concepts that corresponding 
concept-words can be used to express. These conditions in turn correspond to what 
appears to be a finite range of universal grammatical categories (or subcategories) that 
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determine each word’s potential role within the language. With respect to names, these 
conditions again constrain the meaning of a name to things so-called. 
I elaborate on these notions in subsequent chapters, but the present point warrants a 
brief digression. On the one hand, when it comes to theorizing about I-languages it is 
important to abstract away from individual or highly idiosyncratic differences that are 
largely irrelevant to the kinds of theoretically interesting generalizations that keep 
linguists awake at night. On the other hand, we must also guard against abstracting away 
from reality. For as James Higginbotham (1994: 165) aptly notes, “[semantic theory] 
cannot depend on an idealization of our capacities so extensive as to outstrip what is 
potentially available to us in thought.” 
As a general methodological principle, the empirical study of language as a natural 
object should however abstract away from contingent facts about: 
(i) norm-governed linguistic conventions, 
(ii) irrelevant variation between the open-class vocabularies of individual speakers, 
and in turn 
(iii) pre-theoretical intuitions about what does and does not count as semantic 
competence. 
Rather, again following Chomsky we should focus instead on universal linguistic 
principles—that which is common to all competent speakers across all naturally 
acquirable human languages. Indeed, evidence strongly suggests that at some 
theoretically interesting level of abstraction all languages rely on the same set of 
principles as opposed to “peripheral modifications.”
42
 And the most theoretically 
interesting questions turn on just those principles knowledge of which makes linguistic 
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understanding, and hence semantic competence, so much as even possible. As it concerns 
my project, the relevant questions relate to the knowledge/competence needed to acquire 
words with their linguistic meanings, and then deploy those words in grammatically 
acceptable ways as constrained by their meanings. 
The basic moral is that we should not expect a semantic theory for natural language 
to specify the norm-governed extensions of individual words—this is the job of 
lexicographers. Granted, it may be nomologically impossible to acquire a language, and 
thus some core level of linguistic competence, without first acquiring a suitable array of 
its basic constituents. In particular, one must presumably acquire a representative 
selection of its open-class lexical categories (e.g., nouns, verbs, adjectives), along with its 
fixed logical/functional vocabulary (e.g., quantifiers, determiners, pronouns, prepositions, 
connectives/copulas, auxiliaries, and so forth). Yet once a language has been acquired—
i.e., a generative grammar and a suitably primed lexicon—the depth and sophistication of 
one’s open-class vocabulary is not a useful measure of one’s linguistic competence, 
semantic or otherwise, or again at least not in any sense relevant to the kind of semantic 
theory under consideration here. 
In short, what is minimally required of linguistic-semantic competence (LSC), 
specifically at the lexical level, is knowledge of a linguistically-specified rule or 
instruction for how to use words in accordance with constraints imposed by: 
(i) their grammatical category (relative to the context in which they occur), and 
(ii) their linguistically-encoded meanings, yet 
(iii) only once their category information and meanings have been acquired, which 





I will again say more about the nature of linguistic meanings in the next chapter. But 
returning from my digression, the upshot of the preceding section is that if MSC is 
required to understand the meanings of proper names, it follows that a theory of MSC is 
needed to augment any complete theory of a speaker’s core semantic competence. 
Moreover, if one assumes, as I do, that a semantic theory for natural language can 
moonlight as a theory of semantic competence, it also follows that relevant aspects of 
MSC are legitimate explananda of semantic theory.  
1.5. MSC and Frege’s puzzle of informativeness 
Utilizing resources introduced above, I attempt demonstrate in Chapter 7 how MSC 
might figure into a plausible solution to Frege’s puzzle about the informativeness of true 
natural language identity statements of the form ‘ is ’, where ‘’ and ‘’ are 
coreferential proper names. The story here is also somewhat involved but let me attempt 
to briefly summarize. 
As often described, Frege’s puzzle of informativeness arises from the substitution 
of coreferential names in the context of identity statements. For instance, imagine a 
subject, Max, who has the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ in his lexicon but does 
not know that these names corefer. However, Max does know a priori that (26) and (27) 
below are trivially true and thus thoroughly uninformative. Yet presumably Max can 
know this much without believing (28) if he fails to know (or anyhow believe) that there 
is just one object so-called. 
(26) Hesperus is Hesperus 
(27) Phosphorous is Phosphorous 




Now, it obviously won’t help to relieve Max of his confusion for a third-party informant 
to reassert the trivial truth of (26) or (27). By contrast an utterance of (28), if accepted as 
true, is putatively capable of rationally compelling Max to revise his mistaken belief 
about how many objects are the bearers of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’. 
Now, in my view the only way to understand how an utterance of (28) can be 
informative for a subject in Max’s epistemic condition is to first understand how he came 
to be in this condition in the first place. On this count, I think Fodor (2008) offers a 
highly plausible diagnosis of Max’s dilemma as couched in purely psychological (i.e., 
conceptual) terms. To begin, let us assume that Max is capable of thinking about 
Hesperus as such, which is to say as Hesperus. Likewise, let’s suppose that Max is 
capable of thinking about Phosphorous as such, which is to say as Phosphorous. On 
Fodor’s view, this is to presume that Max is in possession of two formally distinct yet 
content-identical singular concepts; call them HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS. That is, by 
assumption both HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS represent the same object; namely, the 
planet Venus. There is, then, an intuitively clear sense in which Max knows de re which 
object is referred to with the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’. Rather, the problem is 
that when using HESPERUS to think about Hesperus, and PHOSPHOROUS to think about 
Phosphorous, Max simply does not realize that he is in fact thinking about the same 
object. Max’s conundrum, in other words, is that he simply fails to recognize that his 
concepts HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS are in fact content-identical. And ex hypothesi this 
because HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS, being formally distinct mental representations, 




for this reason that Max also does not know/believe that the names ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorous’ corefer. 
From a semantic perspective, Max correctly believes that ‘Hesperus’ can be used 
(referentially) to express his concept HESPERUS, and that ‘Phosphorous’ can be used to 
express PHOSPHOROUS. And under present assumptions this is because Max associates the 
meaning of ‘Hesperus’ with HESPERUS and the meaning of ‘Phosphorous’ with 
PHOSPHOROUS. More specifically, and as indicated earlier, I assume that the meanings of 
the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’, respectively, as recorded in Max’s lexicon can 
be specified as follows: 
(29) CON(hesperus) = activate@HESPERUS → {HESPERUS(w), IS-
CALLED(HESPERUS(w)), HESPERUS} 
(30) CON(phosphorous) = activate@PHOSPHOROUS → {PHOSPHOROUS(w), IS-
CALLED(PHOSPHOROUS(w)), PHOSPHOROUS} 
Notice that just like the rest of us, I assume that Max represents ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorous’ as having different meanings. In particular, and again strictly speaking, the 
meaning of ‘Hesperus’ is activate@HESPERUS and that of ‘Phosphorous’ is 
activate@PHOSPHOROUS. 
I further assume that in order to explicitly track which objects/individuals are 
customarily referred to with which names, competent speakers use their conceptsW of 
names to form metalinguistic beliefs about which concepts those names can coherently be 
used to express in ordinary discourse. For instance, by assumption Max knows/believes 
(again like the rest of us) that referential uses of ‘Hesperus’ express HESPERUS and that 
‘Phosphorous’ expresses PHOSPHOROUS. And this is to suggest that Max has the 




(31) w [HESPERUS(w) & EXPRESSES(w, HESPERUS)] 
(32) w [PHOSPHOROUS(w) & EXPRESSES(w, PHOSPHOROUS)] 
However, as a Frege-subject Max’s dilemma is again that while his concepts HESPERUS 
and PHOSPHOROUS are in fact content-identical, he does not represent them as being 
content-identical. And this is due in part to the fact that Max does not know/believe that 
the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ corefer. That is, part of Max’s dilemma is that 
he falsely believes that the meanings of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ are mutually 
exclusive with respect to which object or objects they are customarily used to refer to. 
Now, without taking a firm stance on precisely which thought/proposition is 
literally/conventionally expressed by an utterance of (28)—“Hesperus is Phosphorous”—
the relevant question, in my view, is what misguided but otherwise rational and 
linguistically competent Frege-subjects such as Max stand to learn by understanding its 
utterance and in turn accepting it as true, say as based solely on the testimony of a 
knowledgeable and trustworthy informant. In Chapter 7 I argue that what Max learns 
from his acceptance of (28) is first that the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ do in fact 
corefer. And from this proposition he can readily infer that just one object is a/the bearer 
of both names. Having accepted this much, Max will thereby be rationally compelled to 
tacitly conclude that his singular concepts HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS are in fact 
content-identical. However, as I argue in Chapter 7 the informativeness of the utterance 
rests in the derived proposition that one object is a/the bearer of ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’. Importantly, I contend this much is available to any competent subject 
regardless of what he/she may or may not know about the relevant object of reference. 




know precisely who or what the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ are customarily 
used to refer to. 
For instance, suppose that Max not only positively disbelieves that the names 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ corefer but mistakenly associates the meaning of 
‘Hesperus’ with his concept of Mars, which is to say MARS. Let’s suppose further that 
Max misguidedly associates the meaning of ‘Phosphorous’ with his concept of Jupiter, or 
JUPITER. That is, I am supposing that Max harbors the following metalinguistic beliefs: 
(33) w [HESPERUS(w) & EXPRESSES(w, MARS)] 
(34) w [PHOSPHOROUS(w) & EXPRESSES(w, JUPITER)] 
In this case, Max will be mistaken about which object (or objects) his informant is 
referring to with the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’. However, by accepting the 
truth of (28) Max will again come to believe, correctly, that the names ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorous’ corefer. And from the truth of this proposition he will also correctly infer 
that there is just one object under discussion that is a (or perhaps the) bearer of both 
names. Yet he will falsely infer, if only tacitly, that his concepts MARS and JUPITER are 
content-identical. 
Nevertheless, as I argue in Chapter 7 an utterance of (28) can still be informative in 
the relevant sense for a Frege-subject in Max’s epistemic predicament.
43
 For suppose that 
having accepted (28) as true Max goes on to learn, correctly, that ‘Hesperus’ is 
customarily used to refer to the planet Venus qua Hesperus, which is to say as the planet 
Venus appears in the evening sky. This is to suggest that Max comes to understand, 
correctly, that ‘Hesperus’ is used to express his concept HESPERUS, not MARS. In 
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consequence, however, Max will also come to believe incorrectly that ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorous’ are true synonyms—i.e., that both names express the concept HESPERUS as 
determined by their linguistically-encoded meanings. In other words, Max will come to 
associate the meanings of both ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ with his concept HESPERUS. 
Yet notice that having learned that ‘Hesperus’ expresses HESPERUS Max will thereby 
know, in virtue of his prior acceptance of (28), that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ refer 
to the same object, which Max now correctly believes to be the planet Venus (qua 
Hesperus). Importantly, however, and to put the point counterfactually, under present 
assumptions Max would not have come to believe this latter proposition had he 
previously rejected the truth of (28). And given such observations I conclude that an 
utterance of (28) was informative for Max in the relevant sense despite the fact that he 
was mistaken about the identity of the object of reference. 
To be in possession of HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS implies that Max is acquainted 
with the planet Venus, whether it be by direct ostension or indirectly by uniquely 
identifying definite description. There is, then, an intuitively clear sense in which Max 
knows, in a de re sense, which object is being referred to with the names ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorous’. Rather, the problem is that when using HESPERUS to think about Hesperus 
as such, and PHOSPHOROUS to think about Phosphorous as such, Max does not realize that 
he is thinking about the same object; viz., the planet Venus. Max’s conundrum, in other 
words, is that he simply fails to recognize that his concepts HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS 
are in fact content-identical. And it is presumably for this reason that Max also does not 




presumably learns by his acceptance of (28) is that just one object is a/the bearer of both 
names.  
Frege’s puzzle then amounts to this: In virtue of what is (28) informative in a way 
that (26) and (27) are not? In general terms, Frege wondered why identity statements of 
the form ‘a = b’ in invented formal languages have a kind of “cognitive significance” that 
statements of the form ‘a = a’ and ‘b = b’ lack. Frege’s solution to the puzzle is that 
proper names have both a sense and a reference, where the sense of a name, or in neo-
Fregean terms its meaning, is an abstract mind-independent entity that uniquely 
determines its reference. So conceived, Frege reasoned that identity statements of the 
form ‘a = b’ express a relation between two different senses or “ways” in which type-
distinct coreferential names determine (or present) their common referent. Thus, to grasp 
the informativeness of (28) is to grasp the fact that the respective senses of ‘Hesperus’ 
and ‘Phosphorous’ determine the same referent. 
In purely psychological terms, it is widely assumed that for a Frege-subject such as 
Max to grasp the sense of ‘Hesperus’ he must be capable of representing Hesperus as 
such, which is to say as Hesperus. And to represent Hesperus as such seems to require 
having a concept of Hesperus as such, or what I will call HESPERUS. Likewise, to grasp 
the sense of ‘Phosphorous’ presupposes possession of PHOSPHOROUS. In general, it would 
seem that for Max to grasp the informativeness of (28), he must grasp the thought (or 
proposition) that it expresses (or rather its utterances relative to a context). And to grasp 
the thought expressed by (28) seemingly requires the capacity to mentally represent that 
thought as such. In turn, it would seem that to represent the thought expressed by (28) 




But more generally, the problem for Frege-subjects such as Max seems not to be 
that they fail to know which object is being referred to. Rather, their problem is that when 
faced with an utterance of (28) they simply fail to recognize that there is just one 
contextually-salient object that is a (or perhaps the) bearer of two names. Indeed, this 
could be true of subjects who are mistaken about the actual identity of 
Hesperus/Phosphorous yet who also mistakenly believes that the names ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorous’ do not corefer. Yet as I argue in Chapter 7, an utterance of (28), if 
accepted as true, can nevertheless be informative in the relevant sense for subjects in this 
epistemic condition. 
Described in this way, my proposal in Chapter 7 is that what any competent speaker 
understands from utterances of true natural language identities of the form ‘α is [the same 
as/identical to] β’ is that there is there exists just one contextually-salient bearer of the 
names ‘’ and ‘’. Importantly, this is the case regardless of whether or not Frege-
subjects are acquainted with the relevant object of reference. For what any competent 
interpreter will know, based solely on its logical/linguistic form, is that for the utterance 
to be true it must be the case that the names ‘’ and ‘’ corefer. And from the presumed 
truth of this latter proposition interpreters can readily deduce that there is just one 
contextually-salient bearer of the names ‘’ and ‘’. In this sense, my proposal is rather 
like a psychologized version of Frege’s Begriffsschrift account of identity. This 
hypothesis again requires quite a bit of unpacking, but allow me another moment to 
develop the view employing current technology. 
As indicated earlier, I am taking for granted that the meanings of proper names are 




context-invariant meanings of the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ can be specified 
as follows, 
(35) CON(hesperus) = activate@HESPERUS → IS-CALLED(HESPERUS(w)) 
(36) CON(phosphorous) = activate@PHOSPHOROUS → IS-
CALLED(PHOSPHOROUS(w)) 
where by assumption HESPERUS(w) is a conceptW of the (Anglicized) name ‘Hesperus’ 
and PHOSPHOROUS(w) is a conceptW of the name ‘Phosphorous’. When used referentially, 
my hypothesis is that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ will occur as constituents of the 
lexical expressions (LEs) specified by (37) and (38) below: 
(37) [[NP [PN Hesperus]][x1]] 
(38) [[NP [PN Phosphorous]][x2]] 
Notice that while the LEs in (31) and (32) are non-coindexed, nothing in the grammar 
either precludes or demands their coreference. Rather, facts about coreference between 
type-distinct (i.e., non-coindexed) LEs containing proper names are determined by 
extralinguistic facts about how those names/expressions are customarily deployed in 
ordinary discourse. Moreover, I take it that competent speakers are at least tacitly aware 
of these facts. 
In turn, the compositionally determined meanings of the syntactically complex LEs 
in (37) and (38) above are specifiable in terms of Tarskian satisfaction conditions as 
follows: 
(39) ‘[[NP [PN Hesperus][x1]]]’

 is satisfied by (x1) iff (x1) is called ‘Hesperus’ 
(40) ‘[[NP [PN Phosphorous]][x2]]’






Under present assumptions, the LE ‘[[NP [PN Hesperus]][x1]]’ will denote the planet Venus 
just in case Venus is the first object in the sequence, , and is called [by the name] 
‘Hesperus’. Likewise, the LE ‘[[NP [PN Phosphorous]][x2]]’ will denote Venus just in case 
the second object in the sequence also happens to be Venus, and is called 
‘Phosphorous’.
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 Recall that the category label ‘PN’ formally restricts the satisfaction 
conditions of nominal LEs to all and only those objects in the sequence that are in fact so-
called (again setting aside the question of what it is to be so-called). In terms of 
comprehension, this restriction is enforced because in order to interpret the context-
sensitive semantic values of the LEs in (33) and (34) one must again first interpret the 
context-invariant meanings of the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’. 
Now, in order to keep track of which objects/individuals are customarily referred to 
with which names, my hypothesis is that competent speakers use their conceptsW of 
names to form beliefs about which singular concepts those names can coherently be used 
to express in ordinary discourse. For instance, recall Max who by assumption has the 
names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ in his mental lexicon, and whose meanings he 
represents as (35) and (36). Like the rest of us, Max knows that he can use ‘Hesperus’ 
referentially to express his singular concept HESPERUS, and that ‘Phosphorous’ expresses 
PHOSPHOROUS. And this is to suggest that Max has the following metalinguistic beliefs: 
(41) w [HESPERUS(w) & EXPRESSES(w, HESPERUS)] 
(42) w [PHOSPHOROUS(w) & EXPRESSES(w, PHOSPHOROUS)] 
However, as a Frege-subject Max’s dilemma is that while his concepts HESPERUS and 
PHOSPHOROUS are in fact content-identical, he does not represent them as being content-
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identical. And this is due in part to the fact that Max does not know/believe that the 
names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ corefer. 
Thus, we have generated a paradigm instance of Frege’s puzzle whose solution, 
given present assumptions, is fairly straightforward. First, imagine an informant—call her 
Minnie—who being aware of Max’s confusion utters (28), repeated below, and whose 
linguistic form is given in (28'): 
(28) Hesperus is Phosphorous 
(28') [[NP [PN Hesperus]][x1]] [VP [V is] [[NP [PN Phosphorous]][x2]] 
Since there is just one contextually-salient bearer of the names ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorous’, the sequence variables [x1] and [x2] in the LEs ‘[[NP [PN Hesperus]][x1]]’ 
and ‘[[NP [PN Phosphorous]][x2]]’ will be saturated by the same object, viz., the planet 
Venus. And let us just assume for the sake of argument that (28) expresses the 
thought/proposition that Hesperus is numerically identical Phosphorous. 
In terms of comprehension, given Max’s contrary belief about how many objects 
are the bearers of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’, he will initially be puzzled by the 
content of Minnie’s utterance. As from Max’s perspective it appears to assert a 
contradiction. However, Max can readily infer that whatever is expressed by Minnie’s 
utterance, for her utterance to be true it must be the case that ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorous’ corefer. And from the truth of this propositions Max can tacitly infer that 
his conceptsW of the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’, which is to say HESPERUS(w) 
and PHOSPHOROUS(w), must be conceptsW of coreferential names. For notice that 
HESPERUS(w) and PHOSPHOROUS(w) will be fully activated and available in consequence 




from this latter proposition Max can readily deduce that there is just one contextually-
salient bearer of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’, and not two as he previously believed. 
Finally, should Max find reason to accept Minnie’s testimony as true, he will thereby be 
compelled to accept that his singular concepts HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS are in fact 
content-identical. Max will then be equally compelled to adjust his beliefs about how 
many objects are the bearers of the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’. 
My hypothesis, in short, is that an utterance of (28) is informative only to the extent 
that listeners such as Max recognize the metalinguistic proposition that it pragmatically 
conveys, which is that the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ corefer. However, from 
his acceptance of this proposition Max can readily infer a substantive proposition 
regarding how many objects are presumed to be the contextually-salient bearers of 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’. Indeed, I argue in Chapter 7 that the most natural way to 
interpret an utterance of (28) is that its utterer is making a statement not about the 
numerical identity of Hesperus and Phosphorous but rather a statement about how many 
objects are the bearers of the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ (which are distinct 
propositions). The truth of this latter statement can again be deduced, more or less a 
priori, from the grammatical form (28). To this extent an utterance of (28) can be 
informative even for listeners who are ignorant of what the names ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorous’ are customarily used to refer to. For what such listeners will have learned 
is that there is just one contextually-salient bearer of both names. Listeners will also 








More generally, my proposal about the informativeness (or “cognitive 
significance”) of statements of the form ‘α is β’ is governed by the following principle: 
(INF)ormativeness: A true identity statement of the form ‘ is ’, where ‘’ and ‘’ are 
lexical expressions that contain coreferential uses of proper names, is informative just in 
case its utterance expresses or otherwise pragmatically conveys information that is 
sufficient to rationally compel a linguistically competent yet otherwise misinformed 
subject who understands its meaning, and believes it true, to revise his/her mistaken 
beliefs about how many objects are the bearers of those names. Parallel remarks apply to 
statements of the form ‘ is not ’.
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On my view, the information pragmatically conveyed by an utterance of ‘α is β’ is the 
metalinguistic fact that ‘α’ and ‘β’ are coreferential proper names. A subject’s grasp of 
this proposition will in turn license what I take to be the substantive (i.e., material) 
inference that there exists at most one contextually-salient object/individual that is the 
bearer of both names. 
I will again defend this hypothesis more thoroughly in Chapter 7, but before 
concluding this Introduction let me briefly discuss one additional role for MSC in 
connection with the acquisition of lexical meanings, which I briefly defend in Chapter 4. 
1.6. MSC and the acquisition of lexical meanings 
I suggested earlier that knowing the norm-governed denotations of particular open-
class words (in general) is not a component of a speaker’s core semantic competence but 
that knowing how to acquire words with their meanings is. Moreover, as a Chomskyan I 
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informative identity statements that does not depend on his sense/reference distinction, yet which allows 
that such statements express substantive (i.e., object-involving) thoughts/propositions. 
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am committed to the idea that acquiring an I-language is part and parcel of one’s core 
linguistic competence. Since the lexicon is considered an integral component of I-
languages, broadly construed, it follows that the ability to acquire words with their 
meanings constitutes part of one’s linguistic-semantic competence (LSC). I will again say 
more about this in Chapter 4, but as Carey (1978), Carey & Bartlett (1978), and other 
developmental psychologists report, word acquisition is often a gradual and thus graded 
process. For it seems that one can acquire a word in the sense of having lexicalized its 
phonological form, perhaps together with certain semantically significant grammatical 
features, yet without knowing precisely (or in some cases even vaguely) what that word 
denotes. Stated in purely psychological terms, the claim is that one can acquire a word 
without knowing precisely which concept (or concepts, as the case may be) the word in 
question can coherently be used/uttered to express in ordinary discourse. 
So what then is a word-learner to do in the meantime? As often put in the 
acquisition literature, learners form hypotheses qua beliefs about what their words mean. 
For instance, given suitable background beliefs a competent learner who initially acquires 
the word ‘tabulian’ in the context of, say, (43) below might well form the belief 
expressed by (44): 
(43) The forest fire in Palawan destroyed not only most of the native mahoganies 
but unfortunately most of the rare tabulians as well. 
(44) The word ‘tabulian’ designates some kind of tree, or other. 
That is, our subject will treat (43) as a working hypothesis about what the word ‘tabulian’ 
means in advance of having acquired a more definite concept of what tabulians are. The 
central claim of Chapter 4 is that generation of a belief along the lines of that expressed 




Indeed, I go so far as to suggest that such metalinguistic beliefs often play a role in the 
acquisition of lexicalizable concepts such as TABULIAN(x)—i.e., concepts that we 
associate with the meanings of words and in turn use those words to express. 
Notice that to represent (44) requires representing the word ‘tabulian’. And under 
present assumptions to represent the word ‘tabulian’ presupposes having a conceptW of 
that word—i.e., TABULIAN(w). Deferring details, my proposal, in short, is that a speaker’s 
hypothesis about the meaning of ‘tabulian’, and which I liken to a Roschian prototype for 
the concept TABULIAN(x), will have roughly the following logical form: 
(45) TABULIANP = x F [F(x)  TREE(x) & w [TABULIAN(w) & SATISFIES(x, w)  
F(x)]] 
In loose paraphrase (45) can be read as expressing the word-learner’s belief that there is 
some property F such that some entity x is an F iff x is a tree (of some as-of-yet 
unspecified kind), and x satisfies the word ‘tabulian’ iff F(x). That is a lot to digest in one 
swallow, in part because it builds upon ideas developed in Chapter 3. But the relevant 
claim is that formation of a meaning hypothesis such as (45) requires the recruitment of a 
speaker’s MSC. The relevant consequence is this: If the acquisition of lexical meanings 
requires the exercise of one’s MSC, then once again a theory of MSC is needed to 
complement a complete theory of LSC, and by parallel reasoning any explanatorily 
adequate semantic theory. 
1.7. Closing remarks and next steps 
The claim that speakers have explicit conceptsW of and beliefs about the meanings 
of words is again nothing new or terribly profound. However, I am aware of only a few 




interpretation and thereby constitute part of a speaker’s core semantic competence.
47
 Yet 
given the paucity of empirical evidence my conclusions are in some respects highly 
speculative. However, I believe that in all cases they are intuitively plausible and, 
moreover, fully compatible with the best available empirical data. As importantly, I think 
the proposal has wide-ranging explanatory power, with application to other philosophical 
issues that I haven’t the space here to address. 
 At bottom, it strikes me as indisputable that MSC provides an important epistemic 
bridge between language and thought. Broadly speaking, our conceptsW of words and the 
MSC they subserve provide a window, albeit often dimly lit, onto the intrinsic semantic 
properties and relations of lexical items as manifest by their physical tokens in ordinary 
discourse. So too, this study can be viewed as a somewhat dimly lit journey into the 
semantic psychology of utterance interpretation as viewed through the window of our 
explicit metalinguistic knowledge of/beliefs about the meanings of words. Its rather 
modest goal is to simply work through some of the finer details that might render my 
proposed solutions to the questions posed at least moderately compelling. More 
optimistically, my long-term goal is to generate enough cross-disciplinary interest in the 
project to prompt further empirical research that might help to either confirm or 
disconfirm the philosophically interesting aspects of my core thesis. 
In outline of work to follow, I shall again be arguing that not only does a speaker’s 
MSC often play an important role in utterance interpretation, but as just discussed that it 
has a role to play in the acquisition of lexical meanings. This latter topic is again the 
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 I have in mind here (i) Murphy (2003), specifically with respect to lexical-semantic relations such as 
antonomy, heteronymy, etc., and to whom credit goes for supplying the original inspiration for this project, 
and (ii) Fiengo and May (2006) with respect to the semantics of proper names. Chapter 6 is devoted to 




focus of Chapter 4, and the former is the subject of Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Specifically, 
Chapter 5 addresses the role of MSC in the representation and contextual disambiguation 
of lexical polysemy. And to see just how far my thesis can be pushed, Chapters 6 and 7 
explore how MSC might possibly stand to explain the informativeness of natural 
language identity statements involving coreferential proper names, and more generally 
failures of substitution of such names, salva veritate, in so-called “opaque” contexts.
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Importantly, if even just one of these claims pan out, this result would stand to support 
my general conclusion that a theory of MSC is needed to supplement any explanatorily 
adequate semantic theory for natural language—a theory whose central goal, I again 
assume, is to specify what one must minimally know, or cognize, or otherwise mentally 
represent in order to be a competent speaker of one’s native (I-) language.
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The immediate next steps (Chapters 2 and 3) are to lay bare several core 
background assumptions about the nature of human language, words, lexical meanings, 
lexical concepts (in general), more specifically what I am calling conceptsW and the 
beliefs they are used to form. This initial exercise is designed in part to (i) level-set on 
some technical jargon, (ii) clarify relevant background assumptions, and thereby (iii) 
pave the way toward a proper understanding of my core thesis. Indeed, what may strike 
some readers as boring review in Chapters 2 and 3 is actually doing much of the heavy 
lifting in work that follows. This initial detour requires setting much of what I have just 
said on the back burner for later chapters. Yet I worry that anything of philosophical 
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 In retrospect, I am now of the opinion that no student of philosophy should be allowed to publicly 
comment on Frege’s puzzle until they have been in the business for at least ten years! 
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 Among applications not covered here is the potential role of metalinguistic knowledge/competence in the 
interpretation of quotation expressions; cf., e.g., Cappelen & Lepore (2007). In addition, MSK/C 
doubtlessly plays a role in general literacy and bilingualism, which has been explored to some extent by 




interest will only make sense as situated within an operational model of the relationship 
between language and thought. And while many such presuppositions are not, strictly 
speaking, critical to the success of my core thesis, I think they nonetheless sound given 
what is presently known about the nature of language and thought. I will formally 
conclude this study in Chapter 8 by reiterating the explanatory role of MSC. 
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2. On the Nature of Words and Their Lexical Meanings 
2.1. Introduction 
As this investigation has much to do with words, and in particular their lexically-
encoded meanings, let me begin in earnest by saying something about what I take a 
“word” of natural language to be. And this is to specify, in part, the formal properties of 
their lexical entries that determine the identity of their tokens.1 Doing so is no easy task, 
however, as the criteria must apply not only to words in current circulation but to all 
possible words across all naturally acquirable human languages. It is also somewhat 
paradoxical. For on the one hand competent speakers have an intuitively clear grasp of 
what words are. Or at least in clear cases we are generally adept at distinguishing words 
of our native language from, say, non-words, nonce words, foreign words, and multi-
word phrases/idioms, as evidenced by our shared judgments on ordinary lexical decision 
tasks. On the other hand, possible exceptions and putative counterexamples abound, 
cross-linguistically, making it quite difficult to pinpoint a univocal definition of the word 
‘word’.2 In these more troublesome cases, not only do ordinary intuitions quickly break 
down but even the experts—i.e., those in the “word” business—quite often disagree. 
Despite these difficulties, most linguists and language-oriented cognitive 
psychologists typically take the existence of words for granted. However, widespread 
disagreement and/or lack of convincing arguments and/or hard evidence has fostered 
skepticism among some language researchers, and philosophers in particular, about the 
                                                 
1 As Aydede (2000) rightly comments: “if you are advancing a theory that quantifies over certain entities 
like symbols realized in the brain, you owe an account of their individuation conditions. 




psychological reality of words as a stable class of linguistic entities.3 While the 
skepticism is in some sense justified, there is also reason for optimism. As to my mind 
this is neither exclusively nor centrally a question of how we ordinarily (or even 
philosophically) conceive of words. Rather, it is a substantive empirical question about 
how the human language system, understood as an object of natural inquiry, individuates 
the expressions that it generates. This is simply a reminder that with respect to the 
scientific study of natural language, and in the absence of compelling counterarguments, 
words are justifiably treated as linguistic kinds not unlike other scientific kinds—albeit 
kinds whose underlying nature has yet to be fully unearthed.4 Progress has and currently 
is being made, however, particularly in the fields of language development/acquisition 
and psycholinguistics. The bottom line is that enough is now known to at least tightly 
constrain the range of plausible hypotheses. 
So qualified, the aim of this chapter is to offer not a highly refined theory of words 
but rather merely a working characterization of what words must be like, or are most 
likely to be, in order to explain our intuitive judgments about them along with a 
representative range of well-attested linguistic facts. Doing full justice to this topic 
warrants a dissertation in itself. So to keep the discussion manageable, what follows 
amounts to a relatively brief and highly selective report of what I consider to be the most 
promising proposal, again given what is presently known. As readers may have guessed, I 
will be endorsing a broadly Chomskyan conception of words, though as qualified below. 
                                                 
3 Cf. Lepore & Hawthorne On Words (2011) and Kaplan (1990) for useful discussion. By contrast, while 
linguists recognize the difficulty in specifying the identity conditions of words, they normally take their 
existence for granted.  
4 As such, it should come as no surprise that ordinary speakers, let alone trained theoretical linguists, often 
lack clear intuitions about the underlying nature of words. Indeed, it is a separate question how language 
users conceive of the intrinsic properties and relations of the words they utter. I broach this latter topic near 
the end of Chapter 3 and again in Chapter 4. 
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Once complete, this characterization will then serve as a tentative background assumption 
in all that follows. I stress tentative because I trust that my core thesis is largely 
compatible with other naturalistic outcomes in the same general vicinity. Settling on just 
one, as I will here, is largely aimed at facilitating subsequent discussion. While I also 
trust that most readers are at least vaguely familiar with Chomsky’s wider project, allow 
me to first briefly elaborate on that enterprise, if only to introduce some terminology. 
2.2. A Chomskyan framework for natural language 
It is by now (or at least to my mind) an indisputable fact of human nature that all 
neurotypical children are born with an innate predisposition to acquire, under the pressure 
of limited and imperfect experience,5 one of many possible human languages. If 
Chomsky is right in the details, this potential emerges from a biologically determined set 
of principles—a Universal Grammar (UG)—that governs the development (or growth, to 
use Chomsky’s term)6 of all naturally acquirable human languages. Where variation 
exists, language-specific constraints are thought to become activated/programmed in 
response to linguistic stimuli absorbed from the learner’s ambient environment. Yet 
whichever variant is the target of acquisition, the end result is characterized as a stable, 
computational state of the child’s mind-brain that Chomsky again calls an I-language, 
where the “I,” he adds, “is chosen to suggest that the system is internal, individual, and 
                                                 
5 As Chomsky (1965: 4) observes, children acquire languages as a result of being exposed to the speech 
performances of other speakers, which are characterized by “numerous false starts, deviations from rules, 
changes of plan in mid-course, and so on.” Chomsky adds that “The problem for the linguist, as well as for 
the child learning the language, is to determine from the data of performance the underlying system of rules 
that has been mastered by the speaker-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance.” 
6 This is probably old news, but Chomsky quite literally thinks of human language as a biological organ 




intensional.”7 I will say more about this below, but in short a theory of grammar is for 
Chomsky a theory of I-languages and how they are acquired.8 
Just briefly, I-languages are to be contrasted with what Chomsky calls public E-
languages where the ‘E’ here stands for “external” or “extensional.” E-languages are 
what we normally associate with the world’s spoken languages such as Russian, 
Japanese, Hindi, Urdu, Mohawk, and so forth, and their corresponding norm-governed 
grammars as often taught in elementary schools. From a theoretical perspective, E-
languages are typically modeled as functions in extension—i.e., sets of ordered pairs that 
map publicly tradable E-expressions onto “entities drawn from some stipulated domain.”9 
Understood in this way, however, E-languages are not by Chomsky lights proper subjects 
of natural scientific enquiry. An E-language he says: 
…has no particular status in the empirical study of language; it is something like 
phenomenal judgment, mediated by schooling, traditional authorities and conventions, 
cultural artifacts, and so on.10 
In other words, E-languages are rooted not in human biology but in the corpora of 
expressions that people actually (or might possibly) utter as determined by the various 
and sundry (unpredictable/unscientific) ways that humans put language to use in pursuit 
of their life interests. However, such pursuits have little to do with language, per se, and 
a lot to do with the normative aspects of behavioral and social psychology. Rather, as 
                                                 
7 Chomsky (2000a:120). That is to say, in one sense I-languages are largely private to their owners. 
However, theories of I-languages are intended to describe the psychology of an idealized speaker-hearer 
thereby abstracting away from the irrelevant vagaries of individual speakers. 
8 As mentioned in Chapter 1, once acquired the possession of an I-language (a natural language grammar), 
on Chomsky’s view, constitutes the conditions for “knowing” or “cognizing” a language, which manifests 
itself in a speaker-hearer’s linguistic competence. 
9 Chomsky (2000a: 39). More specifically, externalists usually specify sentential meanings in terms of a 
sentence’s truth-conditions, which themselves correspond to propositions, or sets of possible worlds, or 
what have you. 
10 Chomsky (2000a:28). 
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Chomsky sees it the theoretical interest lies in the “completely internalist” aspects of 
human language, which is to say I-languages—mental “organs” that biologically 
implement functions in intension—where “questions of truth and falsity arise for 
grammar as they do for any scientific theory.”11 
I will return to the relevant details below, but in brief overview a Chomskyan I-
language is characterized as a domain-specific module of the mind that consists in a 
computational procedure and a lexicon.12 The lexicon is essentially a repository for 
individual “words,” or “word-like units,” of a given speaker’s idiolect. Informally, 
Chomsky describes words as “arbitrary associations of sound and meaning.”13 In 
technical terms, each lexical item, or LI for short, is a complex mental representation that 
consists in related “bundles” of phonological and semantic “features” to which Chomsky 
assigns the labels PHON and SEM, respectively.14 The notion of a “feature,” Chomsky 
tells us, “is just the technical term for the elementary constituents of LIs and expressions 
constructed from them.” Thus, on Chomsky’s view it is lexical features and not words, 
per se, which serve as the basic primitives of natural language. 
I will also say more about the nature of lexical features below, but to a first 
approximation we can think of Chomskyan words as <PHON, SEM> pairs—i.e., related 
bundles of formal lexical features that are interpretable by language-external cognitive 
                                                 
11 Chomsky (1986: 22). Indeed, qua biological organ Chomsky often notes that I-languages are 
fundamentally systems of thought and only contingently useful for the externalization of thought in the 
service of interpersonal communication. 
12 Chomsky (1995: 33). 
13 To say that the mappings between word-sounds and their meanings are arbitrary is to just say that these 
mappings do not follow from general linguistic principles. Rather the meanings of individual words must 
be individually learned/memorized. As such, Chomsky often describes the lexicon as “a list of 
irregularities” or “idiosyncrasies.” 
14 Chomsky (2000a: 125) writes “We may take the semantic features S of an expression E to be its meaning 
and the phonetic features P to be its sound; E means S in something like the sense of the corresponding 
English word, and E sounds P in a similar sense, S and P providing the relevant information for the 
performance systems.” [emphases are Chomsky’s]. 
 58 
 
systems. However, Chomsky also routinely adverts to certain purely language-internal 
features of words that are specifically relevant to lexical morphology and/or phrasal 
syntax yet which are not themselves interpretable at the interfaces to language-external 
systems.15 Following others, I will group these so-called “uninterpretable” features of 
words under the label ‘SYN’.16 Thus, to a closer approximation we can think of 
Chomskyan words/LIs as particular instantiations of the complex mental structure 
<PHON, SYN, SEM>, which is to say related bundles or sets of phonological, 
morphosyntactic, and semantic features. A Chomskyan lexicon can therefore be 
characterized as the totality of such representations in a given speaker’s idiolect. 
The computational procedure, by contrast, or what is more commonly known as 
simply the grammar, is effectively a parametric instantiation of UG—a generative 
procedure instantiated in the mind-brain whose job it is to select items from the lexicon 
and combine them, recursively, according to the rules of grammar to generate 
increasingly more complex linguistic expressions (i.e., phrases and sentences). 
Importantly, expressions thus generated must satisfy conditions on interpretability (or 
“legibility”) imposed at the interfaces to language-external performance systems, or what 
Chomsky calls the articulatory-perceptual (A-P) and conceptual-intentional systems (C-
I), respectively.17 When these output conditions are met the derivation is said to 
“converge” at the interfaces. Otherwise it “crashes” and the derived expression is judged 
                                                 
15 With respect to speech production, it is merely a contingent fact about the human language system that it 
happens to be useful for verbal communication by making its outputs available to articulatory systems. 
16 While Chomsky does not himself make explicit reference to ‘SYN’ features, I doubt that he would object 
to those who do. For example, Chomsky (1965: 214, fn.15) writes “We might, then, take a lexical entry to 
be simply a set of features, some syntactic, some phonological, some semantic.” And in his discussion of 
Grimshaw’s (1981) notion of “canonical realization structures,” Chomsky (1995: 32) writes: “Notice that 
this consideration indicates that lexical entries contain at some syntactic information…” [my emphasis]. 




by competent speakers to either be ungrammatical, uninterpretable, or otherwise 
unacceptable. However, notice that while some word strings may not correspond to 
generable linguistic expressions they may, with extra cognitive effort, still be 
interpretable by other means; e.g., by means of reasoning, perhaps of the pragmatic sort, 
about the utterer’s communicative intentions in saying what he/she did.  
Before further evaluating Chomsky’s notion of words qua lexical items, it will help 
facilitate discussion here and elsewhere to briefly mention a few other general points 
about his conception of I-languages. Observe first that the computational procedure is 
characterized by Chomsky as a monolithic combinatorial system. However, other 
linguists working in the generative tradition typically assume a division of computational 
labor between morphology, phonology, syntax, and semantics, treating each system as an 
independent sub-module of the grammar with its own well-defined interface (some of 
which are wholly language-internal). In brief, the morphological subsystem is said to be 
responsible for word formation—i.e., the assembly of lexical features into lexical 
items/LIs, and of LIs into morphologically complex word-forms (e.g., their inflected 
and/or derived forms). The syntactic system is then responsible for combining items so-
assembled into more complex syntactic structures—i.e., linguistic expressions whose 
lexical constituents bear structural relations to one another. The job of the semantics 
module, by contrast, is to map these expressions onto their phrasal/sentential meanings, 
or LFs as they are called, which again must be interpretable at the interface to C-I. 
Operating in parallel, the phonological subsystem generates complex phonological forms 
(PFs) that must be pronounceable by the articulators via the A-P interface. 
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As I understand, the chief motivation for distinguishing morphology from syntax is 
that there is some reason to think that morphologically complex words are generated 
within the lexicon itself as opposed to the wider syntax, corresponding to what Chomsky 
has dubbed the Lexicalist Hypothesis, or what is also known as Lexicalism.18 While 
opinions here vary, more recently Chomsky (1995: 20) himself proposes that only 
derived word-forms (such as the deverbalized noun ‘destruction’) are generated by 
processes “internal to the lexicon,” whereas inflected forms (e.g., the regular past tense 
verb ‘destroyed’) are the products of “computational operations of a broader syntactic 
scope.” But either way, it is widely agreed that once generated many morphologically 
complex word-forms can be manipulated (e.g., moved, merged) by phrasal syntax as 
atomic/indivisible units.19 By contrast, the motivation for distinguishing phonology from 
syntax and semantics stems from the hypothesis that the linear surface structures of 
complex expressions (i.e., their pronounced phonetic forms) are quite different from their 
underlying logico-syntactic forms; their respective constituents not only differ in kind but 
stand in distinct structural relations to one another. And this is again because ex hypothesi 
the same expressions must satisfy two distinct interface requirements—they must again 
be both phonetically pronounceable and semantically interpretable. Different interface 
requirements in turn imply a grammar that generates two distinct structural 
representations (or structural descriptions as Chomsky calls them)—a PF and an LF—
                                                 
18 Chomsky (1995: 35) writes: “The primes constituting the terminal string of a phrase marker are drawn 
from the lexicon; others are projected from these heads by operations of the computational system.” 
[Chomsky’s emphases]. The Lexicalist Hypothesis is widely attributed to Chomsky (1970). For a recent 
defense, see Williams (2007). However, LH has been recently challenged by a movement known as 
Constructivism, or Constructionism, which I’ll say more about below. 
19 Chomsky (2005a: 3) writes, for example: “Adopting the P&P framework, I will assume that one element 
of parameter-setting is assembly of features into lexical items (LIs), which we can take to be atoms for 
further computation…” [my emphasis]. This remark will however be qualified below. 
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the former consisting in a complex array of interpretable phonological features (PHONs) 
and the latter an array of interpretable syntactico-grammatical features (SEMs). 
While it may be convenient for certain theoretical purposes to speak of 
morphology, phonology, syntax, and semantics as independent processing subsystems of 
the wider grammar, these may be just different ways of describing the same 
combinatorial system. Indeed, Chomsky nowadays recognizes just two basic grammatical 
processes (or operations): “one assembles features into lexical items, the second forms 
larger syntactic objects out of those already constructed, beginning with lexical items.” In 
the wake of Chomsky’s Minimalist Program (Chomsky [1993, 1995]), the derivational 
process is said to diverge at certain stages called “phases” where interpretable fragments 
of the emerging structure are “spelled out” by first “checking” (deleting) uninterpretable 
features (or “valuing” unvalued features) to ensure what Chomsky calls Full 
Interpretation (FI) at the interfaces (Chomsky [1984: 98]). One fragment, a PF, clothed 
only in phonological material, is forwarded to A-P for purposes of speech production (in 
the downstream direction). The other fragment, an LF, clothed only in logico-syntactic 
material, is sent to C-I (in the upstream direction) to be semantically interpreted. The 
bottom line is that the output of the computational procedure, whatever it consists in, 
must satisfy these two basic interface requirements. 
With these preliminaries in place we can begin to more carefully formulate an 
answer to the question of what a “word” of natural language is, or rather again what they 
are most likely to be given our present state of knowledge. As a reminder, the relevance 
of this inquiry with respect to my core thesis is that a proper understanding of word-
concepts, or again conceptsW to keep ideas straight, requires an understanding of what 
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these conceptsW are posited to be conceptsW of, which I assume are words of natural 
language. More specifically, my primary interest here is with the nature of lexical 
meanings, or SEMs to use Chomsky’s terminology, that speaker’s use conceptsW to form 
explicit beliefs about, though again as evidenced by the constraints they impose on what 
their host words can and cannot be coherently used to talk about in ordinary discourse. 
And from a theoretical standpoint one can only understand the nature of lexical meanings 
against the backdrop of a plausible general analysis of what words themselves are. 
While certain aspects of my core thesis again do not necessarily rely on one 
particular analysis, the present exercise will provide a vocabulary with which to entertain 
questions that are directly germane to my core thesis. The issues here are subtle, and so it 
will pay to proceed slowly. In particular, I dwell on what has become known in 
linguistics circles as “feature theory,” which is central to Chomsky’s conception of 
words, and of linguistic expressions more generally, as complex non-conceptual mental 
structures/representations. This discussion will help in particular to clarify the nature of 
the lexical meaning axioms postulated in Chapter 1, which elaborates on Chomsky’s 
notion of SEM features to include what there I called ‘CON’. In addition, the notion of a 
“feature” will reappear in the next chapter in connection with prototypes, which is not the 
same notion discussed below. And so I when I talk about lexical features in subsequent 
chapters I want it to be crystal clear what I am referring to. 
2.3. On Chomskyan words—a closer look 
So what then is a word of natural language? As indicated above, Chomsky 
describes words as lexical items, or again LIs for short. I have characterized Chomskyan 
words more specifically as particular instantiations of the triple <PHON, SYN, SEM>, 
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which is merely to say related bundles or unordered sets of phonological, 
morphosyntactic, and semantic features, where lexical features are taken to be “the 
elementary constituents of LIs and expressions constructed from them.” So understood, 
we can think of each lexical feature as constituting a partial description of the words/LIs 
that it composes (where presumably some/many of the same features can be instantiated 
in multiple words/LIs). Thus, to understand the nature of Chomskyan words/LIs requires 
an understanding of the lexical features that comprise them. 
Appeal to features has a long tradition in the cognitive sciences as a way of 
specifying, for example, the decompositional structure of lexical concepts, lexical 
meanings, and/or the definitions (or prototypes) of corresponding concept-words (which 
is not to be confused with what I am calling conceptsW). In these contexts the notion of a 
“semantic feature,” or what are otherwise known as “semantic primitives,” are usually 
cashed out in terms of basic ontological categories such as CAUSE, EVENT, PHYSICAL-
OBJECT, and so forth. I will revisit this conception of features in the next chapter. But for 
the non-specialist it is important to stress immediately that this is not how Chomsky 
employs the technical term “feature” with respect to I-languages. Rather, linguistic 
features are posited as primitive mental representations that encode purely formal, 
intrinsic properties of words—i.e., properties that bear no direct relationships to entities 
in the mind-external world. 
Understood in this way, Chomskyan “words” themselves are not what one might 
pre-theoretically conceive them to be. Yet this should come as little surprise. For there 
are compelling reasons to believe that like other dedicated, domain-specific faculties of 
the human mind such as early vision, the internal resources and representations of I-
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languages, including their stock of lexical primitives, are by and large cognitively 
impenetrable, which is to say non-conceptual and thus sub-personal, except perhaps as 
manifest at the interfaces to language-external systems. It is of course undeniable that we 
consciously use/utter words to talk about things in the world. And, to be sure, the overt 
manifestation of words in speech provides evidence of their psycholinguistic reality and, 
moreover, their underlying nature.20 The point, however, is that if words just are items in 
a Chomskyan lexicon we should not expect to introspectively recognize them as such, 
any more than we should expect to be able to introspect other abstracta such as edges, 
contours, and vertices as represented (i.e., instantiated) by the early visual system. 
For those familiar with the view, it is also true that Chomsky ascribes intuitively 
descriptive names to linguistic features corresponding to their external effects in language 
use. For instance, Chomsky hypothesizes that common nouns encode binary features 
such as [Human], [Animate], and [Artifact]. However, any relation between the 
computational properties of such features and the worldly entities they name is entirely 
abstract and thus non-constitutive of their informational contents. To repeat an earlier 
point, I-languages are posited to be internal systems of human cognition and only 
contingently useful for referring to things in the world. Rather, strictly speaking 
Chomskyan often stresses that linguistic features are posited to be purely syntactic in 
nature in the sense of being primitive mental symbols that participate in language-internal 
computational processes.21 For example, what I am calling SYN features are conceived as 
                                                 
20 This point is crucial to the relation between words and both our ordinary and scientific conceptions of 
them, which I explain in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
21 As Chomsky (2000a: 125) puts it: “The elements of these symbolic objects [i.e., LIs] can be called 
“phonetic” and “semantic” features, respectively, but we should bear in mind that all of this is pure syntax 
and completely internalist. It is the study of mental representations and computations, much like the inquiry 
into how the image of a cube rotating in space is determined from retinal stimulations, or imagined.” 
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intra-system “instructions” between combinatorial processes/operations for how to build 
interpretable syntactic structures. By contrast, phonological features, or again PHONs in 
the Chomskyan vernacular, are so-named because they have certain consequences with 
respect to their interpretations at the interface to A-P. More specifically, with respect to 
speech production Chomsky’s describes PHON features as instructions to the articulators 
for how to pronounce words (usually in combination with other words). For instance, 
given the capacity to pronounce its constituent phonemes, the PHON features of ‘dog’ are 
understood by A-P, collectively, as an instruction for how to pronounce the word ‘dog’. 
In turn the capacity to pronounce the string ‘brown dog’ depends on knowing how to 
pronounce ‘brown’ and ‘dog’ yet which may be articulated slightly differently when 
uttered in combination in fluent speech. 
If still a bit unclear, Chomsky puts it this way: 22 
To say that phonetic features are "instructions" to sensorimotor systems at the interface is 
not to say that they have the form "Move the tongue in such-and-such a way" or "Perform 
such-and-such analysis of signals." Rather, it expresses the hypothesis that the features 
provide information in the form required for the sensorimotor systems to function in 
language-independent ways. Similar observations hold on the (far more obscure) 
meaning side. 
In regard to this last remark, SEM features are said to have semantic import with respect 
to their interpretations at the interface to C-I. I will say more about this below, but in 
                                                 
22 Chomsky (2000b: 91) writes “To say that phonetic features are "instructions" to sensorimotor systems at 
the interface is not to say that they have the form "Move the tongue in such-and-such a way" or "Perform 
such-and-such analysis of signals." Rather, it expresses the hypothesis that the features provide information 
in the form required for the sensorimotor systems to function in language-independent ways. Similar 
observations hold on the (far more obscure) meaning side.” More specifically, Chomsky (2000a: 36) states 
that “…a lexical item provides us with a certain range of perspectives for viewing what we take to be the 
things in the world, or what we conceive in other ways; these items are like filters or lenses, providing ways 
of looking at things and thinking about the products of our minds. The terms themselves do not refer, at 
least if the term refer is used in its natural language sense; but people can use them to refer to things, 
viewing them from particular points of view—which are remote from the standpoint of the natural sciences, 
as noted.” In short, Chomsky states (ibid: 34): “We might well term all of this a form of syntax, that is, the 
study of the symbolic systems of C–R theories (“mental representation”).” [my emphasis]. 
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terms of comprehension we can again think of SEMs as being understood by “belief 
systems” (at the C-I interface) as instructions to activate semantically related 
extralinguistic concepts. In general, lexical features impose selectional restrictions on 
which words can combine with which others in grammatically permissible ways, and, 
with a little luck, conceptually coherent ways. More specifically, Chomsky (2000a: 36) 
adds that: 
[…] a lexical item provides us with a certain range of perspectives for viewing what we 
take to be the things in the world, or what we conceive in other ways; these items are like 
filters or lenses, providing ways of looking at things and thinking about the products of 
our minds. The terms themselves do not refer, at least if the term refer is used in its 
natural language sense; but people can use them to refer to things, viewing them from 
particular points of view—which are remote from the standpoint of the natural sciences, 
as noted. 
The upshot is that “We might well term all of this a form of syntax, that is, the study of 
the symbolic systems of C–R theories (“mental representation”);” (ibid: 34, my 
emphasis). 
The general moral of this discussion is that one should not draw conclusions from 
theoretical naming conventions about the ontological status of linguistic features (e.g., 
[Human], [Animate], and [Artifact]). Rather, from an I-language perspective lexical 
features were initially posited to explain certain facts/generalizations about the 
phonological, morphosyntactic, and semantic behavior of words with respect to language-
internal computational processes as reflected in their interpretations at the interfaces to 
language-external cognitive systems. This is simply to stress that on Chomsky’s view I-
languages are primarily systems of thought and only contingently useful for the 
externalization of those thoughts in interpersonal communication. By contrast, from an 
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externalist/E-language perspective the most we can say about the intrinsic semantic 
properties of Chomskyan words is that they guide and constrain without determining 
what those words can coherently be used/uttered to talk about in ordinary conversational 
situations. 
2.3.1. A closer look at feature theory 
From an historical perspective, the theory of “distinctive features” (as they are 
sometimes called) was first introduced by linguists in the 1950’s as a way to classify the 
basic units of phonological structure called segments or phonemes. More specifically, 
phonological features were employed to characterize the internal representation of a 
word’s syllabic and prosodic structure. Traditionally, phonological features, or again 
PHONs in Chomsky’s terminology, are specified using binary feature “markings” such as 
[Consonantal], [Sonorant], [Nasal], and [Syllabic], where a positive specification 
indicates the presence of the named feature/property and a negative marking indicates its 
absence.23 Contemporary phonological feature systems are much more sophisticated than 
this, however. But roughly speaking, phonological features are again posited to capture 
certain facts/generalizations about how the internally represented phonological structures 
of words determine their permissible phonetic combinations and overt pronunciations in 
spoken language. In terms of comprehension, these features are used by the parser to 
segment linear speech signals into the discrete structural units (i.e., words or morphemes 
roughly speaking) that participate in language-internal computational processes. 
As early as 1965 Chomsky had co-opted the notion of lexically-specified features in 
lieu of production/rewrite rules to describe (and ultimately explain) observed restrictions 
                                                 
23 Other proposals allow features to be single-valued, or to have more than two values, thus dispensing with 
the binary notation. But for ease of exposition I’ll stick with the binary notation. 
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on the syntactic distributions of words—i.e., the linguistic contexts into which various 
lexical categories can be inserted (their so-called “insertion frames”) while preserving 
grammaticality. We know, for example, that in English only verbs and prepositions take 
nouns (or noun phrases/NPs), as direct complements, and that only nouns/NPs and 
adjectives/APs can be the complements of determiners. Generally speaking, each major 
lexical category stands in complementary distribution to the others.24 And it appears that 
the grammatical rules that enforce such restrictions must be capable of distinguishing the 
various grammatical categories of words. Such observations are what motivated 
Chomsky to posit feature markings such as [+N] for common nouns, [+V] for verbs, [+A] 
for adjectives (or adpositions, more generally), and so on, to identify words/LIs by their 
major grammatical category.25 In addition, Chomsky (1965) introduced 
“subcategorization” and “selectional” features to capture more fine-grained distributional 
patterns among various subclasses of words, such as count vs. mass nouns and transitive 
vs. intransitive verbs. 
More will be said below about the classification of lexical features and the 
restrictions they impose. But again for the benefit of non-specialists, perhaps the easiest 
way to understand the theoretical role of lexical features is by way of analogy. In 
particular, we might compare Chomskyan words/LIs to pieces of jigsaw puzzle whose 
                                                 
24 The major open-class lexical categories correspond loosely to the traditional “parts of speech,” that 
standardly include nominals (i.e., nouns, both common and proper), verbs, adjectives, and on some views 
both prepositions and adverbs. However, Chomsky sometimes speaks of adverbs as a lexical subcategory. 
In any case, he continues to consider their category labels to be a defining feature of Words. For example, 
he writes (1995:30): “…any theory of language must include some sort of lexicon, the repository of all 
(idiosyncratic) properties of particular lexical items. These properties include a representation of the 
phonological form of each item, a specification of its syntactic category, and its semantic characteristics.” 
[my emphasis]. 
25 Chomsky (1995: 30) states that among the properties of the lexicon “include a representation of the 
phonological form of each item, a specification of its syntactic category, and its semantic characteristics.” 
However, more recently Chomsky (2006) has floated the possibility that phrase structures are “bare,” 
which is to say they lack category labels, even at the terminal level. 
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physical shapes are determined by certain intrinsic properties of their types. Conversely, 
the shape of each piece constrains its possible position within the puzzle and thus the 
overall shape/structure of the puzzle itself. By analogy, the intrinsic properties of 
words/LIs represented by lexical features restrict their combinatorial potential—i.e., their 
possible insertion frames within the overall structure of larger expressions in which they 
occur. Words that belong to the same grammatical category share many of the same 
properties and thus “fit” in many of the same places. Likewise, common categories 
“select for” the same number and type of grammatical complements. More specifically, 
according to Chomsky phrasal structures are projections of the formal features of their 
syntactic heads26—a thesis known as Projectionism, which typically goes hand-in-hand 
with what above I called Lexicalism.27 On this count Chomsky (1986: 81) writes:  
[…] phrases typically consist of a head (noun, verb, adjective, preposition, and possibly 
others) and an array of complements determined by lexical properties of the head. The 
category consisting of the head and its complements is a projection of the head (NP if the 
head is an N, VP if the head is a V, etc.). 
Without yet saying more precisely what lexical features are, one first wants to know 
to what, if anything, such features attach? That is, linguists often speak of feature 
“markings,” and so one wants to know what it is, exactly, that is being marked? At first 
blush, we might take the structural bearers of lexical features to be grammatical 
formatives—i.e., the linguistic “objects” that are thought to be manipulated by language-
                                                 
26 As Radford (2009) defines the notion, “The head (constituent) of a phrase is the key word which 
determines the properties of the phrase. So, in a phrase such as ‘fond of fast food’, the head of the phrase is 
the adjective fond, and consequently the phrase is an adjectival phrase (and hence can occupy typical 
positions associated with adjectival expressions—e.g. as the complement of is in ‘He is fond of fast food’). 
In many cases, the term head is more or less equivalent to the term word…” 
27 Variants of the Projectionist approach to morpho-syntax can be found in Chomsky (1970), Grimshaw 




internal operations.28 A prior question, then, is what these formatives are supposed to be? 
Let me briefly reconstruct a commonly assumed answer to this question followed by my 
best interpretation of Chomsky’s actual view on the matter, which I sense is sometimes 
misunderstood.29 
2.3.2. On morphology (word structure) 
In the domain of phonology, we can begin with the commonsense observation that 
many if not most words of natural language are phonologically complex, which is to say 
polysyllabic.30 More specifically, speech signals (utterances/vocalizations) are parsed by 
the phonological system into abstract structural segments, again called phonemes, which 
are defined as the smallest pronounceable units of sound. Phonologically complex words 
are therefore polyphonemic—their language-internal representations consist in roughly 
word-sized sequences of phonemes that linguists sometimes call phonological words and 
whose internal phonemic structures are sometimes referred to as their phonological 
“spellings.”31 Phonological features are in turn said to determine a word’s phonemic 
structure/spelling. So understood, one is given to assume that individual phonemes are the 
structural bearers of phonological features. 
                                                 
28 (Chomsky [1965: 86]) writes, for example, that “…separating the lexicon from the system of re-writing 
rules has quite a number of advantages. For one thing, many of the grammatical properties of formatives 
can now be specified directly in the lexicon, by association of syntactic features with lexical formatives, 
and thus need not be represented in the re-writing rules at all.” 
29 Indeed, Chomsky is sometimes unclear about these details, and his terminology is occasionally 
inconsistent. And so I’m not sure that I fully understand the view. But again what follows represents my 
best reconstruction of it. 
30 Some words also have complex stress and/or intonation patterns, but we can safely gloss past these 
details for purposes here. 
31 To be clear, I am using the term “spelling” here as a metaphor for the abstract phonemic structure of 
structurally complex phonological words, which I assume to be distinct from (i) the physical acoustic 
structures of their token-utterances, which have phonetic spellings, and (ii) their physical inscriptions, 
which have orthographic/alphabetic spellings, both of which are mind-external notions. 
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In the domains of morphology and syntax, morphemes are standardly taken to be 
the smallest syntactically manipulable units of natural language, related sequences of 
which constitute what some linguists refer to as grammatical or syntactic words.32 
However, when Chomsky and colleagues speak of words they are quite often referring 
specifically to primitive syntactic formatives known as lexical roots—morphological 
units that may consist of multiple morphemes yet which occupy the terminal nodes of 
syntactic trees.33 Chomsky (1995: 20) states, for example, that “The lexicon contains the 
root [walk], with its idiosyncratic properties of sound, meaning, and form specified.”34 
Characterized in this way, one might assume that lexical roots are the structural bearers 
of lexical features. However, Chomsky (2000a: 170) also states that “there is no separate 
substratum, the word, in which the properties [features of LIs] inhere.” Now, as I read 
him Chomsky is not saying that words as such do not exist. Rather, I take him to mean 
that words are nothing over and above the set of lexical features that comprise them. On 
this construal, in other words, particular instantiations of the triplet <PHON, SYN, SEM> 
                                                 
32 However, as Julien (2006: 619) observes “Using the term ‘grammatical word’… is not strictly correct 
because phonology is, of course, also a part of grammar.” 
33 Indeed, what one might count as words of certain polysynthetic languages can be massively 
polymorphemic. 
34 Now, it’s not entirely clear what Chomsky means here by “form.” Though what he is surely not referring 
to is the word’s orthographic form in written language (i.e., its alphabetic spelling). For contrary to what 
some theorists seem to think, I am aware of neither statements to the effect, nor evidence to suggest, that 
Chomskyan LIs encode the conventional spellings of words. This should come as no surprise, as language 
learners learn to speak long before they learn to write (if ever). Indeed, written language is presumably 
nothing more than the transcription of phonetic speech signals into their customary written/orthographic 
forms according to certain conventionalized rules. And while literate speakers eventually learn these rules, 
they again presumably do not represent the orthographic forms of words. Rather, by hypothesis what LIs 
represent are abstractions over word-sounds—i.e., phonetic speech signals—whose “image” (as Chomsky 
sometimes puts it) is encoded by the PHON component of their lexical entries. Thus, from a 
psycholinguistic perspective the theoretically prior question is how speech signals are internally parsed, 
represented, and interpreted by I-languages; a question to which I return below. The upshot is that like 
other basic grammatical formatives such as phonemes in the phonological domain, lexical roots are again 
by hypothesis mental representations—i.e., complex mental symbols whose tokens enter into certain 
language-internal computational processes. As such, one assumes that lexical roots are distinguished (i.e., 
type-individuated) by the physical “shapes” of their tokens (presumably as realized by certain brain states). 
We might then think of the internal “shape” of a lexical root as its morphological form (which is again not 
to be confused with its conventional orthographic form or its phonetic realization in spoken language). 
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just are the linguistic objects/formatives manipulated by language-internal computational 
processes. 
Chomsky adds that “LIs may be decomposed and reconstructed in the course of 
computation” and, moreover, that “any feature change yields a different LI.” These last 
two remarks in isolation are also a bit misleading, however, and thus require further 
unpacking. It will help to begin here by briefly reviewing the distinction between “open-
class” content words and “closed-class” functional items. Most mainstream versions of 
Minimalist syntax count as members of the open-class lexicon the categories (N)oun, 
(V)erb, and (A)djective—lexical categories whose members usually have inflected and/or 
derived forms, independently specifiable meanings, and the set of which can in principle 
grow without limit as speakers acquire new words (hence the label “open” class). 
Correspondingly, these items head the phrasal categories NP, VP, and AP, respectively.35 
The open-class lexicon is to be contrasted with a comparatively small and largely 
static inventory of closed-class functional items whose respective roles in the language 
are more or less fixed by the grammar. The closed-class lexicon standardly includes 
sentential connectives/copulas, complementizers, auxiliaries, pronouns, determiners, 
quantifiers, and certain inflectional morphemes. These items in turn head their own 
phrasal categories such as CP (complementizer phrase), TP (tense phrase), and DP 
(determiner phrase). Unlike open-class categories, however, functional heads typically do 
not themselves have inflected or derived forms. Indeed, not all functional elements are 
realized in the syntax as lexical roots, per se, which is to say independently 
pronounceable lexical items. In particular, elements such as T(ense), Asp(ect), and 
                                                 
35 While controversial, some theorists treat Adv(erbs) and P(repositions) as open-class items, while most 




Agr(eement), which head the abstract functional categories TP, AspP, and AgrP, are 
realized, syntactically, as bound morphemes that are spelled-out, phonologically, as 
affixes on open-class roots. For example, the suffix ‘-s’ that attaches to English verbal 
roots signals agreement with third-person singular NP-subjects (i.e., subjects marked 
[+3rd Person], [+Singular]), as in “He walks”). However, other posited functional 
categories have no phonological realizations but are merely needed, as it were, to keep 
the grammar happy—they are home to certain features that determine relevant structural 
relations between open-class categories. But setting aside these details, the takeaway here 
is that closed-class lexical items constitute the functional backbone of syntactic 
structures; i.e., the structural glue that holds together their open-class lexical constituents. 
More generally, the proposal is that the grammar operates on what Chomsky calls a 
Numeration—an ordered list of open-class LIs along with relevant closed-class functional 
elements selected from the lexicon that serve as the raw materials for 
combinatorial/derivational processes. The computational procedure then recursively 
combines these items according to their featural specifications and the rules of grammar 
to generate more complex, hierarchically structured linguistic expressions (i.e., structured 
bundles of linguistic features). Once introduced, certain features can be individually 
manipulated by the syntax in the course of a derivation.36 For example, phrasal heads can 
inherit certain features from and/or assign features to subtending LIs. Generally speaking, 
individual features can be moved, copied, reassigned, and in some cases deleted in order 
                                                 
36 Chomsky’s Inclusiveness Condition prohibits new features/LIs from being introduced into the 
Numeration during the course of computation, as explained in Chomsky (2000b: 100): “UG makes 
available a set F of features (linguistic properties) and operations CHL (the computational procedure for 
human language) that access F to generate expressions. The language L maps F to a particular set of 
expressions Exp. Operative complexity is reduced if L makes a one-time selection of a subset [F] of F, 
dispensing with further access to F. It is reduced further if L includes a one-time operation that assembles 
elements of [F] into a lexicon Lex, with no new assembly as computation proceeds.” 
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to satisfy legibility conditions imposed at the interfaces to language-external consumer 
systems. The upshot, according to Chomsky (2000a: 175), is that “At these interface 
levels there may be no sub-unit corresponding to LI.” 
Now, on the one hand the picture that emerges from this (all too brief) discussion is 
a conception of words as transient, dynamically reconfigurable bundles of lexical 
features. On the other hand, Chomsky’s notion of the lexicon as a stable compendium of 
sound-meaning pairs implies a conception of words as consisting in a fixed set of 
lexically-encoded features that persist over time. That is, the persistence of at least some 
lexical features is presumably what allows speakers to recognize and utter tokens of the 
same word on different occasions. Thus, I think the picture that Chomsky has in mind is 
that tokens of the same word—i.e., the same lexical root “with its idiosyncratic properties 
of sound, meaning, and form specified”—can assume different morphological forms by 
combining with various functional morphemes/features in different linguistic contexts to 
generate distinct word-forms having distinct lexical features. Otherwise, one assumes that 
the lexical roots themselves are type-individuated by the context-invariant features 
encoded by their lexical entries. Chomsky does in fact suggest elsewhere (see notes 19 
and 25) that certain type-individuating features of words are lexicalized as part of the 
word-acquisition process. Or anyway, I will be assuming as much in what follows. 
Let me pause here briefly to restate the point of this discussion, which is an attempt 
to develop a conspicuous conception of what words of natural language are, and which 
under the present hypothesis are the primitive mental representations that constitute part 
of the stable state of a competent speaker’s mind (or brain) known as an I-language. But 
more than this, the acquisition and representation of words constitute part of a speaker’s 
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core linguistic competence. In explaining the nature of such competence I have made 
reference to certain aspects of linguistic processing that count as what Chomsky refers to 
as performance—the various ways in which language is put to use in the service of 
communication. However, while certain aspects of linguistic processing/performance 
figure into my core thesis, I want to make clear before proceeding that this is no part of 
Chomsky’s agenda. 
So qualified, let me also continue to delay a more detailed discussion of lexical 
features in favor of trying to first get a bit clearer about how words are distinguished as 
such by language-internal processes. But in the meantime we can again think of lexical 
features as partial descriptions of the words/LIs they compose. It is also widely assumed 
that the inventory of such features is finite, universal, and by definition represented in a 
speaker’s long-term lexical memory. Now, if what it means to be an LI is simply to be 
listed in the lexicon as such, then strictly speaking individual lexical features are LIs. 
However, Chomsky again speaks of words (both open- and closed-class) as consisting in 
related bundles of lexical features. The relevant consequence is that, again strictly 
speaking, not all LIs are words. And if certain assumptions below are correct, then not all 
words are LIs. The more pressing question, however, is how I-languages distinguish 
words from bound morphemes, on the one hand, and more complex expressions (i.e., 
phrases and sentences) on the other. In what follows, I will again offer my best 
interpretation of Chomsky’s view on the matter. 
2.4. On the nature of Words—to a second approximation 
To a second approximation, I have characterized words of natural language (both 
open and closed-class) as lexical roots—i.e., basic syntactic formatives composed of 
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bundles of lexical features (i.e., instances of the triplet <PHON, SYN, SEM>) that 
participate in language-internal computational processes and that occupy the terminal 
nodes of syntactic trees. Lexical roots in turn combine, syntactically, with bound 
morphemes and perhaps other functional elements to yield inflected and/or derived word-
forms that are composed of, or generated from, multiple LIs. Some such constructions, 
and in particular non-productive (irregular/suppleted/declensional)37 word-forms such as 
the English past tense verb ‘went’, the comparative adjective ‘better’, its superlative 
‘best’, and so forth, are also standardly taken to be listed as such in the lexicon.38 By 
contrast, fully productive (i.e., regular/rule-governed) word-forms could in-principle be 
computed online according to morphological rules each time they are uttered and/or 
interpreted. However, many researchers hypothesize that in the interest of computational 
economy certain high-frequency yet fully productive/regular word-forms may also be 
recorded somewhere in long-term lexical memory.39 
Further evidence suggests that other complex “word-like” constructions formed 
initially through morphological processes such as compounding (e.g., ‘egghead’) and 
incorporation (e.g., ‘babysitter’) are retrieved from lexical memory as pre-built “chunks” 
and thus behave like words with respect to the grammar.40 Rather than being recorded in 
the lexicon, however, these latter constructions—particularly those with 
idiosyncratic/idiomatic meanings—are sometimes said to be separately listed as part of a 
                                                 
37 Suppletion is a variety of allomorphy that results in the substitution of one phonological form with 
another. Declension is a form of inflection that distinguishes lexical categories according to Number, Case, 
and Gender (e.g., the singular noun ‘goose’ vs. its plural ‘geese’).  
38 Though many such forms are often not recognized as such by lexicographers. 
39 Wunderlich (2006: 9) argues, for example, that “words can be morphologically complex and 
semantically transparent, so that they do not belong to the idiosyncratic knowledge, but if they are 
frequently used they can nevertheless be memorized and thus belong to the ‘mental lexicon’.” 
40 See Libben & Jarema (2007) for discussion. 
 77 
 
speaker’s mental “vocabulary.”41 Setting details aside, the relevant consequence is again 
that not all LIs are properly classifiable as words. And if vocabulary items count as 
words, then strictly speaking not all words are classifiable as LIs. 
To consolidate on some terminology while at the same time avoiding certain 
unintended theoretical commitments, let me introduce the technical term ‘Word’ to 
designate pronounceable bare/uninflected lexical roots that (i) minimally encode (are 
constituted by) features/properties of sound and meaning, (ii) are listed as such in a 
speaker’s mental lexicon, and (iii) occur as terminal nodes in syntactic trees.42 As 
discussed further below, it may also be a defining property of Words to be marked for 
major grammatical category.43 But for present purposes it’s enough to assume that most 
Words are represented by (or within) I-languages as bare lexical roots whose tokens are 
again instantiations of the triplet <PHON, SYN, SEM>. Broadly speaking, however, my 
notion of a Word is intended to cover any linguistic constituent that satisfies the 
conditions above and is (or potentially can be) manipulated by phrasal syntax as an 
atomic (indivisible) lexical unit, including but not limited to non-productive compounds, 
incorporations, and portmanteaus (e.g., ‘smog’).44 By contrast, I assume that Words differ 
from bound morphemes and clitics in that the former have independently specifiable 
meanings and are individually pronounceable with their meanings.45 
                                                 
41 Notice that this is not the sense of ‘vocabulary’ as used by Distributed Morphologists. 
42 For those who care about such questions, I’m willing to grant that representations which constitute what I 
am calling the mental lexicon are distributed across different brain regions, as is commonly assumed by 
PDP models in the field of psycholinguistics. 
43 Cf., Chomsky (1965), Di Sciullo & Williams (1987). 
44 This is essentially what Di Sciullo & Williams (1987) dubbed the principle of “Lexical Integrity.” 
However, Booij (2007: Ch.12) suggests that the principle of Lexical Integrity is perhaps too strong, as there 
appear to be counterexamples. 
45 It is sometimes claimed that some bound morphemes have no independently specifiable meanings. 
However, emphasis on the conjunct here is to recognize that some bound morphemes, and perhaps also 
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2.4.1. Accommodating some facts 
Chomsky and his followers again posit lexical features to explain a range of 
facts/generalizations about the phonological, syntactic, and semantic behavior of 
Words/LIs with respect to their grammatical distributions and interpretations. Below I 
survey a small but relevant selection of such facts along with some suggestions about 
how to accommodate them within a Chomskyan framework for natural language. This 
discussion will be useful, in particular, as segue into the central goal of this chapter, 
which is to develop an empirically plausible hypothesis about the nature of lexical 
meanings. However, several of the more general facts about words/language mentioned 
here are in one way or another relevant to a deeper understanding of my core thesis, 
many of which will reappear in later chapters. 
2.4.1.1. Some facts about phonology 
On the side of phonology, one robust generalization is that the relation between 
physical speech signals and their internal phonological representations is many-to-one. 
Consider, for example, that speakers have unique accents (voice quality, roughly 
speaking) and often speak different regional dialects (e.g., you say /temaytoh/, I say 
/tomahtoh/). For that matter, consider a native English speaker trying to parse the broken 
English of his/her immigrant parents. In either case, competent listeners usually have 
little difficulty (within limits) recognizing phonetically distinct utterances as utterances of 
the same Word.46 Such facts suggest that I-languages are capable of extracting and 
                                                                                                                                                 
clitics, do appear to have independently specifiable meanings. For example, the English derivational suffix 
‘-er’ appended to any verb, V, robustly means something like “one who Vs; e.g., ‘dancer’, ‘thinker’, etc. 
46 As Dahan & Magnuson (2006:252) write: “When someone speaks, the linguistic content and speaker 
characteristics (e.g., physiology of the vocal tract, gender, regional origin, emotions, identity) 
simultaneously influence the acoustics of the resulting spoken output. Additional sources of variability 
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registering a range of acoustically distinct lexical speech signals as tokens of the same 
abstract phonological word, again understood as a sequence of phonemes. Such facts are 
again accounted for, in part, by positing corresponding phonological features (PHONs) 
encoded by the Word’s lexical entry. It is important to stress that PHONs are abstractions 
over lexical speech signals in the sense that while neither structurally or physically 
isomorphic, they must at some level of analysis be inter-transcribable.47 
In short, it seems clear that each PHON subsumes a wide (yet limited) range of 
acoustically distinct speech signals. This observation raises the important empirical 
question of just how much variation can be tolerated for purposes of comprehension, and 
thus successful communication.48 From a metaphysical perspective, this question is 
important because the answer bears directly on the individuation of Words as they are 
represented in the lexicon. Yet to my knowledge, no one has a definitive answer to this 
question. However, I trust alongside the experts that there is a fact of the matter. From a 
computational perspective, I suspect that the shape of the explanation will be similar to 
an explanation for how the visual system tracks the constancy of surface colors across 
variation in texture, lighting conditions, viewer perspective, and so forth (cf., McGilvray 
[1994] for discussion). 
                                                                                                                                                 
include rate of elocution, prosodic prominence, and the phonetic context in which each word is 
pronounced. Nonetheless, listeners are able to recognize acoustically different stimuli as instances of the 
same word, thus extracting the similarity that exists between these different tokens, and perceiving them as 
members of the same category.” 
47 Chomsky (1986: 57) says, for example, that “… lexical items can be given in an abstract form in phrase 
structure representation, then converted by a succession of phonological and phonetic rules to their actual 
phonetic form…” 
48 Of course, the culturally acceptable range of variation is often artificially determined by prescriptive 
standards of correctness designed to ensure conformity; that is, to constrain variation so that for various 
purposes it does not impede everyday communication. However, Kaplan (1990: 101) contends that, 
technically speaking, “the difference in phonographology, the difference in sound or shape or spelling, can 
be just about as great as you would like it to be.” 
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In short, whatever is the correct explanation with respect to speech processing, the 
boundaries are clearly both vague and subject-dependent, yet also subject to 
change/improvement over time and with experience.49 Such observations illustrate the 
fact that the informational contents of PHONs bear no direct correspondence to their 
physical manifestations in speech. This is of course not to say that there is no relation 
whatsoever between PHONs and their physical manifestations. Rather, Chomsky’s view 
is that the relation is at best causally determinative as opposed to constitutive. As we will 
see below, the same goes for SEM features in the semantic domain. 
2.4.1.2. Some facts about syntax 
On the side of syntax, lexical features are again posited to explain observed 
contextual restrictions on the possible syntactic distributions of various lexical 
categories—i.e., restrictions regarding which categories can combine with which others 
in various linguistic contexts while preserving grammaticality (i.e., without violating 
syntactic rules as opposed to semantic/conceptual constraints). As mentioned earlier, for 
example, only verbs and prepositions take nouns/NPs as direct complements (or 
arguments), which explains why (1) and (3) below are grammatically acceptable while 
(2) and (4) are anomalous: 
(1) Max broke the window 
(2) *Max the window broke 
(3) Max declared his innocence to the deed 
(4) *Max declared to his innocence the deed 
                                                 
49 For example, I assume that most of us have learned to hear/understand the Word-sound \havad\ as 
pronounced by native Bostonians to mean Harvard University. 
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In the early days of generative grammar, such facts were captured by lexical production 
rules as part of the base set of phrase structure rules. These rules again make explicit 
reference to lexical and phrasal categories. As such, Chomsky (1965) hypothesized that 
Words encode feature-markings such as [+N], [+V], [+A], and so forth corresponding to 
a Word’s major grammatical category. 
However, it was apparent then, as it is now, that most if not all open-class lexical 
categories pattern into more fine-grained subcategories according to the exact number 
and types of their grammatical complements. For instance, common nouns—Words 
lexically marked [+N]—subcategorize as either count or mass, prompting Chomsky’s 
introduction of the selectional feature [Count], where a negative marking here indicates 
a mass term. For example, the lexical entry for the English count noun ‘chair’ includes 
the feature specification [+N, +Count], whereas inherently mass terms such as ‘furniture’, 
‘mud’, etc., are marked [+N, -Count]. Among other constraints, the [Count] feature is 
invoked to capture the fact that mass terms do not naturally combine with plural 
morphemes (e.g., *‘furnitures’, *‘muds’), or doing so forces a count reading (e.g., using 
‘wines’ to mean bottles of wine). Mass terms also cannot combine directly with the 
determiners ‘a’/‘an’, or quantifiers such as ‘five’, ‘each’, ‘few’, and ‘many’. In the 
reverse direction, determiners and quantifiers differentially select for NP complements 
whose head noun carries one of the two feature-markings [+Count] or [-Count]. For 
instance, the lexical entry for ‘every’ must specify that it takes only NP complements 
whose head is marked [+Count]. 
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Common nouns subcategorize in other ways as well. In general, Chomsky (1965) 
analyzes the class of nominal expressions, N, according to the following 
subcategorization hierarchy: 
(i) N → [+N, Common] 
(ii) [+Common] → [Count] 
(iii) [+Count] → [-Animate] 
(iv) [-Common] → [Animate] 
(v) [+Animate] → [Human] 
(vi) [-Count] → [Abstract] 
By way of a full example, Chomsky proposes that the lexical entry for the Word ‘boy’ 
(i.e., the lexical root boy) consists in the following selectional features: 
boy: [+N, +Common, +Count, +Human] 
Notice that there is no need here to positively specify the feature [+Animate], as this 
follows from the feature-marking [+Human]. Strictly speaking, Chomsky goes so far as 
to suggest that the category label [+N] is itself predictable from the other specified 
features and is therefore otiose. Indeed, this latter proposal has recently reappeared as 
part of what Chomsky (2005b: 14) calls “bare phrase structure.” However, as reported by 
Radford (2009: 77) this hypothesis has yet to garner widespread support from the broader 
Minimalist community. 
Yet under the plausible assumption that ‘boy’ is lexically marked as a count noun, it 
can legitimately combine with the definite determiner ‘the’ to form the determiner 
phrase/DP ‘the boy’. Conversely, Chomsky (1965) hypothesizes that the lexical entry for 
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‘the’ carries a subcategorization feature that licenses its combination with count nouns 
such as ‘boy’. Specifically, this selectional restriction can be specified as follows, 
the: [+D, +Definite, — [+N] — [+Count], …] 
where collectively the categorial feature [+D] and the subcategorization feature 
[+Definite] identify the functional root the as a definite determiner, and the selectional 
feature ‘— [+N] — [+Count]’ indicates that the Word ‘the’ “selects for” a count noun as 
one of its direct complements (the ellipsis ‘…’ indicating that it selects for other 
categories as well).  
Verbs, by contrast, subcategorize for both the number (i.e., valence/adicity) and 
type of their internal grammatical arguments (i.e., direct and indirect objects). For 
example, Chomsky proposes that the lexical entry for a verb like ‘frighten’ can be 
specified as follows, 
frighten: [+V, — NP, — [+N] — [-Animate], …] 
where here the first selectional feature ‘— NP’ indicates that ‘frighten’ takes an NP as its 
direct object, whereas the second feature [— [+N] — [-Animate]] indicates that the head 
noun of that NP cannot designate an inanimate object (i.e., it must refer to a sentient 
being).50 By contrast, the lexical entry for verbs such as ‘eat’ and ‘grow’ encode, in 
addition to [+ — NP] the feature [— #] reflecting their status as verbs that permit direct 
object omission/deletion. In short, the feature theory introduced by Chomsky (1965) 
implements a kind of agreement system where the subcategorization features of Words 
must agree with the selectional features of their complements, and vice versa. 
                                                 
50 As a point of historical interest, Chomsky (1965) flirts with the subcategory feature [+/-Transitive] to 
distinguish transitive from intransitive verbs. But here again the adicity of ‘frighten’ follows from the fact 
that only a direct object is specified by its lexical entry. 
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I haven’t the space here for a more comprehensive review of Chomsky’s (1965) 
feature system, which is fairly sophisticated in its finer details.51 Rather, this discussion is 
merely intended to give a “feel” for the theoretical role that lexical features were 
originally invoked to play, and indeed continue to play in contemporary generative 
linguistics. However, to round out the present example, notice how the feature 
specifications of ‘boy’ and ‘frighten’ capture the fact that while (5) below sounds fine, 
(6) is somehow anomalous: 
(5) Sincerity may frighten the boy 
(6) *Sincerity may frighten justice 
The postulated reason for the anomaly in (6) is again that so-called “psych” verbs such as 
‘frighten’ only select for NP complements marked [+Animate]. By contrast, the noun 
‘justice’ presumably subcategorizes as [+Abstract], which implies both [-Human] and [-
Animate]. This mismatch in selectional/subcategorization features thus putatively 
explains the infelicity of (6). 
Now, it is a point of contention whether (6) is grammatically anomalous as opposed 
to merely invoking a thought that is conceptually odd or otherwise incoherent. That is, 
the question is whether the unacceptability of (6) owes to a language-internal syntactic 
violation or a language-external conceptual constraint. To flag (6) with a ‘*’, as many 
linguists would, is to treat it as ungrammatical. But to my mind the anomaly of (6), unlike 
say (4) from above, is on a par with sentences like “Colorless green ideas sleep 
furiously,” which while nonsensical Chomsky considers to be perfectly well-formed, 
grammatically speaking (and I happen to agree). But setting individual cases aside, this 
                                                 
51 And so far as I can tell, much of what Chomsky said in 1965 is still considered valid. 
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distinction is important because it bears on the division of lexical labor introduced earlier 
between SYN and SEM features, and is therefore worth dwelling on a moment longer. 
2.4.1.3. Distinguishing SYNs from SEMs 
First of all, one can agree that the infelicity of (6) is attributable to a feature 
mismatch without assuming that it violates a rule of grammar. More specifically, the 
suggestion I have in mind goes hand-in-hand with Chomsky’s more recent distinction 
between “c-selection” features (for category or constituent selection) and what he calls 
“s-selection” features (for semantic selection), which corresponds roughly to the 
distinction I am making between SYNs and SEMs. As I understand the distinction, the 
subclass of c-selection features, which subsumes both major category and 
subcategorization features, are purely formal, language-internal devices employed by I-
languages solely in the service of building interpretable syntactic structures.52 More 
specifically, c-selection features impose constraints on the combinatorial potential of 
words, violations of which result in ungrammaticality, which is to say that they lead to a 
“crash” (or lack of “convergence”) in the derivational process. 
By contrast, s-selection features are by hypothesis visible to and thus directly 
interpretable by conceptual consumers (or again “belief-systems” as they are sometimes 
called) at the C-I interface. In other words, while also grammatically relevant, s-selection 
features have direct consequences for the semantic interpretations of their host Words 
(relative to a context of utterance). I’ll say more below about what those consequences 
are, but we can think of the s-selection features of a Word, collectively, as constituting its 
linguistic meaning. But for the sake of clarity, I will hereafter abandon the notions of “c-
                                                 
52 Or to borrow an apt metaphor from Paul Pietroski (p.c.), we can think of c-selection features as formal 
devices that are necessary “to keep the trains running on time.” 
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selection” and “s-selection” in favor of the labels ‘SYN’ and ‘SEM’, respectively. 
Likewise, I will henceforth think of the SEM features of a Word, collectively, as 
constituting various aspects of its lexical meaning. 
2.4.1.4. Some facts about lexical meanings (SEMs) 
As with just about everything else in theoretical linguistics, the grammatical 
significance of SEMs/lexical meanings is a hotly debated issue. However, it is widely 
agreed that syntactic structures are projections of the lexical features of their constituents. 
In particular, certain SEM features of verbs are said to determine the syntactic realization 
of their argument structure. As Levin & Rappaport (2005: 7) report, for example: 
Since the 1980s, many theories of grammar have been built on the assumption that the 
syntactic realization of arguments—their category type and their grammatical function—
is largely predictable from the meaning of their verbs. Such theories take many facets of 
the syntactic structure of a sentence to be projections of the lexical properties of its 
predicator—its verb or argument-taking lexical item.” [my emphases]. 
Levin & Rappaport Hovav are referring specifically to Chomsky and others who embrace 
a theory of argument realization grounded in the thematic relations which hold between 
events and their event participants, where participant roles (or thematic–roles) are 
specified in terms of semantic notions such as Agent, Patient, Experiencer, Goal, Path, 
and so forth. As L&R report further (ibid: 8): 
Chomsky (1986: 86), for example, suggests that part of the semantic description of the 
verb hit is a specification that it selects arguments bearing the semantic roles agent and 
patient. He suggests that the syntactic type and grammatical relation of each argument (c-
selection) can be derived from s-selection via general principles, so that subcategorization 
frames can be dispensed with altogether. 
While the issues here are again controversial, the leading idea is that the participant roles 
of the events designated by various verbal subcategories correspond to the structural 
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positions of their grammatical arguments. For example, the grammatical subjects (or 
external arguments) of transitive action verbs always correspond to the thematic Agent of 
the designated event (roughly speaking, its cause), whereas their direct objects (or 
internal arguments) correspond to the event’s Patient/Theme role (roughly, the thing 
acted upon).53 Similar generalizations hold cross-linguistically for other postulated verbal 
subclasses. 
I am deliberately keeping the discussion here general in the interest of both clarity 
and brevity. But of greatest import is Chomsky’s Projectionist Hypothesis, which has 
become more or less orthodoxy in contemporary generative linguistics. The hypothesis, 
as I understand it, is that the syntactic realization of a verb’s argument structure is a 
projection of its lexically-encoded thematic structure as mediated by “linking rules” that 
bind these two structures together. Importantly, the postulated lexical features that 
determine thematic relations are typically characterized as being semantic in nature, 
which is to say classifiable as SEM/s-selection features in Chomsky’s terminology. In 
this sense, the SEM features of Words are said to be the “semantic determinants” of 
linguistic structure/form. 
However, one might question whether the features that determine argument 
structure are in fact semantic in nature, which implies that they are directly interpretable 
at the interface to C-I. For one can imagine a combinatorial system that interprets SEM 
features, syntactically, as instructions to introduce into the emerging structure certain 
functional elements (e.g., little v) that correspond to semantic notions such as Agents, 
Patients, and so on. These functional elements are then interpreted by extralinguistic 
conceptual systems as something like instructions to activate the interpreter’s concepts 
                                                 
53 Cf., Williams (1994) for more on the distinction between internal and external arguments. 
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AGENT(x), PATIENT(x), and so forth; cf., Pietroski (2005). In other words, the suggestion 
here, which strikes me as quite plausible, is that what Chomsky and others construe as “s-
selection” features (i.e., SEMs) might in fact turn out to be “c-selection” features (or 
again what I have been calling SYNs) that have certain indirect yet predictable semantic 
consequences. 
2.4.2. Projectionism vs. Constructivism 
Nothing terribly dramatic turns on this last conjecture, but it squares more evenly 
with a recent challenge to Chomsky’s Projectionism known as Constructivism, variants of 
which can be found in Halle & Marantz (1993), Hale & Keyser (1993, 2002), Harley & 
Noyer (1999), Borer (2005a/b), and Ramchand (2008), and which at moments Chomsky 
himself appears sympathetic toward. Constructivists point out that the extreme category 
flexibility exhibited by most open-class roots with respect to their possible insertion 
frames indicates that they are inherently category-neutral.54 Or at any rate most open-
class Words can be “coerced” by the syntax into playing non-canonical grammatical roles 
by a derivational process known as conversion. Observe, for example, how 
easily/naturally the italicized roots in the sentences below adapt to their syntactic 
environments to play the roles indicated in parentheses: 
(7a) Max is strapped for cash (noun  verb) 
(7b) Max’s talk was unbearable (verb  noun) 
(7c) Max googled the book title (name  verb) 
(7d) Max browned the potatoes (adjective  verb) 
(7e) Max upped the ante (preposition  verb) 
                                                 
54 As Ramchand (2008: 10) puts it, under these views “The root is the only lexical category.” 
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(7f) Max has a runny nose (verb  adjective) 
(7g) Max can conceiv[e]ably win (verb  adverb) 
Examples like these are indeed endless.55 The common hypothesis here is that the 
placement and role of open-class roots is projected not by their lexically-encoded features 
but rather by the functional hierarchy (or functional “sequence”) into which open-class 
roots are inserted. In turn, the lexical category of open-class items is inherited from or 
otherwise determined by the functional elements that head these sequences. On more 
radical Constructivist accounts, open-class Words/LIs are treated as entirely featureless 
morphosyntactic formatives devoid of any independently specifiable linguistic meaning 
(cp., Marantz [1997]). 
Adjudicating this question of Projectionism versus Constructivism is well beyond 
my expertise. However, I am compelled by clear cases of category flexibility (or what 
might be alternatively described as type/category polysemy),56 which weighs in favor of a 
Constructivist-style approach to morphosyntax while inveighing against Projectionism. In 
contrast to radical accounts, however, there is contravening evidence to suggest that at 
least some open-class Words as they are listed in the lexicon are not entirely meaningless, 
and perhaps also not entirely featureless; cf., Ramchand (2008). For instance, despite 
widespread category flexibility some Words are stubbornly inflexible. Take the verb 
‘put’, which is rigidly ditransitive/trivalent (i.e., it seems to require three arguments: a 
subject, direct object, and indirect object) as demonstrated by (8a)-(8c):57 
(8a) Max put the book on the table 
                                                 
55 For some psycholinguistic evidence to this conclusion, see Barner & Bale (2002).  
56 This phenomenon is known as “class extension” in the developmental literature; cf.,McCawley (1968), 
Clark & Clark (1979). 




(8b) *Max put 
(8c) *Max put the book 
Such constraints are difficult to explain without supposing that relevant 
selectional/subcategorization criteria are encoded in the verb’s lexical entry. 
While these kinds of facts/generalizations need to be reckoned with, they are also 
clearly exceptions to the general rule that most Words are highly adaptable to the 
linguistic environment into which they are inserted. The null hypothesis, however, which 
I am inclined to accept, is that at least some Words lexically encode the kind of 
constraints exhibited by (5), as violations of these constraints are non-controversially 
syntactic in nature. Nevertheless, the crucial observation is that grammatical processes 
appear capable, in most instances, of either dynamically assigning category-specific 
features to Words or reassigning them in the course of computation as determined by 
their insertion frames. This outcome is not unwelcome, however, as it greatly reduces the 
amount of redundancy (homophony) in the lexicon that would otherwise be needed to 
explain facts about category flexibility. In any case, I will briefly return to this topic in 
Chapter 5 while just assuming as much in what follows. 
To summarize the present discourse, in 1965 Chomsky considered all lexical 
features to be essentially syntactic in nature. Specifically, he writes (1965: 82): 
Each lexical formative will have associated with it a set of syntactic features (thus boy 
will have the syntactic features [+Common], [+Human], etc.). [Chomsky’s emphasis]. 
However, by 1986 Chomsky had begun making a distinction between c-selection and s-
selection features. And, indeed, Chomsky (1995) considers the possibility that all c-
selection/SYN features are predictable from and thus reducible to lexically-encoded s-
selection/SEM features. Yet considerations raised by Grimshaw (1979) and Pesetsky 
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(1982) cast doubt on a full reduction. In particular, Chomsky concludes that idiosyncratic 
Case features, which correlate with the classical, positionally-defined grammatical 
relations “subject of” and “object of,” are not entirely eliminable; Chomsky (1995: 32) 
observes: 
…it’s important to note that formal syntactic specifications in lexical entries have not 
been entirely eliminated in favor of semantic ones. Whether or not verbs assign objective 
Case is, as far as is known at present, a purely formal property not deducible from 
semantics. While much of c-selection follows from s-selection, there is a syntactic 
residue, statable, if Psestsky is correct, in terms of lexically idiosyncratic Case properties. 
Again eliding the details and attendant controversy, for purposes here the upshot is that 
the distinction between SYN and SEM features that I have been laboring to motivate 
appears to be warranted. 
More specifically, the current proposal marks a clear theoretical distinction between 
features that have purely syntactic consequences versus those that have direct semantic 
significance. For while the former may have semantic “reflexes,” by hypothesis they are 
not themselves directly interpretable by C-I. By contrast, while “bona-fide” SEM features 
such as [Abstract], [Human], and [Animate] may have certain syntactic reflexes, they 
are directly interpretable at the interface to C-I. This proposal is attractive because it 
helps distinguish intuitions about syntactic anomalies such as (4) above (*Max declared 
his innocence the deed) from semantic anomalies such as that engendered by (6) above 
(“Sincerity may frighten justice”). For again on my view the anomaly in (6) owes not to 
the violation of a grammatical rule but rather to conceptual difficulties in constructing a 
coherent thought from the linguistically generated meaning assigned to that particular 
string of Words. 
 92 
 
2.5. On the nature of lexical meanings 
Setting aside facts that are exclusively syntactic in nature, the main concern of this 
chapter is again to characterize the nature of lexical meanings. To this end, and with 
minor elaborations, I shall adopt Chomsky’s conception of lexical meanings/SEMs as 
intrinsic properties of Words that are understood, collectively, by interpreters as 
instructions to activate semantically related extralinguistic concepts. In turn, we can think 
of the meaning of a sentence as an instruction for how to construct a thought which, when 
all goes well, results in activation of roughly the same thought that its speaker intended to 
communicate. One of course wants to know more precisely what these meaning-
instructions consist in. I will offer a more detailed analysis of the notion of “meanings-as-
linguistic-instructions” in Chapter 5. But by way of introduction, I find it helpful to frame 
the idea in terms of the relation between Words (or Word-sounds) and the concepts they 
lexicalize. 
2.5.1. On concept lexicalization 
First, I take for granted that competent speakers typically use/utter individual words 
of natural language to express basic lexical concepts (i.e., roughly “word-sized” 
concepts). The English word ‘dog’, for example, is typically used to express the concept 
DOG(x). Conversely, a listener’s interpretation of ‘dog’-utterances reliably causes him or 
her to think about dogs, presumably in consequence having activated his/her DOG(x) 
concept. Such commonsense observations invite the empirical hypothesis that the 
meaning of the word ‘dog’ in the idiolects of most competent English speakers is 
somehow semantically related to their concept DOG(x). Indeed, a widely held view among 
cognitive and developmental psychologists is that the meaning of a word just is (i.e., is 
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constituted by) the concept that it lexicalizes, where concept lexicalization is said to 
establish a fixed association in long-term lexical memory between words and whatever 
extralinguistic concepts speakers associate with their meanings.58, 59 
For example, typical learners of English typically lexicalize their concept DOG(x) 
under the Word ‘dog’ because they are typically attending to dog-thoughts (with their 
DOG(x) concept) at or around the time of acquisition. By noticing, perhaps only tacitly at 
first, the systematic correlation between ‘dog’-utterances and dog-thoughts, learners 
eventually infer that the Word ‘dog’ is used/uttered by competent English speakers to 
express their DOG(x) concept. Put differently, we might say that competent speakers use 
the Word ‘dog’ to designate dogs by means of expressing their concept DOG(x). And this 
is evidently what learners eventually figure out. Or as Paul Bloom (2000: 8) writes: “the 
child is looking at a dog, someone says “dog,” and she somehow connects the word with 
the object.” At some point, so the story goes, neurology eventually takes over and the 
learner’s DOG(x) concept becomes lexicalized (memorized, roughly speaking) under (or 
with) the Word ‘dog’. Once lexicalized, learners then begin to utter ‘dog’ for themselves 
                                                 
58 Paul Bloom (2000: 89) writes, for example, that “Learning a word involves mapping a form, such as the 
sound “dog,” onto a meaning or concept, such as the concept of dogs.” Murphy (2002: 385) writes “By 
word meaning, I mean quite generally the aspect of words that gives them significance and relates them to 
the world… words gain their significance by being connected to concepts.” Jackendoff (1999: 306) 
characterizes language as “a vehicle for expressing concepts.” Margolis & Laurence (1999:4) remark that 
“it's common to think that words in natural languages inherit their meanings from the concepts they are 
used to express.” Snedeker (2009: 503) claims that “All theorists agree that children must learn the 
mapping between the phonological form and the concept.” Pinker (1994: 85) says that “each person’s brain 
contains a lexicon and the concepts they stand for…” Relatedly, Fodor (2008: 198) states that “what an 
English sentence means is determined, pretty much exhaustively, by the content of the thought it is used to 
express.” 
59 As Chomsky (2000a: 61) himself puts it, one of the child’s first tasks in acquiring her native language is 
the assignment of “labels to concepts,” whereby “labels” I take him to mean a word’s phonological form. 
However, Chomsky says little about the nature of concepts. Indeed, as Fodor (2008: 102, fn.2) observes: 
“It’s a question of some exegetical interest why Chomsky so regularly avoids this issue. I suspect it’s 
because he takes some sort of ‘theory theory’ of concepts more or less for granted.” However, Chomsky 
(2003: 279) explicitly denies this charge. 
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to express their concept DOG(x).60 In the reverse direction, subsequent ‘dog’-utterances 
will, ceteris paribus, eventuate in the activation of its interpreter’s DOG(x) concept such 
that when one hears the Word-sound \'do  g\ one naturally thinks DOG(x). 
Notice that while Chomsky describes Words as arbitrary pairings of Word-sounds 
with their meanings, it is widely agreed that Word acquisition involves more than mere 
associative learning (although associative learning may be a necessary stage of Word 
learning). For instance, learning that ‘dog’ is used to designate dogs (or to express 
DOG(x)) is not merely recognizing and then memorizing that dogs and ‘dog’-utterances 
frequently co-occur. For if this were the case, learners would often fail to get the Word-
to-world mapping right—as Quine observed, there are simply too many contingencies to 
sort out, especially in highly ambiguous contexts and in cases of displaced reference. 
Rather, young children quickly become aware of the fact that Words are devices of 
symbolic reference that can be used to refer to things even when those things are not 
perceptually present/salient. In addition, the learning task often requires joint attention 
between speaker and hearer in order to triangulate the intended object of reference. Here, 
even pre-linguistic infants appear to be fantastically adept at using extralinguistic cues 
such as eye gaze and manual gestures to disambiguate what caregivers are using 
unfamiliar Word-sounds to “stand for.” Moreover, for such cues to be effective Word-
learners must be aware of the speaker’s referential intentions—i.e., they must represent 
speakers as having the intention to deploy these noises as symbols of the items being 
jointly attended to. In other words, a very young age language learners appear to 
                                                 
60 I’ll say more about the nature of basic/lexical concepts in Chapter 3. But for now notice that I am taking 
there to be just one concept DOG(x) that is shared by everyone who acquires it in virtue of each its tokens 
having a common content in Fodor’s (1998) sense of a semantically primitive mental representation being 
“locked to” its referent. 
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recognize that the uttered symbol is produced with the intention of representing 
something other than the symbol itself.61 
I will elaborate on these last few points in Chapter 4. But for now such observations 
are again suggestive of the fact that lexical meanings somehow relate Words to their 
referents by way of the concepts those Words lexicalize and are subsequently used to 
express. As mentioned, an even stronger claim is that the meaning of a Word just is the 
concept that it lexicalizes (or perhaps rather its representational content). More 
specifically, the stronger claim is that the Word ‘dog’ designates dogs because (i) the 
Word ‘dog’ lexicalizes the concept DOG(x), and (ii) the concept DOG(x) represents dogs. 
On this view, in other words, the semantic relationship between Words and the concepts 
they lexicalize/express is strictly one-to-one. Now, while one can agree that lexical 
meanings somehow relate Words to the concepts they lexicalize, there are several reasons 
to resist this stronger claim, a few of which I mentioned in Chapter 1. One very good 
reason, however, owes to the problem of category flexibility described above. For if the 
concepts expressed by Words depend on their grammatical role, and grammatical roles 
are context-sensitive, then so is the potential range of concepts that a given Word can be 
used to express. If, by contrast, lexical meanings are rigidly anchored one-to-one to 
particular concepts, it becomes quite difficult to explain the phenomenon of category 
flexibility—or, that is, again without assuming massive redundancy/homophony in the 
lexicon. There is, however, a second related obstacle. 
                                                 
61 Or as Bloom (2000: 55) puts it “When children learn the meaning of a word, they are—whether they 
know it or not—learning something about the thoughts of other people. 
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2.5.2. The problem of lexical polysemy 
In addition to category flexibility, there remains the problem of what I will call 
intra-category lexical polysemy.62 To borrow Chomsky’s favorite example, the English 
Word ‘book’ can be used as a common noun to designate either a physical copy of 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace or its abstract content, and in some contexts perhaps both 
simultaneously. Chomsky remarks: 
One might ask whether these properties are part of the meaning of the word “book” 
or of the concept associated with the word... Either way, some features of the lexical 
item “book” that are internal to it determine modes of interpretation of the kind just 
mentioned. 
In addition to its category label, the kinds of properties that are thought to determine a 
noun’s “mode of interpretation” are s-selection/SEM features, including those discussed 
earlier such as [Count], [Abstract], [Animate], [Human], and [Artifact], which are 
again classified as SEMs because by hypothesis they are directly interpretable at the 
interface to C-I. 
For example, the Word ‘book’ as used to designate a physical object will include 
the feature-markings [+N, +Count, -Abstract, -Animate, +Artifact]. So marked, the 
meaning of ‘book’ in this context will be understood by interpreters as an instruction to 
activate a concept of countable, concrete, inanimate, humanly-made objects. But notice 
that there are lots of concepts, and corresponding concept-Words, that satisfy these 
criteria yet which have nothing to do with books. The Word ‘teapot’, for example, 
expresses a concept of countable, concrete, inanimate, artifactual objects. Yet ‘teapot’ 
clearly cannot be used in ordinary discourse to talk about books, nor vice versa. Thus, we 
                                                 




need of a conception of lexical meaning that not only accounts for what Words mean but 
also what they cannot mean. The general idea, as suggested earlier, is that each use of a 
Word involves the selection of features from the Numeration, some of which are fixed by 
the Word’s lexical entry and others are derived as dictated by the linguistic context. Thus, 
the exact feature configuration for a given use of a Word may vary from context to 
context, or even from utterance to utterance. 
While Chomsky is rarely explicit about this, he seems committed to the idea that 
the lexical entries for inherently polysemous Words like ‘book’ encode a stable semantic 
feature that constrains their possible interpretation in all contexts to all and only those 
concepts that are coherently expressible with that Word. For example, this feature would 
rule out the use of ‘book’ to express, say, the concepts CUMQUAT(x) and TURNSTILE(x) in 
ordinary conversation. Below I offer a formal Tarskian analysis that captures such 
constraints on the context-invariant aspect of a Word’s meaning in terms of their 
satisfaction conditions. But in purely psychological terms, a plausible hypothesis, as 
briefly introduced in Chapter 1, is that such constraints are encoded in the lexical entries 
for Words as a pointer to an address in extralinguistic conceptual memory around which a 
potential family of formally distinct yet analytically related concepts all cluster; e.g., 
BOOK(x)CONCRETE and BOOK(x)ABSTRACT.
63 By hypothesis, these pointers are established as 
                                                 
63 The notion of a “family” of analytically related concepts borrows partly from Paul Pietroski (p.c.), I 
believe by way of Chomsky (via Wittgenstein). However, a similar notion also appears frequently in the 
work of contemporary native German-speaking linguists and philosophers of language, which falls under 
the general heading of “two-level semantics” (not to be confused with the so-called “two-dimensional 
semantics” of Jackson, Chalmers, et. al.), and particularly as addressed to the phenomenon of lexical 
polysemy. Cf., e.g., Bierwisch (1983), Ruhl (1989), Bluntner (1998), Dolling (1995), and Konerding 
(1997). Unfortunately (for me), much of this work is either published in German or not readily accessible 




part of the lexicalization process and thereby fix the semantic relationship between 
Words and the concept(s) they lexicalize. 
As a way of distinguishing these pointers from other posited SEM features, let me 
introduce the label ‘CON’ to indicate one aspect of a Word’s context-invariant meaning 
that circumscribes the range of CONcepts that it can coherently be used/uttered to express 
in ordinary discourse. Now, it may be that CON points directly to some “core sense” of a 
given Word-form from which each of its subordinate senses derive. This core sense may, 
for instance, be the first concept lexicalized, or perhaps the most frequently activated. But 
either way, the idea is that activation of this core sense triggers a spreading chain of 
activation to its other subordinate senses via a network of cognitive associations (cf. 
Klepousniotou, et.al., 2008). Alternatively, Pylkkänen and colleagues (2006: 97) argue in 
favor of a so-called “single entry view” according to which “Related senses connect to 
same abstract lexical representation, but are distinctly listed within that representation.”64 
In other words, on this latter view each sense of a Word is said to be listed under a single 
lexical entry. I will return to some of these details in Chapter 5. But however lexical 
polysemy is represented, several recent psycholinguistic studies confirm long-standing 
evidence that many (perhaps all) senses of a Word are typically co-activated in the course 
of its interpretation.65 
Let me pause to mention that most parties to this debate presume that lexical 
polysemy is a property of Words and that the various senses of a polysemous Word are 
                                                 
64 Similar findings are reported in Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson (2002), Beretta, Fiorentino, & Poeppel 
(2005) and Rubio-Fernandez (2008), among others. 
65 Gorfein (2002: 5) writes, for example, that “More than 30 years of research on lexical access has led to 
the conclusion that for some substantial portion of the time, multiple meanings of a word are active after 
the word is processed. A body of evidence further indicates that later in the process the contextually 
appropriate meaning of the word tends to be available but other meanings are no longer active.” 
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represented as such in the lexicon. As I argue in in Chapter 5, however, a more 
empirically plausible hypothesis is that lexical polysemy is in fact an extralinguistic 
conceptual phenomenon adducible to the analytic relations between the concepts that 
polysemous Word-sounds lexicalize. Assuming the latter, one can hypothesize that 
Words themselves are monosemous—that their CON feature points to a single address in 
extralinguistic conceptual memory around which a potential family of concepts are 
interconnected through a network of associative links. In this way, we can characterize 
lexical meanings as linguistically-specified instructions to activate one or more of 
potentially several analytically related extralinguistic concepts (or what we might think 
of as related senses or polysemes of that Word).66 
As also suggested in Chapter 1, precisely which concept/sense gets “selected” as 
appropriate to a given context doubtlessly depends on a number of factors, both linguistic 
and extralinguistic. But in most cases I assume that the meaning of a Word (i.e., its SEM 
features, including what I have labeled ‘CON’) in combination with the linguistic context 
in which that Word appears will be sufficient to identify which concept its utterer 
intended to express.67 With respect to present concerns, however, the relevant 
consequence is that the meaning of an inherently polysemous Word such as ‘book’ 
cannot be identified with any one concept that it lexicalizes.68  
From a philosophical perspective, one idea of the late Wittgenstein that Chomsky 
seems to embrace is that the meaning of an inherently polysemous Word such as ‘book’ 
                                                 
66 For all one knows, Chomsky borrowed this idea from Strawson (1950) who held a similar view about 
referential terms. 
67 And when that’s not enough, speakers can utilize metalinguistic beliefs about what a given Word can be 
used to express, as I argue in greater detail in Chapter 5. 




makes available multiple senses of that Word that exhibit a kind of “family resemblance.” 
To endorse this much is not however to adopt Wittgenstein’s skepticism about the 
attribution of rule-following in a private language as a way of explaining a speaker’s 
linguistic competence. For again according to Chomsky, we are to think of the meanings 
of Words, and of linguistic expressions more generally, as being, or at least being 
understood as “rules” or “instructions for thought and action.”69 Yet commonsense 
dictates that the same rules/instructions can often be satisfied, or obeyed, or executed in a 
number of different ways. In fact, if I understand Chomsky correctly that’s just what it is 
for a Word to be polysemous. For in the present example there are at least two perfectly 
good ways (actually more than two)70 of executing the meaning-instruction encoded by 
the lexical entry for ‘book’, which is by activating either BOOK(x)CONC or BOOK(x)ABS. 
2.5.3. On the nature of Words and their lexical meanings—Summing up 
In summary of the discussion to this point, I have been advocating a technical 
conception of Words that are internally represented by (or within) I-languages as 
particular instantiations of the complex mental structure <PHON, SYN, SEM>. In a 
modest departure from standard Chomskyan terminology, though keeping to the spirit of 
his view, I have introduced the label ‘CON’ as way of talking about the context-invariant 
aspect of a Word’s meaning that restricts its range of application to all and only those 
concepts that are coherently expressible with that Word. To be clear, however, I am 
assuming that CON is one of perhaps several other SEM features encoded by a Word’s 
lexical entry and that taken together constitutes its linguistic meaning. In terms of 
processing, it is the CON feature of a Word that points interpreters to the right conceptual 
                                                 
69 Chomsky (2000a: 9). 
70 One can also book a ticket, a wager, an appointment, and so on. 
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“neighborhood.” From there, other SEM features conspire with contextual factors to 
narrow down the search. And when all goes well, the search is constrained to precisely 
the concept that its speaker intended to express. 
As cited earlier, Chomsky maintains that “LIs may be decomposed and 
reconstructed in the course of computation” and, moreover, that “any feature change 
yields a different LI.” In my terminology, this means that any difference in lexically-
encoded features yields a different Word. And in terms of lexical meanings, any 
difference in lexically-encoded SEM features yields a different meaning. Thus, in 
response to our opening question which asked under what conditions two utterances are 
tokens of the same Word, my proposal is this: Whenever those utterances are registered 
by a speaker’s I-language as being type-identical with respect to each of their lexically 
encoded PHON, SYN, and SEM features. 
2.6. On referential uses of Words 
I have to this point been assuming a distinction between the linguistically-encoded 
meanings of Words and their denotational or referential uses in discourse. In this section I 
will sketch a hypothesis about such uses, focusing in particular on referential uses of 
proper names. For as discussed in Chapter 1, names play a central role in my core thesis 
about metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC) and its relation to semantic theory. 
And the semantic theory for names developed below will be assumed in later chapters. 
2.6.1. Lexical expressions (LEs) 
To repeat, I am assuming that Words are best characterized (with noted exceptions) 
as lexical roots that appear as terminal nodes in syntactic trees. As observed earlier, open-
class Words/roots combine with other LIs to create morphologically complex 
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expressions. In this section I argue that some Words—and nouns in particular (both 
common and proper)—also combine with syntactic indices to generate non-terminal 
lexical expressions, or LEs for short. In a sense to be made more precise in Chapters 6 
and 7, this formal distinction has implications for our ordinary conceptions of Word-
meanings. 
2.6.2. Referential indices 
It has become commonplace nowadays among semanticists to posit various kinds of 
covert (unpronounced) syntactic elements—including variables and/or indices—in the 
logical forms of linguistic expressions to account for grammatically controlled semantic 
phenomena such as anaphora, ellipsis, theta-linking, quantifier scope and domain 
restriction, among others.71 Most relevant to my purposes here, Baker (2003) argues, for 
example, that referential indices attached to common nouns are what distinguish nouns 
from other lexical categories. I refer readers to the source for the full technical details. 
But in brief outline, Baker’s argument derives from Geach (1962) and Gupta (1980) 
according to whom “only common nouns have a component of meaning that makes it 
legitimate to ask whether some X is the same (whatever) as Y.” And this is to suggest 
that only nouns have criteria of identity—they “provide standards of sameness by which 
we can judge whether X is the same as Y.”72 
                                                 
71 Other applications include the contextual provisioning of comparison classes for comparative adjectives, 
and likewise for the contextual precisification of gradable adjectives. 
72 Baker acknowledges Chomsky’s recent injunction against syntactic indices as superfluous/redundant to 
computation.72 However, Baker claims that his reasons for invoking indices are not those to which 
Chomsky objects. Or in any case, he writes: “It does not actually matter to my theory whether these indices 
are present throughout the computation of a linguistic structure. A legitimate alternative would be that these 
indices are added at the conceptual-intentional interface, just beyond LF. The substance of my theory can 
thus be made consistent with Chomsky’s (1995) view that indices are not part of the linguistic 
representation proper. I nevertheless include indices freely in my syntactic representations, because I do not 
know any compelling reason to say they are not there and because it makes the representations more 
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As Baker conceives them, nominal indices consist in an ordered pair of integers 
yielding complex expressions of the form ‘X{j, k}’ which correspond to the interpretation 
“j is the same X as k.” More specifically, nominal expressions of the form ‘X{j, k}’ 
express a two-place equivalence relation between the semantic value (or referent) of an 
indexed noun and other co-occurring, coindexed expressions.73 The relevant idea is that 
the distribution of nominal indices is regulated by the grammar which thereby determines 
formal constraints on the coreference (or non-coreference) of their tokens. In short, 
“anything that has a referential index must be coindexed with something else in the 
structure,” where coindexation implies coreference.74 
A similar but differently motivated view is defended by Fiengo & May (1998, 
2006) to account for the referential codependency between type-identical tokens of 
proper names. I return in Chapter 6 to consider their proposal in greater detail. But the 
point for now is that Fiengo & May cite convincing reasons for distinguishing names 
from the syntactic expressions of those names in a discourse. According to them, names 
are lexical items (or roughly speaking, Words in my terminology) that “occur in” or are 
“contained by” non-terminal expressions of those names. Importantly, Fiengo & May 
contend that names themselves are semantically empty—they have no independently 
specifiable meaning/reference outside of a discourse. 
More specifically, Fiengo & May treat names merely as syntactic formatives that 
combine with referential indices to create complex nominal expressions of the form ‘[NP 
                                                                                                                                                 
explicit. I leave the exact status of these indices at the different stages of linguistic computation open for 
further conceptual reflection and empirical research.” 
73 For the record, however, Baker qualifies that “readers are invited mentally to reduce my ordered pairs to 
a simple integer if they like. But given that the bearing of a referential index is underwritten by the lexical 
semantic property of having a criterion of identity in my view, and since identity is inherently a two-place 
relation, I assume that pair-indices ultimately make more sense conceptually. 
74 Baker’s account is especially well-suited to explain robust facts about grammatically-determined 
referential dependencies between anaphors and their nominal antecedents. 
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Aristotle]i’, where the index ‘i’ tracks the syntactic identity (or difference) of its tokens 
(again relative to a context/discourse). Since type-identical tokens are necessarily 
covalued, i.e., as a function of the grammar, coindexation of nominal expressions 
determine their coreference. For example, the two coindexed expressions of the name 
‘Aristotle’ in (9) below indicate that they are type-identical and thus covalued (or 
coreferential): 
(9) [NP Aristotle]1 is [NP Aristotle]1 
Indeed, it is a competent speaker’s awareness of expression identity that renders trivial 
the referential identity asserted by (9). By contrast, non-coindexed expressions may or 
may not corefer as determined by speaker-intentions. For instance, the tokens of ‘[NP 
Aristotle]i’ in (10)-(12) are type-distinct, as determined by their non-coindexation, and 
are therefore free to refer to different individuals: 
(10) [NP Aristotle]1 was a Greek philosopher 
(11) [NP Aristotle]2 was a Greek shipping magnate 
(12) [NP Aristotle]1 is not [NP Aristotle]2 
The NPs in (9)-(12) are roughly equivalent to what above I called lexical expressions, or 
again LEs for short. My analysis of LEs is similar to Fiengo & May’s yet avoids some 
dubious consequences of their view. In particular, I argue that names themselves have 
fixed (i.e., context-invariant) meanings that restrict their range of application to only 
things so-called. In this way, we can think of the meanings of names (i.e., their CON 
features) as imposing restrictions on the domains over which the LEs that contain them 
range. Furthermore, I argue that the attachment of referential indices is optional as 
determined by speaker-intentions (but without venturing a guess as to precisely how 
speaker-intentions determine the outcome, one way or the other). 
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Following Fiengo & May, it will be a strategy of this work to specify the semantics 
of LEs in terms of Tarskian satisfaction conditions. With respect to notation, rather than 
using simple numerical indices I will employ syntactically complex variables (x1, x2, x3… 
xn) to render their status as independent syntactic constituents more perspicuous. The full 
details appear in Appendix A at the end of this Chapter. But as a sample, one can 
stipulate that the bare NPs ‘[NP [PN Cicero]]’ and ‘[NP [PN Tully]]’ combine with a 
referential index, [xn], n > 0, to form  are well-formed, non-coindexed yet coreferential 
LEs whose Tarskian assignments relative to a sequence, , are given by (13) and (14):75 
(13a) g(xi) = (i), i > 0 
(13b) g([[NP [PN Cicero]][xi]]) = x: x satisfies ‘Cicero’ iff x = (i) & (i) is called 
‘Cicero’ 
(14a) g(xk) = (k), k > 0 
(14b) g([[NP [PN Tully]][xk]]) = x: x satisfies ‘Tully’ iff x = (k) & (k) is called 
‘Tully’ 
According to (13b), the semantic value of the LE ‘[[NP [PN Cicero]][xi]]’ relative to any 
sequence, , is the i-th object in , and (14b) says that the semantic value of ‘[[NP [PN 
Tully]][xk]]’ is its k-th object. Since ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are typically used in reference to 
the same individual, it will turn out in typical cases that (xi) = (xk) = Marcus Tullius 
Cicero, for any sentence in which those names appear are true.  
To repeat a point made in Chapter 1, the category label ‘PN’ attached to names 
ensures that their tokens apply only to nameable things, whereas the lexically-encoded 
meanings of particular names further restricts their satisfaction conditions to all and only 
                                                 
75 Evidence suggests that names in English always combine with a covert determiner such as ‘the’ or ‘that’, 
in which case it would be more appropriate to label these phrases as DPs rather than NPs. However, I 
needn’t take a stance on the matter here. 
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those objects in the domain that are in fact so-called. The indices with which names 
optionally combine ensure that the LEs containing them refer uniquely to a single 
individual relative to a context/discourse (assuming that there is a referent that answers to 
the expression).76 
I again refer readers to Appendix A below for the full technical details. But in 
philosophical terms, as also briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, I am endorsing a view of 
proper names similar to Burge (1973) according to which names behave, semantically, 
like ordinary one-place predicates. As Burge argues, names function like 
demonstratives—expressions that have fixed meanings but variable reference. In short, 
while it appears that names have meanings that range over objects/individuals so-called, I 
nonetheless agree with Fiengo & May that names in isolation do not themselves refer. 
And so in this sense proper names in natural languages are more like what Kaplan (1990) 
calls “generic names.” Rather, on the view that I am endorsing it is the syntactic 
expression of a name relative to a context/discourse that facilitates its use as a device of 
direct, singular reference. However, names can also be used predicatively, which is to say 
without an index, in which case they are understood as expressing their lexically-encoded 
meanings, which is to say the property of being called by the name ‘PN’. 
One benefit of this proposal is that it stands to explain the difference between 
referential versus predicative/attributive uses of names. For instance, if one intends to 
refer to Aristotle Onassis, one might employ the indexed LE ‘[[NP [PN Aristotle]][xi]]’. 
However, if one intends to use a name with no particular individual in mind, one would 
instead use a bare (i.e., non-indexed) LE. For instance, by hypothesis utterances of the 
                                                 
76 There may be exceptions to this rule, as in Donnellan-style cases where a proper name is used 
successfully to refer to an individual not so-named. 
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question-sentence “Which Aristotle are you talking about?” contains as a constituent the 
non-indexed LE ‘[NP [PN Aristotle]]’. Similarly, one  might introduce a nonce name into 
the discourse by saying “Take your average John Doe” whereby one employs the non-
indexed LE ‘[NP [PN John Doe]]’ as a way of talking about no one in particular. Or to 
borrow a related example from Kent Bach (2002: 87): 
Suppose you and your friend discover a briefcase containing a large amount of 
money and quickly put the money in your shopping bag. You close the briefcase, put 
it down, and notice the name ‘Cassius King’ on the nameplate. You say to your 
friend, “Cassius King won’t be happy, but at least he’ll have his briefcase.” 
Here, the speaker is not using the name ‘Cassius King’ referentially but rather 
attributively, which is to say sans index. The same remarks apply equally to 
attributive/predicative uses of definite descriptions (e.g., ‘[DP [DD the average 
taxpayer]]’).77 
As importantly, and as also outlined in Chapter 1, this analysis of names can help to 
explain the informativeness of true identity statements of the form ‘ is ’, where ‘’ and 
‘’ are coreferential proper names. Illustrating this point is part of the project of Chapter 
7. But as a second substantive assumption of this work, I devote Chapter 3 to a review of 
Jerry Fodor’s conception of concepts and their representational contents. Several features 
of this discussion apply to my overall thesis. But perhaps most saliently I will be using 
Fodor’s view to ground my conception of the nature of Word concepts, or again 
conceptsW as I am distinguishing them. In general, a Fodorian theory of concepts coupled 
                                                 
77 More generally, I suspect that a speaker’s prerogative to deploy LEs with or without a referential index 
stands to explain the tendency of ordinary speakers to conflate the linguistic-semantic properties of Words 
with the referential properties of their lexical expressions in a discourse. 
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with a Chomskyan conception of Words I believe improves the overall plausibility of my 
conception of Word-concepts and their role within a theory of semantic competence. 
Appendix A 
1.  Encoding referential indices in a Tarskian-style semantics for natural 
language 
Recall that in Tarski’s system open sentences (or sentential functions) are said to be 
satisfied by sequences of ordered n-tuples of objects in the domain of discourse. More 
specifically, we can say that each free variable of an object language L stands in one-to-
one (surjective) correspondence to positions in a sequence of the general form   = <1, 2, 
3, …, n>, where the integers here serve as placeholders for corresponding objects in that 
sequence. This correspondence can be defined by an assignment (interpretation) function, 
g, that recursively maps sequence-objects onto corresponding variables that occur in open 
sentences. Accordingly, the system must allow for as many formally distinct variables as 
there are object positions in the sequence, and possible sequence-variants, which as 
Tarksi allowed may be infinitely many. 
To capture these distinctions more precisely, let me introduce the following 
axioms/definitions: 
 Let x be a variable of L that ranges over sequence-objects. 
 Let (x ^ i) describe a recursive operation on variables capable of generating 
infinitely many syntactically complex variables of the form <x1, x2, x3, …, xi>, 
such that for any sequence, ,  x1 corresponds to the first object in , x2 
corresponds to the second object, x3 to the third, and so such that xi corresponds to 
to the i-th object for any i ≥ 1. 
 Let Words of natural language, designated by , =df a class of naturally 
acquirable, syntactically primitive linguistic expressions whose tokens are 
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particular instantiations of the generic mental structure {PHON, SYN, SEM} as 
characterized in Chapter 2 above. 
 Let us further stipulate that Words combine, syntactically, with variables (i.e., 
referential indices) via the expression-forming operator ‘^’ to generate infinitely 
many lexical expressions (LEs) of the form ‘[XP [XL ][xi]]’, where ‘XP’ is a 
phrasal label (e.g., NP, VP, AP, etc.), ‘XL’ is a lexical category label for the 
Word ‘’, and the square brackets reflect the expression’s constituent structure.78 
 NB: Pace Fiengo & May I distinguish Words from Tarskian variables by 
stipulating that the former apply to a restricted range of sequence-objects as 
determined by their category labels, whereas the latter range over all sequence-
objects, though as restricted by lexical constituents with which they combine (see 
below). 
 Thus, we can let the following formula be an axiom of the system, 
 g(‘[XP [XL ][xi]]’) = (xi), for all i ≥ 1 
where g is function that assigns semantic values to variables, where ‘[XL ]’ is a 
labeled Word that applies to a restricted range of sequence-objects, where ‘xi’ is 
again a syntactically complex variable that ranges over sequence-objects so 
restricted, and where ‘XP’ is a phrasal category generated by the syntax as the 
result of inserting the term ‘[XL ]’ into a non-terminal node of the emerging 
structure. 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, and as will be important in later chapters, let me 
explain the interpretation of this notation using proper names, where proper names (or 
proper nouns) are understood to constitute a particular class of Words in the technical 
sense characterized above. 
                                                 
78 As suggested earlier, Words might first combine with other Words to form syntactic compounds, 




First, let us assume for example that the formulae ‘[PN Cicero] ^ [x1]’ and ‘[PN 
Tully] ^ [x2]’ generate well-formed LEs whose Tarskian assignments relative to a 
sequence  are given by (1) and (2), respectively:79 
(1) g(‘[NP [PN Cicero][x1]]’) = (x1) 
(2) g(‘[NP [PN Tully][x2]]’) = (x2) 
According to (1), the semantic assignment of ‘[NP [PN Cicero][x1]]’ relative to any 
sequence, , is the first object in , and (2) says that the semantic value of ‘[NP [PN 
Tully][x2]]’ is its second object. Stated in terms of satisfaction conditions, we can 
conditionalize (1) and (2) as follows: 
(1') g([[NP [PN Cicero]][xi]]) = x: x satisfies ‘Cicero’ iff x = (i) & (i) is called 
‘Cicero’‘[NP [PN Tully][x2]]’ is satisfied by (x2) iff (x2) is called ‘Tully’ 
(2') g([[NP [PN Tully]][xi]]) = x: x satisfies ‘Tully’ iff x = (i) & (i) is called 
‘Tully’ 
Once again, I assume that the lexical category label ‘PN’ (for proper name) ensures that 
name-tokens apply only to things so-called (again without saying what it is to be so-
called). In other words, the label ‘PN’ formally restricts the satisfaction conditions of the 
nominal LEs in (1') and (2') above to all and only those objects in the sequence that are 
so-called.80 
                                                 
79 Evidence further suggests that names in English always combine with a covert determiner such as ‘the’ 
or ‘that’, in which case it would be more appropriate to label these phrases as DPs rather than NPs. 
However, I won’t take a stance on the matter, and need not for purposes here. 
80 If we assume a Kaplanian extension to account for “pure” indexicals such as ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, we 
might reserve a small fragment of the Tarski sequence for speaker, place, and time. This fragment is 
roughly what Fiengo & May (2006) refer to as a “context.” Specifically, they write (p.27) that “contexts are 
sequences of (at least) persons, places, and times…” When speaking of sequences, then, the presence of 
this fragment shall be implied. 
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As also mentioned in Chapter 1, for purposes of describing a speaker’s semantic 
psychology I will specify the sequence-independent (i.e., context-invariant) meanings 
names such as ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ along the following lines: 
(3) CON(cicero) = activate@cicero → {CICERO(w), IS-CALLED(C), IS-CALLED(C, 
C), CICERO} 
(4) CON(tully) = activate@tully → {TULLY(w), IS-CALLED(C), IS-CALLED(C, C), 
TULLY} 
With respect to the conceptsW IS-CALLED(C, C) and IS-CALLED(C), the restricted higher-
order variable C can only be saturated by metalinguistic conceptsW such as CICERO(w), 
whereas C in IS-CALLED(C, C) must be saturated by singular concepts of 
objects/individuals such as CICERO, TULLY, and so on. Alternatively, one could specify 
the following sequence-dependent application conditions for the name ‘[PN Cicero]’ and 
‘[PN Tully]’ as follows:
81 
(3') ‘[PN Cicero]’ applies to (x1) iff (x1) is called ‘Cicero’ 
(4') ‘[PN Tully]’ applies to (x2) iff (x2) is called ‘Tully’ 
Similarly, (5) and (6) below are ways of specifying assignments of values to variables for 
two formally distinct LEs that contain the same name, with their corresponding 
satisfaction conditions specified by (5') and (6'): 
(5) g(‘[NP [PN Aristotle][x1]]’) = (x1)  
(6) g(‘[NP [PN Aristotle][x2]]’) = (x2) 
(5') ‘[NP [PN Aristotle][x1]]’ is satisfied by (x1) iff (x1) is called ‘Aristotle’ 
(6') ‘[NP [PN Aristotle][x2]]’ is satisfied by (x2) iff (x2) is called ‘Aristotle’ 
                                                 
81 See Pietroski (forthcoming) for discussion about the distinction between application conditions and 
Tarskian satisfaction conditions. 
 112 
 
2. Accommodating grammatically-determined referential relations 
Other members of the class of sequence-dependent Words include pronouns and 
reflexives. As such, my notation is designed to accommodate the phenomena to which 
the binding principles of traditional GB theory were originally addressed, as 
characterized by the following three principles; cf., Chomsky (1981, 1986): 
Binding Theory 
(A) Reflexive pronouns are locally bound. 
(B) Personal pronouns are locally free. 
(C) All other NPs (including Names) are globally free. 
In short, whatever theory best explains these facts, our notation must minimally be 
capable of describing them.82 
For instance, the notation must make explicit the fact that the reference of ‘himself’ 
in (7) below is anaphorically dependent on its local (c-commanding) antecedent, ‘Max’, 
while ‘him’ in (8) is not so-bound; i.e., there is no natural reading of (8) under which the 
Pronoun ‘him’ refers to Max, and likewise the pair ‘He’/’him’ in (9) cannot corefer: 
(7) Max helped himself 
(8) Max helped him 
(9) He helped him 
Our system must also reflect the fact that ‘his’ in (10) below can be understood either as 
referentially bound to ‘Max’ or as taking its value deictically from some other 
conversationally salient male. By contrast, ‘He’ in (11) cannot be Max (except perhaps 
under forced/unnatural circumstances): 
                                                 




(10) Max helped his mother 
(11) He helped Max’s mother 
Similarly, the notation must be powerful/flexible enough to describe the fact that ‘him’ in 
(12) below can refer either to Max or some other contextually salient male, but not to 
Max, that ‘himself’ in (13) must refer to Max, whereas in (14) ‘himself’ can only refer to 
Max. 
(12) Max wants Max to help him 
(13) Max wants to help himself 
(14) Max wants Max to help himself 
Finally, consider (15) where the second token of ‘Max’ can be understood as either 
bound to the first token or free to be saturated by some other discourse-salient Max. 
(15) Max wants to help Max 
So described, we can add pronouns to the list of Words in L that combine with 
variables to form complex open formulae (LEs) such as ‘[NP [PR him][xi]]’, ‘[NP [PR 
she][xi]]’, and so forth, where ‘PR’ (pronoun) is taken to be a valid category label 
encoded by their lexical entries. One further assumes that certain Pronouns can combine 
with the reflexive formative ‘self’ to generate ‘[NP [RP himself][xi]]’, ‘[NP [RP herself][xi]]’, 
etc., where ‘RP’ (reflexive pronoun) is also a valid category label. With these additions 
we now have the resources to capture the relevant binding facts of (11)-(19), as 
demonstrated below, and under the assumption that the indexed variables appearing in 
the expressions below are part of their underlying logical forms: 
(16') [NP [PN Max][x1]] helped [NP [RP himself][x1]] 
(17') [NP [PN Max][x1]] helped [NP [PR him][x2]] 
(18') [NP [PR He][x1]] helped [NP [PR him][x2]] 
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(19') [NP [PN Max][x1]] helped [NP [PR his][x1]] mother 
(19'') [NP [PN Max][x1]] helped [NP [PR his][x2]] mother 
(20') [NP [PR He][x1]] helped [NP [PN Max][x2]]’s mother 
(21') [NP [PN Max][x1]] wants [NP [PN Max][x2]] to help [NP [PR him][x1]] 
(21'') [NP [PN Max][x1]] wants [NP [PN Max][x2]] to help [NP [PR him][x2]] 
(22') [NP [PN Max][x1]] wants to help [NP [RP himself][x1]]) 
(23') [NP [PN Max][x1]] wants [NP [PN Max][x2]] to help [NP [RP himself][x2]] 
(24') [NP [PN Max][x1]] wants to help [NP [PN Max][x1]] 
(24'') [NP [PN Max][x1]] wants to help [NP [PN Max][x2]] 
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3. On the Nature of Concepts and their Representational 
Contents 
3.1. Introduction 
I have been assuming all along that humans, like our nearest non-human ancestors, 
possess a great many pre-linguistic concepts, some of which are doubtlessly innate and 
many of which are consciously accessible in human thought; though as briefly suggested 
in Chapter 2 some aspects of human thought is doubtlessly non-conceptual in nature. I 
further assume that a great many other concepts will be acquired throughout a human’s 
lifetime, including his/her concepts of Words, or again conceptsW as I am distinguishing 
them. While the exact nature of concepts, in general, remains highly controversial, I shall 
for wont of a better theory take them to be Fodorian in nature. Although here again I trust 
that my core thesis is largely compatible with other theories on the market. Yet as with 
Chomsky’s conception of Words, my preference for Fodor’s theory of concepts is that it 
renders my story about conceptsW and the metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC) 
they support more theoretically perspicuous and, I believe, more explanatorily powerful. 
In particular, Fodor’s account of concept acquisition will figure into my proposal in 
Chapter 4 about the acquisition of lexical meanings. 
For these reasons, I devote quite a bit of effort here working through the relevant 
details, beginning with a brief review of the central tenets of Fodor’s account of 
basic/lexical concepts and his theory of mental representation more generally. In the 
latter half of this Chapter I will then demonstrate where conceptsW fit into this picture, 
again deferring the details of how my account connects up with the acquisition of lexical 
meanings for the next chapter.  
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3.2. Fodor’s bold conjecture 
Theorists who endorse a representational theory of mind (RTM) also tend to agree 
that the best (and perhaps only) way to explain the observed productivity and 
systematicity of human thought is to assume, similar to natural language semantics, that 
its representational contents are compositionally determined by the contents of its 
constituent parts according to their structural (i.e., syntactic) arrangements. Under the 
further assumption that the basic constituents of thought are roughly “word-sized” 
concepts, Fodor’s rather strict principle of compositionality holds that “the content of a 
thought is entirely determined by its structure together with the content of its constituent 
concepts” (Fodor [2008: 17], my emphasis). He adds (ibid: 19-20): 
Over the last couple of years I’ve become increasingly convinced that capturing the 
compositionality of thought is what RTM most urgently requires; not just because 
compositionality is at the heart of the productivity and systematicity of thought, but also 
because it determines the relation between thoughts and concepts. The key to the 
compositionality of thoughts is that they have concepts as their constituents. 
While many researchers are willing to go along with Fodor’s claim that the contents of 
complex thoughts are compositionally determined, this leaves open questions about the 
underlying nature of basic concepts and their representational contents. 
In partial answer to this question, Fodor has insisted for decades what basic 
concepts cannot be. First, they cannot be definitions as maintained by the classical 
Aristotelian view because the vast majority of basic concepts are not definable in the 
sense of there being necessary and sufficient conditions on their possession and/or 
application. Nor are concepts prototypes (or stereotypes) because prototypes don’t 
compose, or at least not in the way that basic human concepts do, which is to say 
productively and systematically. Nor can concepts be grounded in inferential roles, 
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among other reasons because the possession conditions of basic concepts hold 
independently of their inferential relations to other concepts.1 One can for example have 
the concept DOG(x) without having the superordinate concept ANIMAL(x), and vice versa. 
Of course, while it may be nomologically necessary that all dogs are animals, this fact is 
not logically entailed by the content of DOG(x). Nor can such inferences be licensed by 
the internal constituent structure of DOG(x) because it has none. In other words, the 
entailment x [DOG(x)  ANIMAL(x)] is not by Fodor’s lights analytic. Thus, the content 
of DOG(x) is neither constituted nor determined by its inferential relation to ANIMAL(x). 
Fodor’s positive account of concepts decomposes into a portfolio of related sub-
theses which are variously known as conceptual atomism, informational semantics, 
referentialism, and (radical) concept nativism. Combined, the first three of these theses 
constitute what Fodor calls referential or informational atomism whose truth implies the 
truth of (radical) concept nativism. While likely familiar to my target audience, allow me 
a moment to briefly remind ourselves what each of these hypotheses amounts to. 
First, conceptual atomism is the thesis that “most lexical concepts have no internal 
structure” (1998: 121).2 Specifically, Fodorian atoms are syntactically unstructured 
symbolic representations in a thinker’s internal mental language (i.e., one’s so-called 
language of thought or Mentalese). Construed as mental symbols, atomic (i.e., 
constituent-less) concepts figure into the causal-computational processes of thought in 
virtue of the formal properties of their tokens (which are said to be “content-preserving” 
                                                 
1 These are all known as “knowledge-based accounts” of concepts; cf., Murphy & Medin (1985) for 
discussion. 




over inferential processes).3 Given their unstructured nature, we can think of the purely 
formal properties of these uninterpreted mental symbols in terms of their physical 
“forms” or “shapes” (presumably as realized by neurophysiological properties of 
corresponding brain states). Atomic concepts, understood as mental representation-types, 
are thus individuated by computational processes according to the physical forms/shapes 
of their tokens.4 
Construed as mental representations, however, concepts also have intentional 
properties; they are by Fodor’s lights about things in the world.5 In the reverse direction, 
worldly particulars supply conceptual atoms with their representational or semantic 
contents. More precisely, Fodor’s version of informational semantics holds that 
conceptual contents are “constituted by some sort of nomic [counterfactual-supporting], 
mind–world relation” (1998: 121). These mind-world (or symbol-world) relations are in 
turn said to be subsumable under some as-of-yet undiscovered laws of psychology (more 
on this below).6 Referential atomism adds that “The content of [an atomic] mental 
representation is its referent, and what fixes its reference is the character of its causal 
connections to the world” (2008: 216, my emphases). Atomic concepts are claimed to be 
semantically primitive because on Fodor’s view “reference is the only primitive mind-
world semantic property” (ibid: 16). The upshot is that Fodorian atoms are 
type=individuated by both their form and content. Hence, one can possess formally 
                                                 
3 The inferential relations that primitive mental symbols enter into in computational processes are however 
not constitutive of their contents, which is to deny the existence of so-called “narrow content.” 
4 Fodor is a token-physicalist and thus allows for multiple realization of concept-tokens over their types. 
5 Fodor (2008: 44) writes “most concepts apply to things in the world. Or, anyhow, that’s what they are 
supposed to do.” That is, Fodor appears to accept Brentano’s thesis at face value. 
6 Fodor (1998: 121) adds that “Correspondingly, having a concept (concept possession) is constituted, at 
least in part, by being in some sort of nomic, mind–world relation.” 
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distinct coreferential concepts that play distinct causal-computational roles in cognition 
without supposing that computation roles are constitutive of their content. 
Lastly, radical concept nativism is the thesis that all atomic concepts are innate. 
This claim has of course generated more than its share of controversy over the years. Not 
because it implies that thinkers are born with or otherwise genetically pre-disposed to 
acquire specific concepts such as DOORKNOB(x) and CARBURETOR(x). Rather, to call these 
concepts “innate” also calls for a somewhat revisionary understanding of what innateness 
is, or what the word ‘innateness’ means. For as commonly construed, innate concepts are 
programmed by nature into a thinker’s genetic code and thus either: (i) present at birth, or 
(ii) apt to be acquired some time later as a natural consequence of 
neurological/ontogenetic development, perhaps in coordination with certain 
environmental, experiential, and/or hormonal “triggers.” 
Now, Fodor takes as common ground among his critics that “Minds like ours start 
out with an innate inventory of concepts,” of which he adds “there are more than none 
but not more than finitely many” (2008: 131). Yet whatever this stock of prenatally 
determined concepts happens to be, nobody in their right mind, including Fodor as I 
understand him, thinks that DOORKNOB(x) and CARBURETOR(x) are among them if 
innateness is understood in either of the two senses above. There is however a third, 
weaker sense of innateness which by Fodor’s lights does apply. And this is simply to say 
that an innate concept is one that is not learned, where ‘learned’ is understood in the 
traditional Empiricist sense of involving inductive/statistical generalizations over a 
concept’s prototypical instances. On this latter view, the output of learning is taken to 
include the ability to reliably sort and/or name those instances as instances of a particular 
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category.7 However, since Fodor feels quite confident that basic concepts are not in this 
way learned, and provides what I take to be good arguments in support of this claim, he 
concludes that they must all be innate. 
Notice that Fodor is not just playing games with the meaning of ‘innateness’. For 
there is still something “genuinely” innate about the acquisition of basic concepts such as 
DOORKNOB(x) and CARBURETOR(x), which is a cognitive mechanism that has evolved in 
creatures like us for just this purpose; i.e., to enable minds so-constituted, under 
appropriate conditions and with the right kinds of experiences, to acquire (as opposed to 
learn) concepts by way of becoming metaphysically locked to their referents.8 Precisely 
how this locking mechanism works in neurological terms is admittedly anyone’s guess 
(though see below). However, Fodor is relying on an inference to the best explanation 
which runs something like this: Concepts are by definition intentional and ex hypothesi 
referential. In order to satisfy the explanatory demands of traditional belief-desire 
psychology, the referential relations between concepts and their contents must be 
subsumable under broad psychological laws. Fodor’s wager is that these laws are 
embodied by an innate mechanism that facilitates concept acquisition. And in his words, 
since “acquiring a concept is getting nomologically [i.e., counterfactually] locked to the 
property that the concept expresses” (1998: 125), the mechanism that explains concept 
acquisition also explains why “having a concept is being locked to a property” (ibid.: 
126). 
                                                 
7 Fodor (2008: 163). 
8 To say that a biological mechanism (or mechanisms) evolved that enables minds like ours to become 
nomologically locked onto properties is not to say that this mechanism (these mechanisms) evolved for that 
purpose. For it is compatible with Fodor’s view that this outcome was an accident of nature, or perhaps a 
spandrel effect in Gould’s sense. 
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I’ll return to the details of concept acquisition presently. But Fodorian 
considerations again arguably rule out competing theories of conceptual content 
grounded in definitions, prototypes, and inferential roles. Fodorian atoms do however 
compose to generate the complex (i.e., syntactically structured) mental formulae over 
which inferential processes are defined. To take a paradigm example, consider the 
complex concept BROWN-DOG(x) whose atomic constituents are presumably the monadic 
concepts BROWN(x) and DOG(x). Let us further assume with Fodor that the content of 
BROWN(x) is the semantically primitive property of being brown and that the content of 
DOG(x) is the property of being a dog. Fodor’s principle of compositionality dictates that 
the content of BROWN-DOG(x) is determined by the semantic conjunction of BROWN(x) 
and DOG(x), which yields the intersective (i.e., complex) property of being a brown dog.9 
Or to render its structural analysis more explicit, I will say that the content of [BROWN(x) 
& DOG(x)] is the property brown+dog. 
In this way, complex concepts can be learned, which is to say 
constructed/composed, so long as learners antecedently possess each of their constituents. 
In the reverse direction, complex concepts are also subject to decompositional analysis 
and may therefore bear analytic entailments. For example, Fodor would readily agree that 
if anything is analytically true it’s that brown dogs are both brown and dogs. Likewise, it 
is analytic that if all dogs are animals then so are all brown dogs, and if no dogs are 
marsupials then no brown dogs are. It is important to stress, however, that on Fodor’s 
view such entailments are licensed by the logical structure of [BROWN(x) & DOG(x)]. 
                                                 
9 Fodor (1998: 44) states that “BROWN DOG is the concept whose extension is the intersection of the 
brown things with the dog things.” [my emphasis]. Notice further that Fodor takes properties to be sets 
rather than universals. For example, he writes (2008: 141) “The extension of a concept is the set of (actual 
or possible) instances of the property to which the concept is locked. The concept DOG is locked to the 
property of being a dog and its extension is thus the set of (actual or possible) dogs.” [my emphases]. 
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Contrapositively, if atomic concepts have no constituent structure then they have no 
decompositional analysis and thus license no such entailments. And this is again to deny 
that putative definitions of basic concepts such as KILL(x) = CAUSE-TO-DIE(x) and 
inferences such as DOG(x)  ANIMAL(x) are analytic. 
3.3. Concepts and prototypes 
While Fodor denies that basic/primitive concepts are constituted by their 
prototypes, he does not deny the psychological reality of prototypes. Indeed, Fodor grants 
that acquiring a prototype may well play a causal role in concept acquisition; not as a 
matter of nomological necessity mind you, but simply as a matter of brute empirical 
fact.10 For on anyone’s account, the acquisition of at least some basic concepts in some 
way depends on experiences with their prototypical instances. And since prototype 
formation is just a natural consequence of having had such experiences, Fodor grants that 
concept acquisition may often occur in consequence of having first formed a prototype of 
the concept to be acquired. However, Fodor’s acquiescence on this point is conditioned 
upon a particular conception of (i) the nature of prototypes, (ii) the role of experience in 
prototype formation, and in turn (iii) the role of prototypes in concept acquisition. 
So before going further, it will help to first clarify what prototypes are commonly 
supposed to be. As a signpost, my aim in trying to get clear about the role of prototypes 
in concept acquisition will aid in the construction of a working hypothesis about how 
conceptsW are acquired. And in the next chapter I argue that the construction of 
                                                 
10 Fodor (2008: 150) states that “Although it’s quite true that acquiring a concept can’t be the same thing as 
learning its stereotype, it needn’t follow that learning a stereotype is just a by-product of acquiring the 
concept; it could rather be a stage in concept acquisition. Or, to put the suggestion the other way around, 
concept acquisition might proceed from stereotype formation to concept attainment.” 
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prototypes for other yet-to-be-acquired lexicalizable concepts may initially involve the 
use of conceptsW. 
3.3.1. What are prototypes? 
As commonly characterized, prototypes are complex mental representations whose 
representational contents are statistical abstractions over properties instantiated by 
prototypical members of a given ontological category (i.e., class of things that are 
presumed to exist in the world). More specifically, prototypes are often described in the 
literature as lists or sets of semantic “attributes” or “features” each representing a 
particular property that individual members of that category are statistically likely to 
possess.11 Or as Margolis & Laurence (1999: 27) put it, prototypes “are complex 
representations whose structure encodes a statistical summary of the properties their 
members tend to have.”12 This tendency is often measured as a function of the relative 
frequency of occurrence of these properties among instances of the category. For 
instance, Murphy (2002: 45-6) summarizes the notion thusly: 
The view taken by Rosch and Mervis (1975), Smith and Medin (1981), and Hampton 
(1979) was that the category representation should keep track of how often features 
occurred in category members. For example, people would be expected to know that 
                                                 
11 In this context, conceptual features are also sometimes referred to as ‘attributes’. However, recall from 
Chapter 2 that this use of the term ‘feature’ is not to be confused with Chomsky’s notion of linguistic 
features. 
12 Given failed attempts to analyze lexical concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions on class 
membership, most prototype theorists nowadays adopt the weaker stance that prototypes reflect a statistical 
summary of properties instantiated by prototypical instances of the class (cf., Murphy [2002: 42]). Subjects 
then apply these prototypes with varying degrees of success, based on some sort of similarity metric, when 
judging whether a particular individual is an instance of the class that the prototype subsumes. Margolis & 
Laurence (ibid: 28) point out, however, “that the term "prototype" doesn't have a fixed meaning in the 




‘‘fur’’ is a frequent property of bears, ‘‘white’’ is a less frequent property, ‘‘has claws’’ 
is very frequent, ‘‘eats garbage’’ of only moderate frequency, and so on.13 
To a first approximation, then, we might think of prototypes as lists of semantic features 
that represent prototypical qualities of their instances, and for each feature an assigned 
weight corresponding to its relative frequency of occurrence among all instances of the 
category. 
One question that immediately arises about prototypes so-described, however, has 
to do with the exact nature of the features/attributes that constitute them. Specifically, one 
wants to know whether prototype features are concepts or whether they are perhaps non-
conceptual in nature. From what I gather, prototype theorists typically take features to be 
statistically qualified concepts. To call them concepts is to say prototype features 
represent full-blown ontological categories that thinkers consciously apply to their 
experiences of the world as a way of carving those experiences at their metaphysical 
joints. By contrast, to say that features are “statistically qualified” is, in the general case, 
just to say that not all instances of the category necessarily instantiate each of the 
prototype’s encoded features, although some features may be perceived as (and may in 
fact be) essential to the category. 
To take a toy example, let us suppose that prototypical dogs are furry, four-legged 
animals. That is, by assumption anything that is a dog probably instantiates the ostensible 
properties of being furry and being four-legged and, one assumes, necessarily instantiates 
the species-essential property of being an animal. For simplicity, let us also just stipulate 
that highly variable/contingent properties such as being a particular color, weight, age, 
                                                 
13 Murphy himself eschews a “feature list” view of prototypes in favor of what he calls “schemata” to 
represent semantic primitives/features. So far as I can tell, however, the “feature list” view remains the 
predominant view of prototypes among cognitive psychologists. 
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and so forth are non-constitutive of the dog-prototype. Granted the assumption that 
features are concepts, a typical thinker’s dog-prototype will therefore typically list 
concepts such as FURRY(x), QUADRUPED(x), and ANIMAL(x). In concrete terms, let us 
assume that the traditional Roschian prototype for dogs is specifiable along the lines of 
DOGP, 
DOGP = x: {{FURRY(x), w1}, {QUADRUPED(x), w2}, {ANIMAL(x), w3}} 
where w1, w2, and w3 reflect the relative weights of the named features/properties, again in 
terms of their frequency of occurrence, or perhaps merely their perceived centrality to the 
category. And we can think of ‘DOGP’ merely as an index to the dog prototype stored in a 
subjects long-term conceptual-semantic memory. 
If the constituents of prototypes are concepts then prototype theorists must allow for 
the possibility that constituents of DOGP are themselves complex, which is to say 
decomposable into further features/concepts that may have their own prototypes. For 
instance, the concept ANIMAL(x) is prima facie describable by a prototype whose 
constituents include the more basic concepts ORGANISM(x) and MULTICELLULAR(x). 
These latter concepts are presumably further decomposable into still more basic features 
until the analysis eventually bottoms out in some small set of semantic “primitives,” 
which is to say sui generis concepts such as CAUSE, EVENT, OBJECT, SUBSTANCE, and so 
on. The relevant point, however, is that if basic concepts are constituted by their 
prototypes, as prototype theorists suppose, then DOGP (or something near enough) is 
putatively what typical thinkers use to represent dogs as such, which is to say as dogs. 
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3.3.2. Why prototypes can’t be concepts 
Now, if Fodor’s is correct in thinking that concepts compose in predictable ways 
(i.e., productively and systematically), and prototypes are supposed to be concepts, then 
one would expect prototypes to compose in predictable ways. However, recall that 
Fodor’s chief objection to prototypes as a theory of concepts is that they do not compose 
in predictable ways.14 To invoke Fodor’s favorite foil, while one might agree that 
prototypical brown dogs are both prototypically brown and perhaps prototypically dog-
like, prototypical pet fish, say goldfish or guppies, are neither prototypical pets nor 
prototypical fish. And this is to say that the prototype for pet fish is not, as prototype 
theory predicts, a composite prototype such as [PETP & FISHP].
15 Rather, [PETP & FISHP], if 
such a representation is even constructible by human minds, would presumably describe 
an impossible creature such as a furry four-legged trout!16 Or at any rate, it has yet to be 
shown how prototypes compose to deliver the expected results in all cases (though see 
Smith & Osheron [1984] for a serious attempt). Moreover, according to Fodor the reason 
that prototypes don’t compose is that although they are complex mental representations, 
understood as mere lists or sets of features prototypes lack the kind of logical 
form/structure required of linguistic compositionality. 
The relevant consequence is again that if concepts compose but prototypes do not 
then prototypes cannot be concepts. In Fodor’s words (1998: 94): 
In a nutshell, the trouble with prototypes is this. Concepts are productive and systematic. 
Since compositionality is what explains systematicity and productivity, it must be that 
                                                 
14 It may of course be possible to demonstrate that prototypes can combine using, say, set-theoretic 
operations such union and intersection. However, Fodor’s point seems to be that these modes of 
combination do not comport with the way human concepts compose. 
15 Cf., Fodor & Lepore (1996) for discussion. 
16 I think even Fodor grants that synthetic compounds such as ‘catfish’ may have atomic yet idiomatic 
meanings (express idiomatic atomic concepts). 
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concepts are compositional. But it’s as certain as anything ever gets in cognitive science 
that prototypes don’t compose. So it’s as certain as anything ever gets in cognitive 
science that concepts can’t be prototypes and that the glue that holds concepts together 
can’t be statistical. 
Be that as it may, Fodor again acknowledges the psychological reality of prototypes. In 
particular, he is responsive to the evidence of so-called “typicality effects” adduced to 
prototypes regarding our judgments about category membership, which is what prompted 
Eleanor Rosch and her cohorts in the 1970’s to first hypothesize that concepts are defined 
by their prototypes (or stereotypes—Fodor uses these terms interchangeably).17 What’s 
more, as stressed earlier Fodor also concedes that in the general case prototype formation 
quite likely constitutes a stage in concept acquisition (more on this below).18 
Unfortunately, nowhere does Fodor say exactly what he takes prototypes to be, 
except in the highly general sense of being “the estimation of central tendencies” or 
“abstractions from experience.” To insist, as Fodor does, that prototypes are not concepts 
can however be interpreted in at least two ways. In the first instance, we can take him as 
saying that prototypes are non-conceptual mental representations. And as discussed 
below there is reason to think that this is in fact what Fodor in fact has in mind. In the 
second instance, Fodor might merely mean that prototypes cannot be basic/primitive (i.e., 
unanalyzable) concepts, which leaves open the possibility that at least some prototypes 
are complex concepts, yet under the following provisos: (i) that their constituents are 
themselves concepts that subjects already possess, and (ii) that their contents are 
                                                 
17E.g., judgments such as that robins are more bird-like (more typical examples of the category BIRD) than, 
say, hummingbirds, ostriches, and penguins. 
18 Specifically, he writes (2008: 150, fn.21-2): There’s convincing experimental evidence that something 
like the estimation of central tendencies does go on in stereotype formation… At a minimum, there is quite 
a lot of empirical evidence that stereotype formation often happens very early in concept acquisition; young 
children’s judgments about what concepts apply to what things are typically most reliable for paradigm 




compositionally-determined like any other complex concept. While the latter seems not 
to be Fodor’s considered view, it strikes me as compatible with it, and carries certain 
benefits. Indeed, I think there is room for both conceptions of prototypes within a 
Fodorian theory of concepts, and I will return below to motivate this hypothesis. But it 
will help to facilitate that discussion by first briefly reviewing Fodor’s expressed account 
of concept acquisition, drawing chiefly from Fodor (1998) which so far as I can tell 
reflects his most deeply considered thought on the matter. 
3.4. On concept acquisition 
To repeat, acquiring a Fodorian concept is getting nomologically locked to the 
property that the concept expresses, whereas concept possession entails being so-locked 
to that property. Now, Fodor again concedes that “nobody actually knows what 
‘exogenous’ variables may affect a creature’s capacity for conceptualization,” including 
(as he quips) diet, being hit on the head by a brick, contracting senile dementia, and 
moving to California (the latter, I take it, is intended as a jab at Connectionists). In any 
case, these are all nomological possibilities. However, Fodor again grants that it may be a 
brute empirical fact that concept acquisition occurs in consequence of having had the 
right kinds of experiences with their prototypical instances. In other cases, as discussed 
below, getting locked to a property involves learning and adhering to a (true) scientific 
theory of the property in question. 
More specifically, Fodor maintains that there are basically two kinds of properties 
that minds like ours can become nomically locked to, corresponding to two ways of being 
locked to them. There are what he calls mind-dependent properties and those that are 
mind-independent. As the name suggests, mind-dependent properties, or what I will call 
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MDPs for short, depend for their existence on the psychological laws that govern how 
things that have them appear to us. Or stronger still, as Fodor puts it, MDPs are 
constituted by psychological laws that govern the way their instances “strike our kind of 
minds as being.” Paradigm examples of MDPs are sensory properties such as being red, 
which Fodor claims are “constituted by the sensory states that things that have it evoke in 
us.” In turn, it is visual experiences of things “as-of” being red that causally mediate the 
acquisition of the sensory concept RED(x). Notice again, however, that to say that concept 
acquisition is causally mediated by experience is not to say that concepts are learned by 
statistical abstraction over these experiences (though the prototypes that mediate their 
acquisition may be learned by statistical abstraction). Rather, in these cases Fodor likens 
concept acquisition to contracting the flu—it is something that just happens to us in 
consequence of having the right kinds of experiences.19 
Sensory properties are members of a more general category of MDPs called 
appearance properties which we get locked to by way of appearance concepts including 
our old friends DOORKNOB(x) and CARBURETOR(x). Like sensory properties, appearance 
properties are constituted by a psychological law that governs how “we lock to them in 
consequence of certain sorts of experience,” and in particular experience with things that 
exemplify their prototypes. And this explains why the acquisition of appearance concepts 
is typically mediated by the formation of a prototype. Fodor sums up the distinction as 
follows:20 
                                                 
19 This raises the interesting question of whether blind people can acquire sensory concepts. For a proposal 
in the affirmative, see Zalta (2001). 
20 Recall that Fodor is a realist about colors, doorknobs, and carburetors; to be mind-dependent does not 
imply being unreal. Yet by the same token if there were no minds there would be no colors, carburetors, or 
doorknobs, or for that matter any other appearance property. 
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The model, to repeat, is being red: all that’s required for us to get locked to redness is 
that red things should reliably seem to us as they do, in fact, reliably seem to the visually 
unimpaired. Correspondingly, all that needs to be innate for RED to be acquired is 
whatever the mechanisms are that determine that red things strike us as they do; which is 
to say that all that needs to be innate is the sensorium. Ditto, mutatis mutandis, for 
DOORKNOB if being a doorknob is like being red: what has to be innately given to get 
us locked to doorknobhood is whatever mechanisms are required for doorknobs to come 
to strike us as such. 
The challenge is of course to spell out more precisely the nature of the cognitive and/or 
neurological mechanisms that are responsible for the way that objects and their properties 
“strike our kind of minds as being,” which I return to momentarily. 
In contrast to MDPs, mind-independent properties, or what I will call MIPs for 
short, exist independently of minds—they are not properties that things have “in virtue of 
their relations to minds, ours or any others.” For acquiring a concept of an MIP involves 
getting locked to a property via a nomic mind-world relation. Paradigm examples of 
MIPs are natural kinds—properties that constitute the “hidden essences” of things that are 
causally responsible for their superficial qualities/appearances.21 Rather than being 
constituted by psychological laws, MIPs are governed by laws invoked by the physical 
sciences. The chemical essence of water, for example, is H2O, which is presumably what 
determines its superficial qualities. However, according to Fodor there are actually two 
ways of getting locked to the property of being water, which is to say the property of 
being H2O. The first (and most common) is what I will call the pre-theoretical way, and 
the other is by way of constructing a formal scientific theory of water. 
                                                 




In advance of formal training in chemistry and physics, most of us get locked to 
water via acquisition of a pre-theoretical concept that I will call WATER(x)PT. The 
acquisition of WATER(x)PT proceeds in roughly the same way as the acquisition of 
appearance concepts such as DOORKNOB(x), which is to say in consequence of 
experiences with its prototypical instances. The relevant difference is that being locked to 
a natural kind such as water, viz. the property of being H2O, by way of a pre-theoretical 
concept “is reliable only in worlds where water has the familiar phenomenological 
properties; which is to say only in nomologically possible worlds near ours.” To again 
quote Fodor at length: 
That is, I suppose, the usual, pretheoretic way of having a natural kind concept. The kind-
constituting property is a hidden essence and you get locked to it via phenomenological 
properties the having of which is (roughly) nomologically necessary and sufficient for 
something to instantiate the kind… WATER, like DOORKNOB, is typically learned 
from its instances; but that’s not, of course, because being water is mind-dependent. 
Rather, it’s because you typically lock to being water via its superficial signs; and, in 
point of nomological necessity, water samples are the only things around in which those 
superficial signs inhere. 
In short, Fodor adds that “A ‘natural kind concept’ can be [merely] the concept of a 
natural kind; or it can be the concept of a natural kind as such…” 
By Fodor’s lights, the only way to get locked to water as such, which is to say the 
property that water has in every metaphysically possible world, is by learning a (true) 
scientific theory of water qua H2O. On this count he qualifies: 
We’re locked to water via a theory that specifies its essence, so we’re locked to water in 
every metaphysically possible world. That, I’m suggesting, is what an informational 
semanticist should say that it is to have a concept of a natural kind as a natural kind: it’s 
for the mechanism that effects the locking not to depend on the superficial signs of the 
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kind, and hence to hold (ceteris paribus of course) even in possible worlds where 
members of the kind lacks those signs. 
As it turns out, there are also two ways of getting theoretically locked to water as such. 
The first is by acquiring and then combining more basic concepts such as HYDROGEN(x), 
TWO(x), and OXYGEN(x) to form the complex concept H2O(x), or derivatively a complex 
concept such as [HYDROGEN(x) & DIOXIDE(x)], whose compositionally-determined 
content is the property of being H2O (or being hydrogen+dioxide). However, Fodor 
suggests that one can also get theoretically locked to water atomistically by way of what 
he calls “the real concept WATER,” or what I will call the scientific concept WATER(x)ST. 
The difference here is that WATER(x)ST is acquired in virtue of learning, or inventing, and 
otherwise adhering to a (true) scientific theory of water’s hidden essence (whose 
construction presupposes possession of the concepts HYDROGEN(x), TWO(x), and 
OXYGEN(x)). As Fodor (1998: 162) puts it: 
A theoretical concept isn’t a concept that’s defined by a theory; it’s just a concept that is, 
de facto, locked to a property via a theory. 
That’s the long and short of it. To recap, thinkers typically get locked to MDPs by 
way of experiences with their prototypical instances, whereas getting locked to a MIP 
occurs either by experience or by learning/inventing22 a (true) scientific theory of its 
“hidden essence” (i.e., a theory that establishes the empirical truth of the statement ‘water 
= H2O’). That the theory be true is important, as evidently concepts grounded in false 
theories, e.g., PHLOGISTON(x), VULCAN, etc., never lock to a MIP as such. Nor, obviously, 
can one acquire these concepts through experiences with their prototypical instances (for 
there are none). Nonetheless, Fodor seems to be a realist about things like phlogiston and 
                                                 
22 Fodor suggests that acquisition of scientific concepts can also be mediated by instruments such as 
telescopes and also by deference to experts. 
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Vulcan. In such cases, I take it that misguided scientists acquire something like a 
theoretical analog of an appearance concept—a concept that locks to a mind-dependent 
property by way of a false theory of how the world is supposed to be. Alternatively, it 
may be that some of our mind-dependent concepts are locked to properties that simply 
have no instances in the actual world. In a similar vein, purely fictional concepts such as 
UNICORN(x) get locked to (uninstantiated) properties by way of a story, or myth, or what 
have you.23 It’s just that in the latter case the concepts are often acquired without 
existential pretense. In this way, some concepts are acquirable by description rather than 
direct acquaintance with their instances. 
3.4.1. On the role of prototypes in concept acquisition 
So characterized, let me now return to the question of how prototypes and/or 
scientific theories stand to mediate the acquisition of Fodorian atoms—i.e., basic, 
unanalyzable concepts. As mentioned earlier, to say that prototypes are not concepts can 
be interpreted in at least two ways. First, we might take Fodor as implying that prototypes 
are non-conceptual in nature. Second, Fodor might merely mean that prototypes cannot 
be basic/atomic concepts, which leaves open the possibility that prototypes are complex 
concepts (e.g., beliefs). For my part, I think there is room, with suitable qualification, for 
both conceptions of prototypes within a Fodorian theory of concepts. 
In what follows immediately, I will offer my best reconstruction of how prototypes 
might be recast as non-conceptual (or pre-conceptual) mental representations, or what I 
will call F-prototypes in honor of Fodor. I will agree with Fodor that F-prototypes 
                                                 
23 As Fodor would put it, while the property of being a unicorn has not instances in the actual, it might in 
some nearby possible world. That is, counterfactual unicorns do exist and thus so does the property of 
being a unicorn. 
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facilitate the acquisition of some/many atomic concepts, and in particular those that he 
refers to as “sensory concepts.” I will then attempt to make a case for higher-order 
conceptualized prototypes, or C-prototypes as I shall call tem, that by hypothesis 
facilitate the acquisition of certain human concepts such as JUSTICE, LOVE, and PET-FISH. 
For notice that from the claim that prototypes do not compose in the way that concepts do 
it does not follow that prototypes do not compose. I will further argue C-prototypes are 
needed in any case to account for Roschian typicality effects regarding our explicit 
judgments about category membership. 
Let me pause a moment to remind readers that I am ultimately working toward a 
psychologically plausible account of the nature of conceptsW, how they are acquired, and 
whose contents, to foreshadow, I take to be linguistic (i.e., scientific) kinds. As such, I 
will later argue alongside Fodor that there are two ways of getting locked to Words (i.e., 
the property of being a certain lexical item in a speaker’s mental lexicon). First, there is 
the ordinary way of acquiring a pre-theoretical conceptW of the Word in question. The 
second is by learning/formulating a theory (such as Chomsky’s) about the underlying 
psychological/scientific nature of Words. 
3.4.2. On the nature of F-prototypes 
To begin, it bears noting that Fodor’s informational atomism is modeled after the 
Dretskian idea that a naturalized theory of reference can be given in terms of the 
information carried by token mental representations about their distal causes. 
Specifically, Fodor (2008: 179) suggests that reference can be characterized by the 
schema:  “X represents [or refers to] Y insofar as X carries information about Y.” With 
respect to early vision, for example, the idea is that patterns of retinal stimulation carry 
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information about their distal causes—e.g., objects and their properties in a subject’s 
occurrent field of vision. This information then serves as the raw, unconceptualized (or 
pre-conceptual) content of our visual experiences—i.e., that which is perceptually 
“given” in experience, and which as Fodor reports is standardly taken to be iconic (as 
opposed to discursive) in nature. 
What is given in perception is in turn what grounds the fixation of our fully 
conceptualized perceptual judgments/beliefs.24 As Fodor (2008: 180-2) puts it: 
The idea is that the role of concepts in the perceptual analysis of experience is to recover 
from experience information that it contains… The given is unconceptualized 
representation that is awaiting conceptualization. 
He adds (ibid: 193), however, that: 
There is every sort of evidence that a great deal of the reasoning involved in the causal 
fixation of quotidian perceptual beliefs is unconscious and hence unavailable for report 
by the reasoned… 
In other words, the early visual system registers information without subjects perceiving 
this information as representing anything in particular. Furthermore, “what information 
an interpreter can recover from [a given perceptual experience] depends on what concepts 
the interpreter has available.” And so in this way “the notion of carrying information 
about X seems to offer a way of representing X without representing it as anything…” 
(ibid: 182). 
More specifically still, Fodor flirts with the idea that perceptual reference is 
grounded in something like the FINST mechanism proposed by Pylyshyn (2003, 2009). 
                                                 
24 Fodor (2008: 185) summarizes the idea thusly: “The basic idea is that perceptual information undergoes 
several sorts of process (typically in more or less serial order) in the course of its progress from 
representation on the surface of a transducer (e.g. on the retina) to its representation in long-term memory. 
Some of the earliest of these processes operate on representations that are stored in an ‘echoic buffer’ (EB), 
and these representations are widely believed to be iconic.” 
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By hypothesis, FINSTs (for “fingers of instantiation”) operate in early vision as primitive 
referential indices that lock onto and track perceptually salient distal objects in a subject’s 
visual field. This “locking onto” is described as an automatic (i.e., purely 
psychophysical/causal-mechanical) reflex to the proximal retinal image (or “FING”) that 
is itself caused by the distal object perceived. Or as Pylyshyn puts it, FINSTs are 
“grabbed” by FINGs. Similar to Fodor’s view of conceptual reference, this relation is 
referentially primitive in that the locking mechanism is grounded in a nomological link 
between FINSTs and their proximal causes. And so in this way Pylyshyn’s FINST 
mechanism comports with Fodor’s informational atomism about concepts. However, 
unlike Fodorian concepts, FINSTs are by hypothesis non-conceptual (or again pre-
conceptual) mental representations—they represent distal objects and their properties 
without representing them as such, which is to say without subsuming their referents 
under corresponding concepts. 
A second difference between FINSTs and Fodorian concepts is that the referential 
link between FINSTs and their referents is transient. Specifically, a limited number of 
FINSTs (roughly four) are dynamically allocated to perceptibly distinct objects in the 
perceiver’s visual field. FINSTs will then continue to track those objects through space 
and time, tolerating a certain degree of change in location, trajectory, color, shape, and 
even momentary occlusion, so long as the causal link between them remains largely 
uninterrupted. Otherwise, an object must be re-acquired, perhaps under a different 
FINST. In this way, the brute causal mechanism underlying our visual experiences is 
loosely analogous to the natural mechanism that causes sunflowers to “blindly” track the 
sun across the daytime sky. For when the sun disappears over the horizon, or heavy cloud 
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cover rolls in, the causal-referential link is severed and the tracking ceases. The chief 
difference here is that ex hypothesi FINSTs are representational mechanisms whereas 
sunflowers presumably are not. 
More to the point, the claim, as I understand it, is that once locked to an object 
FINSTs provide a channel that facilitates extraction of information about that object’s 
perceptible properties. Property information is then recorded in what’s called an “object 
file” held in short-term memory, or roughly speaking what memory scientists call an 
“echoic buffer.” From a computational perspective, property information accumulates in 
what we might think of as a set of general purpose registers corresponding to what 
Pylyshyn refers to as “visual predicates,” one for each detectible property of the object 
being tracked. 
By way of example, let f1 be a FINST locked to a particular object, say Fido, in the 
subject’s field of view. For each discernible property of that object, early vision allocates 
a corresponding visual predicate, the set of which I will represent as x: {P1(x), P2(x), 
P3(x), …,Pn(x)}. FINSTs themselves then serve as arguments to these (non-conceptual) 
predicates. For instance, let us suppose that Fido is mostly brown in color. Let us further 
suppose that P1 is dedicated to representing object-color. The “saturated” visual predicate 
P1(f1) then demonstratively represents the object referred to by f1 as instantiating the color 
property picked out by P1, viz., the property of being brown. The remaining predicates 
{P2(x), P3(x), …,Pn(x)} track other visually detectible properties related to, say, the 
object’s texture, shape, size, and so forth. Collectively, the information encoded by f1: 
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{P1(f1), P2(f1), P3(f1), …,Pn(f1)} represents the raw, unconceptualized informational 
content of a perceiver’s visual experience of the object tracked by the FINST labeled f1.
25 
It bears stressing here that f1 does not represent its object (i.e., Fido) as a dog, nor 
does P1 represent that object as being brown. To put the point differently, f1 is not 
content-identical with the Fodorian concept DOG(x) (nor FIDO), and P1 is not content-
identical with the Fodorian atom BROWN(x). Likewise, the saturated predicate P1(f1) is not 
content-identical to the complex concept [BROWN(x) & DOG(x)]. Rather, in order to 
represent an object as a brown dog requires first attending to the information encoded by 
P1(f1)—the raw content of one’s visual experience—and then applying appropriate 
concepts to the content of that experience. However, the lack of corresponding concepts 
is no barrier to perceptually representing brown dogs, as it were, de re. Or as Fodor 
(2008: 186) puts the point “it’s possible to register the Dretskian information that a is F 
even if you don’t have the concept F.” It is important to keep in mind, however, that 
without the appropriate concepts one cannot represent brown dogs as such, which is 
again to say as brown dogs. 
Most relevant to my purposes here is that (if I interpret Fodor correctly) prototypes 
of visually perceptible objects and their properties are formed in consequence of 
experiences registered in early vision (a similar story can be told for other sensory 
modalities). Specifically, I take it that the Fodorian prototype, or what I will again 
abbreviate as an F-prototype, corresponding to the concept DOG(x) can be specified as 
something like DOGP', 
DOGP' = fn: {{P1(fn), w1}, {P2(fn), w2}, {P3(fn), w3}, …} 
                                                 
25 In cases of multiple object tracking, something similar can be said of the FINSTs designated f2, f3, and so 
on for each object that can be simultaneously tracked in early vision. 
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where fn represents an abstraction over dog-experiences as captured by FINSTs over the 
course of multiple encounters with “good examples” of dogs, and the pre-conceptual 
predicates P1(fn), P2(fn), P3(fn), …, correspond to tacitly inferred abstractions over the 
prototypical properties of dogs extracted from those experiences (the properties of being 
brown, furry, quadrupedal, or what have you). As before, w1, w2, and w3 represent relative 
weights assigned to these properties. So characterized, it will be noticed that DOGP' is 
structurally identical to the more traditional prototype DOGP from above, or what I will 
call an R-prototype (‘R’ for Roschian); the difference being that the informational content 
of DOGP' is wholly non-conceptual in nature. 
Let me be clear that Fodor does not explicitly endorse any of what I have just said 
about the nature of F-prototypes. Rather, the picture sketched is my best reconstruction 
of how prototype formation might plausibly occur, and how F-prototypes in particular are 
represented, as based on Fodor’s reported account of non-conceptual content. Yet more 
needs to be said. For according to Fodor what is “given” in perception is registered in the 
echoic buffer (EB), which is a highly ephemeral, short-term memory register. In 
consequence, introspective access to the content of visual experience is highly time-
sensitive. As Fodor describes it: 
…there is a brief interval during which an unconceptualized (presumably iconic) 
representation… is held in the EB… it lasts only for perhaps a second or two… After 
that, the trace decays and you’ve lost your chance. 
Now, if the content of a visual experience is short-lived then one wonders how perceivers 
use this information to form prototypes. For the computation of a prototype presumably 
requires access to accumulated (i.e., stored) memories of multiple experiences, both past 
and present, over which the relevant abstractions/generalizations are inferred. 
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While Fodor is again silent on such questions, one is given to assume that mental 
images of visual experiences are recorded in some sort of long-term iconic memory. 
Thus, it would be these sorts of iconic memories over which “central tendencies” are 
computed. It is of course quite possible that I have completely misunderstood Fodor’s 
view on the matter. Yet it’s also difficult to imagine what else it might be. In any case, 
I’m happy to assume that subjects are capable of forming primitive, non-conceptual 
prototypes—or again F-prototypes. More specifically, I will assume that F-prototype 
formation can occur as the result of a subject’s tacit registration of patterns of similarity 
in the detectible properties instantiated by members of a given category. 
This datum nevertheless leaves open the questions of (i) how F-prototypes facilitate 
the acquisition of basic concepts, and (ii) how appeal to F-prototypes might explain 
Roschian typicality effects as reflected in our explicit judgments about category 
membership. In the first instance, Fodor’s decision to construe prototypes as non-
conceptual appears to be motivated by his commitment that concept acquisition is 
necessarily non-inferential. However, he allows that even the encapsulated processes of 
early vision facilitate “subpersonal inferences” over the informational content of visual 
experience, which reportedly explains perceptual constancies such as “the elliptical plate 
that looks round, the ‘correction’ of perceived color for changes in the ambient light, the 
failure of retinal size to predict apparent size, and so forth through a very long list of 
familiar examples” (Fodor [2008: 192]). On this point Fodor adds (ibid): 
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…all varieties of CTM treat the perceptual constancies as paradigm examples of the 
products of subpersonal inferences; that is, they imply that, invariably, mental 
representations that exhibit the effects of constancy are inferred.26 
As the outcome of this particular question is largely orthogonal to my project, I propose 
to set it aside. Let us instead consider the possibility of another kind of prototype 
grounded in basic concepts, or what I introduced above as C-prototypes, which are to be 
distinguished from both F-prototypes and R-prototypes. 
3.4.3. On the nature of C-prototypes 
While one might grant that F-prototypes causally mediate the acquisition of sensory 
concepts such as BROWN(x) and FURRY(x), it remains unclear (at least to me) how F-
prototypes account for the acquisition of concepts that are, as it were, less intimately tied 
to the sensorium, including I assume most quotidian concepts like DOORKNOB(x), 
CARBURETOR(x), and PET-FISH(x). It is also unclear how F-prototypes are supposed to 
explain Roschian typicality effects related to our explicit judgments about category 
membership. There is however a way of accommodating these explananda without 
assuming that all prototypes are non-conceptual in nature while also keeping to the spirit 
of Fodor’s account of basic concepts. Specifically, the proposal I wish to pursue is that 
while sensory concepts such as RED(x) may be acquired in virtue of acquiring an F-
prototype, many other basic concepts are acquired in virtue of learning/constructing C-
prototypes, which is to say complex concepts whose compositionally-determined 
contents are criterial of their instances. 
                                                 
26 However, prima facie this claim stands in direct contradiction to an earlier remark (ibid: 185) stating that 
“Inferring is in the same basket with as saying and thinking; they all presume conceptualization.” 
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3.4.4. Supplementing F-prototypes with C-prototypes 
We have seen, for example, that on Fodor’s view anyone already in possession of 
the basic concepts FURRY(x), QUADRUPED(x), and ANIMAL(x) can use these concepts to 
construct the compositionally-determined complex concept [FURRY(x) & QUADRUPED(x) 
& ANIMAL(x)]. Now, under the caricature assumption that [FURRY(x) & QUADRUPED(x) & 
(ANIMAL(x)] is criterial of prototypical dogs, one might hypothesize that rather than DOGP 
or DOGP' from above, the prototype for dogs is instead more like DOGP'' below: 
DOGP'' = x: [(FURRY(x), w1) & (QUADRUPED(x), w2) & (ANIMAL(x), w3)] 
where w1, w2, and w3, as before, reflect the relative weights of the named features. But in 
the present example, I propose that we think of these weights as independent parameters 
that “tag along for the ride” with respect to compositional processes.27 Loosely speaking, 
then, we can think of DOGP'' as reflecting a subject’s belief (or theory, or hypothesis) that 
there exists a class of entities in world—the set of dogs—whose members probably 
instantiate the property of being a furry four-legged animal. Now, I assume with Fodor 
that weights don’t compose in the relevant way. And so strictly speaking DOGP'' is not a 
concept in Fodor’s sense of the term. This constraint notwithstanding, I see no reason to 
deny that DOGP'' is representable by human minds and can thereby serve as a conceptually 
grounded prototype (or again C-prototype) for the concept DOG(x). Or anyhow, I will 
assume for purposes here that it can be. 
On this construal, C-prototypes can be learned like any other complex concept 
simply by conjoining more basic concepts, and indeed is what makes learning complex 
concepts a rational achievement. Importantly, however, whether or not DOGP'' is a 
                                                 
27 Although in combination, the “inherited” default weights assigned to individual prototypical properties of 
basic concepts may require adjustment depending on which other concepts enter into the combination. 
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concept, strictly speaking, by Fodor’s criteria one still cannot use DOGP'' to think about 
dogs as such. Rather, for this one must first be in possession of the conceptual atom 
DOG(x). In other words, I am here simply indicating agreement with Fodor that DOGP'' and 
DOG(x) are not content-identical. For the concept [FURRY(x) & QUADRUPED(x) & 
ANIMAL(x)] applies only to prototypical dogs, whereas ex hypothesi DOG(x) ranges over 
all dogs, including atypical ones. And this is just to recapitulate Fodor’s more general 
observation that the contents of basic concepts such as DOG(x) outrun our experiences of 
their prototypical instances. Nor again can [FURRY(x) & QUADRUPED(x) & ANIMAL(x)] be 
constitutive of DOG(x). For one can have [FURRY(x) & QUADRUPED(x) & ANIMAL(x)] 
without DOG(x), and vice versa.28 
Thus qualified, it seems to me entirely compatible with Fodor’s view that learning 
DOGP'' can nonetheless causally mediate the acquisition of DOG(x) while allowing that its 
basic constituents are grounded in F-prototypes. Otherwise, it remains unclear what 
information obtained from the sensorium guides a thinker’s locking onto the property of 
being a dog, or for that matter being a carburetor, being a doorknob, being a pet, being a 
fish, and so on. By contrast, according to the proposal on offer C-prototype formation is 
akin to forming a theory, albeit informal/unscientific in ordinary cases, about which 
properties individual members of a given category are likely to share. However, I find it 
more useful to think of C-prototypes—or anyhow purely discursive ones—in terms of 
beliefs, or sets of belief-predicates, about which properties members of given class are 
likely to have in common. For what is a theory if not a set of belief-statements? 
                                                 
28 In the other direction, Fodor’s auxiliary thesis of “reverse compositionality” explains why one cannot 
believe that dogs, as such, are furry four-legged animals in advance of having the concept DOG(x). 
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Furthermore, I assume that once a subject has acquired DOG(x), he/she will be in a 
position to re-formulate DOGP'' as something like the following universally quantified 
belief: 
DOGP''' = x [DOG(x)  P-INSTANTIATES(x, (FURRY(x), w1) & (QUADRUPED(x), w2) 
& (ANIMAL(x), w3)])] 
where the concept P-INSTANTIATES(x, Y) reflects an agent’s belief that prototypical 
members of the category DOG(x) probably instantiate the properties furry, quadruped, and 
animal. 
Returning to a previous example, it is similarly compatible with Fodor’s view that 
anyone who has the concepts PET(x) and FISH(x) can use these concepts to form the 
complex concept [PET(x) & FISH(x)]. And anyone who has [PET(x) & FISH(x)] can use this 
concept to generate beliefs about whatever one’s conception of prototypical pet fish 
happens to be. To wit, I think of pet fish as being exotic, as dwelling in fish tanks, as 
being short-lived, etc., which is to suggest that my conception (C-prototype) of pet fish 
can be specified as follows:29 
PET-FISHP = x ([PET(x) & FISH(x)]  P-INSTANTIATES(x, [EXOTIC(x) & INHABITS-
FISH-TANKS(x) & SHORT-LIVED(x)]) 
In other words, I take it that PET-FISHP is the representation I deploy when judging 
whether or not something qualifies as a pet fish. Relatedly, I have in addition to the belief 
above the one below, 
DEAD-PET-FISHP = x ([PET(x) & FISH(x)] & DEAD(x)  P-INSTANTIATES(x, 
[FLUSHED-DOWN-TOILETS(x)]) 
                                                 
29 I am omitting weighting parameters in the interest of readability, but I assume that they are present in 
these representations as well. 
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where [[PET(x) & FISH(x)] & DEAD(x)] expresses the property of being a 
dead+[pet+fish]. Here again, notice that PET(x), FISH(x), and [PET(x) & FISH(x)] are each 
proper constituents of my beliefs about (or conception of) prototypical pet fish.30 Indeed, 
it is a point in Fodor’s favor that concepts, whether simple or complex, are in this way 
fully productive. But notice that all of this can be so without supposing that PET-FISHP 
(i.e., the prototype) expresses the property of being a pet+fish, or that DEAD-PET-FISHP 
expresses the property of being a dead+[pet+fish]. 
Rather, on Fodor’s view the compositionally-determined content of [PET(x) & 
FISH(x)] is nothing more exotic than the property of being a pet+fish. Now, while I have a 
pretty clear idea of what prototypical pet fish are (as illustrated by PET-FISHP), I haven’t 
much of a clue what it is to be a pet+fish. And I take it that neither does Fodor, other than 
to say that “the set of pet fish is the overlap of the set of pets with the set of fish” (1998: 
103). Yet as methodological point, Fodor rightly notes that the metaphysics of conceptual 
content is in no way beholden to our epistemic relation to properties like being a 
pet+fish. If it turns out that goldfish instantiate pet+fish then goldfish are instances of 
[PET(x) & FISH(x)]. Same goes for guppies, piranhas, catfish, and so on down the trotline. 
The upshot is that satisfying the possession conditions [PET(x) & FISH(x)] in no way 
guarantees that its possessors will recognize its instances as such. In this way, the content 
of one’s C-prototype of pet fish can diverge from the content of the complex concept 
[PET(x) & FISH(x)]. But more to the point, PET-FISHP demonstrates how antecedently held 
concepts can be used to form prototypes constructed from those concepts. It also stands 
to account for our explicit judgments about category membership. 
                                                 
30 I imagine that many such beliefs are (or can be) inferred real time, rather than stored in long-term 
memory, whenever the topic of pet fish arises. 
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As a point of historical interest, prototype theorists also struggle to explain how two 
people might ever come to share the same concept. For while a goldfish may be your idea 
of a prototypical pet fish, mine might be a guppy, or for that matter any species of aquatic 
creature that I conceive of as being prototypical pet fish. The present account, by 
contrast, readily explains how two subjects who share the one-and-only concept [PET(x) 
& FISH(x)] might nonetheless disagree wildly about what counts as a prototypical pet fish. 
For again it is the contents of their beliefs about pet fish and other things that diverge 
among subjects, and occasionally from reality, not the contents of their constituent 
concepts. Or as Fodor (2008: 144) argues, an atomistic theory of concepts predicts and 
thereby explains why, for example, “Ancient Greeks, who thought stars were holes in the 
fabric of the heavens, could nevertheless think about stars.” The basic moral is that 
having a concept does not depend on the epistemic capacity to identify/discriminate its 
instances.31 
I again dwell on such matters because the results can be used to explain how our 
ordinary conceptions of Words and their lexically-encoded meanings can diverge from 
their actual type-individuating properties. For example, if you ask the average Joe 
Sixpack on the street what the meaning of a Word is, he will likely fumble through some 
story to the effect that the meaning of a Word is whatever it denotes or refers to.32 
However, if Chomsky is right Words themselves neither denote nor refer in the 
traditional Russellian sense. Rather, Words are by hypothesis instantiations of the 
complex mental symbol {PHON, SYN, SEM}. And SEMs, which is again the term used 
                                                 
31 Fodor (2008: 137, fn.8) adds “That I do not know (and do not know how to find out) whether paramecia 
are green does not impugn my claim to have GREEN.” 
32 More likely I suspect that what you’ll get in the case of, say, common nouns is a description of things 
that those Words designate, but the details here are irrelevant to the point being made. 
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to characterized a Word’s lexically-encoded meaning, are purely formal, intrinsic 
properties of Words that guide and constrain without determining what they can and 
cannot be used to talk about in ordinary contexts. Rather, if what I have said thus far is 
correct, it is the effects that lexical meanings have on our use of Words that informs our 
ordinary conceptions of them. 
More specifically, and as I briefly argued in Chapter 1, I assume that speakers use 
their conceptsW of Words, inter alia, to form beliefs about their meanings such that the 
conceptW in question ipso facto becomes a proper constituent of the belief so-formed. The 
set of such beliefs in turn constitutes a speaker’s conception of those Words, or given the 
present discussion what we might think of as their prototypes. Furthermore, as suggested 
below conceptsW are metaphysically locked, à la Fodor, to the same empirical entities 
that theoretical linguists talk about, which is to say Words, which is to say items in a 
Chomskyan lexicon. That is, when ordinary speakers talk about the meanings of Words I 
assume that they are talking about (in a de re sense) the same things that theoretical 
linguists talk about when they talk about Words. It’s just that our ordinary, pre-theoretical 
conceptions of Words and their lexical meanings fail to map directly onto their actual 
language-internal, type-individuating properties and relations. In other words, while 
ordinary speakers and trained linguists think of and talk about Words in different ways, 
one presumes that they are thinking of and talking about the same things. 
The point, in short, is that having perfectly good conceptsW of Words in no way 
guarantees that their possessors will conceive of Words as being so-constituted, any more 
than, say, having the concept WATER(x) ensures knowing that water consists in H2O 
molecules. Rather, to know such facts, as Fodor puts it, requires doing the science. This is 
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not however to suggest that our ordinary conceptions of Words are systematically 
mistaken. Rather, the claim again is merely that our pre-theoretical conception of Words 
and what they mean is to be understood de dicto—“ways of thinking about” Words and 
what they mean as evidenced by certain type-individuating properties of their tokens. 
And so the claim is that ordinary speakers think about Words and their properties in ways 
that differ from the ways in which theoretical linguists think about Words. Specifically, I 
have been arguing that competent speakers know (in a robust sense of “knowing”) the 
various ways in which the meanings guide and constrain without determining what their 
host Words can and cannot be used to talk about in ordinary discourse. And so in this 
sense, ordinary speakers know perfectly well what they are talking about when talking 
about the meanings of the Words they utter. 
3.5. On the nature of conceptsW and their acquisition 
I have characterized the contents of conceptsW as expressing a linguistic property; 
namely, the property of being the Word that they are conceptsW of. For example, I take it 
that the content of DOG(w)—which is to say one’s conceptW of the Word ‘dog’—is the 
property of being the English Word ‘dog’. So characterized, however, it is prima facie 
unclear how to classify conceptsW under the Fodorian framework described above. For 
under present assumptions there is an obvious sense in which conceptsW range over mind-
dependent properties (i.e., properties of lexical items, understood as mental 
representations). Yet these properties are also presumed to be linguistic (i.e., scientific) 
kinds, which Fodor characterizes as mind-independent properties. 
I take the apparent conflict here to be largely terminological. For while Fodor does 
not specifically entertain the possibility, there is nothing incoherent about treating Words 
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as natural or scientific kinds, as in fact Chomsky and other like-minded theorists treat 
them. I doubt that Fodor would disagree. As such, I will assume in what follows that 
conceptsW are Fodorian atoms whose contents are corresponding items, which is to say 
representations, in a speaker’s mental lexicon. I further assume, as has just been 
suggested, that ordinary speakers get locked to Words pre-theoretically by way of 
prototype formation, whereas suitably trained linguists get locked to them by way of a 
scientific theory of their intrinsic properties and relations. 
In the first instance, I assume that as with WATER(x)PT from above our conceptsW 
get pre-theoretically locked to Words by way of our perceptual experiences of their 
prototypical instances—i.e., tokens of Words as they occur in verbal discourse. Of 
course, to have conceptsW of particular Words presupposes having a concept of what 
Words are, in general—call this WORD(w)PT. Similar to our pre-theoretical conceptions of 
lexical meanings, I take it that our pre-theoretical conceptions of what Words are is 
likewise blurry. However, if Fodor is right this is no obstacle to acquiring (and thus 
possessing) the concept WORD(w)PT, and likewise conceptsW of particular Words that are 
among its instances. For similar to concepts such as DOORKNOB(x) and CARBURETOR(x), 
what matters is that we perceive Words as being a certain way, and in particular that they 
strike minds like ours as being Words of natural language. 
By contrast, I assume with Fodor that theoretical linguists (qua scientists) get 
locked to Words by way of a formal theory about their hidden essences. For instance, my 
scientific concept WORD(w)ST is currently attached to a theory stating that Words are 
instances of the mental structure {PHON, SYN, SEM}. Of course, my theory—which is 
essentially Chomsky’s—may turn out to be false, and indeed quite likely is in certain 
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respects. But under the broader hypothesis that Words are in fact psychologically real 
linguistic entities, the former deficit is no barrier to getting/being locked to them, or at 
least no less so than, say, suitably trained physicists are locked to the property of being a 
quark, or that geologists are locked to the property of being a tectonic+plate, and 
cosmologists are locked to the property of being a black+hole. Rather, I take it that on 
Fodor’s view having an incomplete or even partially false theory of the property in 
question just counts as a less robust or perhaps less stable way of getting/being 
theoretically locked to that property. 
In turn, my scientific theory of particular Words includes beliefs about specific 
properties of their lexical entries, including their linguistically-encoded meanings. Now, I 
have suggested that in order to acquire conceptsW of particular Words presupposes having 
a conceptW of what Words are, in general. It also seems safe to assume that acquisition of 
particular conceptsW presupposes possession of the Words that they are conceptsW of. For 
instance, I assume that one cannot acquire DOG(x) in advance of acquiring the Word 
‘dog’. For otherwise there would be no experiences of DOG(x)-instances (e.g., ‘dog’-
utterances, ‘dog’-inscriptions, ‘dog’-signs) to underwrite the acquisition of DOG(x), or at 
least not as such to invoke Fodor’s caveat.33 That is, I assume that the order of 
acquisition, in the general case, is that we first acquire Words and then conceptsW of 
those Words, and perhaps only some time later the concept(s) that those Words lexicalize 
and are subsequently used to express. 
                                                 
33 This is not entirely true, as I assume, for example, that a native monolingual speaker of English could 
acquire a concept of a native Spanish speaker’s word ‘perro’ simply by knowing/being told that ‘perro’ is a 




Specifically, I argue in Chapter 4 that Word-acquisition is a graded phenomenon 
whereby one can acquire a Word, in the sense of having register it as such in one’s 
lexicon, without knowing what that Word means, which is to say without having 
lexicalized a concept under that Word, and thus without knowing which concept (or 
concepts) that it can coherently be used to express in ordinary discourse. In such cases, 
my proposal is that upon acquisition of an otherwise unfamiliar Word (or Word-sound) 
we use our conceptW of that Word to form an hypothesis qua metalinguistic beliefs about 
what it means. As hypothesized in Chapter 1, this reliance upon conceptsW in the 
acquisition of lexical meanings is part of what makes metalinguistic-semantic 
competence (MSC) a crucial ingredient of one’s core linguistic-semantic competence 
(LSC). Before moving on to these details, let me just briefly mention how, on my view, 
conceptsW become activated as a result of interpreting the meaning of corresponding 
Words. 
3.6. Activating Word-concepts (conceptsW) 
I have just stated in broad terms how conceptsW are acquired. As with other 
Fodorian atoms, I assume that once acquired conceptsW are stored somewhere in a 
speaker’s long-term conceptual-semantic memory. That is, by assumption conceptsW are 
consciously accessible language-external mental representations whose representational 
contents are tacit (i.e., non-conscious, non-conceptual, sub-doxastic) language-internal 
mental representations. I also suggested in Chapters 1 and 2 that Words lexicalize the 
concepts that they are customarily used to express. For instance, the Word ‘dog’ in the 
lexicon of most English speakers is used to express DOG(x) because speakers have used 
the former to lexicalize the latter, thereby establishing a fixed semantic relationship 
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between the two. I also drew my reader’s attention to the fact, which I take to be patently 
obvious, that ‘dog’ can also be used self-reflexively to express one’s concept of the Word 
‘dog’, which is to say DOG(w), as in an utterance of the sentence “The word ‘dog’ 
contains three letters” or “The word ‘dog’ designates dogs.” As such, it’s plausible to 
suppose that ‘dog’ lexicalizes both DOG(x) and DOG(w), among perhaps other concepts 
depending on the speaker’s verbal and/or conceptual sophistication. 
More generally, the suggestion is that if concept lexicalization is the process by 
which Words become semantically (i.e., structurally) associated with the concepts they 
express, and Words can be used self-reflexively to express conceptsW of themselves, it 
follows that conceptsW can become lexicalized under the very Words that they are 
conceptsW of. In fact, given the close-knit relationship between Words and corresponding 
conceptsW, it would be unsurprising if conceptsW are always the first to be lexicalized 
under the Words that they are conceptsW of, perhaps as a natural/automatic consequence 
of having acquired the Word in question. What’s more, if Chomsky is right that lexical 
meanings are understood as instructions to activate the concepts they lexicalize, it follows 
that conceptsW become activated (or primed/pre-activated) as a natural consequence of 
interpreting/understanding (the meanings of) the Words that they conceptsW of.
34 I 
believe this is generally true of all conceptsW. However, recall from Chapters 1 and 2 that 
with respect to proper names such as ‘Aristotle’, I have argued that the content of the 
conceptW ARISTOTLE(w) is an integral component of the meaning of ‘Aristotle’, which we 
can again think of as expressing the conceptW IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)). Thus, as a 
proper constituent of IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)) the conceptW ARISTOTLE(w) will always 
                                                 
34 Notice that while Chomsky does not speak of “concept lexicalization” in so many words, I take it that he 
has something like this mind. 
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be fully activated simply in virtue of having interpreted the meaning of ‘Aristotle’. In 
Chapter 1 I briefly discussed the potential benefits of this hypothesis wither respect to 
utterance interpretation, which will become clearer in Chapters 5-7. 
3.7. Chapter summary 
This concludes my survey of critical background assumptions about the nature of 
Words, lexical meanings, and concepts that will serve as the core foundation for all that 
follows. In brief summary, I have proposed that the linguistically-specified, context-
invariant meanings of Words are represented by their lexical entries as pointers—what I 
dubbed CON—that semantically relate those Words to the concepts they lexicalize. And I 
just argued that the family of expressible concepts will normally include conceptsW of the 
Words themselves, and which for largely expository purposes I am taking to be Fodorian 
atoms. With Chomsky, I have in turn hypothesized that lexical meanings are understood 
by interpreters as instructions to activate one or more of the concepts that their host 
Words lexicalize—i.e., the concepts that speakers structurally associate with a Word’s 
meaning, again including conceptsW of the Words themselves. And in this way, the 
meanings of Words guide and constrain without fully determining what they can (and 
cannot) be used to denote, refer to, or otherwise talk about in ordinary discourse.  
With the stage now fully set, it is time to move on to the more substantive aspects 
of my core thesis, the first of which concerns the role of metalinguistic-semantic 
competence (MSC) in the acquisition of lexical meanings. Subsequent chapters will then 
address more directly the role of MSC in utterance interpretation. 
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4. On the Role of MSC in the Acquisition of Lexical Meanings 
4.1. Introduction 
In this comparatively short chapter I argue that metalinguistic-semantic competence 
(MSC) is quite often operative in the acquisition of lexical meanings. For in many cases 
the acquisition of new Words together with their customary meanings does not occur 
overnight. Rather, developmental studies (not to mention good old-fashioned common 
sense) indicate that meaning acquisition is a graded phenomenon in that it can take 
considerable time, conceptual development, and linguistic maturity for Word-learners to 
gain full control over the meanings of certain Words; see, e.g., Carey (1978), Carey & 
Bartlett (1978), and more recently Swingley (2010). 
With respect to child language development, this appears to be true particularly 
with respect to the acquisition of verbs and certain functional Words such as prepositions, 
determiners, etc. In the first instance, Paul Bloom (2000: 25) writes: 
Learning the precise meaning of certain words, especially verbs, might be a long process 
requiring many trials, as shown by the fact that even some relatively frequent verbs, such 
as pour and fill, are not fully understood until middle childhood. 
Regarding prepositions, Karmiloff & Karmiloff-Smith (2001: 72) suggest that: 
[…] the learning of spatial terms like “in,” “on,” “under,” “in front of,” and “behind” is 
constrained by the child’s progressive understanding of the concepts underlying these 
terms. From this viewpoint, the child would not be able to acquire the meaning of, say, 
“under” until she had grasped that objects can be positioned one on top of the other. 
And even when it comes to common nouns, which children reportedly understand as 
object names, Eve Clark (2009: 294) comments: 
Some domains take years to acquire, and the meanings children assign to each term may 
shift as they add words that cut up the conceptual space more finely and learn more about 
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how to use each one… In many domains, though, even after several years, children may 
know little beyond some basic contrasts in meaning. For instance, they may know, by age 
six, that the words oak and elm both designate trees, but not be able to identify any 
instances. That is, they have acquired part of the lexical meaning but they have not yet 
established the reference for either word. This state of affairs is not unusual: it holds for 
most adults in some domains as well. 
On my view, these remarks suggest that language learners often acquire new Words 
without a complete grasp of what they mean conceptually speaking, which is to say 
without knowing which concepts other competent speakers use those Words to express. 
In technical terms, this is to say that competent speakers often acquire Words (or perhaps 
rather Word-sounds) in the absence of an appropriate concept to lexicalize under them. 
Or as Higginbotham (1988) puts it, the child’s task is to fill in the “critical elucidations” 
of the Word’s meaning. 
The question I explore in this chapter concerns what happens in the interim. My 
proposal, in brief, is that Word-learners—both young and old alike—use their conceptsW 
of Words, or again conceptsW, to form hypotheses qua metalinguistic beliefs about what 
otherwise conceptually underspecified Words mean. For while a Word-learner may not 
possess the concepts that others customarily use certain Words to express, so long as she 
has acquired the Word in question (i.e., has registered that Word in her mental lexicon) 
she will be in a position to immediately acquire a metalinguistic conceptW of that Word. 
She will then be able to use that conceptW to form a corresponding belief/hypothesis 
about what that Word means. These metalinguistic beliefs then serve as semantic proxies 
for the non-metalinguistic concepts that learners will eventually acquire, lexicalize, and 
thus more permanently associate with the Word’s meaning. Moreover, I argue that 
metalinguistic hypotheses about lexical meanings may actually double as the prototypes 
 156 
 
that facilitate one’s acquisition of lexicalizable concepts. As this relates to my core thesis, 
if MSC plays a role in the acquisition of lexical meanings, this constitutes an aspect of 
one’s linguistic-semantic competence (LSC), which again to my mind makes MSC a 
legitimate explanandum of semantic theory. 
More specifically, I have argued that Words of natural language are type-
individuated by their lexically-encoded PHON, SYN, and SEM features, where SEM 
features are what Chomskyans tend to think of, collectively, as constituting a Word’s 
linguistic meaning. My concern here is specifically with the establishment of what in 
Chapter 2 I posited to be the ‘CON’ feature of a Word’s lexical entry. Recall that, by 
hypothesis, CON is a particular SEM feature that semantically relates Words to the 
concepts they lexicalize. My aim here is to forward a theory about the circumstances 
under which a speaker finds him/herself in a position to assign values to the CON 
features of Words thereby fixing a critical aspect of their linguistic meanings. But before 
launching into the details, it will help to first outline an auxiliary hypothesis about the 
process of Word acquisition, more generally. 
4.2. On the development of metalinguistic competence 
To begin, I wish to first briefly consider at what stage of cognitive development 
children attain metalinguistic awareness, in general, and MSC in particular. Recent 
studies suggest that the attainment of such awareness/competence might occur much 
earlier than previously imagined. For instance, it is now well known that by the third 
trimester prenatal fetuses are highly attuned to speech patterns emanating from outside 
the womb. Specifically, Guasti (2002: 28) reports that healthy/normal neonates already 
possess the ability to distinguish utterances of their soon-to-be-acquired native language 
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from those of unfamiliar foreign languages (or at least those that belong to different 
rhythmic classes). She adds (p.32): 
Since infants do not know anything specific about their native language (i.e., about 
phonological constructs, stress, syllables, etc.), the prosody of languages must include 
some very robust and reliable acoustic cue that infants can easily pick up in a very short 
time and use for classifying languages. 
Furthermore, it has been reported that newborns are highly sensitive to statistical patterns 
in maternal language that distinguish various lexical categories (e.g., nouns, verbs, etc.) 
which might later aid in the acquisition of lexical meanings; cf. Lany & Saffran (2010). 
Indeed, a more recent study conducted by Mampe, et. al. (2009) indicates that the crying 
patterns of newborn babies can be differentiated according to corresponding features their 
mother’s native tongue. 
Most relevant for purposes of this chapter, and as briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, 
there is now ample evidence that infants are born with the capacity to distinguish 
linguistic utterances as symbols of interpersonal communication—that there is a symbolic 
link between Words and things in the world that those Words are used to designate. And 
this is to suggest that linguistic comprehension, and hence linguistic competence, goes 
beyond mere associative knowledge of the mappings between Word-sounds and their 
referents. Rather, as Woodward (2004: 149) puts it, “Word learning is both an act of 
associative learning and an act of symbolic learning.” As I am no expert on this topic, let 
me quote Woodward at length (ibid.): 
This aspect of linguistic knowledge rests on more general folk psychological concepts 
such as attention and intention—when a word is used referentially, the speaker’s 
intention is to draw attention to a particular entity by its use, or to call to mind a 
particular idea in her interlocutor. 
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This is not, however, to deny that associative learning plays a role in the child’s 
acquisition of a lexicon. For as Woodward (ibid.) adds: 
Both the associative and symbolic aspects of learning are critical. Without the 
ability to retain and organize associations in memory, it would be impossible to build a 
lexicon. And, as many theorists have pointed out, the language learning enterprise would 
not get far without an understanding of the referential nature of the link between words 
and the world.1 
Given such evidence, I will take for granted that at least by the time infants begin to 
understand the meanings of linguistic signals they have acquired a certain degree of 
metalinguistic-semantic knowledge/competence. Specifically, young language learners 
appear poised to represent speakers as produced Word-utterances with the intention of 
using those Words to stand for things in world other than the Word itself. Nonetheless, in 
order to represent the referential intentions of speakers as such, it would seem that Word-
learners must be capable of representing those utterances as Words of natural language. 
4.3. On Word acquisition 
If what I have said thus far corresponds to an actual language user’s semantic 
psychology, the ability to acquire particular Words presupposes a tacit understanding that 
Words, in general, are type-individuated by their PHON, SYN, and SEM features. One is 
therefore given to assume that at some early stage in their linguistic development 
language learners acquire a universal lexical representation-type, call it root, whose 
internal structure is the triplet {PHON, SYN, SEM}. That is, while individual Words are 
themselves unique expression-types, by hypothesis they are each tokens of the same 
                                                 
1 Woodward directs our attention to Akhtar & Tomasello (2001), Baldwin (1996), Macnamara (1982), and 
Tomasello (1999) for discussion of this point. 
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universal type, root.2 Once acquired, particular Words and their tokens are then 
individuated by the type-specific values assigned to individual PHON, SYN, and SEM 
features by the I-languages that generate them. As suggested, however, it often takes time 
and experience with otherwise conceptually underspecified Words to fully flesh out these 
values, and in particular the value of their CON feature, which again we might think of as 
one context-invariant aspect of their lexically-encoded meanings. 
So conceived, it seems reasonable to suppose that the first step in acquiring a new 
Word is to recognize its phonetic form (i.e., acoustic profile) as a potential Word-sound 
of one’s native language, and then to record its role as such in one’s lexicon. Imagine, for 
example, a two-year old learner of English in the throes of acquiring the Word ‘apple’. 
When the child’s phonological system first recognizes the sound \ˈa-pəl\ as a potential 
Word-sound of English, her I-language registers this event by generating a new lexical 
entry, i.e., a token of the generic type root, whose initial value assignments can be 
described by the structure: 
(1) apple: {PHON = [\ˈa-pəl\], SYN = , SEM = { = , CON = }}3 
I am using ‘’ as a placeholder for lexically-encoded SEM features other than CON as 
discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g., [±Count], [±Animate], etc.), and ‘’ indicates that the 
features in question have yet to be assigned values. I will say more about the assignments 
of SYNs and SEMs presently, and I have already offered a feel for what these features 
consists in, including major category and subcategorization features. To keep the notation 
                                                 
2 I am limiting my assumptions here to open-class Words only, thereby allowing for the possibility that 
closed-class/functional Words have a different structure. 
3 As mentioned in Chapter 2, what counts as a token of the same Word-sound can presumably vary 
dramatically across dialects and indeed within individual idiolects. Thus, ex hypothesi each PHON 
circumscribes some tolerable range of acoustic input/speech signals. This range of signals must then be 
correlated with the internal feature values assigned to corresponding PHONs by the learner’s I-language. 
 160 
 
simple, I will represent the phonological component of the Word ‘apple’, which is to say 
the lexical root apple, as PHON(apple). 
In short, one assumes that whatever these PHON features are, by the time a child 
begins to talk her phonological system knows enough about the sound made by typical 
utterances of the Word ‘apple’ to (i) recognize its sound as a potential Word-sound of 
English, and (ii) encode its role as such in the PHON component of its lexical entry 
(though the phonological forms of very young language learners are probably at best 
crude imitations of those of adults). The child’s remaining tasks are then to figure out (iii) 
the grammatical role of ‘apple’ in her native language, and (iv) its linguistic meaning, 
which includes identifying which extralinguistic concept (or concepts) that Word being 
acquired is customarily used to express.4 
4.4. On the acquisition of conceptually underspecified Words 
I also suggested in Chapter 2 that if a learner knows (or otherwise has definite 
beliefs about) which concept an otherwise unfamiliar Word-sound is being used to 
express, she will be in a position to immediately lexicalize that concept under the Word 
in question via a process known in the developmental literature as “fast mapping.” For 
instance, if our learner knows/ believes that the Word ‘apple’ expresses the concept 
APPLE(x), she will (ceteris paribus) lexicalize APPLE(x) under ‘apple’. Under current 
assumptions, this is to say that she will assign the value @apple to the CON feature of 
her lexical entry for ‘apple’, where @apple serves as a pointer to the concept APPLE(x) in 
her long-term semantic memory. Following notation introduced in Chapters 1 and 2, my 
                                                 
4 It may be that Word-acquisition for beginning language learners involves a kind of brute association 
between labels/signals and their meanings, which is to say that complex lexicalization skills of the kind 
being suggested here may only come online later in the child’s linguistic development; one imagines with 
the acquisition of complex syntax. 
 161 
 
hypothesis is that the meaning assignment for the Word ‘apple’ can be characterized as 
follows: 
(2) CON(apple) = activate@apple → APPLE(x) 
In terms of comprehension, as described in Chapter 2, we can think of activate@apple as 
being understood by interpreters as an instruction to activate APPLE(x). 
While fast mapping helps to explain the vocabulary “explosion” that occurs with 
children, often beginning around age two, as I indicated above there is also evidence to 
suggest that Word-learners—both young and old—often acquire new Words on just one 
or two exposures yet with little or no idea what those Words mean, conceptually 
speaking; that is, without knowing precisely or in some cases even vaguely which 
concepts those Words are customarily used to express. Indeed, learners may have yet to 
acquire one of the possibly several concepts they will eventually come to associate with 
the Word’s meaning. In consequence, newly acquired Words are often initially deployed 
in conceptually inappropriate ways.5 For example, the Word ‘apple’ might be used to in 
reference to grapefruits, or for that matter any round, edible object. 
By around age three, however, children nonetheless begin to deploy conceptually 
underspecified words in grammatically appropriate ways. This ability coincides with the 
emergence of productive syntax, lending credence to the syntactic bootstrapping 
hypothesis as exemplified by a child’s tacit understanding of so-called “Jabberwocky” 
sentences. To borrow an example from Higginbotham (1988),6 consider (3) below, which 
has roughly the same form of interpretation as (4): 
(3) All mimsy were the borogoves 
                                                 
5 See Landau & Gleitman (1985), Gleitman (1990), Gillette, Gleitman, Gleitman, & Lederer (1999). 
6 As I understand, this example owes originally to Harman (1974). 
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(4) The plates were all broken 
While upon first acquaintance a hearer of (3) may lack sufficient evidence to fix the 
extensions of ‘mimsy’ and ‘borogove’, given her tacit knowledge of the grammar, and 
familiarity with other words in the sentence, by age three or so she can nevertheless infer 
that ‘borogoves’ is a plural count noun that designates some class of things, or other. She 
will also know that ‘mimsy’ is an ordinary adjective that describes some state or property 
of ‘borogoves’ (again whatever those “things” happen to be). As importantly, knowledge 
of the “logical skeleton” (i.e., grammatical structure) of (3) provides learners with tacit 
clues about what these words cannot mean. Higginbotham (ibid.: 166) notes, for instance, 
that “the child knows that the word 'mimsy' could not mean tree, and 'borogove' could not 
mean run.” This competence is again adducible to what the child antecedently knows, 
which is (i) the formal grammatical structure of (3), (ii) the semantic principles by which 
sentences with that structure (or logical form) are interpreted, along with (iii) the 
meanings of its other lexical constituents.7 
In short, such observations suggest that at some early stage of linguistic 
development the child’s I-language becomes capable of extracting and lexicalizing 
certain grammatical features of Words (i.e., PHONs, SYNs, and SEMs) based solely on 
the linguistic context in which they are encountered. Again, these purely formal features 
of Words often provide learners with tacit clues as to what they can (and cannot) mean, 
even in the absence of a complete or even vague understanding of which concepts those 
Words are customarily used to express. Or in my terminology, this kind of tacit lexical 
                                                 
7 As Lust (2006: 185) explains, “Functional categories provide a critical mechanism by which we map the 
speech stream to the secret skeleton, just as we do for “Jabberwocky”… Children must link content words 
to the skeleton… When words are linked to the skeleton, children can label phrases; e.g., nouns will head 
noun phrases, verbs will head verb phrases. 
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knowledge is what enables learners to acquire Words and deploy them appropriately prior 
to having hit upon a stable value to assign to their CON feature. 
4.4.1. Innate biases 
In addition to their tacit knowledge of syntax/grammar, there is abundant evidence 
that language learners bring to the acquisition task certain innate conceptual/semantic 
biases that further constrain their initial assumptions about the meanings of newly 
acquired Words, and particularly with respect to common nouns (which by all accounts 
dominate the child’s early vocabulary). The leading candidates are variously known as 
the Whole Object bias, Taxonomy, and Mutual Exclusivity, described by Markman (1994: 
155-63) as follows: 
Whole Object: A novel label [i.e., Word-sound] is likely to refer to the whole object 
and not to its parts, substance, or other properties. 
Taxonomy: Labels refer to objects of the same kind rather than to objects that are 
thematically related. 
Mutual Exclusivity: Words are mutually exclusive… Each object will have one and 
only one label. 
The Whole Object bias is fairly self-explanatory. For instance, when adults use the Word 
‘dog’ in reference to dogs, toddlers naturally assume that the thing designated is the 
entire animal and not, say, one of its parts, properties, or relations to other things in the 
environment.8 According to Taxonomy, young children will also naturally assume that 
‘dog’ extends over other instances of the same homogenous class/domain of entities (i.e., 
that ‘dog’ is a simple one-place predicate). By contrast, Mutual Exclusivity, or what we 
                                                 
8 Think here Quine (1960), ‘gavagai’, and his thesis of the “indeterminacy of translation.” However, while 
Quine may have been right that the referents/extensions of words are metaphysically arbitrary, it appears 
that with respect to language learners they are not conceptually arbitrary. 
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might call the “no synonym rule,” inclines learners to assume, in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, that distinct Word-sounds have distinct meanings; i.e., that the relation 
between Word-forms and their meanings is one-to-one. Most theorists also agree, 
however, that these biases are defeasible in light of negative evidence. Nevertheless, and 
ceteris paribus, they appear to function as important heuristics in the Word acquisition 
process. 
There is in addition a more specific taxonomic principle, the Basic-Level Category 
bias, which naturally favors an interpretation of common nouns as designating a “basic-
level” category—a category which, as described by Lust (2006: 285), “has the greatest 
communicative value.” For instance, the Word ‘dog’ is naturally taken to designate dogs 
rather than, say, animals (more generally) or collies (more specifically). These biases are 
not infallible, however, as any parent knows. In particular, young children quite often 
over-extend (over-generalize) Words like ‘dog’ to designate any furry four-legged 
animal, and ‘apple’ to denote any round edible object (and in one study even a 
doorknob!); cf., Clark & Clark (1973) and Karmiloff & Karmiloff-Smith (2001).9 In the 
other direction, as observed by Lust (2006: 231), young children also under-extend 
Words such as ‘roof’ applying it to pitched roofs but not flat ones. Indeed, both over- and 
under-extensions occur not only with nouns but all open-class lexical items (and, as 
reported in Lust even classifiers, in classifier languages such as Japanese and Thai). 
The key observation, however, is that despite tacitly known constraints on lexical 
meanings, Word-learners—again both children and adults alike—are quite often not in a 
position to fix the precise meanings/extensions of Words on first encounter. The obvious 
                                                 
9 Although, some theorists argue that over-extension occurs because the learner has yet to acquire a more 
specific Word for the object in question. 
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question, then, is: What is a learner to do in the meantime? The consensus in the 
developmental research community is that learners exploit what evidence is available at 
the time of acquisition to form an hypothesis about what the Word means. Now, to put 
the task in terms of hypothesis formation makes it sound as though the goal of toddlers is 
to align their lexical meanings with those of adults. Yet it is entirely unclear whether 
conformity to adult language is ever a concern of young children. For one thing, this 
presupposes that little kids understand that the meanings they assign to Words might be 
mistaken. To the contrary, however, it seems that young children quite often simply latch 
onto the nearest available meaning and just assume that they’ve got it right, or at least in 
the absence of negative evidence, which is reportedly quite rare, and perhaps occasionally 
even in spite of it! But let’s set this latter question aside in favor of evaluating what, if 
anything, learners represent as the meanings of conceptually underspecified Words. 
4.4.2. On the role of MSC in the acquisition of lexical meanings 
By way of illustration, consider a child who over-extends the Word ‘dog’ to 
designate any medium-sized furry four-legged animal, which reflects her belief that ‘dog’ 
applies to things other than dogs. More specifically, let us assume that what the child 
tacitly believes is reflected in (5): 
(5) w [DOG(w) & EXPRESSES(w, [FURRY(x) & QUADRUPED(x) & ANIMAL(x)])] 
In paraphrase, (5) reflects the child’s tacit belief that the Word ‘dog’ expresses the 
complex concept [FURRY(x) & QUADRUPED(x) & ANIMAL(x)]. Or differently described, 
(5) represents the child’s working hypothesis about what the Word ‘dog’ means. Indeed, 
it may be that children initially lexicalize something like [FURRY(x) & QUADRUPED(x) & 
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ANIMAL(x)] under the Word ‘dog’ as its meaning.10 If that were the case, on my view we 
could specify its lexically-encoded meaning as (6): 
(6) CON(dog) = activate@dog → (FURRY(x) & QUADRUPED(x) & ANIMAL(x)) 
Of course, by the time a child has acquired FURRY(x), QUADRUPED(x), and ANIMAL(x), 
he/she is quite likely already in possession of DOG(x). In the imagined scenario, however, 
the child’s predicament is that he/she simply doesn’t know (and perhaps doesn’t care) 
that adults use ‘dog’ to express DOG(x). 
Alternatively, it has been suggested to me (by Paul Pietroski, p.c.) that rather than 
conceiving of the meaning of ‘dog’ as expressing the complex concept [FURRY(x) & 
QUADRUPED(x) & ANIMAL(x)], it might be that the child associates the meaning of ‘dog’ 
with an extensionally equivalent atomic concept, call it BEASTIE(x). The idea is that the 
child will eventually replace BEASTIE(x) with DOG(x) once she keys in on the fact that 
others use ‘dog’ to express DOG(x). If correct, this might obviate the need to generate 
meaning-hypotheses such as (5). However, it may be nevertheless be the case that 
learning (5) is a prerequisite for acquiring BEASTIE(x), whereas an even more specific 
hypothesis will be needed to acquire DOG(x). 
To take a more illustrative example, imagine a slightly older child—call her 
Minnie—who by assumption has the Words ‘horse’, ‘adult’, and ‘female’ in her lexicon, 
and has correctly lexicalized her concept HORSE(x) under the Word ‘horse’, her concept 
ADULT(x) under ‘adult’, and likewise FEMALE(x) under the Word ‘female’. Suppose 
further that during a visit to the petting zoo, Minnie’s father points to a horse and says 
                                                 
10 I see no reason to deny that some Words lexicalize complex concepts, rather like an idiom or 
definition/meaning postulate. For example, it would be unsurprising to learn that ‘bachelor’ lexicalizes 
[UNMARRIED(x) & MALE(x)]. In the other direction, I see no reason to deny that certain complex 
expressions (e.g., idioms) lexicalize atomic concepts. For example, it seems to me quite plausible that 
‘kick-the-bucket’ lexicalizes DIE(x). 
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“Look Minnie, that’s a mare.” Given the principles of Mutual Exclusivity and Taxonomy 
from above, Minnie will presumably be inclined to infer, correctly in this instance, that 
‘mare’ is not synonymous with ‘horse’ but rather designates a subordinate category (i.e., 
a sub-class of horses). By assumption, however, Minnie knows not which property (or in 
this case properties) distinguishes mares from the more general class of things called 
‘horse’. In the absence of further evidence, it may be that Minnie simply introduces an 
existentially generalized concept to serve as a placeholder for an otherwise unknown 
property that differentiates mares from the more general category HORSE(x). 
Specifically, one might hypothesize that Minnie comes to believe something like 
(7): 
(7) w [MARE(w) & F [EXPRESSES(w, [HORSE(x) & F(x)])]] 
In paraphrase, (7) says: For some w, w is the Word ‘mare’, and for some property F, w 
expresses the complex concept [HORSE(x) & F(x)].11 Here again, it may be that learners 
initially lexicalize the complex concept [HORSE(x) & F(x)] under the Word ‘mare’ as its 
meaning. And this is to float the suggestion that [HORSE(x) & F(x)] may be what a child 
who believes (6) actually intends to express with the Word ‘mare’. Alternatively, and 
perhaps more accurately, what the child hypothesizes may be more like (8): 
(8) x F [F(x)  HORSE(x) & w [MARE(w) & SATISFIES(x, w)  F(x)]] 
                                                 
11 If the agent believes that more than one property distinguishes mares from other horses, then F(x) above 
is perhaps more accurately represented as some set of concepts {F1(x) & F2(x) & … Fn(x)}. In the present 
case, in particular, I am not assuming that Minnie knows immediately that being an adult is part of what 
distinguishes mares from say fillies. Rather, I assume that the null hypothesis for Word-learners, and 
children in particular, is that there is just one yet-to-be-discovered property that will adequately distinguish 
mares from other horses. 
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In rough paraphrase, (8) can be understood as representing the word-learner’s belief that 
there exists some property F such that some entity x is an F iff x is a horse (of some as-of-
yet unspecified subcategory), and x is a satisfier of the Word ‘mare’ iff F(x). 
A third alternative is that what the child initially acquires/represents is what in 
Chapter 3 I called a C-prototype—i.e., a Roschian-like prototype whose constituents are 
Fodorian atomic concepts with weights attached to indicate the relative frequency of their 
instances among the category in question. For instance, rather than (7) or (8) above one 
might hypothesize that what the child represents is more like the C-prototype in (9): 
(9) MAREP = x: [(HORSE(x), w1) & (ADULT(x), w2) & F (F(x), w3)] 
As also suggested in Chapter 3, it appears that acquiring something like a Roschian 
prototype constitutes a stage in the acquisition of most lexicalizable concepts. If so, then 
acquiring/learning (9) may be a necessary precursor to acquiring the primitive concept 
MARE(x). 
In any case, it seems obvious that at some point most English speakers eventually 
learn that mares are adult female horses. And when this happens, they need only 
substitute [ADULT(x) & FEMALE(x)] for F(x) in (7)-(9) above, as say in (10) below, to 
conform with the conventional use of ‘mare’ (if again that happens to be the learner’s 
goal): 
(10) w [MARE(w) & EXPRESSES(w, [HORSE(x) & ADULT(x) & FEMALE(x)])] 
Indeed, I suspect that ‘mare’ may be one of those rare Words that actually admits to a 
definition (e.g., that ‘mare’ = [HORSE(x) & ADULT(x) & FEMALE(x)]). Or anyway I would 
be unsurprised if Word-learners often resort to building a representation that is equivalent 
to a definition in the absence of a more specific, perhaps atomic, concept to lexicalize 
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under otherwise unfamiliar Words. However, if Fodor is right learners will eventually 
acquire a bona fide atomic concept of mares, which is to say MARE(x). As recall that on 
Fodor’s view one cannot think about mares as such without a concept of mares as such. 
And if MARE(x) happens to be the only concept there is of mares as such, then 
presumably one cannot think about mares as such without having first acquired the 
concept MARE(x). 
If that’s right, under present assumptions the acquisition of MARE(x) will also 
normally result in the subject’s attainment/formation of the following metalinguistic 
belief: 
(11) w [MARE(w) & EXPRESSES(w, MARE(x)] 
Or as represented in the lexicon, we can specify the meaning of the lexical entry of the 
Word ‘mare’ as follows: 
(12) CON(mare) = activate@mare → MARE(x) 
More specifically still, I am inclined to think that MARE(x), as opposed to say DOG(x), is a 
prime example of what Fodor calls a natural kind concept whose acquisition depends on 
having an empirically informed theory of what mares are. In general, I am disposed to 
think that the acquisition of any concept whose instances cannot be distinguished by their 
superficial/perceptible properties may occur only in virtue of having first formed a 
complex definitional belief like (10), which at least for the child serves as a kind of 
informal scientific theory of what mares are. 
There are of course many Words whose scientific and even ordinary meanings 
remain conceptually underspecified throughout a speaker’s adult life. Consider the Word 
‘elm’, for example (or compare the Word ‘tabulian’ from Chapter 1). As Putnam 
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famously suggested, one might learn at an early age that elms are a kind of deciduous tree 
yet grow up not knowing (or again even caring) how to identify their instances as such. In 
my view, this is again to suggest that otherwise competent speakers will have formed a 
crude hypothesis (i.e., C-prototype) about what the Word ‘elm’ means to the effect of 
(13), or alternatively one of the hypotheses in either (14) or (15): 
(13) ELMP = x: [(TREE(x), w1) & (DECIDUOUS(x), w2) & F (F(x), w3)] 
(14) x F [F(x)  TREE(x) & DECIDUOUS(x) & w [ELM(w) & SATISFIES(x, w)  
F(x)]] 
(15) w [ELM(w) & F [EXPRESSES(w, [TREE(x) & DECIDUOUS(x) & F(x)])]] 
In either case, the relevant claim is once again that the existentially quantified predicate-
concept F(x) is introduced to represent some otherwise unknown property (or set of 
properties) that is believed to distinguish elms from other tree species. 
To be sure, I take it to be an observational fact that most adult English speakers are 
familiar with elms in name only, or perhaps crude description. Yet so long as one has 
acquired the Word ‘elm’, or have minimally registered the Word-sound \'elm\ as a Word 
of English in one’s lexicon, one is thereby in a position to acquire the conceptW ELM(w) 
and then use that conceptW to form a metalinguistic belief/hypothesis about its meaning, 
such as one of (13)-(15). Specifically, we can think of (13) serving not only as one’s 
hypothesis about the meaning of ‘elm’ but also as one’s (C-) prototype of elms. 
Moreover, should this prototype grow sufficiently sophisticated, say in consequence of 
experience with elms, perhaps together with an informal theory of what elms are, it might 
serve to mediate the acquisition ELM(x). That is, in Fodor’s terminology the proposal is 
that learning (13) might constitute a stage in the process of getting metaphysically locked 
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to the property of being an elm. The acquisition of ELM(x) would then result in the 
rearrangement of the prototype specified in (13) to that of (16) below: 
(16) ELMP' = w [ELM(w) & EXPRESSES(w, ELM(x))] 
In turn, having acquired ELM(x) will presumably lead to a revision of the speaker’s 
lexical entry for the Word ‘elm’ along the lines of (17): 
(17) CON(elm) = activate@elm → ELM(x) 
But more accurately, for each Word considered in this chapter I assume, as argued for to 
some extent in Chapters 1-3, that competent speakers will have lexicalized under that 
Word a metalinguistic conceptW of the Word itself. For instance, to be more precise I 
should represent the meaning of ‘elm’ in (17) as (18): 
(18) CON(elm) = activate@elm → {ELM(w), ELM(x)} 
Again, I assume the same holds for ‘dog’, ‘apple’, ‘mare’, and so forth for each Word 
recorded in a speaker’s mental lexicon. 
All of this being as it may, I agree with Fodor that the formation of metalinguistic 
prototypes cannot be the only way to acquire basic concepts. For presumably our non-
human, non-linguistic ancestors also know how to pull this trick off, I assume by way of 
what in Chapter 3 I called F-prototypes (i.e., prototypes grounded in the sensorium). 
Rather, to be clear I am merely putting forth an empirical hypothesis about the way 
language users may in fact acquire certain lexicalizable concepts. And while I have no 
empirically testable evidence to prove this, our beliefs about the meanings of Words at 
least seem to have the right structure and content to serve as prototypes for the concepts 
that we eventually acquire and then lexicalize under otherwise unfamiliar Words. Thus, 
what better way to kill two birds with one stone than to use metalinguistic beliefs about 
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lexical meanings as a way of bootstrapping the acquisition of corresponding lexical 
concepts? Whether or not I am right about the role of metalinguistic beliefs in the 
acquisition of lexicalizable pre-linguistic concepts, it strikes me as exceedingly plausible 
that competent speakers use their conceptW of Words to form beliefs/hypotheses about 
what those Words mean, and in general that such beliefs are instrumental in the 
acquisition of lexical meanings. 
As any of this relates to linguistic competence, it will be remembered that 
Chomskyans are committed to the idea that acquiring a language is part-and-parcel of 
one’s linguistic competence. Since the lexicon is an integral component of I-languages, it 
follows that the capacity to acquire Words along with their linguistic meanings 
constitutes part of one’s core linguistic competence. I have proposed here that the 
acquisition of lexical meanings may very well depend on using concepts of Words (i.e., 
conceptsW) to form beliefs/hypotheses about what those Words mean, and by the same 
token what they cannot mean. And this is to suggest that the acquisition of lexical 
meanings quite often depends on the deployment of a speaker’s metalinguistic-semantic 
competence (MSC). 
More generally, as suggested back in Chapter 1 I assume that an adequate theory of 
linguistic competence should minimally specify (i) what competent speakers must know, 
or represent, in order to understand the meanings of linguistic expressions, (ii) how their 
meanings constrain what these expressions can and cannot be used/uttered to talk about 
in ordinary discourse, (iii) how such knowledge is acquired, and (iv) how this knowledge 
is deployed in the service of comprehension. In the present chapter I have attempted to 
demonstrate that in cases where speakers don’t know what newly acquired Words mean, 
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they often recruit their MSC to satisfy one or more of these criteria. If correct, then MSC 
is an essential ingredient of one’s overall semantic competence, and hence one’s general 
linguistic competence. However, I will be arguing in chapters to follow that MSC 
contributes to speaker’s core semantic competence in yet other ways. 
4.5. Chapter summary 
I have briefly argued here that the acquisition of Words with their lexical meanings 
is often a graded phenomenon. Specifically, child studies indicate that at some early stage 
of linguistic development, the child’s I-language becomes capable of extracting and 
lexicalizing certain purely syntactic features of words (i.e., SYNs) based solely on the 
linguistic context in which they are encountered. Importantly, these features provide 
learners with tacit clues as to what otherwise unfamiliar Words can (and cannot mean), 
even in the absence of a complete or even vague understanding of which concepts those 
Words are customarily used to express. However, the absence of a corresponding concept 
to lexicalize under a Word appears to be no barrier to the acquisition of the Word itself 
and its subsequent deployment in ordinary conversation. The absence of a corresponding 
concept to lexicalize under a Word also seems to be no obstacle to acquiring a conceptW 
of that Word. Indeed, if what I have said is on the right track belief/hypotheses formed 
with one’s conceptsW often facilitates the acquisition of lexical meanings, perhaps by way 
of facilitating the acquisition of lexicalizable concepts. 
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5. On the Role of MSC in the Interpretation of Lexical 
Polysemy 
5.1. Introduction 
Under the present hypothesis Words are semantically related to the extralinguistic 
concepts they lexicalize, and subsequently used to express, by way of a pointer that I 
have dubbed CON (for “concept,” roughly speaking). However, I again assume that CON 
is just one among perhaps several other SEM features encoded by a Word’s lexical entry 
that collectively constitute its context-invariant linguistic meaning. In terms of 
comprehension, I am following Chomsky in his conjecture that linguistic meanings are 
understood by interpreters as instructions to conceptual systems “for thought and action.” 
More specifically, by hypothesis lexical meanings are understood by their interpreters as 
instructions to activate one or more of the extralinguistic (or pre-linguistic) concepts that 
their host Words lexicalize. 
In this chapter I examine a closely related but more refined conception of linguistic 
meaning defended by Paul Pietroski (2005, and forthcoming) that adds some semantic 
flesh to the syntactic bones of Chomsky’s conjecture. Most relevant to my purposes, 
Pietroski’s semantic architecture offers a theoretically attractive way to think about the 
representation of lexical polysemy—the linguistic phenomenon by which a single Word 
can be used/uttered to express multiple analytically related concepts, or senses. It will be 
the burden of this chapter to demonstrate how Word-concepts (conceptsW) and 
corresponding metalinguistic beliefs might fit into this picture and, correlatively, how a 
speaker’s metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC) contributes to the interpretation 
(i.e., disambiguation) of polysemous Words relative to a context of utterance. 
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Before reviewing the relevant details of Pietroski’s account, it will be noted that not 
everyone recognizes polysemy as a legitimate linguistic phenomenon—most notably 
Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. In particular, Fodor & Lepore (1998) argue instead for 
what they call a purely “denotational” (as opposed to “decompositional”) conception of 
the lexicon according to which lexical meanings are both univocal (i.e., monosemous) 
and atomistic (i.e., unstructured/non-decompositional). To foreshadow, it will turn out 
that my construal lexical polysemy is not necessarily incompatible with Fodor and 
Lepore’s atomistic conception of the lexicon; though it does conflict with their 
denotational conception of Words. But let me begin by making a case for the 
psychological reality of lexical polysemy, and later I will attempt to show how the 
conceptual representation of polysemy is related to the semantics of the language in a 
way that is largely compatible with the constraints imposed by Fodor and Lepore, while 
also relying heavily on Pietroski’s minimalistic semantic architecture. 
5.2. A case for the psychological reality of lexical polysemy 
I should also qualify immediately that the literature on lexical polysemy is vast and 
thus allows for only a cursory review of the relevant details here. I will initially approach 
the question from largely a descriptive perspective by classifying putative forms of 
lexical polysemy and later consider extant proposals for representing polysemy in the 
lexicon. 
5.2.1. Distinguishing homophony from polysemy 
Prima facie most if not all open-class Word-forms are in one way or another 
semantically ambiguous, or at least with respect to their norm-governed interpretations 
relative to a context of utterance. More precisely, it strikes me and many other 
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commentators as patently obvious that in many instances the same Word can be 
used/uttered to express different concepts on different occasions and/or in different 
contexts. However, Words appear to be semantically ambiguous in different ways. At a 
very coarse level of description, this difference is reflected in the widely recognized 
distinction between lexical homophony and lexical polysemy.1 
Lexical homophony (or just homophony for short)2 is characterized by Words that 
have the same phonology/pronunciation but express unrelated meanings. To cite a stock 
example, the English Word-sound \ˈbaŋk\ can be used to designate either a kind of 
financial institution or a type of land formation (e.g., a river bank), which are of course 
semantically unrelated entities. As such, ambiguity theorists tend to agree that the Word-
sound \ˈbaŋk\ is homophonous, which is to say that there are actually two semantically 
unrelated Words that as a matter of historical accident happen to have the same 
pronunciation. In technical terms, this is to suggest that the same phonological form is 
listed in the lexicon under two separate entries with unrelated meanings.3 Homophones 
are traditionally distinguished with numerical indices, as in ‘bank1’ and ‘bank2’, thereby 
marking their status as ontologically distinct Words/lexical entries.4 In short, the semantic 
relationship between homophones and their meanings is by definition one-to-one. 
                                                 
1 Strictly speaking, many theorists only count homophonous/homonymous Words as ambiguous. However, 
others see things slightly differently. For example, as Fodor & Lepore (1998: 278, fn.12) write “We take 
ambiguity to be the generic property of which polysemy and homonymy are species.” Many theorists in the 
psycholinguistics literature also refer to polysemy as a form of lexical ambiguity. 
2 Theorists quite often speak of homophony at the phrasal/sentential level as well. However, for purposes of 
this chapter we can take ‘homophony’ to mean lexical homophony. 
3 Some theorists describe homophony as one phonological form linked to two separate lexical entries. 
4 From a definitional standpoint, homonyms are Words that are both pronounced and spelled alike, whereas 
homophones needn’t be spelled alike (e.g., ‘tale’ and ’tail’ are by definition homophones). However, by 
hypothesis Words as they are represented in the mind have no internal “orthography,” per se, and thus the 
distinction as manifest in written language is irrelevant for theoretical purposes. Rather, under present 
assumptions Words are type-individuated by their phonological and semantic properties. Now, from a 
computational standpoint distinct <PHON, SEM> will be formally distinct mental symbols, but in virtue of 
encoding distinct features. If one wishes to think of these symbolic differences in terms of a mental 
 177 
 
By contrast, lexical polysemy (or just polysemy) arises when what appears to be the 
same Word is used/uttered to express multiple analytically related meanings or senses.5 
On my way of thinking, this is to say that lexical meanings are conceptually 
underspecified in that most if not all open-class Words can be used/uttered to express a 
range of formally distinct yet analytically related concepts. Without begging too many 
questions, the key observation is that prima facie the semantic relationship between 
polysemous Words and their meanings/senses appears to be one-to-many.6 In Chapter 2 I 
introduced Chomsky’s example of the Word ‘book’ as an instance of intra-category 
polysemy. Recall that ‘book’ (or the Word-sound \ˈbu k\) can be used as a common noun 
to designate either a particular physical object (“That book is heavy”) or, relatedly, its 
abstract content (“That book is disturbing”), and in some contexts, as we shall see in a 
moment, it appears that both senses can be expressed simultaneously. But unlike the two 
unrelated meanings of ‘bank’, these two senses are clearly related, analytically or 
semantically, suggesting that the Word ‘book’ is in fact polysemous as opposed to 
homophonous. 
A perhaps more dramatic example of lexical polysemy routinely cited in the 
literature occurs with the Word ‘paper’ which when used as a common noun is 
                                                                                                                                                 
representation’s internal “orthography,” I suppose that’s fine. But one can maintain that these differences 
supervene on differences in a Word’s phonological and semantic properties. In any case, some theorists 
nonetheless refer to the phenomenon in question as homonymy, but more often the term homophony is 
used and so that’s the one I’ll employ for purposes here.  
5 Taylor (2003: 644) writes “A defining feature of polysemy is that the various meanings of a word should 
be related.” To say that some Word senses are etymologically related is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition on polysemy. For while not perceived as being so-related, many homophones reportedly have 
etymologically related meanings. But as pointed out by Koskela & Murphy (2006: 743) what ultimately 
matters for the empirical study of lexical ambiguity is how speakers perceive the semantic relatedness of 
meanings. 
6 Or at least in adult lexicons. For if the Mutual Exclusivity bias from Chapter 4 is correct, young children 
generally eschew assigning multiple meanings/senses to the same Word-form. However, it’s been reported 
that children as young as four recognize and process certain forms of lexical polysemy, including the 




polysemous, among other ways, as between both count and mass readings. For example, 
in appropriate contexts ‘paper’ can be used to designate a newspaper, the textual content 
of a newspaper, the material that it is printed on (mass reading), and even the 
newspaper’s publisher (e.g., “The paper declared bankruptcy”), among other more 
distantly related things such as a scholarly journal article and student writing assignment, 
or for that matter just about anything printed on paper. Moreover, in its plural form, 
‘papers’ can be used to designate cigarette wrappers or passport documents, or for that 
matter just about anything made of paper.7 The fact that each of these senses is related to, 
and indeed seemingly derives from, the material substance sense of ‘paper’—what we 
might call its “core” sense—strongly suggests that the Word ‘paper’ is inherently 
polysemous. 
The standard diagnostic used to distinguish instances of homophony from polysemy 
is to place candidate Words in variable-binding contexts such as anaphora, sentential 
ellipsis, and verbal “gapping,” and then gauge the resultant semantic effects. Specifically, 
the unrelated meanings of homophones normally cannot co-occur in these contexts, or 
when they do the result is an anomalous (absurd/humorous) effect known as zeugma. As 
a means for comparison, observe first that in unbound, uncoordinated contexts such as (1) 
one can coherently say things like: 
(1) Max drove to the bank1 and Minnie drove to the bank2 
where non-coindexation of the two tokens of ‘bank’ again reflects their presumed status 
as homophones—distinct Words with unrelated meanings. If, however, the second token 
                                                 
7 While this semantic potential is productive, and perhaps in some cases rule-governed, as mentioned 
earlier there are limits. For example, the word ‘paper’ cannot be used to denote spinach (among lots of 
other things). And this constraint on the range of possible meanings, I assume, is due to the context-




of ‘bank’ is elided (omitted), by common hypothesis the trace (or copy) left behind 
becomes syntactically coindexed with, and thus referentially bound to, its antecedent, as 
in (2): 
(2) Max drove to the bank1 and so did Minnie t1 
The result of coindexation (as determined by the grammar) is that there is no natural 
reading of (2) according to which Max drove to a financial institution whereas Minnie 
drove to the river’s edge (or vice versa). One can of course strain to generate a reading 
where the trace derives its reference deictically and is thereby understood to mean what 
(1) means: However, doing so in a bound context such as (2) induces a noticeable 
zeugmatic effect. Cruse (2000: 31) describes the effect in terms antagonism: 
Antagonism between two readings of a word means that they are in competition, like the 
visual construals of a Necker Cube, and can only be processed one at a time. 
In short, the “antagonism” between the two unrelated meanings of ‘bank’ on the strained 
reading indicates that these meanings are unrelated, and hence that the Word ‘bank’ is 
homophonous. 
By contrast, semantic shifts between the related senses of polysemous Words in 
bound constructions are typically accommodated more seamlessly, sometimes without 
noticing that a shift in meaning has occurred. For example, competent speakers easily 
register the slide between the publisher reading of ‘paper’ in the matrix sentence of (3) 
below and its objectual reading in the embedded clause:8 
(3)  Max lodged a complaint with the paper1 when it1 stopped arriving on time 
In other words, a natural reading of (3) tolerates equivocation between the publisher 
sense expressed by ‘paper’ and the shifted material sense of the coindexed anaphor ‘it’; 
                                                 
8 For other distributional differences between pure homophony and lexical polysemy, see Pustejovsky 
(1995, 1996), Cruse (1986, 2000), Goddard (2000), and Allwood (2003). 
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the latter reading being invited by the phrase “stopped arriving on time.” Similarly, one 
can say, 
(4)  Max read the book1 on the table and found it1 quite interesting 
where here the prepositional phrase “on the table” invites an objectual reading of ‘book’ 
in the antecedent whereas ‘interesting’ in the predicate picks up its abstract sense, here 
again with no noticeable zeugmatic effect.9 
I shall be refining this picture moving forward, but a common assumption among 
ambiguity theorists is that lexical polysemy occupies a logical space of context-sensitive 
meaning between homophony, on the one side, and monosemy on the other, as depicted 
in Figure 1 below:10 
monosemylexical polysemyhomophony
 
Figure 1: Spectrum of lexical-semantic ambiguity. 
5.2.2. On the ubiquity of lexical polysemy 
Lexical polysemy is arguably not limited to just common nouns, but rather appears 
to be ubiquitous across all open-class lexical categories in virtually all studied 
languages.11 For example, the English adjective ‘heavy’ is polysemous as between 
weighty/massive (as in “a heavy load”) versus thick/dense (as in “heavy traffic”). And its 
                                                 
9 Indeed, as Cruse (2000: 41) observes (and as seconded by Chomsky): “Speakers are not normally aware 
of the dual nature of book. The facets [senses, roughly speaking] form a gestalt. The default usage of book 
is the one which combines the facets.” 
10 I wonder if there even are such things as monosemous Words outside of the various and sundry 
functional vocabularies of natural languages, but we needn’t settle this question here. 
11 Several theorists argue that certain functional categories also exhibit lexical polysemy, though I have no 




adverbial form ‘heavily’ follows the same pattern.12 Among its myriad other related 
senses the verb ‘walk’ is polysemous as between a manner of motion (“Max walked 
home”) and a causative activity (“Max walked the dog”). Now, ambiguity theorists often 
restrict their analyses to related senses of Words within the same category, or what I 
referred to in Chapter 2 as intra-category polysemy. However, lexical polysemy appears 
to constitute a class of semantic phenomena that spans categorial boundaries to produce 
what I labeled inter-category or type-polysemy. 
As hypothesized in Chapter 2, type-polysemy is the result of a morpho-syntactic 
process known as type conversion that generates, for example, de-nominalized verbs 
(“Max bottles wine for a living”), de-nominalized adjectives (“Max only drinks bottled 
water”), de-verbalized nouns (“Max went for a run”), de-adjectival adverbs (“The 
decision weighed heavily on Max’s mind”), and so forth. Indeed, by all appearances most 
lexical roots can again be quite easily coerced by the syntax into playing non-canonical 
grammatical roles. While the senses of Words clearly shift with changes in grammatical 
type, a characteristic property of inter-category polysemy is that the analytic/semantic 
relations between senses are typically preserved, which is why I consider the result of 
type conversion a form of lexical polysemy. 
While much more could be said in favor of the distinction between intra- and inter-
category polysemy, the relevant claim here is that polysemy can arise as the result of 
morpho-syntactic manipulations. Next I briefly review a few more commonly recognized 
varieties of polysemy that can be used to cross-classify instances of both intra- and inter-
category polysemy. 
                                                 
12 These are examples of what I call below modulated polysemy—a form of lexical polysemy wherein the 




5.2.3. Varieties of polysemy 
I have again distinguished intra-category polysemy from inter-category polysemy 
(or type-polysemy), which while controversial is not without warrant. However, just 
about all ambiguity theorists agree that the Word ‘polysemy’ is itself polysemous in that 
it applies to a range of distinct yet related phenomena, which here again occupy a logical 
space between homophony and monosemy. While opinions vary greatly about how to 
divide this space, I will for purposes here decompose lexical polysemy into three major 
sub-categories: systematic polysemy, non-systematic polysemy, and modulated polysemy. 
Figure 2 below depicts these sub-categories in relation to one another and with respect to 











Figure 2: Varieties of lexical polysemy. 
Given the proximity of non-systematic polysemy to homophony, their instances are quite 
often difficult to distinguish. Similarly, the difference between instances of modulated 
polysemy and monosemy can be quite subtle and therefore difficult to distinguish. 
Indeed, standard diagnostics designed to distinguish particular cases often generate 
equivocal results, which leads most researchers to gravitate toward the middle of the 
spectrum by focusing solely on clear-cut cases of systematic polysemy. 
Thus situated, let me briefly elaborate on these distinctions, keeping in mind that 
the ultimate point of this exercise is to motivate the legitimacy of lexical polysemy as a 
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bona fide psychological phenomenon that warrants explanation by any complete and 
respectable semantic theory for natural language. And certain distinctions introduced here 
will later aid in that effort. It will help to begin in the middle with a brief description of 
systematic polysemy, or what is alternatively known in the literature as “regular,” 
“logical,” “metonymical,” or “closed-class” polysemy. 
The key distinguishing feature of systematic polysemy is that it is productive across 
entire Word sub-classes. This is to say that in regard to instances of systematic polysemy 
the generation of related senses appears to be rule-governed and thus (in most cases) 
predictable by speakers who know the rule.13 For example, ‘book’, ‘paper’, and 
‘magazine’ are paradigm examples of a general pattern of systematic polysemy between 
printed objects and their abstract textual contents. A speaker who knows the rule for this 
pattern knows that it applies to other members of the class (e.g., ‘tabloid’). Relatedly, the 
Word ‘newspaper’ (or just ‘paper’) is also part of what’s called the “product/producer” 
paradigm (i.e., newspaper/publisher). Other oft-cited examples include regular 
alternations between structural openings and their apertures (e.g., ‘door’, ‘window’, etc.), 
containers and their measurements (‘teaspoon’, ‘cup’), sensations/tastes. 
moods/personalities (‘warm’, ‘cold’, ‘sweet’, ‘bitter’), and dance-types versus their 
performances (‘tango’, ‘waltz’). Such patterns are indeed both extensive and ubiquitous, 
they occur within all major lexical categories, and again in virtually every studied 
language (though perhaps not all languages—see Kamei & Wakao [1992] for 
discussion).14 
                                                 
13 Some theorists, such as Copestake & Briscoe (1995), further distinguish what they call semi-productive 
polysemy, which I won’t address here. 
14 In highly inflected languages sense alternations are often accompanied by a change in gender marking. 
See Soler & Marti (1993) for some examples. 
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Many researchers contrast systematic polysemy with what is variously known as 
non-systematic, or “irregular,” or “metaphorical,” or “open-class” polysemy. The key 
distinction here, as often described, is that instances of non-systematic polysemy are 
language and/or culture-specific, non-productive, non-rule-governed, and thus generally 
unpredictable/arbitrary. Instances of non-systematic polysemy must therefore be 
learned/memorized on a case-by-case basis and then (putatively) recorded as such in a 
speaker’s lexicon.15 For example, the meaning of ‘column’ in the noun phrase ‘news 
column’ is semantically related to its occurrence in the phrase ‘marble column’ (i.e., they 
both involve the vertical arrangement of relevant items). However, extending the 
meaning of ‘column’ to the news domain is largely parochial to Anglo-American culture. 
A general rule of thumb frequently cited in the literature is that whereas systematic 
polysemy derives from metonymical extensions of meaning, instances of non-systematic 
polysemy are said to derive from metaphorical extensions (though I am not entirely 
convinced by the evidence for this distinction). In any case, what does seem true is that 
metaphorical sense extensions tend to be more “distant” from the core meaning of the 
Word from which they derive as compared to metonymical sense-extensions, which is 
why non-systematic polysemy is situated closer to homophony on the scale in Figure 2 
above. 
Lastly, let me briefly consider what I have labeled modulated polysemy, which in 
the relevant literature usually goes by the name “vagueness” or “indeterminacy” (which I 
also think is somewhat misleading but will suppress commentary). Modulated polysemy, 
as understood here, occurs when the contextually-determined sense of a polysemous 
                                                 
15 One occasionally finds patterns of non-systematic polysemy that crosses language and/or cultural 
boundaries, which is generally thought to be purely accidental. 
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Word depends on the meanings of Words with which it combines (or co-occurs). To cite 
a few common examples, the Word ‘fast’ in the phrase ‘fast car’ seems to mean 
something different as when combined with ‘typist’ or, say, ‘runner’. Likewise, the 
sense/meaning of ‘healthy’ in ‘healthy food’ is not the same as when it combines with 
‘appetite’ versus say ‘complexion’.16 Similarly, the Word ‘heavy’ in the phrase ‘heavy 
traffic’ does not refer to the weight of the traffic but rather something like its spatial 
density. 
In short, it appears that the various senses of ‘fast’, ‘healthy’, and ‘heavy’ are 
precisified as determined by the meanings of the nouns they modify. Put differently, the 
cases just surveyed are all instances of what Copestake & Briscoe (1995: 31) call 
“adjectival premodification.” One notices, however, that Words need not combine 
directly in order to exhibit modulated polysemy. To borrow an example from Recanati 
(2004: 34), consider (5): 
(5) The city is asleep 
As Recanati (ibid: 35) observes: 
In one case the speaker means that the inhabitants of the city are sleeping, in the other she 
means that the city itself is quiet and shows little activity… 
More specifically, on Recanati’s view if ‘The city’ is assigned a literal interpretation, 
then ‘asleep’ must receive a non-literal (or metaphorical/metonymical) interpretation, and 
vice versa. The point to notice is that in (5) the interaction of senses is between subject 
and direct object as opposed to a Word and its modifier. In addition, in the latter example 
the interaction appears to operate in both directions. 
                                                 
16 To test one’s intuitions about this distinction, one can ask whether it is possible to simultaneously assert 
and deny a sentence like “My appetite is healthy but my diet is not” without contradiction. If the answer is 
yes, then there is a conceptual difference between the two senses expressed indicating that the Word in 
question is polysemous. 
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What is especially interesting about modulated polysemy is that there are infinitely 
many combinations of Words whose precise meanings/senses cannot be predicted in 
advance of their appearance in a given context. Moreover, given the open-endedness of 
modulated polysemy its instances presumably cannot be listed as such in the lexicon (or 
at least not all of them) but rather must be computed, as it were, on-the-fly. However, 
competent speakers nevertheless quite easily register the often subtle conceptual 
differences between unfamiliar Word combinations, suggesting that like systematic 
polysemy, modulated polysemy is somehow rule-governed.  
This latter observation is precisely what motivated James Pustejovsky’s (1991, 
1995) notion of a Generative Lexicon (GL), which is largely designed to account for the 
unlimited productivity of what I am calling systematic and modulated forms of lexical 
polysemy. However, it is also Pustejovsky to whom Fodor & Lepore’s (1998) objections 
are directly addressed, as mentioned earlier.17 In fact, the reason I bother to trudge 
through these details is in preparation to respond to those objections. But in aid of this 
discussion, it will help to first consider some standard proposals for how lexical 
polysemy is represented in the lexicon, including Pustejovsky’s GL which is widely 
considered a viable solution to the problem of lexical polysemy. Having done so, I 
ultimately agree with Fodor & Lepore that Pustejovsky’s account is untenable on both 
empirical and philosophical grounds. I will attempt to demonstrate, nevertheless, that 
there is a way of defending the psychological reality of lexical polysemy against Fodor & 
Lepore’s general rejection of polysemy as a linguistic-semantic phenomenon. 
                                                 




5.2.4. Representing polysemy in the lexicon 
As suggested earlier, the semantic relationship between polysemous Words and 
their related senses appears to be one-to-many. And this is again to suggest that a single 
Word can be used in appropriate contexts to express any of a potentially wide range of 
semantically related senses/concepts. An important open question concerns how these 
related senses are encoded in a speaker’s mental lexicon, if at all. Within the space of 
possibilities, we can broadly distinguish what I will call full specification views (FSVs) 
from semantically underspecified views (SUVs). According to FSVs the lexical entries of 
polysemous Words are fully specified for each of their possible senses, which is to say 
that these senses are learned on a case-by-case basis and then individually recorded in the 
lexicon. According to SUVs, polysemous Words are underspecified for their range of 
possible senses, which relative to a context must therefore be dynamically computed on 
the basis of either lexical-semantic rules or by way of extralinguistic 
pragmatic/inferential processes, or perhaps some combination thereof (i.e., as a result of 
interaction between linguistic and pragmatic computational processes). 
With respect to FSVs, perhaps the least complex way to represent polysemy is by 
means of what is called a sense enumeration lexicon (SEL) according to which each 
sense of a polysemous Word is treated as a separate lexical entry (cf., e.g., Kempson 
[1977]). On this view, polysemes are treated no differently than homophones with respect 
to their internal representations apart from the fact that their senses happen to be related. 
The idea, in other words, is that each sense is listed as a distinct Word that happens to 
have the same phonology as other Words with related senses. However, most lexical 
semanticists nowadays reject SEL accounts. The worry is that besides being cognitively 
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uneconomical, SELs fail to capture the fact that the various senses of polysemous Words 
are semantically related. And capturing such relations is widely considered a core 
desideratum of lexical semantics. SELs also fail to explain the creativity/productivity of 
lexical polysemy—i.e., the fact that novel Word senses can be generated “on-the-fly” 
and, moreover, that these novel senses are often transparently understood by interpreters 
on first encounter. 
The leading alternatives to SELs are what I will lump together under the general 
heading of single entry views (SEVs). According to SEVs, the related senses of 
polysemes are listed collectively under a common lexical root/phonological form. The 
main advantage of SEVs over SELs is that they explicitly encode the semantic 
relatedness of semantically related senses. The most straightforward approach here is 
what I will call the undifferentiated list view (ULV) according to which each sense is 
afforded equal status in its lexical entry—i.e., senses are listed together in the same entry 
yet without regard to the centrality of one sense over the others.18 In terms of processing, 
the idea is that activation of a lexical item (in the course of its interpretation) will cause 
activation (or priming) of each of its senses. However, the linguistic and/or extralinguistic 
context will normally favor one interpretation over the others which, when all goes well, 
will be the sense that its speaker intended to express. The claim, in short, is that both 
linguistic and extralinguistic factors conspire to ensure that only the context-appropriate 
                                                 
18 There is substantial psycholinguistic evidence that the activation of a Word also simultaneously activates 




sense rises to salience and is thereby “selected” to participate in compositional 
processes.19 
A variation on this theme is what I will call the core meaning view (CMV) 
according to which the related senses of a polysemous Word derive from a single “core,” 
“default,” or “literal” meaning—i.e., the meaning encoded in a Word’s lexical entry. As 
suggested earlier, for instance, the various senses of the Word ‘paper’ all appear to derive 
from its material sense (i.e., being composed of compressed wood pulp, rice, papyrus, 
etc.). And as suggested in Chapter 2, this core meaning often coincides with the first 
concept lexicalized under a Word, which in turn often happens to be the sense with the 
highest frequency of occurrence in the language. 
The proposal is that while all known senses of a polysemous Word are individually 
listed under a single lexical entry, they are differentially weighted/organized such that 
senses “closer” to the core meaning have lower thresholds of activation, with the core 
meaning itself being most readily/rapidly activated in otherwise neutral contexts. In 
contexts favoring a weaker sense (e.g., more semantically “distant” or less frequently 
used sense), highly activated senses must be actively suppressed/inhibited (or allowed 
time to decay) in order to facilitate selection of only the context-appropriate sense by 
compositional processes. The main advantage of CMVs is that they help explain faster 
response times in the retrieval of high frequency/core senses as confirmed by many 
psycholinguistics experiments. In addition, the notion of a “core” sense (or meaning) 
suggests a basis by which regular/systematic sense extensions are computed according to 
some rule. 
                                                 




According to one variant of CMV, which falls under the more general heading of 
what above I called semantically underspecified views (SUVs), only the core meaning of 
a polysemous Word is recorded in its lexical entry. In turn, subordinate or derived senses 
are thought to always be dynamically computed as the context demands. More 
specifically, if the core meaning of a Word does not “fit” the context, interpreters will 
attempt to derive the intended sense, either by way of a lexical-semantic rule that governs 
its possible extensions (cf., Nunberg [1979], Caramazza & Grober [1976]), or 
inferentially through extralinguistic pragmatic processes (cf., Sperber & Wilson [1986], 
Carston [1997], among others). The chief disadvantage of CMVs, whether of the SUV or 
FSV variety, is that they struggle to explain how, precisely, the process of sense selection 
operates—i.e., precisely which factors are relevant in the computation of the sense 
expressed in a given context. Of greatest relevance here is that the absence of a 
convincing story about sense selection, according to critics, threatens semantic 
compositionality. CMVs also offer few suggestions as to how irregular/non-systematic 
senses are generated and/or understood. Yet again it would seem that the interpretation of 
unpredictable sense-extensions typically poses little problem for competent language 
users. 
Finally, among the more ambitious attempts to respond to the challenges presented 
by lexical polysemy is again James Pustejovsky’s Generative Lexicon (GL) (cf., 
Pustejovsky [1991, 1995]).20 Pustejovsky’s overarching goal is to account for the 
apparent context-sensitivity of lexical meaning, or as he puts it (1995: 42): “how words 
can take on an infinite number of meanings in novel contexts.” He does so by positing 
richly structured lexical entries that consist in a combination of lexical-semantic features 
                                                 
20 Copestake & Briscoe (1995) defend a similar account. 
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(not in the Chomskyan sense of “feature” but more along the lines described in Chapter 
3) in combination with a set of lexically-specified rules of semantic composition. To offer 
a rough sense of what I am talking about, Figure 3 below depicts the internal structure of 




CONST = what x is made of
FORMAL = what x is
TELIC = function of x







Figure 3: General structure of a Pustejovskian lexical entry.21 
In Figure 3, ‘’ (in the upper left hand corner) represents the Word’s ontological category 
in relation to the hierarchy of worldly entities; e.g., as an object versus a substance, an 
artifact versus a natural kind, etc. ‘ARGSTR’ represents the Word’s argument structure 
(for Words such as verbs, and perhaps prepositions, that have argument structures), 
‘EVENTSTR’ represents its event structure (for Words that have event structures), and 
‘QUALIA’, which applies to every open-class lexical item and represents the item’s 
lexical conceptual structure (or LCS). 
Let me gloss past details pertaining to ‘ARGSTR’ and ‘EVENTSTR’ but to say that 
they encode lexical-compositional rules for linking thematic/event participants to their 
corresponding grammatical argument positions. Most relevant to present purposes is 
                                                 
21 Figure 3 is reconstructed (though not copied) without permission from Pustejovsky (2005). 
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Pustejovsky’s conception of a Word’s qualia structure, which as he posits “defines the 
essential attributes of objects, events, and relations, associated with a lexical item.”22 The 
attribute (or semantic feature) ‘[CONST]’, for example, represents “the relation between an 
object and its constituent parts,” whereas ‘[FORMAL]’ represents “the basic category of 
which distinguishes the meaning of a word within a larger domain,” ‘[TELIC]’ represents 
“the purpose or function of the object, if there is one,” and ‘[AGENTIVE]’ represents “the 
factors involved in the object’s origins or ‘coming into being’.” 
I will return to some of these details below, but let me emphasize here that 
Pustejovsky’s account is again especially well-suited to accommodate systematic and 
modulated forms of lexical polysemy. The leading idea being that lexical-semantic 
information encoded by one Word can interact with that of other Words in a sentence 
through processes that Pustejovsky (1998: 294) identifies as “co-composition,” “type-
coercion,” and “subselection” (or “selective binding”). Generally speaking, these 
processes are what determine a Word’s contextually appropriate meaning. Importantly, 
having lexical-semantic rules built into a Word’s lexical entry helps to explain how novel 
Word-senses are dynamically generated. Pustejovsky summarizes his view thusly (2005: 
141): 
The richer structure for the lexical entry proposed in GL takes to an extreme the 
established notions of predicate-argument structure, primitive decomposition and 
conceptual organization; these can be seen as determining the space of possible 
interpretations that a word may have. That is, rather than committing to an enumeration 
of a predetermined number of different word senses, a lexical entry for a word now 
encodes a range of representative aspects of lexical meaning. For an isolated word, these 
meaning components simply define the semantic boundaries appropriate to its use. When 
embedded in the context of other words, however, mutually compatible roles in the 
                                                 
22 Pustejovsky (2005: 142). 
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lexical decompositions of each word become more prominent, thus forcing a specific 
interpretation of individual words within a specific phrase.23 
In short, a Pustejovskian GL is somewhat like an SUV in that it does not list Word-
senses, as such. It is also somewhat like a CMV in that each Word has just one lexical 
entry and a single lexically-encoded meaning, albeit highly structured in most cases. 
However, like SEVs Pustejovsky’s lexical entries arguably contain enough lexically-
encoded semantic information (i.e., semantic attributes/features) to generate not only the 
various senses of a Word in common currency but also novel extensions to that Word’s 
meaning. 
The takeaway from this fairly broad discussion of lexical polysemy is that most 
theories of the lexicon presume that its lexical entries are complex, structured mental 
representations that specify or otherwise determine a Word’s linguistic meaning, 
including its possible sense extensions. However, some theorists, and again most notably 
Fodor and Lepore, find decompositional views of lexical meaning implausible on a 
number of independent theoretical grounds, both empirical and philosophical, which is 
ultimately what motivates their rejection of lexical polysemy as a linguistic phenomenon, 
as I discuss next in greater detail. 
5.3. An argument against polysemy 
As suggested above, a widely held assumption among linguists and philosophers 
alike is that any explanatorily adequate lexical-semantic theory must account for facts 
about the ambiguity and/or context-sensitivity of lexical meanings. Among its other 
                                                 
23 Pustejovsky (1998: 289) adds: “…I have proposed a framework, Generative Lexicon Theory, that faces 
the empirically hard problems of how words can have different meanings in different contexts, how new 
senses can emerge compositionally, and how semantic types predictably map to syntactic forms in 
language. The theory accomplishes this by means of a semantic typing system encoding generative factors, 
called qualia structures, into each lexical item. Operating over these structures are compositional rules 
incorporating specific devices for capturing the contextual determination of an expression’s meaning.” 
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commonly stated goals, lexical-semantic theory is expected to capture generalizations 
about the semantic relations between Words such as synonymy, antonymy, mereonymy, 
hyponymy, and the like (i.e., the so-called “nyms” of traditional lexical-semantic theory). 
Relatedly, lexical semanticists take themselves to be responsible for explaining materially 
and/or logically valid inferences licensed by the meanings of Words, as with (6)-(8): 
(6) Fido is a dog  Fido is an animal 
(7) Max killed Minnie  Minnie died 
(8) Max is a bachelor  Max is not married 
Furthermore, recall from Chapter 2 that in the wake of Chomsky’s Lexicalist hypothesis, 
most generative semanticists nowadays take syntactic structures to be projections of the 
argument and/or event structures encoded by verbs, which are in turn standardly 
considered to be part of the verb’s linguistic meaning. For instance, Levin & Rappaport-
Hovav (2005: 7) note: 
Since the 1980s, many theories of grammar have been built on the assumption that the 
syntactic realization of arguments—their category type and their grammatical function—
is largely predictable from the meaning of their verbs. 
As suggested, language theorists generally agree that lexical semantics is responsible, in 
addition, for identifying the semantic determinants of syntactic structure. 
Such a wide diversity of explanatory goals is what drives many semanticists to 
conclude that lexical meanings must be semantically complex/structured mental 
representations that decompose into more primitive semantic features, with each feature 
constituting one facet of a Word’s linguistic meaning. Representative of such proposals is 
again Pustejovsky’s Generative Lexicon (GL), which is the primary target of Fodor & 
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Lepore (1998), or just F&L henceforth.24 Although, the arguments levied by F&L apply 
more generally to any decompositional conception of the lexicon. As my interest here is 
specifically with their objection to lexical polysemy as a linguistic-semantic 
phenomenon, I will limit discussion to what F&L find problematic with Pustejovsky’s 
solution to that question, with the further understanding that F&L’s complaints apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to any decompositional theory of lexical meaning. Also for 
expediency, I shall constrain my review to just one core example. For as F&L state, theirs 
is a principled objection to the “kind of account of the lexicon that [Pustejovsky] 
endorses,” and to which they add “We aren’t, in short, just quibbling about cases.” 
The paradigm cases are instances of what I above described as modulated polysemy, 
where again the precise interpretation of a Word-in-context is seemingly determined in 
part by the meanings of other Words with which it combines. To borrow one of 
Pustejovsky’s favorite examples, consider the difference in interpretation of the verb 
‘bake’ in the verb phrases ‘bake a cake’ and ‘bake a potato’. In the first case, ‘bake’ 
intuitively expresses a creative process that requires first assembling some cake 
ingredients and then heating up the result until it becomes baked; i.e., where the meaning 
of ‘bake a cake’ is something like to create by process of baking. That is, cake ingredients 
do not become a cake until those ingredients are appropriately assembled and sufficiently 
baked. In the second case, ‘bake’ seems to behave, semantically, as a mere change-of-
state predicate denoting a process that results in a preexistent object (e.g., a potato) 
becoming baked. That is, an unbaked potato is still a potato whereas unbaked cake 
ingredients is not yet a cake. 
                                                 
24 Cf., Fodor (2002). 
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According to Pustejovsky, however, the meaning of ‘bake’ is univocal in both 
cases—it expresses the process of baking. Rather, the apparent difference in the two 
senses ‘bake’, he claims, adduces to differences in the meanings of its respective NP 
complements in the VPs ‘bake a cake’ versus ‘bake a potato’, and in particular to 
differences in the qualia structures of ‘cake’ and ‘potato’. Specifically, ‘cake’ denotes an 
artifact kind whereas ‘potato’ denotes a natural kind. In consequence, the lexical entry for 
‘cake’ specifies a value for the [AGENTIVE] feature of its lexical conceptual structure to 
the effect that people (agents) create cakes by process of baking.25 By contrast, the 
[AGENTIVE] feature of ‘potato’ is presumably unspecified, as potatoes come into existence 
through natural processes rather than agentive ones. 
The idea, in short, is that the compositionally determined meanings of the VPs 
‘bake a cake’ and ‘bake a potato’ are determined in part by a lexical-semantic process of 
“co-composition” where some of the semantic weight falls on the meanings of their 
complement NPs. Specifically, when ‘bake’ combines with an artifact term such as ‘cake’ 
it generates the creation sense of ‘bake’, whereas in combination with ‘potato’ the result 
is a change-of-state reading. Importantly, however, on Pustejovsky’s view it is not the 
meanings of these constituents that vary with the context but rather the meanings of the 
phrases in which they occur. That is, in each case the meanings of ‘bake’, ‘cake’, and 
‘potato’ are each univocal—each Word has a single lexical entry with its decompositional 
semantic structure fully specified. And this implies that these Words are not themselves 
polysemous. Rather, the idea is that their composed interpretations depend on the 
meanings of other Words with which they combine. 
                                                 
25 Pustejovsky (2005: 139). 
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In reply, F&L observe, first, that its old news that the meanings of complex phrases 
are compositionally determined by the meanings of their parts. Hence, any difference in 
the meanings of these phrases is due to a difference in the meanings of one or more of 
their constituent parts. Yet they contend that from these facts it does not follow that 
semantic composition occurs in the lexicon, or that the only way to explain the context-
sensitivity of lexical meanings is by supposing that lexical entries are semantically 
complex. Of course, no one denies that the meanings of ‘bake a cake’ and ‘bake a potato’ 
differ at least in part due to differences in the meanings of ‘cake’ and ‘potato’, which in 
these contexts unambiguously denote cakes and potatoes, respectively. Rather, the 
question is what explains the perceived difference in the interpretation of the verb ‘bake’ 
in these phrases? F&L conclude, contrary to Pustejovsky, that this apparent difference in 
sense is attributable to the fact that the Word ‘bake’ is itself lexically ambiguous, and 
more specifically that it is homophonous.26 
F&L’s reasoning runs as follows. First, in the negative direction, if Pustejovsky is 
right that the creative sense of ‘bake’ is determined by the fact that the meaning of ‘cake’ 
specifies that cakes are made by baking, then one presumably does not know the meaning 
of ‘cake’ unless one knows how cakes are made. By parallel reasoning, the implication 
seems to be that if “you don’t know how pencils are made, you don’t know what pencil 
means [i.e., the Word ‘pencil’],” which is of course outlandish.27 On the other hand, if the 
creation sense of ‘bake a cake’ is to be explained by the fact that ‘cake’ denotes an 
                                                 
26 As I understand him, Fodor takes apparent cases of polysemy to be actual cases of homophony, but with 
respect to corresponding concepts in Mentalese. By contrast, Lepore seems to think that homophony exists 
in the lexicon. 
27 Indeed, this argument runs parallel to Fodor objection to Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) according to 
which one does not know the meaning of a Word (or the content of a concept) unless one knows the 
inferences that its meaning (or content) license. 
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artifact then we should expect a creation reading of ‘bake’ in combination with other 
artifact terms such as ‘trolley’ and ‘knife’. However, as F&L observe ‘bake a trolley’ and 
‘bake a knife’ both naturally resist the creation sense of ‘bake’ in precisely the same way 
that ‘bake a potato’ does. In the other direction, one can easily imagine a situation where 
‘bake a cake’ resists the creation sense of ‘bake’ in favor of mere change-of-state reading; 
for instance, if the cake in question was purchased pre-assembled, so to speak, and then 
tossed in the oven. 
This is a highly condensed version of their counterargument. But in short, F&L 
contend that such observations point to the fact that the verb ‘bake’ in these contexts 
must itself be lexically ambiguous. Specifically, they write (1998: 280): 
If the creative sense of bake is determined by something that it inherits from its direct 
object—and if bake and cake are themselves univocal—then bake a cake must have only 
the “creative” reading. But, in fact, bake a cake is ambiguous. To be sure, one can make a 
cake by baking it; but also one can do to a (preexistent) cake just what one does to a 
(preexistent) potato: put it in the oven and (noncreatively) bake it. Since bake a cake is 
ambiguous and cake is univocal, it must be that bake is lexically ambiguous (specifically, 
polysemous) after all, contrary to JP’s analysis. 
F&L later clarify that the correct analysis of ‘bake’ is not that it is polysemous but rather 
again that it is homophonous. For while there appears to be a clear sense in which the 
event denoted by ‘bake’ in both cases involves a process of baking, F&L ask: 
By what criterion do both kinds of baking count as the same process? What decides that 
the bake in bake a cake (hence creating one) denotes the same activity as the bake in bake 
a potato (hence heating one)? (Whereas, presumably, bank is homonymous because the 
bank in bank a check counts as a different process from the bank in bank a plane.). 
In other words, the most straightforward explanation of the context-sensitivity of ‘bake’ 
is that there are actually two Words (i.e., ‘bake1’ and ‘bake2’) with different meanings. 
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To better understand their general objection to polysemy, recall first that Fodor is 
card-carrying conceptual atomist. He is also a lexical atomist, which is to say that Fodor 
takes a very spare view of the lexicon, and indeed of human language more generally. In 
fact, Fodor has famously argued that natural languages have no semantics, per se, and 
thus that linguistic expressions have no meanings. Rather, on Fodor’s view expressions 
generated by the human language faculty are merely translated into semantically 
interpreted formulae of Mentalese (cf. Fodor [1975]).28 Lepore, by contrast, is known to 
those engaged in the semantics-pragmatics debate as a Semantic Minimalist. Specifically, 
Lepore grants that linguistic expressions have meanings but that they are purely 
denotational in nature, which is to say unstructured and thus non-decomposable. And for 
purposes of their collaboration Fodor seems willing to indulge as much. In short, the 
positive view endorsed collectively by F&L (1998: 270) states that: 
[…] the lexical entry for dog says that it refers to ‘dogs’; the lexical entry for boil says 
that it refers to ‘boiling’; and so forth. [F&L use single quotes to indicate 
meaning/content and italics to designate Words]. 
The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for ‘cake’ and ‘potato’. Specifically, under the 
assumption that ‘bake’ is homophonous we can predict that ‘bake1’ refers to baking1 
(something like create by heating up), and ‘bake2’ refers to baking2 (simply to heat up). 
In other Words, Lepore’s approach to meaning is not only denotational but 
disquotational.29 
While I agree with F&L that the two senses of ‘bake’ are not identical, the chief 
drawback of F&L’s spare conception of the lexicon is that we again lose sight of the fact 
                                                 
28 A similar view is defended by Hornstein (1986), and one is given think that this is more or less 
Chomsky’s view as well. 
29 However, F&L (1998:270) concede that: “…strictly speaking, lexical entries are typically complex. But 
we claim that they are complex in a way that does not jeopardize either the thesis that lexical meaning is 
atomistic, or the identification of lexical meaning with denotation.” 
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that these senses are in fact analytically/semantically related, as both senses license the 
following inference: 
(9) x: baked an x  x was heated up 
What’s more, capturing such facts is one desideratum of semantic theory that in my view 
is worth holding onto. As I argue below, however, one can maintain that all Words are 
monosemous without analyzing them as homophones. Specifically, my proposal is that 
the CON feature of a Word serves as pointer to a family of analytically related concepts. 
Importantly, this pointer is fixed at or around the moment of acquisition, by hypothesis 
points to just one address in long-term conceptual memory, and is therefore univocal. As 
suggested in Chapter 2, however, a single lexical-semantic address may be home to 
multiple analytically related concepts. So understood, there is a tolerably clear sense in 
which most Words are both monosemous and polysemous. However, technically 
speaking I take all Words to be monosemous, which is to say that their lexically-encoded 
meanings are univocal/context-invariant. 
In short, if we think of the CON feature of a Word as the context-invariant 
component of its linguistically-specified meaning, then in this sense I agree with 
Pustejovsky that apparent cases of polysemy are actually cases of monosemy. As 
indicated in the beginning of this chapter, my response to F&L relies heavily on the 
Minimalist semantic architecture developed by Pietroski (2005, and forthcoming), which 
includes a psychologically respectable proposal for how to represent lexical polysemy 
along the lines of what I have been advocating. My contribution to Pietroski’s account 
will again be to demonstrate the role of a speaker’s metalinguistic-semantic competence 
(MSC) in the representation and interpretation of semantically ambiguous Words 
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(relative to a context). It will pay to begin here with a broad-stroke sketch of Pietroski’s 
semantic architecture and its central motivation. 
5.4. On the nature of semantic composition 
Initially inspired by the rediscovery of Frege’s logic for invented formal languages, 
the standing orthodoxy among contemporary semanticists is that the primary mode of 
semantic composition for natural language is function application by way of argument 
saturation; cf., Heim & Kratzer (1997) for a representative perspective. On this approach, 
the semantic correlates of syntactic constituents are assumed to be either (i) inherently 
“gappy” polyadic predicates (i.e., unsaturated predicates of varying adicities/valences), 
(ii) the logical constants that saturate these gaps, or (iii) functional elements of one sort or 
another that bind these constituents together. Such theories are thereby committed to the 
idea that natural languages make available a certain semantic typology that is needed to 
account for the various ways that polyadic expressions (expressions of varying adicities 
or valences) manage to compose, recursively by way of function application, to 
determine their truth, reference, or satisfaction conditions (relativized to a context). 
Other options are available, however. I am again referring specifically to Pietroski’s 
revisionary proposal that the fundamental mode of semantic composition for natural 
language is not function application but rather predicate conjunction. Pietroski’s version 
of Conjunctivism is premised on a growing body of evidence that the combinatorial 
processes of natural language traffic largely in monadic (one-place) predicate-concepts, 
which couched in terms of traditional typology is roughly equivalent to mental 
representations of type <e,t>, or as Pietroski (forthcoming) puts it predicates of type ‘M’ 
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(for monadic).30 Given their type-homogeneity, the semantic correlates of syntactic 
constituents combine, rather promiscuously, by a single operation of predicate 
conjunction called M-JOIN, which ex hypothesi is triggered by syntactic MERGE. The 
relevant idea, which is an outgrowth of Chomsky’s conjecture, is that the output of 
linguistic-semantic processing is an LF that serves as a kind of “blueprint” or 
“instruction” for recursively constructing (or “assembling”) a complex monadic concept 
from a finite set of lexicalized monadic-predicate concepts. Roughly speaking, these 
linguistically-specified monadic concepts are formal abstractions over the polyadic 
thoughts expressed by our linguistic utterances. 
Importantly, if the processes of semantic composition traffic only (or largely) in 
monadic concepts, this imposes a formal constraint on concept lexicalization under the 
assumption that ordinary pre-linguistic animal concepts are polyadic. Thus, central to 
Pietroski’s account is the auxiliary hypothesis that concept lexicalization is a creative 
process which takes lexicalizable polyadic concepts and introduces a monadic analog of 
those concepts by way of predicate abstraction (or in the case of singular concepts 
argument introduction) that results in the generation of a corresponding one-place (i.e., 
monadic) predicate-concept. That is, the product of lexicalization are monadic analogs of 
the pre-lexical polyadic concepts that we typically use Words to express, the former 
being what Pietroski sometimes calls I-concepts.31 I-concepts can be thought of as open 
sentences whose semantic assignments are specifiable in terms of Tarskian satisfaction 
conditions. Thus, while I-concepts have satisfiers they do not, on Pietroski’s view, have 
Fregean Bedeutungen (i.e., referents or truth-conditions). 
                                                 
30 Pietroski does not countenance a truth-conditional semantics for natural language. 
31 Or as Pietroski sometimes puts it (in p.c.), pre-lexical concepts undergo a specific kind of “reformatting” 
as a result of lexicalization. 
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On a global scale, the result of concept lexicalization is the generation of a layer of 
I-concepts that effectively serves as the central interface between language and thought. 
On the language side of the border, lexical meanings (i.e., Chomskyan SEMs) are 
understood by interpreters as instructions to “fetch” basic (formally primitive) I-concepts. 
In turn, complex LFs—which is to say phrasal/sentential meanings generated by 
language-internal combinatorial processes—are understood as instructions for conjoining 
basic I-concepts to produce what we might think of as I-thoughts—complex monadic 
analogs of semantically related polyadic thoughts. The relevant consequence is that for 
every lexicalized polyadic concept there will be one or more analytically related I-
concepts that are structurally associated with a Word’s linguistic meaning, more or less as 
described back in Chapters 1 and 2. And so in this sense the relation between linguistic 
meanings and the polyadic concepts that speakers lexicalize under Words, and use those 
Words to express, are mediated by a layer of I-concepts. 
5.4.1. Polysemy under Conjunctivism 
To help clarify the view, let us consider how one might represent lexical polysemy 
under Conjunctivism. Take, for example, the English Word ‘boil’ (or lexical root boil), 
which can be used as a transitive/accusative verb to express a two-place predicate of 
event-processes, as in (10) below, or intransitively/incohatively as a one-place predicate 
of event-states, as in (11): 
(10) Max boiled the water 
(11) The water boiled 
In other words, (11) describes the terminal state of some water having boiled whereas 
(10) describes Max as the thematic Agent (or Initiator) of a process, with some 
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contextually salient quantity of water as its Theme, that terminated in the water’s boiling. 
(10) and (11) thus provide linguistic-semantic evidence that the same lexical root can be 
used to express two formally distinct yet analytically related polyadic concepts, let’s call 
them BOILPROC(x, y) and BOILSTATE(x). In this case, the content of BOILPROC(x, y) can be 
described as the process of heating a substance to the point of vaporization, whereas 
BOILSTATE(x) expresses the property of having attained a state of heated vaporization.
32 
Correlatively, the lexicalization of BOILPROC(x, y) and BOILSTATE(x) yields two 
formally distinct yet analytically related I-concepts, call them BOILPROC(e) and 
BOILSTATE(e), where ‘e’ is an event variable introduced by the grammar. Glossing over 
several important notational details,33  with respect to comprehension the meaning of 
‘boil’, on Pietroski’s view, is understood by interpreters as an instruction to “fetch” one 
of either BOILPROC(e) or BOILSTATE(e). And this is to say that the execution of the meaning-
instruction encoded by the lexical entry for the Word ‘boil’ (or more precisely the lexical 
root boil) can be satisfied in at least one of two ways.34 One of course wants to know 
how this ambiguity is resolved. As Pietroski (2008: 13) puts it, the context-appropriate 
choice is likely to “reflect complicated interactions of grammatical principles with 
various contingencies of actual language use.” I return to this question below. But in most 
cases, including the present example, the unambiguous linguistic environment is usually 
                                                 
32 While not identical, notice the similarity here with respect to the meaning of the verb ‘bake’ from earlier 
discussion. The present example, however, is better suited to explain not only the ‘bake’ example but also 
to highlight a further benefit, as we shall see below. 
33 Pietroski’s notation is much more nuanced than represented here. But I am taking certain liberties in the 
interest of clarity of exposition along with consistency from earlier chapters, I trust without significant loss 
or gross misrepresentation of Pietroski’s broader view. 
34 The concept fetched may be more or less usable, conceptually speaking, in a given context as evidenced 




sufficient to settle the matter. Yet as we shall see below the choice is not always 
straightforward. 
As it concerns my project, the relevant aspect of Pietroski’s proposal is that for each 
open-class Word/lexical root—or in my terminology for each {PHON, SYN, SEM} 
triplet in a speaker’s lexicon—there may be a “family” of analytically related I-concepts 
all clustered around the same fetchable address, or “bin” to borrow Pietroski’s metaphor, 
in long-term conceptual semantic memory. While Pietroski does not use this term, I will 
assume for purposes of this discussion (and for sake of theoretical consistency together 
with earlier notational conventions) that the address in question is encoded by the CON 
feature of a Word’s lexical entry. More specifically, we can represent the value of the 
CON feature for the Word ‘boil’ (i.e., the lexical root boil) as: CON(boil) = 
fetch@boil, where fetch is a primitive lexical-semantic operation and @boil again 
specifies an address in conceptual memory where a potential family of fetchable monadic 
I-concepts all “live,” so to speak.35 
If not obvious, the family of fetchable I-concepts lexicalized under a given Word-
form can expand (and perhaps contract) over time. Suppose for instance that a Word-
learner subsequently acquires the dyadic, pre-linguistic concept BOILCOOK(x, y), whose 
content is something like to cook by process of boiling. Like other competent speakers of 
English, our learner will (again, by hypothesis) lexicalize her newly acquired concept 
BOILCOOK(x, y) under the root boil thereby adding its monadic analog, BOILCOOK(e), to 
                                                 
35 Notice that Pietroski’s notion of “fetching a concept” is roughly analogous to what I have been referring 
to as “activating a concept.” Pietroski’s notion of “fetching,” however, is tied up with his theory of 
semantic compositionality and the idea that linguistic meanings are instructions to build/assemble complex 
monadic concepts. For this reason, Pietroski’s notion of “fetching” is much richer than my notion of 
“activating.” With this in mind, and since my proposal is largely neutral about the complexities of semantic 




her idiolect—i.e., to her collection of I-concepts located at the address specified by 
@boil, again each of which she structurally associates with the meaning of the Word 
‘boil’. 
While the semantic relatedness of BOILCOOK(e) and BOILPROC(e) is also fairly 
obvious (they both express predicates of event-processes that involve events of boiling), 
they have different satisfaction conditions (or as Pietroski sometimes put it, different 
application conditions). For notice that while Max’s boiling of the water in (10) entails 
that some water boiled, his cooking of the eggs by process of boiling as described in (12) 
below does not entail that the eggs literally boiled: 
(12) Max boiled the eggs 
Thus, BOILPROC(x, y) and BOILCOOK(x, y) are not content-identical concepts, and hence 
neither are their lexicalized I-concepts BOILCOOK(e) and BOILPROC(e). The result of 
lexicalizing BOILCOOK(x, y) under the root boil, therefore, is the expanded family of 
distinct yet analytically related I-concepts that all cluster around the lexical address 
specified by @boil, and which again following the convention established in Chapters 1 
and 2 I will represent as (13), 
(13) CON (boil) = fetch@boil → {BOILPROC(e), BOILSTATE(e), BOILCOOK(e)} 
where again the arrow ‘→’ in this context indicates “points to.”36 So construed, we can 
say, as echoed above and in Chapter 2, that while the meaning of the Word ‘boil’ (i.e., the 
lexical root boil) is conceptually underspecified it is nonetheless semantically 
determinate—it is understood by interpreters as the instruction fetch@boil, where @boil 
                                                 
36 As alluded to in Chapter 2, it may be that @boil points to just one of BOILPROC(e), BOILSTATE(e) or 
BOILCOOK(e)—perhaps the one lexicalized first, or with the highest frequency of use. Either way, nothing 
much I wish to claim here rests on the outcome. Rather, the present claim depends only on the fact that 




points unambiguously to a particular address in conceptual memory around which a 
binful of fetchable I-concepts all reside.37 
In this way, one can talk about the meaning of the Word ‘boil’ without specifying 
precisely which concept that Word is used to express outside of a particular context of 
utterance. In other words, from a lexical-semantic perspective ‘boil’ is monosemous. Yet 
there is a sense in which ‘boil’ is also polysemous in that the concept fetched in 
consequence of executing its lexically encoded meaning-instruction is context-dependent. 
And while Pietroski himself is generally skeptical of such evidence (or so far as I can 
tell), recent psycholinguistic experiments suggest that lexical-semantic interpretation 
normally results in the initial activation of all semantically related senses of a polyseme. 
In Pietroski’s terminology, this suggests that the execution of a meaning-instruction such 
as fetch@boil initially activates each I-concept in the bin of fetchable I-concepts 
specified by @boil. However, by hypothesis the operation fetch will normally return just 
one I-concept; i.e., either BOILPROC(e) or BOILSTATE(e) or BOILCOOK(e).
38 We might then 
think of these analytically related I-concepts as distinct senses or polysemes of the Word 
‘boil’, yet keeping in mind that ‘boil’ encodes an unambiguous linguistic meaning.39 
Again, precisely which concept is returned as a result of executing a fetch operation will 
normally depend on a number of contextual factors, both linguistic and extralinguistic. 
                                                 
37 In this regard, Pietroski sometimes uses the metaphor of a single family home or perhaps apartment 
building with several residents, each of which are regarded by the postal service as living at the same 
address. 
38 To be clear, Pietroski takes I-concepts to be formally distinct yet syntactically primitive mental 
representations. My use of subscripting here should not therefore be taken to indicate that I-concepts have 
hidden internal structure. 
39 If however linguistic meanings are univocal, as suggested, this forces a non-standard definition of the 
term ‘polysemy’, yet for good reason. 
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5.5. Polysemy, Conjunctivism, and Word-concepts 
To recap, I have been operating under the hypothesis that Words lexicalize the 
concepts they are customarily used/uttered to express. Among others, I observed in 
previous chapters that Words can be used, self-reflexively, to express corresponding 
Word-concepts—i.e., conceptsW whose representational contents are the very Words 
(lexical items) used to express them. Given these assumptions, a plausible auxiliary 
hypothesis is that in addition to the ordinary non-metalinguistic concepts that Words 
lexicalize, Words also lexicalize corresponding conceptsW. The chief question I wish to 
explore here is how my notion of conceptsW might fit into the Conjunctivist framework 
outlined above, and how this extension to the present framework relates to the 
phenomenon of lexical polysemy. 
To a first approximation, one might predict that conceptsW are lexicalized under 
Words in precisely the same way as any other pre-lexical concept such as BOILSTATE(x, y), 
DOG(x), ARISTOTLEPHIL, and so forth. For instance, take my conceptW of the Word ‘dog’, 
which to employ notation introduced in earlier chapters is to say DOG(w). As before, I 
assume that DOG(w) expresses something like the property of being the English Word 
‘dog’ (as that Word is recorded in my lexicon). Taking Pietroski’s proposal at face value, 
DOG(w) is a lexicalizable concept whose lexicalization should result in the generation of a 
corresponding monadic analog (I-concept). However, given the intimate relationship 
between Words and conceptsW, I am prepared to suggest that conceptsW are formally 
indistinguishable from I-concepts and are therefore lexicalizable in their native format as 
monadic predicate-concepts. Moreover, as an empirical hypothesis I propose that 
 209 
 
conceptsW simply become lexicalized, as it were, “automatically” as a natural 
consequence of having acquired the Words that they are conceptsW of. 
As a way of briefly motivating this claim, I have argued that to understand [the 
meaning of] 40 a Word is to know which concept(s) that it lexicalizes. And to know this 
much, at least in many cases, seems to entail having first formed beliefs/hypotheses about 
which concept(s) that Word can coherently be used to express in ordinary discourse 
(although as suggested in the previous chapter such hypotheses are often mistaken or 
otherwise incomplete/underspecified). That is, again with Fodor I suppose one could not 
explicitly think about the meaning of a Word as such without first having formed a 
conceptW of that Word and then having used that conceptW to form a metalinguistic 
belief/hypothesis about what that Word means. If correct, it strikes me as a plausible 
working hypothesis that both the acquisition and lexicalization of conceptsW occurs as a 
natural/automatic consequence of the Word acquisition process. In terms of the natural 
order of events, it follows that the acquisition and lexicalization of conceptsW normally 
precedes lexicalization of the non-linguistic (or pre-lexical) concepts that those Words 
are ordinarily used/uttered to express. 
I say “normally precedes” because I wish to leave open the possibility that the 
acquisition and lexicalization of conceptsW is not a necessary condition for the acquisition 
and/or lexicalization of all pre-linguistic concepts. Rather, it is important to remember 
that mine is an empirical hypothesis about typical language users in the general case. One 
might also object that young children lack the kind of explicit metalinguistic knowledge 
that I have been adverting to and thus, a fortiori, lack what I am calling conceptsW. 
                                                 
40 I bracket the expression [the meaning of] because technically speaking it is redundant. For as mentioned 
back in Chapter 1 I assume that to understand an expression just is to understand its meaning. 
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However, it has been suggested to me (by Sandeep Prasada, p.c.,) that children may 
acquire metalinguistic awareness early than previously imagined.41 For the fact that 
toddlers do not explicitly talk about language in the way that adults often do is no proof 
that they lack the target knowledge/competence. However, I am prepared to believe that 
the acquisition of conceptsW, and hence metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC), 
emerges at some later stage of development (around age 4-5 by most estimates).42 
With respect to the present example, my committed proposal is that in addition to 
other concepts that competent English speakers lexicalize under the Word ‘boil’ they also 
lexicalize the conceptW BOIL(w), which by hypothesis is directly fetchable at the address 
@boil. More specifically, while Pietroski himself does not endorse this view I am 
inclined to think that the conceptW BOIL(w) plays the role of an I-concept in speaker’s 
semantic economy. As again, given the intimate relation between BOIL(w) and ‘boil’, it 
strikes me as exceedingly plausible that BOIL(w) becomes lexicalized under ‘boil’ as a 
natural consequence of having acquired ‘boil’. Given this assumption, it strikes me as 
uneconomical to think that one’s lexicalization of BOIL(w) would result in the 
introduction of a corresponding I-concept. Rather again, my proposal is that BOIL(w) just 
is an I-concept in Pietroski’s sense. If correct, BOIL(w) is directly (i.e., structurally) 
related to the meaning of the Word ‘boil’ (as encoded by its CON feature) in the same 
way as other fetchable I-concepts.43 So conceived, BOIL(w) would itself be a member of 
                                                 
41 Yet so far as I know the verdict is still out as to when exactly children begin to acquire introspectively 
accessible metalinguistic knowledge. 
42 When it comes to adult linguistic competence, I am inclined to think that it may be nomologically 
impossible to acquire certain uniquely human concepts (e.g., JUSTICE, LOVE, etc.) without first acquiring a 
certain degree of MSC. Yet, I am not wedded to this claim either. 
43 Indeed, one wonders whether Word-concepts might in fact serve as the “bins” posited by Pietroski, but I 
won’t pursue this thought here. 
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the set of I-concepts activated, and occasionally fetched, by the semantic interpretation of 
‘boil’, as represented by (14): 
(14) CON(boil) = fetch@boil → {BOIL(w), BOILPROC(e), BOILSTATE(e), 
BOILCOOK(e)} 
I have in fact argued (back in Chapter 1) that this must be the case with proper names 
whose meanings, it will be recalled, are on my view most naturally understood to express 
the essentially metalinguistic conceptW IS-CALLED(PN(w)), which contains as a constituent 
a conceptW of the name itself (i.e., PN(w)). I return below to consider the treatment of 
names under Conjunctivism. 
One remaining question is how the process of sense selection operates on an 
otherwise undifferentiated binful of monadic I-concepts. While Pietroski himself says 
little about sense selection in terms of processing, his proposal for the representation of 
lexical polysemy is suggestive of an answer, which I briefly speculate about next. 
5.6. On sense selection 
5.6.1. Sense selection under Conjunctivism 
Given present assumptions, the set of fetchable I-concepts located at the address 
specified by @boil includes BOIL(w), BOILPROC(e), BOILSTATE(e), and BOILCOOK(e). 
However, one again wants to know precisely which of these concepts is actually fetched 
in a given context of utterance—i.e., which concept is returned as the result of executing 
the meaning-instruction fetch@boil. To see how the process of sense selection might 
work, reconsider (15)-(17) from above, repeated below, along with their corresponding 
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logical forms in (15')-(17'), analyzed in neo-Davidson fashion for illustrational purposes 
(and ignoring tense):44 
(15) Max boiled the water 
(15') e [Agent(e, Max) & Boil(e) & Theme(e, the water)] 
(16) The water boiled 
(16') e [Boil(e) & Theme(e, the water)] 
(17) Max boiled the eggs 
(17') e [Agent(e, Max) & Boil(e) & Theme(e, the eggs)] 
In the context of (15)/(15'), speakers will fetch their concept BOILPROC(e) because (i) ex 
hypothesi the thematic structure of (15)/(15') calls for a concept that applies to events 
with two participants, and (ii) because the understood Theme/Patient of this event must 
be the sort of thing that can literally boil.45 By contrast, the absence of a thematic Agent 
in (16)/(16') indicates a concept of event-states, thereby calling for the selection of 
BOILSTATE(e). 
The selection of BOILCOOK(e) over BOILPROC(e) in (17)/(17') is a bit trickier because 
both they and their polyadic counterparts are formally identical concepts. But notice that, 
on Pietroski’s view, the content of BOILCOOK(e) is extensionally equivalent to its polyadic 
counterpart BOILCOOK(x, y). In turn, the first argument in BOILCOOK(x, y) presumably 
ranges over things (objects/substances) that can be cooked by process of boiling, yet 
which as we have seen need not literally boil in the process. And competent speakers of 
English evidently know this, though presumably not as part of their core linguistic 
                                                 
44 I take no stance here on the exact format/structure of their LFs. I use the term ‘neo-Davidsonian’ in the 
sense that these analyses reflect full separation of Agents and Themes/Patients, unlike Davidson’s original 
(1967) analysis. 
45 Whether or not recognition of this latter fact requires access to extralinguistic/pragmatic knowledge I 
leave as an open question. 
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competence but rather as part of what in Chapter 1 I described as their conceptual-
semantic competence (CSC). In short, the concept fetched as instructed by the meaning 
of the Word ‘egg’, for example, will naturally favor selection of BOILCOOK(e) over 
BOILPROC(e). 
In this way, I think Pustejovsky is on to something regarding the way the 
contextually-salient interpretation of Word can depend on the meanings of other Words 
in the sentences in which they occur. However, as just suggested I am also inclined to the 
think, pace Pustejovsky, that the rules governing such interactions are not linguistically 
encoded but rather more likely pragmatic/inferential in nature.46 In any case, similar 
remarks apply to the contextual selection of the conceptW BOIL(w), as expressed by a 
sentence such as (18), and whose neo-Davidsonian analysis is given in (18'): 
(18) By hypothesis, the word ‘boil’ fetches BOIL(w) 
(18') e [Agent(e, ‘boil’) & Fetch(e) & Patient(e, BOIL(w))] 
Here, one can hypothesize that interaction effects between the meaning of the definite 
description ‘the word’ will flag the fact that ‘boil’ is being used self-reflexively (i.e,, 
metalinguistically) to express the conceptW BOIL(w), which is then selected for activation 
(and on Pietroski’s model fetched for construction). Or anyway this represents my best 
guess as to how sense selection might proceed under Pietroski’s framework. 
5.6.2. Sense selection and metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC) 
Despite often having linguistic cues, there are fully ambiguous contexts where the 
linguistic context alone is insufficient to determine the speaker’s communicative 
intentions—i.e., wherein it is not be entirely or even vaguely clear which concept the 
                                                 
46 And so far as I know, there is no reason to deny that pragmatic processes compute the correct results 
quite quickly, and perhaps also non- consciously. 
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speaker intends to express with which Words. Consider (19) and (20), for example, where 
multiple possible readings are equally valid in the absence of relevant extralinguistic 
contextual support: 
(19) Chomsky is difficult to read 
(20) Mary cannot bear children 
(19) can be understood, for example, as saying either that (i) Chomsky (the person) is 
mercurial or otherwise difficult to predict, (ii) that the ideas conveyed in Chomsky’s 
written work are obscure, or perhaps more literally (iii) that Chomsky’s prose is difficult 
to parse, or that he simply has poor handwriting. Each of these readings apparently 
involves distinct yet analytically senses of the Word ‘read’. Thus, the Word ‘read’ is 
clearly polysemous.  By contrast, (20) can be interpreted as stating either that Minnie 
cannot tolerate the presence of children or that she is reproductively infertile.47 In short, 
the relevant question is how, in the absence of clear linguistic cues, might competent 
listeners settle upon an interpretation of these sentences, even at the risk of being 
mistaken?  
My suggestion is that listeners often rely upon their metalinguistic-semantic 
competence (MSC), and more specifically on their explicit beliefs regarding the 
meanings of Words such as ‘read’ and ‘bear’. Take the Word ‘read’, for example. I have 
argued that every competent English speaker who has the Word ‘read’ in his/her lexicon 
has also acquired and lexicalized a metalinguistic conceptW of that Word—call it 
READ(w). I have further proposed that such speakers will have used their conceptW 
READ(w) to form explicit metalinguistic beliefs about what the Word ‘read’ means, which 
                                                 
47 Many theorists would argue that ‘bear’ is homophonous, which is perhaps so. However, I take the Word 
‘read’ to be incontrovertibly polysemous. 
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constitutes what I have called one’s conception of its meaning. More specifically, I have 
suggested that one’s conception of the meaning of a Word is a direct conscious reflection 
of a one’s tacit understanding of which concepts are coherently expressible with that 
Word in which contexts as constrained by its lexically-encoded meaning. 
For instance, suppose I believe that the Word ‘read’ can, in appropriate contexts, be 
coherently used to express the concepts READPREDICT(x, y), READCOMPREHEND(x, y), and 
READPARSE(x, y),  corresponding to the three senses of ‘read’ mentioned in connection 
with the ambiguity of (19). By earlier hypothesis, I will have used my conceptW READ(w) 
to form the following beliefs: 
(21) w [READ(w) & EXPRESSES(w, READPREDICT(x, y))] 
(22) w [READ(w) & EXPRESSES(w, READCOMPREHEND(x, y))] 
(23) w [READ(w) & EXPRESSES(w, READPARSE(x, y))] 
By assumption, I have lexicalized each of the extralinguistic concepts in in (21)-(23) 
above under the meaning of the Word ‘read’, which on Pietroski’s view implies that I 
will have introduced three analogous monadic I-concepts; e.g., READPREDICT(e), 
READCOMPREHEND(e), and READPARSE(e). On my view, the list of concepts lexicalized 
with/under the Word ‘read’ will also include my conceptW of the Word itself, which is to 
say READ(w). 
Thus, we might in turn suppose that the meaning of the Word ‘read’ in my lexicon 
is encoded as follows: 
(24) CON(read) = fetch@read → {READ(w), READPREDICT(e), READCOMPREHEND(e), 
and READPARSE(e)} 
Again by hypothesis, I will understand the meaning of the Word ‘read’ as encoded by 
(24) as an instruction to activate/fetch (and conjoin) one or more contextually-salient 
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extralinguistic concepts lexicalized under the memory location specified by @read. In 
light of what was said earlier about the intimate association between Word-meanings and 
conceptsW, I assume that my interpretation of ‘read’ will typically prime or even activate 
my conceptW READ(w). Moreover, since READ(w) is a proper constituent of each of (21)-
(23), one assumes that activation of READ(w) will naturally lead to the activation of pre-
activation of certain metalinguistic beliefs, including possibly those in (21)-(23). And this 
this way explicit thoughts/beliefs about a Word’s lexically-encoded meaning can be 
naturally triggered by one’s tacit interpretation of that Word. 
Generally speaking, it should be unsurprising that one’s interpretation of a Word 
might naturally trigger a chain of spreading activation, or anyhow increased levels of 
resting activation, across an entire network of associated beliefs, both metalinguistic and 
non-metalinguistic. Simultaneously, in contexts such as (19) and (20) listeners will be 
feverishly generating hypotheses about the speaker’s communicative/referential 
intentions in virtue of having used they Words they did in saying what they said. And 
when the evidence of speaker-intentions is spare, we of course have no choice but to 
simply take our best shot. 
It is of course difficult if not impossible to know precisely which thoughts/beliefs 
are triggered by which Words in which contexts. However, one can readily imagine in the 
case of (19) above that given what competent speakers know about “readings” and 
“difficult” things, one can immediately rule out an interpretation according to which, for 
example, reading Chomsky is physically demanding. Moreover, if one suspects (for 
whatever reason) that an utterer of (19) above is referring to Chomsky the person (as 
opposed to his literature), one can immediately infer that reference is being made to a 
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psychological state or disposition of Chomsky (the person), and not his written work, 
which will favor selection of the concept READPREDICT(e)). On the other hand, if one 
understands the Word ‘difficult’ as adverting to a mental state of the speaker, one can 
justifiably infer that READCOMPREHEND(e) is the intended concept, and so on for other 
possibilities. 
The upshot is that given contexts such as (19) and (20) wherein speaker-intentions 
are only vaguely known, or completely unknown, listeners are left to their own devices to 
assign an interpretation to those particular strings of Words. The choice is not random, 
however. For there may be, as lexical semanticists often claim, some “core” sense of each 
open-class lexical item that is selected by default. However, in many contexts the default 
or what are sometimes called the “literal” senses of each Word in the sentence, such as 
‘Chomsky’, ‘difficult’, and ‘read’, do not readily combine to generate a coherent thought. 
In these situations, my proposal is that listeners rely on their metalinguistic-semantic 
competence (MSC), as guided by beliefs such as (21)-(23), to trigger further beliefs about 
the different senses of Words such as ‘read’ and ‘difficult’ in order to generate 
epistemically-guided inferences to the best interpretation in light of the evidence 
available. And while this interpretive strategy may be prone to error, employing one’s 
MSC is often a better bet than simply relying on the first thing that pops into one’s mind; 
e.g., the literal/conventional interpretation of a particular string of Words. In this way, I 
contend, a speaker’s MSC often plays an indispensable role in the process of sense 
selection, and hence in the process of utterance interpretation. 
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5.6.3. Sense selection and proper names 
Ambiguous uses of proper names are, I believe, even more readily accounted for 
under present suggestions. As you might recall from Chapters 1 and 2, on my view the 
meanings of names are naturally understood as containing an essentially metalinguistic 
component. More specifically, many theorists have argued over the years that the 
meanings of proper names are fundamentally predicative in nature. For example, Russell 
(1911, 1918) proposed that the meaning of a name can be analyzed as “the object called 
‘N’,” where ‘N’ stands for the name in question. To navigate around descriptivist 
criticisms, Burge (1973) recasts Russell’s analysis as “is an entity called ‘N.” Similarly, 
Katz’s (1994) “pure metalinguistic description” theory of names cashes out the meaning 
of a name as “the thing which is a bearer of `N'.” By contrast, Kent Bach’s (1981, 1987 
2002) nominal description theory holds that the meanings of proper names are 
semantically equivalent to the definite description “the bearer of ‘N’.” 
Setting aside their differences, notice that in each case the meanings of names range 
over a restricted domain of entities (i.e., things so-called) rendering them fundamentally 
predicative in nature. However, each analysis also makes reference to the name itself 
rendering them fundamentally metalinguistic in nature as well. While I am again partial 
to a Burge-style account, it is not a primary goal of this work to provide a fully developed 
semantic theory for proper names (though I do have a considered view on the matter, as 
outlined in Chapter 1 and Appendix A of Chapter 2). In any case, the point is that many 
language theorists agree that names are broadly understood as predicates of things so-
called (or so-named). My aim here is to briefly evaluate how a listener’s MSC figures 
into the interpretation of proper names in ambiguous contexts. 
 219 
 
In brief review, I have argued that when a syntactically primitive name like 
‘Aristotle’ is used predicatively with its meaning it is naturally understood to express the 
conceptW IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)), or as qualified in Chapter 1 perhaps instead the 
conceptW IS-CALLED(C, ARISTOTLE(w)) to account for quantificational uses. I have also 
argued that when names are used as devices of direct singular reference they combine, 
syntactically, with a referential index/variable to yield a syntactically complex lexical 
expression (LE) which contains the name in question as a proper constituent. For 
example, I take it that the name ‘Aristotle’ used in reference to Aristotle the philosopher 
yields an indexed LE of the form ‘[[NP [PN Aristotle]][xi]]’ whose compositionally-
determined semantic value is specified below in terms of its Tarskian satisfaction 
conditions (where g is an interpretation function that assigns values to variables relative 
to a sequence, ): 
(26) g(xi) = (i), i > 0 
(27) g([[NP [PN Aristotle]][xi]]) = x: x satisfies ‘Aristotle’ iff x = (i) & (i) is 
called ‘Aristotle’ 
According to (27), the semantic value of ‘[[NP [PN Aristotle]][xi]]’ relative to any 
sequence, , of entities in the domain is the i-th object in . The category label ‘PN’ 
attached to ‘[PN Aristotle]’ ensures that name tokens apply only to objects in the 
sequence/domain that are in fact so-called. In this way, when the name ‘Aristotle’ is 
interpreted as a proper constituent of an indexed LE it will be understood as referring 
uniquely and rigidly to a particular ‘Aristotle’.48 
Notice that in order to interpret the indexed LE ‘[[NP [PN Aristotle]][xi]]’ one must 
first (or perhaps simultaneously) interpret the bare (i.e., non-indexed) nominal expression 
                                                 
48 Please refer back to Chapter 2, Appendix A, for further details. 
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‘[NP [PN Aristotle]]’. Yet in its bare form ‘[NP [PN Aristotle]]’ is effectively just the name 
‘Aristotle’, which again by hypothesis is naturally understood to express the conceptW IS-
CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)), or again perhaps IS-CALLED(C, ARISTOTLE(w)). By contrast, I 
have suggested that the indexed LE ‘[[NP [PN Aristotle]][xi]]’ itself, say as used in 
reference to Aristotle the philosopher, is naturally understood as expressing the “doubly 
unsaturated” relational conceptW IS-CALLED(C, C), such that the assignments: 
C=ARISTOTLEPHIL and C=ARISTOTLE(w) yield the conceptW IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLEPHIL, 
ARISTOTLE(w)). 
As a way of encoding these suggestions, I have further proposed to specify the 
meaning of ‘Aristotle’ as follows: 
(26) CON(aristotle) = activate@aristotle → {ARISTOTLE(w), IS-CALLED(C), IS-
CALLED(C, C), ARISTOTLEPHIL, ARISTOTLETYC} 
One will notice, however, that this regimentation is not directly compatible with 
Pietroski’s semantic framework. As in consequence of having lexicalized the singular 
concepts ARISTOTLEPHIL and ARISTOTLETYC under the name ‘Aristotle’, by Pietroski’s 
lights speakers will have thereby introduced by abstraction the corresponding monadic I-
concepts ARISTOTLEPHIL(_) and ARISTOTLETYC(_). Although, Pietroski seems to agree that 
the name ‘Aristotle’ itself, as suggested back in Chapter 1, expresses something like the 
property of being called ‘Aristotle’.49 Pietroski also has a way of encoding the concepts 
that I have ascribed to our understanding of names in Conjunctivist terms. However, the 
benefit of hacking through those details here will have little payoff, as the same basic 
                                                 
49 As I understand, however, on Pietroski’s view, strictly speaking, the meaning of ‘Aristotle’ is understood 
as expressing the property of being called by the sound/noise/PF of the Word ‘Aristotle’. But as mentioned 
back in Chapter 1, I propose not to quibble over this detail. 
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points can be made in reference to the semantic axiom in (26). Yet I will proceed under 
the assumption that (26) can in principle be reformulated in Conjunctivist terms. 
The relevant claim, again on my view, is that any use of a proper name, ‘PN’, is 
naturally understood to express the fundamentally metalinguistic conceptW PN(w). For 
example, I have argued that when the name ‘Aristotle’ is used self-reflexively in 
reference to itself, it will be understood as an instruction to activate (or under Pietroski’s 
model fetch and conjoin) its interpreter’s conceptW ARISTOTLE(w). When used 
predicatively, it will be understood as an instruction to first activate ARISTOTLE(w) and 
one of either IS-CALLED(C) or IS-CALLED(C, C), and then “saturate” the open C position 
with the conceptW ARISTOTLE(w) to generate one of either IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)) or 
IS-CALLED(C, ARISTOTLE(w)). And when used referentially, the name ‘Aristotle’ will be 
understood as an instruction to activate IS-CALLED(C, C) and doubly saturate such that C = 
ARISTOTLE(w) and C = {ARISTOTLEPHIL | ARISTOTLETYC}. Notice that in each use of 
‘Aristotle’ the conceptW ARISTOTLE(w) is either directly expressed or appears as proper 
constituent of the conceptW expressed. In the latter two cases, ARISTOTLE(w) will be 
activated in consequence of having activated the conceptW expressed. Hence, as I argued 
in Chapter 1 even referential uses of names express a metalinguistic component of 
meaning. In turn, understanding the various uses of names always involves recruitment of 
one’s metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC). 
I have argued, in addition, that like any other open-class Word speakers who have 
the name ‘Aristotle’ in their lexicon will have used their conceptW ARISTOTLE(w) to form 
explicit metalinguistic beliefs about what that name means in terms of which concepts it 
can coherently be used to express in ordinary discourse. Or put in general terms, I have 
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argued that one’s explicit beliefs about of conceptions of Word-meanings are the direct 
conscious reflection of one’s tacit understanding of the various ways in which those 
meanings constrain without univocally determining what their host Words can and cannot 
be used/uttered to denote, refer to, or otherwise talk about in ordinary discourse.  
For instance, I take it that typical adult English speakers will have used their 
conceptW ARISTOTLE(w) to form the following metalinguistic beliefs: 
(27) w [ARISTOTLE(w) & EXPRESSES(w, ARISTOTLEPHIL)] 
(28) w [ARISTOTLE(w) & EXPRESSES(w, ARISTOTLETYC)] 
Here again, the conceptW ARISTOTLE(w) is a proper constituent of the beliefs in (27) and 
(28) whose activation is normally facilitated by interpreting [the meaning of] ‘Aristotle’. 
In turn, activation of (27) and (28) ipso facto involves activation of the singular concepts 
ARISTOTLEPHIL and ARISTOTLETYC. In this way, merely mentioning the name ‘Aristotle’ 
will often call to mind thoughts about one or more ‘Aristotle’s of the interpreter’s 
acquaintance. Indeed, just as with the Word ‘read’ form above, having ready access to 
this sort of knowledge can come in handy when trying to disambiguate ambiguous uses 
of proper names.  
With respect to the question of sense selection, consider a context in which one 
overhears an utterance of (29) in casual conversation: 
(29) Athens has undergone significant change since Aristotle 
Now, without relevant extralinguistic contextual support a competent listener who is duly 
knowledgeable of both Aristotle the philosopher and Aristotle Onassis cannot 
immediately deduce which of these two ‘Aristotle’s is being referred to by an utterance of 
(29) without further contextual support. In such contexts, my hypothesis is that 
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interpreters will naturally understand ‘Aristotle’ as expressing the fundamentally 
predicative conceptW IS-CALLED(ARISTOTLE(w)), or again that conceptsW  which 
competent speakers most naturally associate with the meaning of ‘Aristotle’. Here again, 
an interpreter’s conceptW ARISTOTLE(w) will become activated in virtue of having 
understood the meaning of ‘Aristotle’. Yet given the referential ambiguity, my conjecture 
is that interpreters will immediately begin sifting through their explicit metalinguistic 
beliefs about what that name means in search of clues. Specifically, activation of (27) and 
(28) will cause activation of the singular concepts ARISTOTLEPHIL and ARISTOTLETYC. And 
this may trigger a massive chain of spreading activation lighting up beliefs about 
Aristotle the philosopher, Aristotle Onassis, related beliefs about Athens, Jackie O., 
philosophy, and so on. 
Importantly, this sequence of interpretive events may eventually lead to an 
inference to the best interpretation regarding which individual is being referred to in (29). 
For instance, suppose our subjects recalls hearing about turmoil among leaders of the 
Greek federal government over the negative economic ramifications of having hosted the 
2004 Summer Olympics. Suppose our subject also recalls learning that during the 
Onassis era, given his business interests and political clout Arie had lobbied hard against 
hosting the Olympics in Athens because he predicted that the economic burden would be 
too great.50 On this basis, our subject might justifiably conclude that the ‘Aristotle’ under 
discussion is in fact Aristotle Onassis and not, say, the ancient philosopher. 
Importantly, if what I have conjectured is correct, then the chain of pragmatic 
reasoning that led to this conclusion was initiated by what our subject understood about 
the meaning of the name ‘Aristotle’, which ex hypothesi is largely metalinguistic in 
                                                 
50 None of this is factual, so far as I know. 
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nature. And while our subject’s reasoning involved mostly non-metalinguistic 
knowledge, it is unclear whether that knowledge would be accessible if not by means of 
activating metalinguistic beliefs such as (27) and (28) above. Moreover, simply 
recognizing an utterance of (29) as being referentially ambiguous might owe to our 
subject’s metalinguistic-semantic competence. All of this in turn points directly to the 
fact that MSC often plays an important role in utterance interpretation, sometimes 
expression interpretation, and in this case the resolution of lexical polysemy. 
To take a slightly different kind of example, consider Quine’s famous logophoric 
example in (30): 
(30) Giorgione was so-called because of his size 
To my knowledge, everyone agrees that the pronoun ‘his’ in (30) is anaphoric on the 
name ‘Giorgione’ and thus coindexed as shown in (30'): 
(30') Giorgione1 was so-called because of his1 size 
Thus, there is an intuitively clear sense in which the name ‘Giorgione’ in (30) is used 
referentially, which on my view is to say that its meaning in this context will be naturally 
understood as expressing the conceptW IS-CALLED(GIORGIONE, GIORGIONE(w)). However, 
(30/30') is also a referentially “opaque” context that prohibits substitution of coreferential 
names. For instance, while the names ‘Giorgione’ and ‘Barbarelli’ corefer, substitution of 
the latter for the former as in (30) below yields a false statement. 
(31) Barbarelli was so-called because of his size 
The failure of substitution here evidently owes to the fact that the name ‘Giorgione’ in 
Italian literally translates as “Big George.” And since Giorgione, the High Renaissance 
Venetian painter, was reportedly large in stature, the thought expressed (30) is true with 
respect to Giorgione as such, yet false with respect to Barbarelli. 
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A standard diagnosis of the substitution failure between (30) and (31) is that the 
adjective phrase (or logophor) ‘so-called’, rather like the adverbial phrase ‘as such’, 
behaves like an anaphor that makes backward reference to connotative features of the 
name itself. In (30), the name is ‘Giorgione’ which again connotes “largeness in stature,” 
whereas the name ‘Barbarelli’ does not (‘Barbarelli was part of Giorgione’s surname). 
Notice that connotative properties are not the sort of thing one would expect to find 
among the intrinsic semantic features of proper names in a Chomskyan lexicon. Thus, it 
seems to me that a correct evaluation of the truth-conditions of (30) could not be 
grounded in what I called back in Chapter 1 an interpreter’s core linguistic competence, 
or even his/her core semantic competence (LSC). 
Rather, an English speaker’s knowledge that the Italian name ‘Giorgione’ connotes 
“largeness in stature” is the kind of information that is learned and recorded as part what I 
am calling one’s metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC). Thus, to a rough 
approximation we might suppose that such information is recorded a in metalinguistic 
belief such as (32): 
(32) w [GIORGIONE(w) & CONNOTES(w, LARGE-IN-STATURE(x))] 
Given present assumptions, it should be clear how (31) could easily become activated in 
consequence of having interpreted the meaning of the name ‘Giorgione’. And since such 
knowledge is instrumental in representing the truth-conditions of (30), one might argue 
that this aspect of MSC is constitutive of one’s core semantic competence. Something 
quite similar applies to the interpretation of opacity-inducing dialectical variants of 
proper names such as ‘Harvard’ and ‘London’. For instance, a speaker might believe that 
\'harverd\ borders the Charles River but deny that \'havad\ does. 
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The upshot of this discussion is an empirically-guided refinement of what has been 
known about the meanings of names for a long time. Specifically, when evaluating what 
it is that a competent speaker must know in order to understand the meaning of a proper 
name, Kent Bach (2002: 76) observes that:  
…one’s knowledge about particular bearers of particular names does not count as 
strictly linguistic knowledge. Rather, it is in virtue of one’s general knowledge about 
the category of proper names that one knows of any particular name that when used 
in a sentence (whether as a complete noun phrase or part of a larger noun phrase) it 
expresses the property of bearing that name. 
And Jerrold Katz (1994: 7) seconds this notion by stating that: 
Speakers who know the sense of ‘London’ know that literal tokens of that proper 
noun type denote the contextually definite bearer of the name, but that knowledge 
does not tell them who or what the bearers are, or even whether there are any tokens 
of the type. Extra-linguistic information of various sorts is required to know who or 
what the bearers of the proper noun `London' are and whether an utterance or 
inscription is a literal occurrence of a token of this type. Given this information, the 
speaker still requires further extra-linguistic information to know which of the 
bearers is the referent in the context. 
Just so, among other claims made in this chapter it seems to me quite possible that 
understanding [the meaning of] a proper name is to understand it as an instruction to 
fetch, among perhaps other concepts, one’s conceptW of that name. 
5.7. Chapter summary 
In this chapter I first argued that lexical polysemy is a psychologically real 
phenomenon that any complete semantic theory for natural language must account for. In 
my view, Pietroski’s internalist/Conjunctivist semantics, which builds on Chomsky’s 
conception of I-languages, offers an attractive and empirically well-motivated framework 
within which to better understand and perhaps eventually explain this elusive 
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phenomenon. The main goal of this chapter, however, was to introduce an independently 
motivated semantic framework in which to more concretely situate the relevance of a 
speaker’s metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC) in utterance and/or expression 
interpretation. In particular, I briefly explored how my notion of Word-concepts (i.e., 
conceptsW) might naturally fit into an internalist-Conjunctivist semantics for natural 
language. In turn, I have briefly argued for a modest extension to Pietroski’s semantic 
framework which I believe is needed to capture the fundamentally metalinguistic aspects 
of lexical polysemy, and how a competent speaker’s employ MSC in the so-called 
processes of sense selection. To this end, I have sketched a couple of related applications 
of MSC to demonstrate the psychological/conceptual resources that interpreter’s bring to 
the task of disambiguating semantically ambiguous lexical constituents, and particularly 
with respect to our natural interpretation of ambiguous uses of proper names. And while I 
lack hard empirical support for my proposed extension to Pietroski’s account, it is in 
principle an empirically testable hypothesis. Indeed, I would be delighted to see linguists 
and cognitive psychologists begin to pay greater attention to the potential role of MSC in 
utterance/expression interpretation. 
From a philosophical standpoint, and more generally speaking, there has to my 
knowledge been just one or two other serious attempts to evaluate the role of MSC in 
utterance/expression interpretation, and specifically against the backdrop of a Chomskyan 
conception of language. One effort in particular owes to a recent (2006) monograph by 
Robert Fiengo and Robert May entitled De Lingua Belief which is the culmination of 
more than a decade of work on the topic. Unfortunately, I only discovered this work after 
having devoted more than two years myself thinking about the question. As it turns out, 
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Fiengo & May’s proposal exhibits several affinities with my own view, only theirs is 
much more thorough and ably stated/defended. In addition, Fiengo & May’s account is 
specifically designed as a linguistic (or what I would call metalinguistic) solution to 
Frege’s puzzle about the informativeness of true identity statements of the form ‘ is ’, 
where ‘’ and ‘’ are coreferential proper names, and correlatively failures of 
substitution of such names in opaque contexts such as belief reports. 
While Fiengo & May’s proposal has much to recommend, several commentators 
have observed that it contains a serious (perhaps fatal) defect. Given its parallels to my 
account, I devote the next chapter to a careful review of Fiengo & May’s account. In 
Chapter 7 I then develop an alternative approach to resolving these puzzles, based on 
current assumptions, and which I believe overcomes the shortcomings of De Lingua 
Belief while preserving many of its core intuitions. 
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6. De Lingua Beliefs 
6.1. Introduction 
I have been arguing that speakers have explicit beliefs about the meanings of the 
Words they utter, and that such beliefs underwrite an aspect of their core linguistic 
competence. The present chapter evaluates a closely related proposal by Robert Fiengo 
and Robert May (F&M hereafter) in a recent monograph entitled De Lingua Belief 
(2006), or DLB henceforth. As their title suggests, what I have been calling metalinguistic 
beliefs F&M refer to as de lingua beliefs, which is to say beliefs about language. 
Specifically, F&M agree that competent speakers have explicit beliefs about the 
meanings of Words—or what F&M refer to as their semantic Assignments—that “reflect 
fundamental aspects of our underlying linguistic competence.” 
While our respective views again have much in common,1 they also differ in a few 
crucial respects. Specifically, F&M’s proposal is designed in part as a linguistic (as 
opposed to merely pragmatic) solution to Frege’s puzzle about (i) the informativeness of 
identity statements containing type-distinct coreferential names, and correlatively (ii) 
failures of substitution of coreferential names in propositional attitude reports. 
Importantly, F&M are committed to the claim that beliefs of Assignments are sometimes 
covertly expressed as part of the semantic content of certain utterances as reflected in 
their logical forms. However, F&M’s analysis appears to suffer from the same problem 
that it purports to solve, which, for example, is how it might be that a rational subject and 
competent speaker could know that Fa yet reject Fb when ‘a’ and ‘b’ refer to the same 
                                                 
1 As a matter of propriety, I should mention that many of my thoughts on the topic were developed prior to, 
and thus independently of, my acquaintance with DLB. My own view has nevertheless benefitted 
immeasurably from the rigor of F&M’s analysis of the relevant issues. 
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thing. By contrast, I believe the metalinguistic framework developed in previous chapters 
can be applied as a corrective to F&M’s account while preserving many of its otherwise 
sound intuitions. 
I postpone presentation of my own positive account for Chapter 7 where I recast 
F&M’s proposal in largely pragmatic (i.e., non-semantic) terms, as outlined back in 
Chapter 1. The present chapter is devoted to a detailed analysis of F&M’s way of 
defending the core intuitions underlying their view. Since I again share their core 
intuitions, my review of several details here will stand in support of my own positive 
account thus easing the burden of the next chapter. Specifically, I will draw on certain 
details of F&M’s proposal as way to motivate the role of conceptsW, and hence a 
speaker’s metalinguistic-semantic competence, in the interpretation of identity 
statements.  
To get the ball rolling, I first review Frege’s puzzle about the informativeness of 
identity statements and relatedly the problem of substitution failure in attitude reports. I 
then outline Kripke’s attempt to neutralize Fregean solutions to the second puzzle. This 
debate will be old hat for many. But my initial goal is to remind ourselves of Frege and 
Kripke’s respective motivations for thinking that any solution to such puzzles, if one 
exists, will not be metalinguistic in nature. I then turn to a detailed discussion of F&M’s 
account which attempts to reverse this conclusion, followed by an analysis of why their 
particular proposal ultimately fails. The next chapter again capitalizes on the salvageable 
insights of DLB to show how such puzzles can be explained by appeal to what I have 
characterized as a speaker’s metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC). 
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6.2. Informativeness and substitution 
Similar to Frege’s Begriffsschrift, natural languages tolerate multiple Words that are 
used to denote the same things, which is perhaps most common with coreferential proper 
names. This affordance of coreference, however, when coupled with a Millian view of 
the semantics of names, gives rise to the puzzles mentioned above regarding (i) the 
informativeness of true identity statements containing formally distinct coreferential 
names, and relatedly (ii) failures of substitution of coreferential names in referentially 
opaque contexts such as belief reports. 
To see why these cases were puzzling for Frege, first recall J. S. Mill’s account of 
proper names according to which the meaning of a name is nothing more than its referent. 
Formally, Millianism (M) about names can be stated as follows: 
(M)illianism: The meaning of a proper name is exhausted by its reference. Hence, 
coreferential names have the same meaning and therefore make the same semantic 
contribution to the proposition expressed by sentences in which those names appear. 
In turn, (M) seems to entail a principle of Substitutivity (S): 
(S)ubstitutivity: Coreferential names are everywhere substitutable, salva veritate, which 
is to say that their substitution in otherwise structurally identical sentences is truth-
preserving.2 
                                                 
2 While often implicit in these discussions, I take it that virtually all parties to the debate endorse some 
version of what I will call Strict Compositionality (SC), Truth Conditionality (TC), and Propositionality 
(P), which can each be stated roughly as follows: 
(S)trict (C)ompositionality: The meaning of a sentence is wholly determined by the meanings of its 
constituent parts (relativized to a context) together with their mode of semantic composition. Thus, 
any difference in the meanings of its constituents translates to a difference in the meaning of the 
sentence. 
(T)ruth (C)onditionality: The mode of semantic composition for natural language is truth-
functional (usually taken to be Fregean “function application”), which is to say that the composed 
meaning of a sentence, relativized to a context, just is or otherwise fully determines its truth, 
reference, or satisfaction conditions. 
(P)ropositionality: Propositions (not sentences) are the bearers of truth, and so the truth-conditions 
of a sentence (or its utterance relative to a context) determine the proposition that it expresses. Thus, 
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A stronger version of (S) adds that substitution preserves the cognitive significance of the 
proposition expressed by such sentences, yielding (S'): 
(S')ubstitutivity: Coreferential names are everywhere substitutable, salva veritate and 
salva significatione. 
Opponents of (M), however, maintain that both (S) and (S') are false. And if it can be 
shown that (S) and (S') are in fact false, then (arguably) so too is (M). Frege’s puzzle 
about the informativeness of identity statements directly challenges the truth of (S'), 
whereas apparent failures of substitution in opaque or intensional contexts calls into 
question the soundness of (S). 
For example, under the assumption that the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ refer to the 
same individual,3 both (S) and (S') imply that their substitution in the following identity 
statements should be truth-preserving: 
(1) Cicero is Cicero 
(2) Tully is Tully 
(3) Cicero is Tully 
While it is widely agreed that the truth-values of (1)-(3) covary, which is compatible with 
the truth of (S), together (M) and (S/S') jointly imply something much stronger, which is 
that (1)-(3) have the same meanings that determine the same truth-conditions and thereby 
express the same thought/proposition. Frege of course had reason to doubt this stronger 
claim. 
First, that (3) might differ in meaning from both (1) and (2) is evidenced by the 
observation that (3) appears to be informative in a way that (1) and (2) are not. For 
                                                                                                                                                 
any difference in the meaning of a sentence translates to a difference in its truth-conditions, which in 
turn translates to a difference in the proposition expressed. 
3 As suggested in earlier chapters, I do not believe that names themselves bear reference to things in the 
world. However, following Fiengo & May I will for purposes of this chapter speak as if they do.  
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consider Max who by stipulation is a rational agent and competent speaker of English. 
Let us further assume that Max has the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ in his idiolect (i.e., 
lexicon) and uses them appropriately, which is to say that he uses those names with what 
Scott Soames calls their “usual reference.” Let us qualify, however, that Max uses 
‘Cicero’ only in reference to someone he believes was a Roman statesman and ‘Tully’ 
exclusively in reference to someone he believes was a Roman poet. And this is to suggest 
that Max does not know/believe that ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ corefer. However, Max 
presumably knows in virtue of his knowledge of grammar and basic logic that (1) and (2) 
are trivially true and thus thoroughly uninformative. Yet Max can evidently know this 
much without knowing/believing (or assenting to) (3) if he fails to believe that there is 
just one individual who is in fact so-called.4 
Now, it obviously won’t help to disabuse Max of his mistaken beliefs for a third-
party informant to reassert the trivial truth of (1) and (2). By contrast, (3), if uttered 
persuasively, is putatively capable of causing Max to adjust his (false) belief about how 
many individuals are the bearers of the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, thereby leading to the 
conclusion that Cicero and Tully are in fact one and the same person. For Max to accept 
the truth of (3) thus constitutes what Frege considered to be a substantive extension of his 
knowledge about the identity of a certain individual. It appears in turn that an identity 
statement is informative only to the extent that the information it expresses or otherwise 
conveys is sufficient to cause a rational subject to revise his or her mistaken beliefs about 
the truth of the identity that it states. The relevant question is this: What is it about (3) as 
                                                 
4 I am of course using English translations of Cicero’s given Latin name(s). ‘Cicero’ is the standard 
American English translation, whereas in The King’s English he is referred to as ‘Tully’, or so I have read. 
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opposed to (1) and (2) that might cause a subject such as Max to revise his mistaken 
beliefs? 
6.2.1. Frege’s puzzle about the informativeness of identity statements 
This is of course precisely what Frege wanted to know. More specifically, Frege’s 
puzzle about the informativeness of true identity statements amounts to this: If, as 
entailed by (M) and (S/S'), there are no relevant semantic (i.e., referential) differences 
between (1)-(3), then why, or in virtue of what, is (3) informative in a way that (1) and 
(2) are not? In general terms, Frege wondered why identity statements of the form ‘a = b’ 
(in formal languages) have a kind of “cognitive significance” that statements of the form 
‘a = a’ lack.5, 6 In particular, he wondered whether statements of identity express a 
relation, as their grammatical forms suggests, and if so what is the nature of this relation 
and what are its relata? As a starting point, Frege pretty much took for granted that the 
logico-mathematic symbol ‘=’ expresses the Liebnizian relation of numerical identity (or 
self-identity), which is to say the relation that a thing bears to itself and no other. So 
defined, identity is symmetric, transitive, and reflexive. Such statements should therefore 
admit free inter-substitution of the signs flanking the identity symbol. Yet one might still 
wonder, as did Frege, what exactly are the relata of such statements? 
Frege initially considers just two possibilities: identity statements either express a 
relation between (i) the signs (linguistic expressions) that flank the identity symbol, or (ii) 
the objects (individuals) that those signs designate. Siding with (i), he notes, has the 
consequence that: 
                                                 
5 As Frege (1879: 217) puts it, “…sentences of the form a = b often contain very valuable extensions of our 
knowledge and cannot always be justified in an a priori manner.” 
6 In terms of natural language, we can take the equality sign “=” as equivalent to the English copular verb 
“is,” or its infinitive “to be.” 
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What is intended to be said by a = b seems to be that the signs or names `a' and 'b' 
designate the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a 
relation between them would be asserted. 
However, Frege also understood that the assignment of names to their bearers is 
arbitrary, which is to say a matter of linguistic convention. It is then equally arbitrary 
whether any two names designate the same individual. And so to assert ‘a = b’ is merely 
to report a metalinguistic fact about language use rather than a substantive semantic fact 
about the relevant object of reference. In this sense, statements of the form ‘a = b’ are no 
more informative than statements of the form ‘a = a’. Taking option (ii) from above, 
however, has the equally benign consequence that: 
A relation would thereby be expressed of a thing to itself, and indeed one in which each 
thing stands to itself but to no other thing. 
That is, since everything is self-identical, and any rational agent knows this a priori, 
every statement of identity between a thing and itself is analytically true and thus 
thoroughly uninformative. 
Such considerations are what ultimately led Frege to the conclusion that proper 
names have both a sense and a reference, where the sense of name, or in neo-Fregean 
terms its meaning, is an abstract, mind-independent entity that uniquely determines (or 
presents) its reference. So conceived, Frege reasoned that identity statements of the form 
‘a = b’ must express a relation between two different senses or “ways” in which type-
distinct coreferential names determine (or present) their common object/referent. As 
Frege put it, the formal linguistic difference between ‘a’ and ‘b’ corresponds to or is 
connected with a difference in their “mode of presentation.” Thus, Frege concluded that 
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while the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ have the same reference they express different 
senses (or have different meanings). 
Let us assume, for instance, that under the conditions in which he acquired the 
names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ that Max associates the former with the sense of ‘Cicero’ as 
“the Roman statesman” and the latter with the sense of ‘Tully’ as “the Roman poet.” By 
Frege’s lights, it then becomes plausible to suppose that Max might “grasp” the distinct 
senses of ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, respectively, without thereby recognizing that they 
determine the same reference. Hence, to learn the truth of (3) from above (Cicero = 
Tully) is to learn that ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ express two different ways of presenting the 
same individual. Since senses are both mind- and language-independent entities, Frege 
considered such an advance to constitute a substantive/valuable extension of knowledge.7 
In short, the common reference of ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ explains why the truth-
values of (1)-(3) covary, whereas their difference in sense/meaning accounts for the 
informativeness of (3).8 And this is because, on Frege’s view, the sense of a proper name 
makes a semantic contribution to the thought expressed by sentences in which it appears. 
Hence, (1)-(3) differ in meaning because they express different thoughts. Moreover, 
under the assumption that Max might believe the truth of (1) and (2) while not believing 
(or positively disbelieving) (3) suggests that senses are truth-relevant in opaque contexts. 
Furthermore, if as Frege assumed (1) and (2) are analytic/necessary whereas (3) is 
synthetic/contingent, not only do these sentences express different thoughts, they express 
                                                 
7 Frege argued that it is possible, at least in principle, that a speaker might associate different names with 
the same sense, in which case neo-Fregeans would say that those names are strictly synonymous. This point 
will be relevant in my discussion of Fiengo & May (2006) below. 
8 Notice that any two tokens of the same name-type by definition have the same sense that determines the 
same reference, which is presumably at least part of the reason why ‘a = a’ is uninformative. By contrast, 
distinct names that express different senses can uniquely determine the same reference, which presumably 
accounts, in part, for the informativeness of ‘a = b’. I’ll return to this point in discussion to follow. 
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different kinds of thoughts.9 The upshot is that given their differences in sense, formally 
distinct coreferential names are not everywhere substitutable, salva significatione. As 
such, Frege’s invocation of sense amounts to a refutation of (S'). 
Similar reasoning applies to apparent failures of (S) in propositional attitude 
reports. Consider, for example, the simple predicative statements expressed by the 
sentence-pairs in (4)-(5) and (6)-(7) below: 
(4) Cicero was a Roman statesman 
(5) Tully was a Roman statesman 
(6) Tully was a Roman poet 
(7) Cicero was a Roman poet 
While in this case (4)-(7) each express contingent (i.e., synthetic) truths, according to (S) 
if (4) is true then so too is (5), and likewise for (6) and (7). What’s more, by (M) and (S) 
it follows that (4)-(7) express just two Russellian propositions whose logical forms 
(ignoring tense) are roughly as follows: 
(8) x [Roman (x) & Statesman(x) &  x = Marcus Tullius Cicero] 
(9) x [Roman (x) & Poet(x) & x = Marcus Tullius Cicero] 
But here again, while one might agree that the sentence-pairs (4)-(5) and (6)-(7), 
respectively, are true in all the same circumstances, there is reason to doubt that they 
have the same meanings and/or express the same thoughts (or propositions). 
In this case, common intuition has it that if Max does not believe (3) (that Cicero = 
Tully), he can sincerely assent to (4) and (6) while rationally denying the truth of (5) and 
(7). Furthermore, based solely on Max’s verbal behavior, listeners seem entitled to the 
following belief attributions: 
                                                 
9 Although this interpretation of Frege has been disputed. See, e.g., Sluga (1986: 58, 60). 
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(10) Max believes that Cicero was a Roman statesman 
(11) Max does not believe that Tully was a Roman statesman 
(12) Max believes that Tully was a Roman poet 
(13) Max does not believe that Cicero was a Roman poet 
The puzzle now becomes this: On the surface, (10) and (11) seem to attribute to Max 
belief in both a proposition and its negation, suggesting that he is irrational. However, if 
Max understands the meanings of ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, by (M) and (S) he should be in a 
position to readily infer that (4) and (5) express the same proposition, as do (6) and (7). In 
other words, from his belief that (4) and (6) are true Max should be able infer the truth of 
(5) and (7). Max’s denial of (5) and (7) therefore suggests either that the attributions in 
(11) and (13) are unjustified or, despite robust intuitions to the contrary, that Max is in 
fact irrational. 
Thus, in order to preserve intuitions something seemingly has to give, and there 
appears to be roughly three options: one might argue (i) that despite appearances, Max 
does not understand the meanings of ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, (ii) that our normal practices 
of attributing beliefs in these situations are unjustified, or (iii) that (S)ubstitutivity, and 
hence (M)illianism, are both false. It seems safe to rule out (i) on empirical grounds. For 
if Max uses the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ appropriately, which is to say only in 
reference to the man Marcus Tullius Cicero, one would be hard-pressed to deny that he 
understands their meanings. This leaves just (ii) and (iii) as live options. 
Frege again pins the blame on (iii), and for reasons roughly parallel to the 
informativeness of identity statements. And this is to say that Max’s epistemic condition, 
and hence his verbal behavior, are explained by the fact that ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ differ in 
meaning or express different senses. With respect to attitude reports, however, Frege’s 
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explanation is a bit more sophisticated involving so-called “reference shifting.” Setting 
this complication aside, Frege concludes that substitution of coreferential names in 
propositional attitude reports is not truth-preserving. And so in this case Frege’s 
invocation of sense (arguably) serves as a refutation of (S). And here again, if (S) falls 
then so does (M). There is still option (ii), however, which is explored by Kripke (1979) 
in his widely-discussed “defense” of (M)illianism.10 
6.2.2. Kripke to the rescue 
More accurately, rather than being a direct defense of (M), Kripke’s (1979) A 
Puzzle about Belief attempts to show that Frege’s puzzles militate neither against (M) nor 
in favor of what he calls a “Frege-Russellian” account of proper names, or what I will 
abbreviate as (FR): 
(F)rege-(R)ussell: The meaning of a proper name is not exhausted by its reference. 
Whatever this extra component of meaning turns out to be (e.g., a Fregean sense, or some 
kind of hidden Russellian descriptive content), it is truth-conditionally relevant in opaque 
contexts.11 
Kripke’s strategy is to demonstrate that Frege-style puzzles can be generated without 
appeal to the problematic principle of (S)ubstitutivity. Specifically, Kripke abandons (S) 
in favor of a principle that he calls disquotation and whose truth he takes to be “self-
evident.” In a slightly modified form, what I will call Disquotation (D) can be stated 
thusly: 
                                                 
10 While Kripke does not specifically position his rebuttal as a defense of (M)illianism, many commentators 
agree that that’s what it amounts to. 
11 Recall that on Russell’s view names are disguised definite descriptions. If one takes the sense of a name 
to be a definite description, or collection of descriptive properties, that uniquely identifies or otherwise 
determines its reference, then Russellianism and Fregeanism (with respect to names) effectively (or at least 
operationally) collapse into what I am calling (FR). 
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(D)isquotation: If an agent who is both rational and linguistically competent reflectively 
and sincerely assents to 'p', or positively asserts ‘p’, he or she believes that p. Conversely, 
if a reflective speaker sincerely denies ‘p’, then he/she does not believe that p.12, 13 
Kripke not only takes (D) to be self-evident but suggests that this principle is implicit in 
our ordinary belief-ascribing practices. I emphasize suggests because while not explicit in 
Kripke’s discussion, there seems to be a corollary to (D) that deserves to be made explicit 
in a principle that I will call Attribution (A): 
(A)ttribution: For every sentence ‘p’ endorsed by a speaker per the conditions of 
(D)isquotation above, third-party listeners are entitled to attribute to that speaker the 
belief that p. Conversely, for every sentence ‘p’ explicitly denied by a speaker per the 
conditions of (D), third-party listeners may attribute to that speaker disbelief that p. The 
attributions governed by these constraints may in turn be justifiably reported using the 
same sentences that the subject of the report would endorse (or deny), if asked, or 
“content-preserving” translations of those sentences.14, 15 
Now, Kripke argues that the same sorts of prima facie paradoxes generated by (S) 
can also be generated by (D) in conjunction with what I am calling (A). The consequence 
is this: If such apparent paradoxes falsify (S) then they also falsify (D). However, if one 
agrees with Kripke that (D) is axiomatic then the problem must lie elsewhere. In short, 
                                                 
12 Kripke actually develops stronger and weaker versions of disquotation which I have consolidated here 
for expediency. 
13 Following Kripke, I assume that 'p' can be replaced, inside and outside quotation marks, by any 
grammatical sentence of English (unless otherwise qualified). We may also assume for the sake of 
argument that the sentence replacing `p' is free from indexicals, pronouns, and other inherently ambiguous 
or otherwise context-sensitive expressions. 
14 Kripke invokes another principle that he calls translation, or what I will describe as Translation (T): 
(T)ranslation: If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that language, then any translation 
of it into any other language also expresses a truth (in that other language). 
(T) is specifically employed in Kripke’s so-called “Pierre puzzle.” Given that this puzzle is in my view 
weaker than his “Paderewski puzzle,” I won’t discuss it here. 
15 The way Kripke frames (D) makes it seem as though the principle is known only to the believer, or the 
theorist, or perhaps only from God’s point-of-view. (A) is intended to make clear that listeners are entitled 
to these inferences. And while somewhat of a nit, I assume that one can attribute beliefs to speakers —i.e., 
take something like a pro-attitude towards the speaker’s beliefs—without explicitly reporting these 
attributions, hence the qualification in (A) about reporting. As importantly, if I understand correctly (A) is 
really the principle responsible for generating the puzzles, as will be made clear in a moment. 
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Kripke’s conclusion is that the puzzles in question arise not from failures of (M), (S), or 
(D), per se, but rather from a breakdown in our practices of attributing beliefs to other 
speakers on the basis of what they say. As I interpret him, in other words, our intuitions 
about failures of (S) can be adduced to failures of (A).16 Ultimately, Kripke is skeptical 
about solving the puzzle. The upshot, however, is that his way of generating them 
arguably neutralizes Frege’s reductio of (S), and hence (M). 
Kripke’s rebuttal to (FR) is most forcefully demonstrated by his so-called 
“Paderewski puzzle,” which proceeds with the introduction of Peter who, like Max from 
above, is presumed to be a rational agent and competent speaker. In this case, Peter 
comes to believe that there are two individuals with the same name, viz., ‘Paderewski’; 
one of whom is believed to be an influential politician and the other a talented musician. 
Unbeknownst to Peter, however, there is in fact just one person so-named who is both a 
politician and a musician. In addition, Peter is naturally prone to doubt that politicians 
have musical talent and that musicians have political clout. Given Peter’s epistemic state, 
he sincerely assents to (14) and (15) below in reference to Paderewski “the politician” 
and likewise to (16) and (17) in reference to Paderewski “the musician:” 
(14) Paderewski has political clout 
(15) Paderewski lacks musical talent 
(16) Paderewski has musical talent 
(17) Paderewski lacks political clout 
Correlatively, with earlier intuitions now codified in (D) and (A), duly informed listeners 
appear entitled to the following pair of prima facie contradictory belief attributions: 
                                                 
16 Indeed, Kripke’s article might have been better titled A Puzzle About Belief Attributions. For Kripke says 
very little about what he takes to be the underlying nature of belief itself. 
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(18) Peter believes that Paderewski has political clout 
(19) Peter does not believe that Paderewski has political clout 
(20) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent 
(21) Peter does not believe that Paderewski has musical talent 
The puzzle in this case is over the surprising difficulty in answering the rather 
straightforward question: Does Peter, or does he not, believe that Paderewski has 
musical talent (or political clout)? Kripke’s conclusion is that there is no correct answer 
to this question. For on the assumption that all parties are using the name ‘Paderewski’ in 
the “normal” way, which is again to say with its “usual” reference, either Peter has 
inconsistent beliefs or the attributions of his beliefs are unjustified. And this is to suggest 
that (D) and/or (A) is false. However, intuitions again push hard in the opposite 
direction—that neither consequence follows. For as the situation has been described, both 
Peter and his auditors seem perfectly justified in their verbal behavior. 
Notice further that there appears to be no grounds for invoking (FR)-style 
objections. For under present assumptions (22) appears to have the form ‘a = a’ (or ‘ is 
’) and is therefore uninformative: 
(22) Paderewski is Paderewski 
As such, there is no obvious formal difference between names (or their senses) to block 
what are presumably instances of the trivially valid inference scheme: 
(23) S believes that Fa  S believes that Fa 
Indeed, as Kripke suggests no amount of logical acumen could cause Peter to reverse his 
verbal commitments apart from acceptance of some further premise that would compel 
him to believe that there exists just one individual named ‘Paderewski’. 
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As we shall see below, Fiengo and May (2006) argue convincingly that an utterance 
of (22) in the right circumstances can effect such a change in Peter’s beliefs, which calls 
into question the assumption that (22) necessarily expresses a proposition of the form a = 
a. But for now, Kripke’s point is that without a formal difference between names to point 
to, the question of substitution failure does not arise. For the “Paderewski” puzzle can be 
generated without invoking the problematic principle of (S)ubstitutivity.  
The upshot, argues Kripke, is that there is no point trying to square the content of 
Peter’s beliefs with the semantic content expressed by the embedded complements of 
(18)-(21), nor has it to do with the logical relations between them. Nor will it do to argue 
that proper names have Fregean senses or hidden Russellian descriptive content (see note 
11). For in the present example, any senses or hidden content will be invariant across all 
type-identical name-tokens. Rather, Kripke’s diagnosis is again that such prima facie 
paradoxes owe to failures of what I am calling (A)ttribution, and indirectly to 
(D)isquotation, which is to say instability in our belief ascription/reporting practices. And 
so whatever its solution, if indeed there is one, Kripke takes the “Paderewski” puzzle as 
showing that the apparent contradiction in Peter’s beliefs cannot be blamed on failures of 
(S). And if (S) survives the assault then so does (M), as nowhere in the “Paderewski” 
puzzle is the truth of (M) presupposed. 
Kripke’s closet defense of (M) has not gone unchallenged, however. For instance, 
Sosa (1996) argues that Frege/Kripke-style puzzles can be generated without appeal to 
either (S) or (D)/(A), which presents a unique challenge to (M). By contrast, Saul (1997, 
2007) claims that the same sorts of puzzles can be generated with so-called “simple” 
sentences (i.e., non-opacity-inducing sentences), which calls for an entirely new analysis 
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of the problem. Setting objections aside, whatever are the respective merits of (M) and 
(FR), the relevant point for purposes here is that both views are united in their assumption 
that whatever generates the relevant puzzles, it is not formal (i.e., linguistic or 
metalinguistic) in nature. I have briefly mentioned Frege’s reasoning to this conclusion. 
And Kripke’s “Paderewski” puzzle arguably cements the case. For again there are no 
apparent formal differences between tokens of the name ‘Paderewski’ to support either 
an (FR) or otherwise purely linguistic explanation for how a speaker can at once 
rationally assent to both a sentence and its negation. 
In reply to the contrary, Fiengo & May (2006) argue that such anti-linguistic 
sentiments are grounded in misguided assumptions about the “underlying linguistic 
reality” of proper names. For example, Kripke assumes (and from what I gather most 
other philosophers of language) that the two tokens of ‘Paderewski’ in (22) above are 
actually homophones (i.e., ‘Paderewski1’ and ‘Paderewski2’), which is to say tokens of 
formally distinct name-types. By contrast, while Fiengo & May (F&M henceforth) agree 
that the two tokens utterances of ‘Paderewski’ are tokens of distinct expression-types, 
they deny that the name ‘Paderewski’ is homophonous. Rather, F&M argue instead that 
the two instances of ‘Paderewski’ are tokens of type-distinct expressions of the same 
name. And since natural language grammars do not require coreference between type-
distinct expressions of the same name, a speaker can rationally (albeit mistakenly) 
believe that the two token-expressions of the name ‘Paderewski’ in (22) do not corefer. 
Moreover, to learn otherwise, that is to learn the truth of (22), can be informative for a 
speaker who is ignorant of the fact that there is just one ‘Paderewski’—i.e., just one 
individual who is the bearer of that name. 
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I will elaborate on this claim in greater detail over the next several sections, which 
requires substantial effort given the subtleties of F&M’s proposal. But the basic moral, 
according to F&M, is that one cannot rule out a linguistic (or metalinguistic) solution to 
these puzzles in advance of an empirically motivated theory of how natural language 
grammars (i.e., I-languages) individuate the expressions that they generate. For only then 
can we properly understand the ways in which our beliefs about their identity conditions 
constrain our beliefs about whether two tokens of a given expression refer to the same 
individual (or not). Once properly understood, argue F&M, a linguistic solution not only 
seems plausible but vindicates Frege’s earlier Begriffsschrift intuitions about “what’s 
going on” in the puzzles under discussion. 
6.3. De lingua beliefs to the rescue 
To recapitulate some of what’s been said to this point, it practically goes without 
saying that competent speakers assert declarative sentences to express beliefs, including 
beliefs about what other speakers believe. And while occasionally mistaken, it seems 
equally obvious that if their utterances are to be sincere, speakers must believe what they 
say. Take Max, who again by stipulation is a rational agent and competent speaker of 
English. When Max sincerely utters (4), repeated below, he thereby commits himself to 
the so-called “de re” belief that Cicero was a Roman statesman.17 
(4) Cicero was a Roman statesman 
For if Max did not believe what is expressed by (4) we surely would not judge his 
utterance sincere, even if Max happens to be mistaken about the true identity of Cicero. 
By (D)isquotation from above, Max’s endorsement of (4) also entitles listeners to tacitly 
                                                 
17 For reasons that I don’t quite follow, F&M prefer the term “non-de dicto” to “de re,” yet they seem to be 
effectively the same notions. 
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attribute to him belief in the proposition that it expresses. Furthermore, the principle of 
(A)ttribution entitles listeners to explicitly report Max’s belief with a sentence such as 
(10) from above: 
(10) Max believes that Cicero was a Roman statesman 
Now, according to F&M, in addition to ordinary de re beliefs about individuals and their 
properties, competent speakers also have beliefs about certain properties of the 
expressions they utter in reference to those things, again to which speakers commit 
themselves in saying what they do. In the reverse direction, we form beliefs about the 
linguistic beliefs of others on the basis of what they say. Collectively, these are what 
F&M call de lingua beliefs—i.e., beliefs about language—to which they add “reflect 
fundamental aspects of our underlying linguistic competence, as well as how we employ 
that competence to further our communicative ends.” 
Among others, de lingua beliefs include what F&M refer to as “de dicto” beliefs of 
Assignments, where the notion of an Assignment is defined as follows: 
Assignment: An Assignment is a relation between a linguistic expression and its 
semantic value. 
Accordingly, F&M characterize beliefs of Assignments thusly: 
Beliefs of Assignments: Beliefs of Assignment are beliefs about the semantic values of 
linguistic expressions. 
With respect to lexical expressions, beliefs of Assignments amount to beliefs about the 
denotations of Words as they are used in discourse. For example, by asserting (4) above 
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Max not only commits himself to the de re belief that Cicero was a Roman statesman, he 
implicitly commits himself to belief in the de dicto Assignment expressed by (24):18 
(24) ‘Cicero’ refers to Cicero 
Indeed, that Max believes the proposition expressed by (24) is according to F&M 
constitutive of his rational use of (4), again whoever he takes the referent of ‘Cicero’ to 
be. Following F&M, I limit discussion here to proper names with the understanding that 
the same general principles apply to other lexical categories. 
In order to properly understand the role of beliefs of Assignments and related de 
lingua beliefs, F&M’s definition of an Assignment requires some unpacking, and 
specifically with respect to proper names. To this end, it will be helpful to first review in 
greater detail F&M’s account of the grammatical role of proper names and the formal 
individuation of lexical expressions in which they occur. As we shall see, speaker-beliefs 
about the individuation conditions of lexical expressions influence beliefs about the 
individuation of Assignments in which those expressions appear. And according to F&M, 
the Assignments that speaker’s believe are influenced by how those Assignments, and the 
LEs they contain, are in fact individuated by the speaker’s internal grammar, which is to 
say by his/her I-language. 
6.3.1. Names and their expressions relative to a discourse 
As mentioned back in Chapter 2, F&M endorse a view according which names are 
unrepeated (non-homophonous) items listed in a speaker’s lexicon and that serve as 
terminal nodes in syntactic trees. Following Chomsky, F&M take names, like all lexical 
                                                 
18 F&M suggest that Max need not know any particular descriptive facts about Cicero to have the name 
‘Cicero’ in his idiolect, and to use it with its conventional reference, so long as Max believes that (24) is 
true—that is, he must only believe (de re) of some individual (or other) that he goes by the name ‘Cicero’. 
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items, to be individuated by certain formal properties that determine, among other things, 
“where a lexical item can occur in syntactic structures.” Among properties that names 
lack, however, are referential properties. That is, while F&M agree that names have 
bearers, names themselves do not refer. Rather, it is only as employed in a discourse that 
names are used to refer unambiguously to particular objects/individuals. F&M put the 
claim as follows: 
To avoid confusion, we must distinguish names, which have bearers, from the 
occurrences of expressions containing names in discourse, which have referents. If we 
do, we may say that it is not really names that have reference, but linguistic expressions 
that occur in sentences used in discourse, which, of course, may contain names. 
In structural terms, names are again taken to be terminal nodes that “occur in” or are 
“contained by” non-terminal expressions of those names. Employing standard notation, 
F&M use square brackets to indicate structural (i.e., syntactic) containment. For instance, 
the bare NPs ‘[NP Cicero]’ and ‘[NP Tully]’ are non-terminal lexical expressions (LEs) that 
contain the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, respectively, which is to say that ‘Cicero’ and 
‘Tully’ are proper constituents of the expressions ‘[NP Cicero]’ and ‘[NP Tully]’. 
As argued in Chapter 2, F&M agree that names combine, syntactically, with 
referential indices to generate indexed LEs of the form ‘[NP ]i’, where ‘’ is a proper 
name and ‘i’ is a referential index for integer values > 0. Or in my more perspicuous yet 
somewhat more cumbersome notation, these NPs take the form ‘[[NP [PN ]][xi]]’. But for 
exegetical purposes I will stick with F&M’s notation according to which ‘[NP Cicero]i’, 
for example, is an indexed LE that contains the name ‘Cicero’ and which in appropriate 
contexts can be used to refer to Cicero. 
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F&M also appear to adopt a Tarskian-style semantics for LEs that is similar though 
not identical to that detailed in my Appendix to Chapter 2. As formally they claim that an 
Assignment is a function g that maps linguistic expressions onto their semantic values.  
The central difference between F&M’s proposal and mine is that on my view names 
themselves have satisfaction conditions of the form x: x satisfies ‘’ iff x is called ‘’. 
In turn, I would specify the contextually-determined semantic value of the indexed LE 
‘[NP ]i’ as follows, 
(25a) g(i) = (i), i > 0 
(25b) g([NP ]i) = x: x satisfies ‘’ iff x = (i) & (i) is called by the name ‘’ 
where g is an interpretation function that assigns values to the index ‘i’ relative to a 
Tarskian sequence, . Thus, according to (25b) the LE ‘[NP ]i’ is satisfied by a sequence 
 just in case (i) is the i-th object in  and is called by the name ‘’. In this way, when 
the name ‘’ is interpreted as occurring in an indexed LE of the form ‘[NP ]i’ it will be 
understood as referring uniquely and rigidly to a particular individual. 
By contrast, according to F&M’ names not only lack referential properties but as I 
understand names also lack meanings/satisfaction conditions. Rather, names for F&M are 
semantically empty lexical formatives that when combined with referential indices play 
the role of syntactically complex variables which do have satisfaction conditions. F&M 
do not spell out the details in precisely this way, but I believe (26) below is an accurate 
rendition of how they would specify the satisfaction conditions of what they take to be 
the complex variable ‘[NP ]i’: 
(26) g([NP ]i) = x: x satisfies ‘’ iff x = (i) 
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Notice again that unlike my proposal the name ‘’ makes no independent contribution to 
the satisfaction conditions of (28). So as not to misrepresent their view, however, I will 
for purposes of this chapter just accept F&M’s assumptions along with their preferred 
notation. 
In short, when F&M talk about Assignments as relations between linguistic 
expressions and their semantic values, I assume what they mean is something along the 
lines of (26). More specifically, F&M appear to think of Assignments as functions-in-
intension (i.e., mental procedures) that generate specifications of satisfaction conditions 
on Tarskian sequences, as opposed to say sets of sequences (or possible worlds) that 
satisfy expressions. In other words, I take it that F&M embrace an I-language perspective 
on meaning (as opposed to an E-language perspective as this distinction was discussed in 
Chapter 2). However, as evidenced by the quotation above F&M also describe LEs as 
having referents, which requires a Church-style extension to Tarski’s system.19 Thus, I 
think what F&M have in mind, which matches my own intuitions, is that referring is a 
kind of speech act. But whatever is F&M’s view on the matter, I will for convenience 
speak as though LEs have reference conditions with the understanding that on my view 
the meanings of LEs are specifiable only in terms of their satisfaction conditions. These 
differences notwithstanding, I agree with F&M that there are sound theoretical reasons 
for distinguishing names, syntactically, from the LEs that contain them. 
6.3.2. Individuating Assignments 
Consider a name such as ‘Aristotle’, which can be used, inter alia, in reference to 
either a particular ancient Greek philosopher (i.e., Aristotle of Stagira) or to a 
                                                 
19 See Pietroski (forthcoming) for discussion on this point. 
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contemporary Greek shipping tycoon (i.e., Aristotle Onassis). Under present assumptions, 
these two uses of ‘Aristotle’ will occur as constituents, respectively, in the non-coindexed 
LEs ‘[NP Aristotle]i’ and ‘[NP Aristotle]k’. Notice further that given standard assumptions 
about the relationship between coindexation and referential codependency, the grammar 
allows but does not require coreference between tokens of non-coindexed LEs, which is 
to say that these tokens can be satisfied by different Tarskian sequences. And this is to 
suggest that two tokens of the same name, e.g., ‘Aristotle’, can occur in formally distinct 
Assignments in F&M’s sense. For if Assignments are relations between linguistic 
expressions and their semantic values, and Assignments are individuated by their relata, 
then any difference in either expression-type or semantic value constitutes a different 
Assignment. And since tokens of the LEs ‘[NP Aristotle]i’ and ‘[NP Aristotle]k’ have 
different semantic values, it follows that they have different Assignments. 
Generally speaking, the referential indices that attach to LEs determine the formal 
(i.e., syntactic) identity (or difference) of their tokens. Specifically, tokens of coindexed 
LEs are type-identical, whereas tokens of non-coindexed LEs are type-distinct.20 
Importantly, these syntactic distinctions have semantic implications. For like the 
referential relationship between anaphors and their coindexed antecedents, tokens of 
coindexed LEs are referentially codependent; i.e., they necessarily corefer as dictated by 
the rules of grammar. On the other hand, like certain unbound (deictic) pronouns, tokens 
of non-coindexed LEs are free to corefer, or not, as determined in part by the speaker’s 
referential intentions. 
For example, consider again the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’. While these names are 
customarily used in reference to the same person, nothing in the grammar requires their 
                                                 
20 F&M (2006: 17). 
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coreference. Of course nothing in the grammar prohibits their coreference either. As 
such, ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ will normally occur as constituents in non-coindexed, type-
distinct LEs of the form ‘[NP Cicero]i’ and ‘[NP Tully]k’, where their coreference (or non-
coreference) in a given context is governed by the speaker’s referential intentions 
together with local naming conventions. Yet according to F&M, the names ‘Cicero’ and 
‘Tully’ could in principle appear in coindexed expressions, as in ‘[NP Cicero]i’ and ‘[NP 
Tully]i’, and in which case their tokens would necessarily corefer. But this also implies 
that despite surface appearances ‘[NP Cicero]i’ and ‘[NP Tully]i’ are in fact tokens of type-
identical LEs. Likewise, nothing precludes LEs that contain tokens of the same name-
type from being non-coindexed, such as ‘[NP Aristotle]i’ and ‘[NP Aristotle]k’. That is, 
while on the surface ‘[NP Aristotle]i’ and ‘[NP Aristotle]k’ appear to be tokens of the same 
expression-type, they are treated by the grammar as type-distinct because of their non-
coindexation. And since ‘[NP Aristotle]i’ and ‘[NP Aristotle]k’ are non-coindexed LEs they 
are free to corefer, or not, as again determined by speaker-intentions and local naming 
conventions. However, from the perspective of successful communication it would be 
otiose for a speaker to use two type-distinct LEs that contain tokens of the same name-
type in reference to the same individual in the same discourse (more on this below).  
The relevant claim, in short, is the fact that coindexed LEs contain what might on 
the surface appear to be tokens of type-distinct names has no bearing on the formal 
identity/individuation conditions of the LEs in which those names occur. Rather, on 
F&M’s account expression identity (or difference) is determined solely on the basis of 
whether the LEs in question are coindexed or non-coindexed. While the claim that tokens 
of coindexed LEs are necessarily type-identical has certain unexpected (and perhaps 
 253 
 
unwelcome) consequences, it is not entirely baseless. For instance, in light of the 
discussion in Chapter 2 on phonological variation (§2.4.1.1 in particular), it seems quite 
possible, as F&M suggest, that some speakers might treat phonologically distinct name-
pairs such as ‘New York’ and ‘Noo Yawk’, or ‘London’ and ‘Londres’, as dialectical 
variants of the same name-types. In turn, such speakers will both use and interpret LEs 
that contain these names as being coindexed and thus type-identical, as in [NP New 
York]i/[NP Noo Yawk]i, [NP London]i / [NP Londres]i, and so forth.  
Now, syntactic indices are not standardly used to track expression identity but 
rather referential codependency between, say, anaphors and their antecedents. F&M 
argue, however, that by interpreting referential indices as reflecting identity (or 
difference) of expression-type, the relevant semantic facts about anaphora fall out 
naturally. Yet theoretical elegance here comes with a cost. As using a single index to 
capture both sets of facts depends on some rather unorthodox commitments, including 
F&M’s claim that nominal expressions have multiple pronominal forms. For example, 
the suggestion is that in a sentence such as, 
(27) Oscar loves Sally because he is a good son 
the LEs ‘[NP Oscar]1’ and ‘[NP he]1’ are in fact tokens of type-identical LEs despite their 
radically different spellings/pronunciations.21 Yet this is a bullet that F&M are reportedly 
willing to bite. For if ordinary speakers are willing to tolerate other “shape 
transformations” such as between ‘London’ and ‘Londres’, or say between two tokens of 
the numeral ‘2’ in the expression ‘2 + 2 = 4’, then on what basis should we deny that that 
‘[NP Oscar]i’ and ‘[NP he]i’ in (27) are tokens of type-identical LEs? 
                                                 
21 By way of comparison, David Kaplan (1990, fn.3) observes that “Linguists seem to think that "John 
admires John" and "John admires Jane" have the same syntactical form and differ only in what they call 
"lexicalization" (though they claim that "John admires himself" differs from both syntactically).” 
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As we shall see below, this distinction is important to F&M’s rebuttal to Kripke’s A 
Puzzle About Belief and thus worth dwelling on a moment longer. Specifically, F&M 
describe their view as follows: 
We have also tolerated another sort of transformation, allowing that a given expression-
type may have both pronominal and nonpronominal tokens; “[NP Oscar]1” has its 
pronominal counterpart “[NP he]1,” so that “Oscar loves Sally because he is a good son” 
is of the same order as “Oscar loves Sally because Oscar is a good son.” 
To which they add: 
[…] which form an expression takes will very much matter when figuring how tokens of 
an expression can be distributed in a syntactic structure. This is the import of Binding 
Theory, which can be couched as a set of constraints on the possible arrays of indices, 
and thus the possible arrays of expression-types, that can be manifest in phrase-markers. 
The question then becomes this: If, for example, ‘[NP Oscar]1’, ‘[NP he]1’, ‘[NP himself]1’, 
and ‘[NP his]1’ are all phonological variants of the same expression-type, then why aren’t 
they freely interchangeable in (28) and (29)? 
(28) Oscar loves Sally because he is a good son 
(29) #He loves Sally because Oscar is a good son 
While F&M do not address this question, the idea seems to be that binding principles are 
nonetheless sensitive to otherwise tolerable “shape” differences between tokens of type-
identical LEs as spelled out by the phonological system. In one of their clearest 
statements on the matter, F&M contend that: 
Technically speaking, there is no theory of anaphora per se; rather there is a theory that 
deals in sameness or difference of expressions, and their attendant interpretations. 
“Anaphora” is a term of art… Now, in our view, by virtue of the coindexing in (1), 
 (1)  Oscar1 kissed his1 mother. 
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it is part of that sentence’s linguistic meaning that the name-expression and the pronoun 
corefer, and this will be so for any utterance of that sentence. Speakers who use a 
sentence with coindexing as in (1) are committed to coreference simply by virtue of the 
form of the sentence. By using a sentence with coindexing, speakers cannot mean to 
express anything but that the coindexed expressions corefer. This is not at the discretion 
of the speakers. Speakers who use a sentence such as (1), therefore, would intend by their 
utterance to make a statement in which the name and the pronoun corefer. There is no 
other option; coreference is forced by grammar.  
By way of summary, they add: 
Our view is the following: coreference may be grammatically determined, but not 
noncoreference, and this reflects the underlying structure of syntactic expressions. It is 
this structure that is represented by our notation, coindexing indicating that there are 
tokens of the same expression, noncoindexing, of different expressions. So, we 
distinguish (1):  
 (1) Oscar1 kissed his1 mother.  
from (2):  
 (2) He1 kissed Oscar2’s mother.  
where the use of numerals provides a clear formal means of distinguishing occurrences of 
the same index from those of others, and hence tokens of the same expressions, as 
opposed to tokens of different ones. From this alone we can conclude that “[Oscar]” and 
the pronoun in (1) have the same reference. (Note that there is no particular conceptual 
problem with grammar determining coreference through identity; this is presumably the 
effect of the morpheme “self” in reflexive constructions, as in “Oscar saw himself.”) No 
such conclusion as this follows for (2), however. Noncoindexing does not mean 
noncoreference; in fact it means nothing as far as reference is concerned. It only means 
that there are tokens of distinct syntactic types, just as coindexing means just that there 
are tokens of the same type. 
Moreover, F&M assert that “we obtain a better theory of anaphora if we assume that 
syntactic tokens have types along the lines we have indicated.” I won’t quarrel over this 
claim, for it is presented as an empirical hypothesis. 
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6.3.3. Beliefs of Assignments 
The upshot of the discussion thus far is that Assignments are individuated not only 
by their semantic values but also by the syntactic identity (or difference) of the 
expressions they contain. Moreover, the individuation of Assignments influences what 
F&M again call de dicto beliefs of Assignments, which to repeat are characterized as 
follows:  
Beliefs of Assignments: Beliefs of Assignment are beliefs about the semantic values of 
linguistic expressions. 
With respect to LEs that contain proper names, beliefs of Assignments amount to beliefs 
about their contextually-specified denotations. By way of example, recall Max who by 
assumption believes that Cicero was a Roman statesman and would thereby readily assent 
to (4): 
(4) Cicero was a Roman statesman 
To reiterate an earlier claim, by asserting (4) Max not only commits himself to the de re 
belief that Cicero was a Roman statesman, he implicitly commits himself to belief in the 
de dicto Assignment expressed by (24) from earlier: 
(24) ‘Cicero’ refers to Cicero 
That Max believes the proposition expressed by (24) is again according to F&M 
constitutive of his rational use of (4), even if he happens to be mistaken about the true 
identity of Cicero. 
Beliefs of Assignment are in turn governed by a close relative to (D)isquotation 
from above that F&M call the Assignment Principle (AP): 
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(A)ssignment (P)rinciple: To be sincere, if a speaker uses a sentence containing an 
occurrence of the expression ‘[NP ]i’, the speaker believes an ‘[NP ]i’-Assignment.22, 23 
As before, ‘[NP ]i’ is an indexed NP (i.e., nominal LE) that contains the proper name ‘’. 
And like both (D)isquotation and (A)ttribution from above, that competent speakers are 
at least tacitly aware of (AP), and generally adhere to it, is according to F&M an aspect 
of their basic linguistic competence. More specifically, F&M claim that (AP) follows 
from two things: “the desire on the part of the speakers to speak truthfully, and the fact 
that it is a condition on the truth of sentences that the expressions have the appropriate 
values.” 
Now, not only do competent speakers have beliefs of Assignments, they have 
beliefs about the Assignments that other speakers believe, again as justified by what those 
speakers say. With respect to proper names, F&M state that “not only do we know what 
names we give to people; we know what names other people give to people.” And this is 
to say that competent speakers have what I will call beliefs of Attributed Assignments:24 
Beliefs of Attributed Assignments are beliefs about the Assignments that other speakers 
believe and which can be justifiably attributed to them as governed by (AP), which is to 
say as evidenced by their verbal behavior. 
When speakers verbally express their beliefs of Attributed Assignments they are in effect 
reporting their beliefs about another speaker’s beliefs of Assignment, again as justified by 
(AP). In the present example, the report will take the form of a sentence like (30): 
(30) Max believes that ‘Cicero’ refers to Cicero 
                                                 
22 They add that (AP) follows from two things: “the desire on the part of the speakers to speak truthfully, 
and the fact that it is a condition on the truth of sentences that the expressions have the appropriate values.” 
23 Notice that I am altering F&M’s notation slightly to remain consistent with my own, yet without loss of 
detail or accuracy. 
24 F&M do not formulate what I am calling Beliefs of Attributed Assignments in so many words, but this 
seems to be essentially what they have in mind.  
 258 
 
Notice, however, that (AP) does not license the Attribution expressed by (31) below, or at 
least not as based solely on Max’s explicit endorsement of a sentence such as (4): 
(31) Max believes that ‘Tully’ refers to Tully 
Why not? In short, this is because ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are tokens of formally distinct (or 
what F&M called “non-cospelled”) name-types, which suggests that the LEs in which 
these names occur are tokens of formally distinct expression-types. Max therefore 
believes formally distinct Assignments that happen to have the same semantic values. 
Max’s utterance of (4), however, commits him only to belief in the ‘Cicero’-Assignment 
in (24).  
The Attribution of Max’s ‘Tully’-Assignment expressed by (32) below is however 
justified by his endorsement of (6): 
(6) Tully was a Roman poet 
(32) ‘Tully’ refers to Tully 
For if Max believes (6) then by (AP) he is thereby committed to the belief of Assignment 
expressed by (32) just as it is attributed to him in (31). The upshot, according to F&M, is 
that “Assignments are distinguishable strictly on linguistic grounds.” (ibid: 16). That is, 
while the Assignments attributed to Max in (30) and (31) have the same semantic values 
(i.e., referential content) they are nevertheless formally (i.e., syntactically) distinct 
Assignments because they contain tokens of formally distinct name-types. 
The formal individuation of Assignments, and correlatively their Attributions, is not 
always clear cut, however. For suppose that Max’s cousin Minnie sincerely asserts both 
(33) and (34). 
(33) Aristotle was an ancient Greek philosopher 
(34) Aristotle was a twentieth century Greek shipping tycoon 
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where it is clear from the context that Minnie is using the name ‘Aristotle’ in (33) and 
(34), respectively, in reference to two different individuals. In other words, Minnie 
believes two referentially distinct Assignments each involving the name ‘Aristotle’ yet 
which have different semantic values (cp., Pierre’s beliefs about the two ‘Paderewski’s 
from above; more on this below). Under present assumptions Minnie’s interlocutor, call 
him Sam, is entitled to the Attribution reported with (35): 
(35) Minnie believes that ‘Aristotle’ refers to Aristotle 
The question is of course which of Minnie’s Assignments is being ascribed/reported with 
Sam’s utterance of (35)—i.e., is it the Assignment whose semantic value is the 
philosopher or the one whose value is the tycoon? The answer here seemingly depends on 
who Sam is using the name ‘Aristotle’ to refer to. This in turn suggests that either the 
name ‘Aristotle’ is referentially ambiguous (i.e., homophonous) or that its respective 
tokens out of Sam’s mouth are not tokens of the same expression-type. 
As indicated earlier, since on F&M’s view names do not have referents, the name 
‘Aristotle’ cannot be referentially ambiguous. Rather they claim that contrary to 
appearances, in her respective utterances of (33) and (34) Minnie is in fact using formally 
distinct expressions of the same name—i.e., LEs that have different semantic values yet 
which happened to be “cospelled” (have the same phonological form) And this is again to 
suggest that the underlying syntactic forms of LEs are more fine-grained than their 
surface forms suggest. What’s more, competent speakers have beliefs about how LEs are 
formally (i.e., syntactically) individuated, or what F&M call beliefs of Identity: 




As suggested earlier, beliefs about the individuation conditions of LEs constrain beliefs 
about whether or not their tokens are covalued (or in the case of names whether or not 
they “corefer”). Specifically, speakers tacitly know that tokens of type-identical LEs must 
be covalued as enforced by the grammar. Thus, speakers who believe of two LEs that 
they are coindexed will also naturally believe that they are covalued. On the other hand, 
speakers who believe of two LEs that they are non-coindexed will believe that they may 
or may not be covalued, again as determined by the speaker’s referential intentions in 
conjunction with customary naming conventions. 
In short, by assumption Minnie believes that ‘Aristotle’ has two distinct bearers; 
one a philosopher and the other a shipping tycoon. And this is to say that Minnie believes 
two non-coindexed, non-coreferential (or non-covalued) Assignments each containing an 
LE that itself contains the name ‘Aristotle’. If expressions are individuated in part by 
their semantic values (i.e., referents), and the two ‘Aristotle’-expressions in Minnie’s 
Assignments do not corefer, then Minnie’s ‘Aristotle’-expressions cannot be tokens of 
the same expression-type, which is precisely what F&M contend: 
While there is only one name “Aristotle”—one phonetic type “Aristotle,” one “spelling” 
or “shape” “A^ r^ i^ s^ t^ o^ t^ l^ e”—there are many distinct syntactic expression-types 
that contain the name “Aristotle.” 
Likewise, if Minnie believes two different ‘Aristotle’-Assignments, she will thereby 
believe that those Assignments contain type-distinct ‘Aristotle’-expressions (LEs) that 
refer to numerically distinct individuals. In general, F&M claim that: 
… a speaker will believe that there are as many expression-types containing a given name 
as she believes there are people bearing that name… In a given discourse, a speaker’s use 
of expressions of a name will directly reflect the speaker’s beliefs about how many values 
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that name has; in referring to each, a speaker will use different expressions, for only this 
will comport with his beliefs (otherwise his expressions would corefer). 
The question of whether or not type-distinct expressions corefer is again a matter of 
linguistic convention, not grammar. That is, beliefs about the coreference of type-distinct 
expressions depend on beliefs about what other speakers use these expressions to refer to. 
And this is intuitively at least part of the story for why true identity statements of the 
form ‘ is ’ can be informative for competent speakers who are otherwise ignorant of 
the relevant naming convention. For given that the expressions ‘[]i’ and ‘[]k’ are tokens 
of formally distinct expression-types, a speaker might mistakenly (though quite naturally) 
believe that they do not corefer. Indeed, while F&M do not say this, recall from Chapter 
4 that in the absence of evidence to the contrary the Mutual Exclusivity bias naturally 
predisposes speakers to assume that type-distinct expressions are not covalued. And so to 
learn otherwise would seemingly constitute a substantive advance in the speaker’s 
knowledge about (i) the referential properties of certain linguistic expressions, and 
thereby (ii) the identity and number of individuals referred to by these expressions. In 
other words, the question of informativeness seems to turn, in some way or other, on the 
fact that ‘[]i’ and ‘[]k’ are tokens of formally distinct (i.e., non-coindexed) expression-
types. 
I will return to the topic of informativeness below and again in Chapter 7. But back 
to our previous example, the fact that Minnie uses the name ‘Aristotle’ in reference to 
two individuals implies that she believes two formally distinct ‘Aristotle’-Assignments 
that contain two non-coindexed ‘Aristotle’-expressions as their respective constituents. 
For instance, let us just stipulate, as do F&M, that the LE ‘[Aristotle]1’ refers to the 
philosopher and that ‘[Aristotle]2’ refers to the shipping tycoon (to avoid clutter, the 
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category label ‘NP’ shall hereafter be left implicit).25 Thus, the (partial) logical forms of 
their respective Assignments in Minnie’s idiolect are specifiable as follows: 
(35) ‘[Aristotle]1’ refers to [Aristotle]1 (= the philosopher) 
(36) ‘[Aristotle]2’ refers to [Aristotle]2 (= the shipping tycoon) 
Notice that the second occurrence of ‘[Aristotle]’ in both (35) and (36) is being used 
rather than mentioned. In other words, like traditional meaning axioms the second 
occurrence represents the semantic contribution of its first occurrence to the proposition 
expressed by these Assignments. 
So qualified, we can specify more precisely which of Minnie’s ‘Aristotle’-
Assignments are being reported with Sam’s utterance of (34): 
(34) Minnie believes that ‘Aristotle’ refers to Aristotle 
For under the assumption that Sam’s grammar can generate both ‘Aristotle’-expressions, 
he can use (34) to report either Assignment in (35) or (36), depending on the logical form 
of his utterance, which by hypothesis will be one of the following:26 
(37') Minnie believes that ‘[Aristotle]1’ refers to [Aristotle]1 
(37'') Minnie believes that ‘[Aristotle]2’ refers to [Aristotle]2 
Precisely which of these forms his utterance takes presumably depends on what it is that 
Sam intends to express. And while there are open questions as to how speaker-intentions 
determine the logical forms of utterances, that they do is generally taken for granted. 
                                                 
25 For their part, F&M use double quotes around names as they appear in expressions, as well as different 
position for indices; for example [1 “Aristotle”]. However, I will continue to use single quotes to maintain 
consistency with notation employed in earlier chapters. Indeed, the notation employed by F&M is itself 
inconsistent, apparently due to the fact that DLB is a collection of independently written essays. 
26 F&M say very little about how a speaker chooses between logical forms, and how listeners recover these 
forms in a given context of utterance. Yet we seem to manage such tasks with other ambiguous expressions 
on a daily basis. And so for purposes here I am willing to indulge the assumption that there is a mechanism 
that explains how we sort such things out. 
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Let me mention in passing that while it may again strike one as obvious that 
‘[Cicero]’ and ‘[Tully]’ are type-distinct LEs in virtue of containing tokens of non-
cospelled name-types, theoretical consistency dictates that they too carry syntactic 
indices. So for completeness let us represent the logical forms of their Assignments as 
follows: 
(24') ‘[Cicero]1’ refers to [Cicero]1 (= Marcus Tullius Cicero) 
(32') ‘[Tully]2’ refers to [Tully]2 (= Marcus Tullius Cicero) 
Here again the index-values that we as theorists assign to these expressions is arbitrary. 
What matters for purposes of interpretation in this case is that they differ. Also keep in 
mind that non-coindexation neither entails nor precludes non-coreference—it allows for 
either, with one exception to be discussed presently. Yet one assumes that there is a fact 
of the matter, and that in the present case I am assuming that the expressions ‘[Cicero]1’ 
and ‘[Tully]2’ do in fact corefer. 
6.3.4. Coindexation, coreference, and Singularity 
This last caveat is actually quite important, for while non-cospelled (i.e., formally 
distinct) names are indicative of a difference in expression-type, on F&M’s view, as 
mentioned earlier, a difference in name-type does not guarantee a difference in 
expression-type. For consider again the following coindexed expression pairs:  ‘[New 
York]1’/‘[Noo Yawk]1’ and ‘[London]1’/ ‘[Londres]1’, which are plausibly phonological 
variants of the same expression. But even if speakers do not treat non-cospelled 
expression-tokens as type-identical, they may nevertheless believe that they are what 
F&M call Translations of each other. Correlatively, such speakers have what F&M refer 
to as beliefs of Translation: 
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Beliefs of Translation are beliefs that non-coindexed (type-distinct), non-cospelled 
expressions corefer. 
For example, I take it that most philosophers and historians believe that the type-distinct 
expressions ‘[Cicero]1’ and ‘[Tully]2’ are Translations of each other, but that, say, 
‘[Cicero]1’ and ‘[Cataline]2’ are not. Beliefs of Translation actually play a pivotal role in 
F&M’s solution to Frege’s puzzle of informativeness, which I will get to momentarily. 
By contrast, in the case of type-distinct yet cospelled expressions such as 
‘[Aristotle]1’ and ‘[Aristotle]2’, no speaker, as F&M (ibid: 147) put it, would ever assume 
that “one person can have one particular name more than once,” which rules out 
coreference of the LEs ‘[Aristotle]1’ and ‘[Aristotle]2’ in typical circumstances. That is, 
this situation is the exception to the general rule that type-distinct expressions optionally 
corefer. The exception here is governed by a principle that F&M call Singularity, which I 
abbreviate as (SI) to avoid confusion with the principle of (S)ubstitutivity from above: 
(SI)ngularity: Speakers believe that cospelled expressions corefer if coindexed, and if non-
coindexed that they do not corefer. 
Unfortunately, F&M are unclear as to whether (SI) is governed by the grammar or 
whether it is extralinguistic/pragmatic in nature (I take the latter to be the intended view). 
Whatever is the case, as we shall see momentarily (SI) is central to F&M’s solution to 
“Padereswki”-style puzzles. For (SI) is the principle that serves to bridge the epistemic 
gap between (i) a speaker’s de re beliefs about how many individuals are the bearers of a 
given name, and (ii) his or her de dicto beliefs about whether or not two names corefer. 
Before proceeding to the puzzles, let me take a moment to rehearse one last assumption 
that is equally central to F&M’s account, and arguably the most controversial. 
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6.3.5. Expressing beliefs of Assignments 
Recall that beliefs of Assignments can be verbally attributed (and reported) as 
licensed by the Assignment Principle (AP), repeated here for convenience: 
(A)ssignment (P)rinciple: To be sincere, if a speaker uses a sentence containing an 
occurrence of the expression ‘[NP ]i’, the speaker believes an ‘[NP ]i’ Assignment. 
For instance, Max’s belief of Assignment expressed by (1'), repeated below, can be 
reported with (29) whose (partial) logical form is given in (29'): 
(24') ‘[Cicero]1’ refers to [Cicero]1 
(30) Max believes that ‘Cicero’ refers to Cicero 
(30') Max believes that ‘[Cicero]1’ refers to [Cicero]1 
Now, vital to the account developed in DLB is that not only can listeners overtly report 
Max’s belief of Assignment with (30'), the Assignment that it attributes to him can in the 
right circumstances be optionally expressed as a covert part of the proposition expressed 
by an utterance of (10): 
(10) Max believes that Cicero was a Roman statesman 
Specifically, the hypothesis is that the logical form of (10), as uttered in discourse, is 
systematically ambiguous as between (10') and (10''): 
(10') Max believes that [[Cicero]1 was a Roman statesman] 
(10'') Max believes that [[Cicero]1 was a Roman statesman] & [‘[Cicero]1’ refers 
to [Cicero]1]] 
That is, (10) can be used to ascribe to Max either an ordinary de re belief about Cicero as 
analyzed in (10') or this same belief optionally conjoined with a de dicto belief of 
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Assignment as in (10'').27 Thus, F&M suggest that sentences such as (10) have both de 
dicto and what they call “non-de dicto” logical forms. Specifically, (10') is the non-de 
dicto logical form of (10), and (10'') is its de dicto logical form. In general, F&M claim 
that the non-de dicto logical form of a sentence expresses its objectual content, whereas 
its de dicto logical form conveys in addition its informational or linguistic content. As we 
shall see below, de dicto logical forms are on F&M’s view what explain the 
informativeness of identity statements containing type-distinct coreferential names of the 
form ‘[a]i = [b]j’ (or in natural language, ‘[]i is []j’). 
Importantly, F&M say of de dicto logical forms such as (10'') that “one belief is 
attributed, that one belief being expressed as the conjunction of two sentences.”28 The 
“one belief” remark is crucial because it implies that the believer (in this case Max) has 
integrated (i.e., brought together in his mind) both conjuncts of the belief attributed to 
him in (10'') under a single thought. And this is to suggest that the attribution in (10'') 
above is not that expressed by (10''') below: 
(10''') Max believes that [[Cicero]1 was a Roman statesman] & Max believes that 
[‘[Cicero]1’ refers to [Cicero]1] 
For according to F&M (10''') can be true if Max believes its two conjuncts independently, 
“having never considered the two beliefs together,” a possibility that is reportedly 
excluded by (10''). Whatever one makes of this last claim, the upshot is that: 
… when certain conditions are met, the content of beliefs about the reference of 
expressions can be taken to be part of what we say by our utterances, part of the 
propositional content; to put it a little differently, they can be part of the interpretation of 
                                                 
27 F&M (2006: 64) state that “It is natural to call attributions containing Assignments de dicto; their logical 
forms explicitly contain the expressions with respect to which the beliefs are held. More specifically, (10'') 
is what F&M regard a “disquotational” de dicto logical form for reasons I take to be apparent. 
28 My emphasis. F&M suggest (ibid), in addition, that for the attribution to be correct, it must be the case 
that the agent would agree that it is Cicero is being referred to by the ‘Cicero’-expression. 
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our utterances, by ourselves and by others. By “part of” here we mean formal part—that 
is, as constituents of the logical form that expresses this interpretation, that represents 
what we say. 
If correct, however, one still wants to know why a speaker might attribute a belief 
of Assignment, covertly or otherwise. I will also say more about this below, but one 
reason derives from the fact that beliefs of Assignment are idiosyncratic—i.e., they vary 
from speaker to speaker. An Assignment might therefore be attributed in order to draw an 
audience’s attention to the fact that a particular expression is being used as the subject of 
the report uses it, and thus not (necessarily) as the reporter uses it.29 In other words, 
beliefs of Attributed Assignments are expressed when a reporter wishes to say of the 
agent of the report that he/she believes something with respect to a particular 
Assignment. In F&M’s words: 
The speakers, for example, may wish to speak of the terms under which an agent holds a 
belief. In that case, the speakers may specify the particular Assignment that they believe 
the agent would assent to. The speakers may, that is to say, attribute Assignments. 
However, doing so covertly is only likely to be effective when both the reporter and 
his/her audience know that: 
… there is some other attribution, containing some other equivalent Assignment, that the 
agent does not believe. If that constitutes the reason for the inclusion, then it stands as an 
implicature of an attribution containing an Assignment that there is some other incorrect 
attribution, an attribution containing an Assignment that the agent does not believe. 
                                                 
29 In this case, the attributed Assignment is being expressed with the reporter’s intention of notifying the 
subject of a divergence in their respective beliefs about the identity of particular linguistic expression. In 
turn, the linguistic information expressed by the attribution, if recognized, may be sufficient to cause the 
subject’s to bring his objectual beliefs about how many individuals are the bearers of a particular name into 
conformity with those of the reporter. 
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A second reason is to draw the subject’s attention to the fact that two type-distinct (i.e., 
non-coindexed) expressions corefer or, conversely, that they do not corefer.30 As we shall 
see in a moment, this second condition is essentially what grounds F&M’s proposed 
solution to both Frege’s puzzle about the informativeness of identity statements and 
Kripke’s “Paderewski” puzzle about failures of substitution in propositional attitude 
reports.31 
In sum, the key to understanding both puzzles, claim F&M, is to recognize that they 
turn on two kinds of beliefs held by speakers and hearers. The first are de re (objectual) 
beliefs about how many individuals, x, are the bearers of a particular name, ‘’. The 
second are the linguistic beliefs just surveyed, which is to say de dicto beliefs of Identity, 
Assignment, Attributed Assignment, Translation, and Singularity. Disagreement (or 
confusion) between speakers and listeners over such beliefs are what generate the 
relevant puzzles, whereas the de dicto logical forms of sentences used to report these 
beliefs are reportedly what dissolve them, as I attempt to demonstrate next. I begin with 
Frege’s puzzle about the informativeness of identity statements followed by F&M’s 
related analysis of Kripke’s “Paderewski” puzzle about belief sentences. Thereafter I 
recapitulate what appear to be two devastating objections that illustrate why, despite 
otherwise sound intuitions, DLB fails to achieve its stated goals. 
                                                 
30 The reporter is again entitled to such attributions only under the conditions specified by (AP). As will 
also become clearer below, according to F&M it is apparent exceptions to (AP) that generate the puzzles 
about belief sentences. 
31 As an advertisement, F&M suggest that when properly framed the latter is just “a new puzzle about 
identity statements.” As mentioned in the beginning, I happen to agree. 
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6.4. DLB’s solution to the puzzles 
6.4.1. Frege’s puzzle of informativeness 
Frege’s puzzle of informativeness again amounts to this: Why should the 
substitution of type-distinct, non-cospelled, coreferring proper names in an identity 
statement alter the informativeness or “cognitive significance” of the thought that it 
expresses? I again take it that all parties agree that identity statements of the form ‘a = b’ 
(in formal languages) or ‘ is ’ (in natural language) are (or can be) informative for 
subjects who understand them, where the relevant notion of informativeness I take to be 
governed, more or less, by the following principle: 
(INF)ormativeness: A true identity statement of the form ‘ is ’, where ‘’ and ‘’ are 
lexical expressions that contain coreferential uses of proper names, is informative just in 
case its utterance expresses or otherwise pragmatically conveys information that is 
sufficient to rationally compel a linguistically competent yet otherwise misinformed 
subject who understands its meaning, and believes it true, to revise his/her mistaken 
beliefs about how many objects are the bearers of those names. Parallel remarks apply to 
statements of the form ‘ is not ’. 
The trick is again to specify (i) what, exactly, is the nature of the information conveyed 
by ‘ is ’ (or ‘a = b') that renders it informative, and (ii) how does this information 
(causally) effect relevant changes in the subject’s system of beliefs. 
In the first instance, as you might have guessed, the relevant information is 
according to F&M linguistic in nature (or again what I would call metalinguistic). More 
specifically, it has to do with what they call the “informational content” conveyed by the 
de dicto logical forms of sentence-utterances. Broadly speaking, F&M (2006: 113) say: 
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Let us identify the informational content of a sentence with the entailments of its logical 
form.32 A sentence, by virtue of having the logical form that it does, has informational 
content; a statement, we then say, conveys the informational content the sentence used to 
make that statement has. 
I will clarify these remarks in a moment, but in the second instance the informational 
content carried by such statements is claimed to be sufficient to bring about relevant 
changes in a subject’s beliefs by first rationally compelling him/her to reconsider his/her 
standing de dicto beliefs about whether or not the two names in question corefer. If 
accepted, this information will provide the subject with a crucial premise that logically 
connects his/her de dicto beliefs of Assignments to his/her de re or objectual beliefs 
about how many individuals are referred to in those Assignments. If that connection is 
properly grasped, the resulting inference will in turn provide grounds for bringing both 
kinds of beliefs into alignment with those of the subject’s informant. 
The reasoning just sketched is an example of what F&M mean by “entailments of 
logical form.” Recall (10) from above, whose logical form is ex hypothesi ambiguous as 
between (10') and (10''): 
(10') Max believes that [[Cicero]1 was a Roman statesman] 
(10'') Max believes that [[Cicero]1 was a Roman statesman] & [‘[Cicero]1’ refers 
to [Cicero]1] 
 (10') again represents the “non-de dicto logical form” of (10), which is to say that it 
specifies only the objectual content of (10); i.e., sans the de dicto Assignment in (10''). 
However, the non-de dicto logical form of (10) entails that its de dicto logical form in 
(10'') will include an Assignment involving the expression ‘[Cicero]1’. Naturally, the first 
                                                 
32 F&M (ibid: 113) add: “Let us use the term logical form to designate that part of the syntactic description 
of a sentence that determines (along with other nonlinguistic factors of context of utterance and indexicality 
that we set aside), the truth conditions of statements made by using that sentence.” 
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conjunct of (10'') expresses the same objectual content as (10'). But it is the linguistic 
(i.e., de dicto) content of the Assignment in (10'') that F&M identify with its 
informational content. 
Identity statements are reportedly no different in this respect.33 For instance, (3) 
from earlier, repeated below, is ambiguous as between the non-de dicto logical form of 
(3') and its de dicto logical form in (3'') which in this case contains three conjuncts: 
(3) Cicero is Tully 
(3') [Cicero]1 is [Tully]2 
(3'') [[Cicero]1 is [Tully]2] & (‘[Cicero]1’ refers to [Cicero]1) & (‘[Tully]2’ refers to 
[Tully]2)] 
Here again (3') and the first conjunct of (3'') express the same objectual content, or as 
Frege would say they express the same “objectual identity.” Moreover, the objectual 
content of (3) is identical to that expressed by (1'') and (2'') below, which are of course 
both trivially true. 
(1'') [Cicero]1 is [Cicero]1 
(2'') [Tully]2 is [Tully]2 
Indeed even the informational contents of (1'') and (2'')—i.e., their de dicto logical 
forms—in isolation are uninformative, which are those in (1''') and (2'''): 
(1''') [Cicero]1 is [Cicero]1 & ‘[Cicero]1’ refers to [Cicero]1 
(2''') [Tully]2 is [Tully]2 & ‘[Tully]2’ refers to [Tully]2 
The de dicto Assignment in (1'''), for example, conveys nothing more than the fact that 
the two occurrences of ‘[Cicero]1’ in the first conjunct refer to the same thing, which 
                                                 




carries the trivial non-de dicto entailment that the individual so-referred is self-identical. 
Parallel reasoning applies to (2'''). 
By contrast, because (3) contains type-distinct names its de dicto logical form in 
(3'') will contain two Assignments, one for each expression of those names. The 
difference is relevant because (3'') “includes,” as F&M put it, the “information” that 
‘[Cicero]1’ and ‘[Tully]2’ corefer. For given the collective truth of the three conjuncts in 
(3''), F&M contend that their coreference “follows trivially.” Specifically, they reason 
that (3''): 
… entails that the reference of the expression “Cicero” is the same as the reference of the 
expression “Tully,” for if “Cicero” refers to Cicero, and “Tully” refers to Tully, and 
Cicero and Tully are one and the same, then “Cicero” and “Tully” corefer. De dicto 
logical forms convey information by virtue of what they show or display that their paired 
non–de dicto counterparts do not. 
The idea seems to be that if an utterance of (3) is understood as expressing (3''), the result 
is a single thought that integrates all three conjuncts. The information conveyed by its de 
dicto logical form is therefore what renders an utterance of (3) informative, as recognition 
of the thought that it expresses will, ceteris paribus, be sufficient to cause Max to adjust 
his de re beliefs about how many individuals are the bearers of the names ‘Cicero’ and 
‘Tully’. This is all just to reinforce Fregean intuitions, couched in linguistic terms, that an 
utterance of (3) is (or at least can be) informative in a way that (1) and (2) are not. 
I will explain more precisely how this is supposed to work in a moment, but notice 
that the same clearly cannot be said of (3'). For the informational content conveyed by 
(3') is nothing over and above what is apparent from its surface form, which is that the 
expressions ‘[Cicero]1’ and ‘[Tully]2’ are non-coindexed (i.e., type-distinct) and, hence, 
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that their tokens optionally corefer, and which with respect to (INF) from above is 
uninformative. To this point F&M add: 
A speaker who makes an utterance of “Cicero is Tully” does so backed by the beliefs that 
(i) Cicero is Tully, (ii) “Cicero” has the value Cicero, and (iii) “Tully” has the value 
Tully. Only if she utters a sentence with a de dicto logical form do the latter beliefs 
become part of what is said by the speaker; by virtue of the explicit occurrences of 
Assignments, she will convey the information that two distinct expressions corefer. [my 
emphasis]. 
The putative entailment conveyed by (3'') is perhaps more easily seen in the following 
logically equivalent regimentation; I will call this ‘(P3)’ for reasons that will become 
clear shortly: 
(P3) x y [(x is referred to by ‘[Cicero]1’) & (y is referred to by ‘[Tully]2’) & 
(x=y)  ‘[Cicero]1’ and ‘[Tully]2’ corefer] 
 So, we now know what information putatively accounts for the 
informativeness/cognitive significance of identity statements. However, it remains to be 
said precisely how this information effects the relevant changes in a listener’s beliefs. 
Let’s take the case of Max first, which we might think of as the easy case involving the 
belief that non-cospelled (type-distinct) names have numerically distinct bearers. The 
more difficult case to explain, which I turn to below, involves one name, such as 
‘Aristotle’ or ‘Paderewski’, which is believed to have multiple bearers. 
By hypothesis, Max, like other competent speakers, knows/believes that ‘[Cicero]1’ 
and ‘[Tully]2’ are non-coindexed and thus may optionally corefer. And in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, it should again come as no surprise that Max might believe that 
‘[Cicero]1’ and ‘[Tully]2’ in fact do not corefer. Thus, we can say that Max mistakenly 
but rationally believes (P2): 
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(P2) x y [(‘[Cicero]1’ refers to x) & (‘[Tully]2’ refers to y) & (x≠y)] 
The question is how can an utterance of (3), which expresses only trivial objectual 
content, cause Max’s de re beliefs to become coincident with those of its speaker? This is 
where the informativeness of (3'') comes into play, for it putatively conveys to Max the 
crucial “bridge premise” specified by (P3) above, which is that ‘[Cicero]1’ and ‘[Tully]2’ 
corefer. In other words, (3'') reportedly conveys the information that these two 
expressions are Translations of each other. Max’s acceptance of (P3) will thereby 
provide him with grounds to adjust his de re beliefs about how many individuals are the 
bearers of the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’. 
Even supposing that Max grasps the proposition expressed by (P3), one still might 
wonder why he might be compelled to accept it. According to F&M (ibid: 117), this is 
because “ordinarily we speak assertively (and sincerely) just because we want to speak 
informatively.” Max will therefore assume that his interlocutor is using (3) to tell him 
something that he doesn’t know. F&M (ibid: 23) add that “if a hearer properly 
understands what a speaker says, he or she will come to represent the sentences the 
speaker utters as the speaker does.” And since Max knows that the only contingent fact 
about the logical form of (3'') is whether or not ‘[Cicero]1’ and ‘[Tully]2’ corefer, he will 
be compelled to consider the possibility that his informant has included the content 
expressed by (3'')/(P3) specifically to challenge his disbelief that the Assignments that it 
embeds are covalued.34 Should Max defer to the challenge, which is to say should he (i) 
manage to extract its intended content, and (ii) find that content persuasive, he will 
thereby feel rationally obliged to align his (de re) beliefs with those of his informant 
about how many individuals are the bearers of the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’. And this, 
                                                 
34 F&M don’t put it quite this way, but I take it this is what they have in mind. 
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argue F&M (ibid: 104), is “how identity statements can be used to tell someone that 
names are coreferential, so that they come to be informed,” which in turn demonstrates 
one way in which “linguistic information can be semantically significant” (ibid: 142). 
If some of this strikes you as a bit fishy, you are in good company. But hold onto 
that thought. For under that assumption that what has been said here is coherent, it 
becomes a relatively simple task to show how F&M’s proposal extends to Kripke’s 
“Paderewski puzzle,” which is just a special case of (INF)—i.e., the informativeness of 
identity statements involving coreferential expressions. 
6.4.2. The Paderewski puzzle 
First recall Kripke’s Peter, who mistakenly believes that there are two individuals 
with the same name; one a politically talentless musician and the other a musically 
talentless politician. In consequence of his confusion, Peter assents to both (15) and (16): 
(15) Paderewski lacks musical talent 
(16) Paderewski has musical talent 
Next recall F&M’s principle of Singularity, repeated below: 
(SI)ngularity: Speakers believe that cospelled expressions corefer if coindexed, and 
if non-coindexed that they do not corefer. 
Now, by (SI) coupled with Peter’s belief that there are two individuals named 
‘Paderewski’, he will thereby believe that there are two non-coindexed, cospelled 
expressions of that name. That is, by assumption Peter believes the following 
Assignments: 
(38) ‘[Paderewski]1’ refers to [Paderewski]1 
(39) ‘[Paderewski]2’ refers to [Paderewski]2 
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Thus, (15) and (16) out of Peter’s mouth will have the following (non-de dicto) logical 
forms: 
(15') [Paderewski]1 lacks musical talent 
(16') [Paderewski]2 has musical talent 
Given (SI), Peter will thereby reject the identity expressed by (22), whose logical form is 
given in (22'): 
(22) Paderewski is Paderewski   
(22') [Paderewski]1 is [Paderewski]2   
For according to Peter’s idiolect, (22) has the form ‘ is ’. And again given his beliefs 
about Singularity, Peter will believe that his two ‘Paderewski’-expressions do not corefer. 
And so in this way Peter can rationally assent to (16) while denying (15). 
By the same token a duly informed listener, call her Penny, can infer from Peter’s 
verbal behavior his beliefs of Assignments in (38) and (39)—i.e., his belief that there are 
two cospelled, non-coindexed expressions, ‘[Paderewski]1’ and ‘[Paderewski]2’, that do 
not corefer. In turn, by (AP) from above Penny is entitled to the following attributions 
without thinking Peter irrational: 
(20') Peter believes that [Paderewski]1 has musical talent 
(21') Peter does not believe that [Paderewski]2 has musical talent 
For only under this condition would Penny not be attributing to Peter the contradictory 
belief of the form p & not-p. As F&M (ibid: 22) describe the situation: 
If the occurrences of “Paderewski” are not occurrences of the same expression-type, then 
it does not follow, as a matter of logical form, that inconsistent beliefs have been 




So, the question now becomes: What could be said to relieve Peter of his confusion 
about the true identity of Ignacy Jan Padereswki? In other words, what premise might be 
sufficient to alter Peter’s mistaken beliefs about the number of bearers of the name 
‘Paderewski’? Since Penny believes that there is just one individual named ‘Paderewski’, 
it follows from (SI) that she believes there is just one expression containing that name, 
say ‘[Paderewski]1’. As such, Penny cannot sincerely assert (22) with the non-de dicto 
logical form of (22'), for this is not consonant with her beliefs. Penny can however assert 
(22) with its de dicto logical form as specified in (22''): 
(22'') [(Paderewski]1 is [Paderewski]2) & (‘[Paderewski]1’ refers to [Paderewski]1) 
& (‘[Paderewski]2’ refers to [Paderewski]2)] 
For in this case Penny is free to use the name ‘Paderewski’ as Peter uses it. What’s more, 
as F&M suggest (ibid: 77), she is saying to him, in effect, that “your “Paderewski”-
expressions corefer.” 
I take it that F&M’s qualification “in effect” above is purposeful. For as we have 
seen, (SI) prohibits beliefs of coreference between cospelled, non-coindexed (type-
distinct) names. And since Penny and Peter presumably both adhere to (SI), they both 
know/believe that the two ‘Paderewski’-expressions in (22'') cannot corefer. And so, 
more accurately we should say, as F&M do elsewhere (ibid: 77), that what Penny is 
trying to tell Peter is that “two of his Assignments are equivalent.” And this, I take it, will 
convey to Peter the message that there is only one ‘Paderewski’-expression and that it 
refers to the man Ignacy Jan Padereswki. This epiphany will, as before, trigger a chain of 
reasoning that rationally compels Peter to bring his de dicto beliefs of Assignments into 
conformity with those held by Penny. 
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In a more regimented formulation, Peter’s chain of reasoning is (roughly) an 
instance of the following inference scheme, where (P3)—the crucial premise—is 
isomorphic to the de dicto logical form of Penny’s utterance of (22''): 
(P1) x y, x≠y, [(x is named ‘a’) & (y is named ‘’)] Assumption 
(P2) x y, x≠y, [(‘[]1’ refers to x) & (‘[]2’ refers to y)] (P1), (SI) 
(P3) x y, x=y, [(‘[]1’ refers to x) & (‘[]2’ refers to y)] (P2) 
(P4) x y, x=y, [(x is named ‘’) & (y is named ‘’)] (P3), (SI) 
(P5) x (x is named ‘’) (P4), Simp 
(P6) x [(x is referred to by ‘[]1’) & (x is referred to by ‘[]2’) (P5), (SI) 
With assumptions discharged, F&M take themselves to have provided a linguistic 
solution to Kripke’s “Paderewski puzzle” though framed specifically as a puzzle about 
identity statements. 
6.5. Objections to DLB 
6.5.1. Objection 1 
As a way of introducing the first worry, recall that by assumption Max has the 
names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ in his idiolect, which is to say that he believes the 
Assignments given by (24) and (32), whose logical forms are again those in (24') and 
(32'), respectively: 
(24) ‘Cicero’ refers to Cicero 
(32) ‘Tully’ refers to Tully 
(24') ‘[Cicero]1’ refers to [Cicero]1 
(32') ‘[Tully]2’ refers to [Tully]2 
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Now, as noted repeatedly, coreference of ‘[Cicero]1’ and ‘[Tully]2’ is not fixed by the 
grammar. Yet by assumption these two expressions do in fact corefer, say as determined 
by their causal-historical chains of reference.35 If correct, the worry turns on how we as 
theorists are to understand the formal analysis of these Assignments. If we take them as 
equivalent to traditional meaning axioms, then the expressions ‘[Cicero]1’ and ‘[Tully]2’ 
on the right hand side of the “refers to” relation contribute the same individual (i.e., 
Marcus Tullius Cicero) to the propositions they encode, despite what Max may or may 
not assent to. If so, then the logical forms of (1'') and (2'') are perhaps more perspicuously 
represented as (1''') and (2'''): 
(1''') g(‘[Cicero]1’) = Marcus Tullius Cicero 
(2''') g(‘[Tully]2’) = Marcus Tullius Cicero 
Substituting equals for equals, we should then be able to rewrite F&M’s de dicto logical 
forms of, say, (4) and (5) as (4'') and (5''): 
(4'') [Cicero was a Roman statesman] 
 & [‘[Cicero]1’ refers to Marcus Tullius Cicero] 
(5'') [Tully was a Roman statesman] 
 & [‘[Tully]2’ refers to Marcus Tullius Cicero] 
The obvious question is of course if Max believes each of (1'''), (2'''), and (4) then what 
blocks his inference to the truth of (5)? For understood this way, the example above 
appears to be an instance of the familiar inference scheme: (Fa & a = b)  Fb. In other 
words, F&M’s proposal appears to suffer from precisely the same defect that it was 
designed to solve.36 
                                                 
35 F&M seem to accept some such story. I doubt that this is true, but that doesn’t matter for purposes here. 
36 This objection owes to Gary’s Ostertag’s (2007) review of DLB. I understand that David Braun raised a 
similar objection during a panel discussion of DLB at the APA Pacific conference in 2009. 
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6.5.2. Objection 2 
A second serious worry, raised in Ostertag (2007), has to do with so-called 
“negative” belief reports, as in (40), 
(40) Max does not believe that Tully was a Roman statesman 
whose de dicto logical form is represented by (40''):  
(40'') Max does not believe that [[Tully]2 was a Roman statesman] & [‘[Tully]2’ 
refers to [Tully]2] 
As Ostertag rightly notes, (40'') is compatible with Max not believing the ‘Tully’-
Assignment that is justifiably attributable to him by the de dicto logical form of (12) 
given in (12''): 
(12) Max believes that Tully was a Roman poet 
(12'') Max believes that [[Tully]2 was a Roman poet] & [‘[Tully]2’ refers to 
[Tully]2 ] 
This in turn suggests that F&M’s conjunctive analysis of de dicto logical forms, as 
discussed earlier, is seriously flawed. In Ostertag’s words: 
If a de dicto report attributes belief in P & A (where A is an assignment) then 
contradicting that report should simply consist in a denial of belief in P & A.  But 
whereas one can use a negative de dicto belief report to deny belief in P, one cannot use a 
negative de dicto belief report to deny belief in A (to do so is incompatible with the 
report's being de dicto). This suggests that the conjunctive analysis is incorrect—that A is 
not part of what is asserted. 
Ostertag cites other worries for a metalinguistic approach to the puzzles, including those 
raised by Saul (1997), though I won’t rehearse those details here. The alternative 
psychological construal of F&M’s solution as proposed in the beginning, however, 
arguably avoids these formal semantic issues. 
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6.6. Chapter summary 
The preceding has been a particularly long-winded way of getting at the same 
worry that Kripke (1979) raises about the defective nature of our belief-reporting 
practices, or at least under the assumption that the meaning/propositions expressed by 
belief-reports are supposed to mirror the logical forms of the beliefs they are used to 
report. For indeed under this assumption the semantics of belief-reports seem ill-equipped 
to avoid the pitfalls raised in A Puzzle about Belief. However, on my view one can 
explain the informativeness of identity statements without taking a stance about the 
relationship between the meanings of those statements and the beliefs they are used to 
report. This is the project of Chapter 7, which accepts many of the intuitions motivated in 
DLB while rejecting the claim that what’s informative about identity statements is 
literally expressed as part of their meaning/semantic content. Rather, on view the solution 
to informativeness is extralinguistic/pragmatic/inferential in nature yet which 
nonetheless, as F&M argue, crucially involves beliefs about the meanings of Words. In 
this way, I contend that my proposal avoids the failure of F&M’s linguistic-semantic 
solution to the puzzles. It is worth stressing here that I will not be offering a theory of 
beliefs, nor a theory of the semantics of belief reports, per se. I will however be using 
some empirically justified conclusions about the linguistically generated meanings of 
sentences of the form ‘ is ’ to explain how their utterances relative to a context can be 
informative in the relevant way. 
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7. A Metalinguistic Solution to Frege’s Puzzle of 
Informativeness 
7.1. Introduction 
As advertised, in this final chapter I argue in favor of a broadly metalinguistic 
solution to Frege’s puzzle about the informativeness of true natural language identity 
statements of the form ‘ is ’, more or less as the puzzle was characterized in Chapter 6, 
yet which navigates past the difficulties encountered by Fiengo & May (F&M).1 
However, I again concur with F&M on several key points. In particular, I agree that 
competent speakers have (at least tacit) beliefs about the syntactic identity (or difference) 
of the names that appear in these statements, and that these beliefs influence speaker-
judgments about the reference, or coreference as the case may be, of name-tokens relative 
to a context/discourse. I further agree that such beliefs play an important role in the 
interpretation of identity statements for competent subjects who are otherwise ignorant of 
the truth of the thoughts they express. However, contra F&M my positive proposal is that 
an utterance of ‘ is ’ pragmatically conveys (but does not express) the metalinguistic 
fact that the names ‘’ and ‘’ designate the same object (i.e., that they corefer). This 
latter proposition, I contend, is derivable solely from the utterance’s linguistic form along 
with the subject’s understanding of the semantic role of proper names in the grammar. 
What distinguishes my view from other pragmatic accounts such as Salmon (1986) 
and Soames (2002) is that on my view the metalinguistic information about coreference 
pragmatically conveyed by ‘ is ’ provides subjects with a logical premise needed to 
                                                 
1 While my proposal extends naturally to questions related to belief reports containing proper names, I do 
not directly address these questions here, save a very brief discussion near the end regarding how my 
proposal applies to identity statements of the form ‘Paderewski is Paderewski’ that involve two occurrences 
of the same name. I also propose to set aside identity statements flanked on both sides of the identity sign 
by definite descriptions. 
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further deduce that there exists at most one contextually-salient bearer of both names (or 
two in the case of ‘ is not ’). It is coming to accept this latter proposition regarding not 
precisely who or what is being referred to but how many objects/individuals are under 
discussion—a proposition which was not believed (or positively disbelieved) prior to the 
utterance—that can rationally compel misinformed subjects to accept the truth of ‘ is ’. 
Importantly, my proposal relies on the assumption that the former thought/proposition 
regarding how many objects/individuals are under discussion may not be the same 
thought that speakers intend to express with ‘ is ’ (yet without taking a firm stance as 
to what, precisely, this latter thought is). As importantly, I argue that accepting the former 
thought as true constitutes what Frege considered a “substantive” advance in the 
interpreter’s knowledge, which holds irrespective of what else they may or may not know 
about the relevant object(s) of reference. For even if subjects know nothing else apart 
from their names, they can readily deduce how many objects are the topic of discussion. 
Moreover, these subjects will have thereby learned that whatever they previously 
believed (de re) about the referent of ‘’ is also quite likely true of the referent of ‘’, 
and vice versa.2 Furthermore, they will henceforth know that the truth of ‘ is ’ is what 
rationally justifies the intersubstitution of ‘’ and ‘’, salva veritate, in transparent 
contexts. 
In short, the central claim of this chapter is that while one might agree with Frege 
that the “cognitive value” of an identity statement is determined by the thought that it 
“contains” (i.e., the proposition that it expresses), I contend that the actual 
informativeness of those statements for Frege-subjects derives chiefly from the logical 
                                                 
2 I say “quite likely true” as I am willing to grant possible exceptions. For instance, I am willing to grant 
that it may be true, strictly speaking, that while Superman can fly, Clark Kent cannot. 
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implications of their linguistic forms.3 At bottom, the relevant information conveyed by 
an identity statement is again not, in my view, who or what is being referred to but rather 
how many objects/individuals are under discussion. The full details of my proposal 
require quite a bit of unpacking. And I will set forth the agenda of this chapter 
momentarily. However, I wish to distance this discussion somewhat from the previous 
chapter by stating a few additional background assumptions about the target 
phenomenon, not all of which are explicitly (or even implicitly) endorsed by Fiengo & 
May. At the same time, I will attempt to further clarify my approach to resolving the 
puzzle. 
7.1.1. Resetting the discussion 
First of all, I take it that Frege’s puzzle about the informativeness of identity 
statements involving type-distinct coreferential names, and correlatively failures of 
substitution of those names salva veritate in opaque contexts, both arise for one of two 
simple reasons. Either (i) subjects do not know/believe de dicto that the names in 
question corefer (or not), or (ii) they have confused de re one individual for two (or vice 
versa). These two facts are intimately related, however, in the sense that ignorance of the 
one explains ignorance of the other.4 For in the general case, to believe of two names that 
they do not corefer is ipso facto to be committed to the belief that those names have 
numerically distinct bearers. Conversely, to believe de re that there exists two 
                                                 
3 Similar points are raised in Perry (2003), and elsewhere. However, I am unaware of anyone who has tried 
to develop such considerations into a full-blown hypothesis. 
4 To be clear at the onset, I assume that suitably sophisticated non-linguistic animals can in principle be 
Frege-subjects. If correct, then Frege’s puzzle is not a puzzle about language, per se, but rather a puzzle 
about the nature of thought. This point will be repeated below. But in short, given that the puzzle is 
typically cast as a linguistic phenomenon, and which is how Frege himself conceived the puzzle, I will 
address my arguments specifically to language users. 
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objects/individuals that are the respective bearers of type-distinct names rationally entails 
the subject’s de dicto belief that those names do not corefer. 
Similarly, there at least two ways out of the confusion. Subjects might either (i) 
learn, perhaps by being told, that the names in question corefer (or not), or (ii) infer from 
independent evidence that there exists at most one object/individual that happens to be a 
(or perhaps the) bearer of both names (or in the reverse direction, that there exists 
multiple bearers of the same name). These latter two facts are also related in the formal 
sense of providing premises that logically connect one to the other such that a subject 
who both recognizes and accepts the one fact will be rationally compelled to accept the 
other (or perhaps should be so-compelled, and again ceteris paribus). 
There is of course a third way of becoming so-informed, or anyway by common 
assumption, which is to be told by way of a true identity statement of the form ‘ is ’ 
that  and  are in fact one and the same object/individual. As raised in the previous 
chapter, the challenge is to specify which property (or perhaps properties) of such 
statements renders them informative. For again if one takes a Millian view of names then 
presumably what speakers express with ‘ is ’ is the trivial/uninformative proposition 
that the object referred to is self-identical. However, from the perspective of misinformed 
interpreters what is understood by such statements, if taken at face value, appears to 
them, at least initially, to be a logical contradiction. As competent listeners know a priori 
that [what they believe to be] numerically distinct objects cannot at once be numerically 
identical. Competent subjects also know a priori that the only way they could be 
mistaken about the truth of ‘ is ’ is if the names in question are in fact being used in 
reference to the same object/individual. Otherwise, it would simply never occur to them 
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that what is being expressed is the trivial truth that the common referent of ‘’ and ‘’ is 
self-identical. 
Practically speaking, a perhaps more effective way for speakers to achieve the 
desired result is to utter a more fully articulated sentence such as ‘ is numerically 
identical to ’, or ‘ and are numerically identical’, or ‘ is the same [] as ’, or 
equivalently ‘ and  is/are the same []’, and so forth, where ‘’ is an optional but often 
helpful modifier such as ‘object’, ‘person’, or what have you. Better yet, in my 
estimation, speakers might just as well inform addressees that the names ‘’ and ‘’ refer 
to the same object/individual—i.e., that there is just one contextually-salient bearer of 
both names. As I think the latter thought is the basically what misinformed understand 
anyway. But setting this question aside for the moment, the point for now is that there 
appears to be several ways for speakers to achieve the desired effect of communicating 
the fact that just one object/individual is under discussion. But thanks in part to Frege and 
Russell we as theorists are tasked to explain the informativeness of isomorphic 
translations of the formal language expression ‘a = b’ into corresponding sentences of 
natural language (e.g., ‘ is ’ in English, ‘ ist ’ in German, and so on). And so far as I 
can tell, most contemporary researchers, including Fiengo & May, agree that with respect 
to natural language the informativeness of identity statements of the form ‘ is ’ 
constitutes the core explanadum of Frege’s puzzle. 
So constrained, I will just go along with the program and take as my target the 
relative informativeness of true identity statements of the (abbreviated) form ‘ is ’ (as 
opposed to ‘ is ’ and ‘ is ’). Now, in most discussions of Frege’s puzzle it is also 
widely assumed that Frege-subjects are antecedently acquainted with the relevant 
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object(s) of reference, either by direct perceptual acquaintance or by uniquely identifying 
definite description (or some set of such descriptions). That is, Frege-subjects are 
presumed to be capable of thinking about those objects as such, if perhaps only in a de re 
sense. And recall from Chapter 3 that if Fodor is right, one cannot think about things as 
such without having a concept of those things. In turn, interpreters who lack concepts of 
the relevant object(s) are presumably incapable of fully grasping the thought expressed 
by an identity statement. Moreover, if I understand Frege correctly one cannot grasp the 
cognitive significance of ‘ is ’ without fully grasping the thought that it expresses. If 
true, then Frege-subjects cannot grasp the informativeness of ‘ is ’ unless they have at 
least one concept of / with which to think about that object as such. In my view, 
however, this latter assumption is misguided and I shall challenge it below. 
With stated qualifications in place, the dialectical strategy of this chapter will be as 
follows. Since my aim is to meet Frege’s challenge head-on—i.e., more or less as Frege 
himself conceived the puzzle, though again as applied specifically to natural language—I 
begin with a more careful review of the developments in Frege’s own thought on the 
matter, starting with his Begriffsschrift view of identity followed by his ultimate rejection 
of that account in On Sense and Reference. Part of the rationale behind this initial 
exercise is that my own proposal can be thought of as a kind of “psychologized” 
rendering of Frege’s Begriffsschrift account of identity statements. I then briefly review 
certain technological resources developed in earlier chapters, and specifically my 
conception of the semantics of proper names and how they are understood by ordinary 
language users. I will then apply these resources to demonstrate how Frege-cases are 
plausibly generated together with a full account of how, along the lines sketched above, 
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Frege-subjects manage to grasp the cognitive import of identity statements largely on the 
basis of their linguistic competence (LSC) alone, which I take to include, more 
specifically, relevant aspects of their metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC). 
7.2. Frege’s Begriffsschrift account of identity 
7.2.1. Foundations 
Frege’s partitioning of semantic (or conceptual) content into sense and reference, as 
first introduced in Function and Concept (1891) and later expounded in On Sense and 
Reference (1892), is widely viewed as a corrective to his earlier Begriffsschrift (1879) 
analysis of identity statements in terms of their capacity to warrant the substitution of 
formally distinct yet content-identical names, salva veritate, in the context of a logical 
proof.5, 6 For while the Frege of Begriffsschrift had an eye toward semantics, which is to 
say the objective nature of thought [Gedanke] and its relation to truth and reference, his 
main concern circa 1879 was to reinvent logic as a purely formal, gapless, and fully 
general system of reasoning. More specifically, Frege’s aim was to demonstrate how the 
logical form of thought licenses valid inference, which is to say logically justified 
transitions from one propositional form to the next in the derivation of a proof.7 Identity 
statements presented Frege with a special problem, however, which revealed a 
fundamental tension between the demands of logic and those of semantics—i.e., that 
                                                 
5 To my mind, this interpretation of Frege has convincing textual support; cf., e.g., Heck (2003) for a 
thorough defense, though see Thau & Caplan (2003) and Bar-Elli (2006) for contrary perspectives. 
6 This corrective action would of course have wider-reaching consequences with respect to substitution not 
only with respect to identity statements but also within so-called “opaque” contexts such as propositional 
attitude reports, the latter which I again set aside for purposes here. 
7 Where thoughts are taken to be logical entities that exhibit function-argument structure and which serve as 




which is relevant to valid patterns of inference as opposed to that which is relevant to 
questions of truth and reference.8 
The difficulty for Frege arises from his early acceptance of names (à la Mill) as 
signs of objects; i.e., as logical constants that merely “stand for” [bedeuten] their 
referents. For given a language that permits the introduction of formally distinct names 
with the same Bedeutung, those names should, in consequence of Leibniz’s law of self-
identity, be everywhere substitutable salva veritate.9 Yet one needs a way to express what 
Frege considered to be a fundamentally semantic fact in a logically perspicuous manner; 
for example, in a way that licenses judgments/inferences of the form:10 
(1) |----   (Fa  Fb) 
For (1) to constitute a valid step in a proof, however, one must first establish, usually by 
mere stipulation, that the names ‘a’ and ‘b’, understood as formal symbols, are in fact 
content-identical and thus everywhere substitutable under identity of content. Yet prior to 
Begriffsschrift the only notion of identity available to Frege and his contemporaries was 
what is sometimes referred to as objectual identity, which expresses the fact that the two 
arguments qua objects flanking the symbol ‘=’ are numerically identical (or self-
identical). That is, it was commonplace at the time to assume that statements of the form 
‘a = b’ express the material fact that a is identical to b, or that a is the same object as b, 
or as Frege later puts it that a and b coincide. The problem, as Frege saw it, is that under 
objectual identity a judgment such as (2) in the body of a proof, 
                                                 
8 For Frege of the Begriffsschrift, the relevant judgments were judgments of form rather than judgments of 
assertable contents, the latter being defined as the transition from a thought to a truth-value, and which 
would ultimately take center stage in Frege’s later work. 
9 As stated by Leibniz, the law reads: “those things are the same of which one can be substituted for another 
without loss of truth.” 
10 In Frege’s notation, the horizontal line is the “content stroke” and the vertical line is the “judgement 




(2) |----   (a = b) 
fails to express what is needed to formally justify the substitution of ‘b’ for ‘a’ in 
statements like (1), thereby rendering the step invalid. As with respect to (1), it is the 
substitution of names and not their objects (or contents), that is logically relevant.11 
Frege’s Begriffsschrift solution to the problem—what we might call his 
metalinguistic analysis of identity—was to introduce a new symbol, the triple-bar ‘≡’, to 
designate what he called identity of content [Inhaltsgleichheit], which is basically what 
we today think of as formal equivalence.12 For what this relation does is license the 
intersubstitution of formally distinct names, salva veritate, in the context of proof 
statements such as (1). For instance, a well-formed formula of Frege’s Begriffsschrift is 
given by (3), 
(3) |----   (a ≡ b) 
which can be read as asserting the judgment that “the symbol a and the symbol b have the 
same conceptual content, so that a can always be replaced by b and conversely.”13 Thus, 
while Frege assigns a special meaning to the symbol for identity of content he retains the 
classical Leibnizian clause regarding the substitution of equals for equals. What is needed 
in addition, however, is yet another proposition (or perhaps a rule of inference) that 
                                                 
11 As May (2000: 9) puts it, “while inferential relations hold between thoughts, we can only determine 
whether one thought follows from another with respect to the form by which that thought is expressed.” 
12 The German term ‘Inhaltsgleichheit’ is sometimes translated as “identity of content.” For as Beaney 
(1997: 64, fn.24) notes, “Throughout his writings, both here [in Begriffsschrift] and in his later work, Frege 
makes clear that he understands ‘Gleichheit’ in the sense of ‘identity’; so either rendering is correct.” This 
point will be reinforced below. 
13 Frege uses the capital letters ‘A’ and ‘B’ but I am taking the liberty of replacing them with lower case 
letters to maintain consistency with earlier examples. Frege also sometimes ignores the use/mention 
distinction. But in this case he is clearly speaking about symbols and not their contents. 
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justifies the transition from (3) to (1). In Begriffsschrift, this lacuna is filled by Frege’s 
basic proposition #52, whose equivalent formulation is given in (4):14 
(4) |----   (a ≡ b)  (Fa  Fb) 
In paraphrase, (4) states that one may freely substitute the symbol ‘b’ for ‘a’ in any 
formula so long as ‘a’ and ‘b’ are content-identical; a fact which again must first be 
established by asserting (3) somewhere in the body of the proof. In short, what we wind 
up with, by modus ponens, is the following sequence of formally valid judgments: 
(3) |----   (a ≡ b) 
(4) |----   (a ≡ b)  (Fa  Fb) 
        ---------------------------------- 
(1) |----   (Fa  Fb) 
The chief drawback of this proposal is that not only does it bifurcate the logician’s 
construal of identity as between objectual identity and identity of content—a situation that 
would ultimately not sit well with Frege—it also bifurcates the meaning of each atomic 
name in the object language. For in all other contexts names again merely stand proxy for 
their referents. However, in the context of a statement of identity of content names come 
to stand for themselves. Or as Frege puts it in his opening remarks of §8 of 
Begriffsschrift: 
Equality [or Identity] of content [Inhaltsgleichheit] differs from conditionality and 
negation by relating to names, not to contents. Elsewhere, signs are mere proxies for their 
content, and thus any phrase they occur in just expresses a relation between various 
contents; but names at once appear in propria persona so soon as they are joined together 
by the symbol for equality [/identity] of content; for this signifies the circumstances of 
two names having the same content. Thus, along with the introduction of a symbol for 
                                                 
14 As reported by May (2000), in “Boole’s logical Calculus and the Concept-script,” published shortly after 
Begriffsschrift in 1881, Frege considers exporting his basic proposition #52 as a rule of inference, which 
leads to certain complications that are largely irrelevant to my purposes here. 
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equality [/identity] of content, all symbols are necessarily given a double meaning—the 
same symbols stand now for their own content, now for themselves. 
Frege’s Begriffsschrift notion of identity of content is therefore a fundamentally 
metalinguistic construal of identity, as statements of the form ‘a = b’ express a relation 
between the names ‘a’ and ‘b’. In particular, as Frege puts it above identity expresses the 
circumstance that two names have the same content. 
7.2.2. Justifying coreferential terms 
To avoid this ambiguity, one might wonder why Frege did not instead simply 
prohibit the introduction of content-identical names into his logical language. For if the 
relation between names and their objects were strictly one-to-one there would be no need 
for statements of identity of content and hence no need for a special symbol to express 
this relation. However, Frege realized that such a constraint would come at the cost of 
expressiveness. Specifically, it would sacrifice the full generality of his Concept-script, 
which was paramount to the success of his wider logicist program whose ultimate goal 
was to reduce arithmetic to logic. As without the ability to introduce content-identical 
names, along with perhaps some “fruitful” definitions,15 one cannot derive certain 
proofs/theorems that might otherwise be derivable with their aid. 
To motivate this exception to the rule, Frege invokes the geometric example in 
Figure 1 to demonstrate the need for formally distinct names with the same content: 
                                                 








Figure 1.  As line B representing the circumference of the circle turns about point 
A in the direction of the arrow, line B moves toward point A until they coincide at 
point A.16 
Frege observes that where the perpendicular line intersects the circle at the point named 
‘A’, the name ‘B’ has the same content as ‘A’, yet whose shared content is determined in 
two different ways. Specifically, he argues (again from §8 of Begriffsschrift):17 
The need for a symbol for identity of content thus rests on the following: the same 
content can be fully determined in different ways; but that, in a particular case, the same 
content is actually given by two modes of determination is the content of a judgement. 
Before this judgement can be made, two different names corresponding to the two modes 
of determination must be provided for that that [the relevant content] is thereby 
determined. But the judgement requires for its expression a symbol for identity of content 
to combine the two names. It follows from this that different names for the same content 
are not always merely a trivial matter of formulation, but touch the very heart of the 
matter if they are connected with different modes of determination. 
That two names might differ in their “modes of determination” [Bestimmungsweise], or 
what I will call MoDs for short, is signaled by their distinct forms (or shapes in the case 
                                                 
16 This figure is egregiously reproduced (though not copied) without permission from Beaney (1997: 64). 
17 The translation here, taken from Beaney (1997), is I think more comprehensible than the Geach & Black 
(1960) translation, yet which I cite for comparison as follows: 
“The need of a symbol for equality of content thus rests on the following fact: The same content can be 
fully determined in different ways; and that, in a particular case, the same content actually is given by two 
ways of determining it, is the content of a judgement. Before this judgement is made, we must supply, 
corresponding to the two way of determination, two different names for the thing thus determined. The 
judgement needs to be expressed by means of a symbol for equality of content, joining the two names 
together. It is clear from this that different names for the same content are not always just a trivial matter of 
formulation; if they go along with different ways of determining the content, they are relevant to the 
essential nature of the case.” 
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of atomic symbols such as syntactically simple proper names). Normally a difference in 
form signals a difference in content. But in the present example the fact that two formally 
distinct symbols are content-identical must again be established somewhere in the body 
of the proof and is why Frege needed a custom symbol to express this relation. 
Indeed, it is not entirely clear from the quotation above precisely what work MoDs 
are supposed to be doing for Frege. Yet the following passages from May (2000) are 
suggestive of an answer: 
(17) What Frege has illustrated here is a “proof” of the judgement that “A” and “B” have 
the same content; the role of the modes of determination is that they stand as premisses of 
this proof. These modes of determination, however, are synthetic, one being geometrical, 
the other perceptual. Thus, because of the way in which this conclusion was reached, in 
this case, Frege puts it, “the judgement as to identity of content is, in Kant’s sense, 
synthetic.” 
And earlier May explains: 
(15-6) Modes of determination, Frege thus tells us, are what justify judgements of identity 
of content; but more than that, it is through this justification that we can touch the 
thought, for this justification will provide information fixing the judgements within the 
[traditional Kantian] categories of thought. 
On May’s interpretation, in other words, Frege is employing MoDs as a formal way to 
distinguish statements of identity of content as either a priori analytic versus a posteriori 
synthetic. Distinct MoDs in the context of an identity statement therefore signal what kind 
of thought one is faced with. And as justified in this way judgments of identity of content 
make contact with the proper subject matter of logic—i.e., the judgeable contents of 
thought—albeit only indirectly, as May qualifies: 
(16) The justification to which Frege refers, we must understand, is not itself part of the 
content of the judgement per se, and is thus not represented in the judgement; it is rather 
extra-notational. Modes of determination are thus in no way represented in judgement 
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above and beyond that which follows about them in virtue of the occurrence of (distinct) 
symbols. What is expressed by a judgement of identity of content via its representation in 
the conceptual notation is solely that the symbols have identical content; the justification 
for such a judgement, and hence its connection to “thought,” is not so represented in such 
logical forms. 
Or as Frege puts in the Grundlagen (Beaney [1997: 92]): 
Thus in general the question as to how we arrive at the content of a judgment has to be 
distinguished from the question as to how we provide the justification for our assertion. 
What specifically follows from an identity of the form ‘A ≡ A’ (or ‘a ≡ a’) is that it is an 
instance of Leibniz’s law and thus trivially (i.e., self-evidently or necessarily) true, and 
indeed known to be so a priori; that is, regardless of what ‘A’ (or ‘a’) refers to. Put 
differently, we can say that a logician is justified in judging such a thought true on the 
basis of its form alone. 
In contrast, what follows immediately from the linguistic form of ‘A ≡ B’ (or ‘a ≡ 
b’) is that the thought contained therein is synthetic and thus knowable only a posteriori. 
May elaborates as follows: 
(17) Judged by conceptual content, introducing a new atomic symbol into the conceptual 
notation with the same content as some other atomic symbol, does not, in and of itself, 
change the expressiveness of the system, unless by that introduction there is some 
judgement that can be expressed that otherwise could not be. This obtains in the case at 
hand, for a synthetic judgement has become possible, established by a proof of that 
judgement, where the critical premisses in the proof that fix its status are the modes of 
determination. Without such modes of determination there would be no way to establish 
that distinct expressions, atomic or not, play distinct roles in proofs, even though they 
have the same content. 
Notice that while MoDs resemble what Frege would later call “modes of presentation,” 
they are not the same notion. For as May suggests, the MoDs of names are not for Frege 
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part of the content expressed by sentences in which those names occur. However, there 
again seems to be a sense in which MoDs are at least indirectly related to their contents, 
for as May further clarifies: 
(18) Such assertions are not just about the expressions, but also pertain to the thought 
because each atomic term is itself justified by being associated with distinct modes of 
determination. Such distinct modes of determination thus give good reason for multiple 
atomic terms for a given object… (21) It is characteristic of [judgments of identity of 
content] that significant information relevant to conceptual content is secreted away, 
revealed as modes of determination… Where modes of determination are called for is 
just where there is a relation [identity of content] that does not reveal the relevant 
information, in particular where we say of two atomic names [my emphasis] that they 
have the same conceptual content. 
In other words, it is important to stress that MoDs are not by Frege’s lights part of the 
judgeable content represented by (3) above but rather serve as the formal justification for 
making that judgment. For again what is expressed by (3), unlike (2), is the 
metalinguistic fact that the symbols ‘a’ and ‘b’ are content-identical. In turn, to recognize 
an identity statement as involving type-distinct names is to recognize those names as 
being associated with distinct MoDs. Given two different MoDs, one can thereby “see” a 
priori that (3) is not merely an instance of Leibniz’s law (e.g., ‘a = a’) but rather that the 
thought contained therein is synthetic and thus carries substantive information about its 
proper subject matter, which is to say information about its object of reference. 
Of course one wants to know what, exactly, this substantive piece of information 
amounts to; that is, beyond the metalinguistic fact that the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ are content-
identical? It can’t be, as Russell seemed to have thought, that their common referent is 
self-identical. For as Frege later acknowledges in On Sense and Reference, any 
competent logician who feels justified in asserting ‘a = b’ presumably knows a priori that 
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the object being referred to is self-identical. He also knows by mere inspection that ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ have distinct MoDs. But this latter fact says nothing about the actual identity of 
their shared content in the sense of uniquely identifying/describing precisely which object 
(i.e., who or what) is being referred to. Yet if one is logically and/or rationally justified in 
asserting that the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ are logically equivalent one can nevertheless 
justifiably infer, a priori, how many objects are being referred to. 
Let me pause here to stress that the purpose of this discussion is to tease out what, 
on Frege’s view, a competent logician can justifiably infer from the purely formal 
properties of an identity statement of the form ‘a = b’. For purposes of conducting a 
formal proof, what is logically relevant is having proved that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are content-
identical. And from this one can be sure that whatever is true of the referent of ‘a’ is also 
true of the referent of ‘b’, which is again the feature of the proof that licenses their 
intersubstitution. With respect to natural language, I contend that what ordinary language 
users are justified in inferring from the presumed truth of an utterance of ‘ is ’ is that 
there is just one object/individual so-called. Moreover, as agued in greater detail below, 
knowing this much can constitute a substantive advance in knowledge, particularly if 
such knowledge licenses other material inferences about the relevant object(s) of 
reference. 
7.2.3. A note of historical interest 
By way of contrast, it’s worth briefly mentioning that by the publication of 
Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) Frege appears to have set aside his Begriffsschrift 
account of identity in favor of what we might call his objectual (or semantic) analysis of 
identity expressed by the traditional mathematical symbol of equality (‘=’). The reason 
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appears to be this. First, recall that Frege’s goal in the Grundlagen is to analyze the 
concept of number in purely logical terms. Unlike the possibly many-to-one relationship 
between logical symbols and their contents, however, the relationship between numerals 
and numbers is always one-to-one as fixed by the grammar of arithmetic. Even in cases 
where a complex expression such as ‘2 + 4’ appears to designate the same number as ‘6’, 
there is no need for a statement of identity of content such as ‘2 + 4 ≡ 6’ to convey the 
information that the signs ‘2 + 4’ and ‘6’ have the same content—i.e., that they designate 
the same number in two different ways. For the expression ‘2 + 4’ is not for Frege a 
complex name for the number six but rather a complex expression/formula that contains 
the names of two numbers, viz., two and four, whose sum equals six. 
Unlike logical identities, in other words, judgments of mathematical equalities such 
as ‘2 + 4 = 6’ are justified by information that stands in plain view of the mathematician. 
Hence, there is no need to convey information (e.g., MoDs) beyond what is given by the 
content of such statements. What’s more, since Frege believed that all mathematical 
statements are at bottom analytic, there is no need for different MoDs, as exists in logic 
and geometry, to distinguish analytic statements from synthetic ones. 
Indeed, in the Grundlagen Frege seems to have abandoned his Begriffsschrift notion 
of identity of content once and for all in favor of a unified conception of Gleichheit as 
what I am calling objectual identity. He writes in §63, for example, that: 
The relationship of equality does not hold only amongst numbers. From this it seems to 
follow that it ought not be defined specially for this case. 
Frege then proceeds to demonstrate that even the geometrical judgment that two lines are 
parallel, traditionally indicated by the symbol ‘//’, can be specified in terms of equality 
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(‘=’) whereby two parallel lines are “defined as lines whose directions are equal” (§64). 
In short, May writes (ibid: 25): 
As Frege now sees matters, with a rather revisionist ring given his own prior view, the 
notion that mathematicians (including himself) actually had in mind when they employed 
the equality symbol was identity, and it is this “ordinary sign” that subsumes identity of 
content. But although like equality it stands for an objectual relation, it is not a symbol 
peculiar to mathematics, as is equality; rather it is a general symbol, applicable to 
propositions about all sorts of things, as is identity of content. 
Yet it is not entirely clear whether prior to On Sense and Reference Frege has actually 
abandoned his notion of identity of content altogether. For his only justification for 
treating mathematical equality as being on par with objectual identity is that the former 
applies to a domain less general than logic. Rather, on my reading Frege finds himself 
stuck with two distinct notions of identity, neither of which is general enough to apply to 
across the board. And this, I take it, is why we find Frege still wrestling with the question 
in 1892. 
All this being so, let me fast-forward to a review of Frege’s opening passage of On 
Sense and Reference (or OSR for short) where according to standard interpretation Frege 
attempts to overturn his previous two conceptions of identity in favor of a third, which 
follows from, or perhaps rather justifies, his distinction between the sense of a linguistic 
expression and its reference. 
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7.3. On the distinction between Sense and Reference 
7.3.1. The opening paragraph 
Frege begins his discussion in OSR by again revisiting the problem posed by 
‘Gleichheit’, which is often translated into English as equality:18 
Equality [Gleichheit] gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to 
answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? 
In an immediate footnote, however, Frege qualifies that he takes the term ‘Gleichheit’ to 
be synonymous with ‘Identität’, the latter which straightforwardly translates to English as 
identity. In this note Frege also appears to advertise his new and improved construal of 
identity: 
I use this word [i.e., ‘Gleichheit’] in the sense of identity [Identität] and understand ‘a = 
b’ to have the sense [dem Sinne] of ‘a is the same as b’ [‘a ist dasselbe wie b’] or ‘a and b 
coincide’ [‘a und b fallen zusammen’]. 
What Frege seems to imply here is that the sense of the expression ‘a = b’ is synonymous 
with the sense of ‘a is the same as b’ (or that of ‘a and b coincide’). Or in any case, it 
would seem that to understand the sense of the former just is to understand the sense of 
the latter. 
What remains unexplained at this preliminary stage, however, is what exactly the 
names ‘a’ and ‘b’ contribute to the compositionally determined sense of ‘a = b’. I will 
say more about this below, but Frege ultimately suggests that the sense of a declarative 
sentence—or again in neo-Fregean terms its meaning—can be understood in terms of the 
thought that it expresses. And since on Frege’s view the sense of a name determines its 
reference, the thought expressed by ‘a = b’, and correlatively ‘a is the same as b’ (or ‘a 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Geach & Black (1960) and Beaney (1997). 
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and b coincide’), is the fact that the respective senses of the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ determine 
the same reference, which is to say that they present the same object in two different 
ways. In purely epistemic terms, it would therefore seem that to grasp the thought 
expressed by an identity statement depends on grasping the respective senses of the 
names involved. In turn, grasping the sense of a name seems to require knowing how to 
determine its reference. However, grasping the respective senses of ‘a’ and ‘b’ in no way 
guarantees that subjects will recognize that they do in fact determine the same reference, 
which is presumably how, on Frege’s view, Frege-cases are generated. 
Frege devotes the remainder of this paragraph to explaining what identity cannot 
be, and in particular to cast doubt on his previous two conceptions of identity, beginning 
with his Begriffsschrift account. Continuing from the first quotation above, he adds: 
In my Begriffsschrift I assumed the latter [i.e., that identity is a relation “between names 
or signs of objects”]. The reasons which seem to favour this are the following: a = a and 
a = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value [Erkenntniswert]; a = a holds 
a priori and, according to Kant, is to be labeled analytic, which statements of the form a 
= b often contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge [Erweiterungen unserer 
Erkenntnis] and cannot always be established a priori… 
As suggested, Frege correlates the difference in cognitive value between ‘a = a’ and ‘a = 
b’ with a difference in their respective classification among the Kantian categories as 
either analytic or synthetic, and as being knowable a priori versus a posteriori. From a 
semantic perspective, Frege again considered statements of the form ‘a = a’ to be 
analytic, which is to say true in virtue of meaning alone. Epistemically, the truth of ‘a = 
a’ is knowable a priori because it is recognizable as an instance of Leibniz’s law solely 
on the basis of its linguistic form; i.e., without regard to what the name ‘a’ denotes. By 
contrast, statements of the form ‘a = b’ are classified as synthetic because their truth is 
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determined by applying a Fregean Concept (i.e., function) to its argument(s). And only 
once synthesized can the resulting thought be judged either true or false. If it turns out 
that what the predicate of the sentence expresses is not, as Kant would say, already 
“contained” in its subject, then it expresses a synthetic truth that is knowable only a 
posteriori. And for this reason to grasp the content of ‘a = b’ can constitute a substantive 
advance in the interpreter’s knowledge of the mind and language-external world. 
In general, Frege seems to have held that all true synthetic statements have 
cognitive significance, including not only identities of the form ‘a = b’ but also 
predicational and relational sentences of the form ‘Fa’ and ‘Rab’, respectively. For 
instance, an utterance of ‘Fa’ can clearly be informative for a subject who does not 
antecedently believe the thought that it expresses. Indeed, to merely judge (correctly) that 
thought as synthetic is to recognize it as containing a potentially valuable piece of 
knowledge. And while Frege is not explicit about this, it appears that just as competent 
speakers can know a priori that ‘a = a’ is analytic and thus trivially true, so too can one 
know a priori that ‘a = b’ is synthetic and thus at least potentially informative simply by 
recognizing that it is not an instance of Leibniz’s law. To put the point differently, 
subjects can know whether or not a given identity is informative based solely on what 
Perry (2003: 9) calls its “epistemic profile.” 
Crucially, however, it is again the thought expressed by a statement that according 
to Frege determines its cognitive value, and in turn its status as either analytic or 
synthetic. And while it may be true that all synthetic statements are potentially 
informative, it would seem that statements expressing different thoughts differ in 
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cognitive value.19 The relevant point is that it is one thing to recognize that a given 
statement contains a potentially valuable piece of information and quite another to know 
precisely which piece of information is contained therein. However, as I argue in greater 
detail below, one can nonetheless learn something substantive from a true identity 
statement of the form ‘ is ’ simply by recognizing its status as expressing a non-trivial 
thought. Namely, one can infer that there is just one contextually-salient bearer of the 
names ‘’ and ‘’, and thus one object/individual under discussion. 
Moving along, Frege next observes the following: 
Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ 
designate [bedeuten], it would seem that a = b could not differ from a = a; i.e. provided a 
= b is true. A relation would thereby be expressed of a thing to itself, and indeed one in 
which each thing stands to itself but to no other thing. 
Frege is here apparently refuting what I earlier characterized as his objectual analysis of 
identity. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the idea seems to be that since everything 
is self-identical, and competent subjects knows this a priori, then every statement of 
identity between a thing and itself is analytically true, hence thoroughly uninformative, 
and indeed recognizable as such a priori. Yet in the case of ‘a = b’ this is clearly not the 
case. Frege therefore concludes that a purely objectual analysis of identity cannot be 
correct. 
Frege then proceeds to reevaluate the status of his Begriffsschrift account of identity 
as identity of content, which I have also characterized as his logical analysis of identity, 
or what has now become known as his metalinguistic analysis of identity: 
                                                 
19 Frege is actually a bit unclear about this as well, but it raises a potentially interesting question. For if all 
that Frege meant is that the thought expressed determines its epistemic profile then subjects could grasp the 
cognitive value simply by recognizing its epistemic profile. However, I seriously doubt that this is what 
Frege intended, and I assume not in what follows. 
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What we apparently want to state by a = b is that the signs or names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate 
the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a relation 
between them would be asserted. But this relation would hold between the names or signs 
only in so far as they named or designated something. It would be mediated by the 
connection of each of the two signs with the same designated thing. But this is arbitrary. 
Nobody can be forbidden to use an arbitrarily producible event or objects as a sign for 
something. In that case the sentence a = b would no longer be concerned with the subject 
matter, but only with its mode of designation; we would express no proper knowledge 
[eigentliche Erkenntnis] by its means.  
In other words, Frege again understood all too well that the assignment of names to 
individuals is arbitrary, which is to say a matter of linguistic convention. It is then 
equally arbitrary whether any two names designate the same individual. And so to assert 
‘a = b’ is to merely report a metalinguistic fact about language use as opposed to a 
substantive (i.e., material) semantic fact about the relevant object of reference. And so in 
this sense statements of the form ‘a = b’ are no more informative than statements of the 
form ‘a = a’, as we would again “express no proper knowledge by its means.” Yet Frege 
continues: 
But in many cases this is just what we want to do. If the sign ‘a’ is distinguished from the 
sign ‘b’ only as an object (here, by means of its shape), not as a sign (i.e. not by the 
manner in which it designates something), the cognitive value of a = a becomes 
essentially equal to that of a = b, provided a = b is true. A difference [in cognitive value] 
can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode 
of presentation of the thing designated. 
Thus, we have arrived at the final stage in Frege’s mature thought on the matter, which is 
that names ‘a’ and ‘b’ have different modes of presentation [Art des Gegebenseins]. 
More specifically, we find Frege exploiting the perceived difference in cognitive 
value between ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’ as way of motivating his semantic distinction between 
the sense of an expression and its reference. Or put the other way around, Frege’s sense-
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reference distinction is invoked to explain the presumed difference in cognitive value 
between ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’; that is, to account for why the latter is informative in a way 
that the former is not. For Frege reasoned that since these two statements obviously differ 
in cognitive value they must express different thoughts.20 And the reason they express 
different thoughts is because the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ have different senses, which again in 
neo-Fregean terms is to say that they differ in meaning.21 As such, ‘a’ and ‘b’ make 
different semantic contributions to the thoughts expressed by sentences that contain them. 
This in turn explains why their substitution in otherwise structurally identical sentences 
yields a different thought, and indeed can change the kind of thought expressed by such 
statements, generating a synthetic statement from one that is analytic. And for these 
reasons, so far as I can tell, Frege concludes that the thought expressed by a declarative 
sentence is what determines its cognitive value. 
7.3.2. Summing up 
Summarizing, Frege held that the thought expressed by an identity statement, or for 
that matter any declarative statement, is classifiable as either analytic or synthetic. 
Thoughts that are classified as synthetic contain what Frege called “real” cognitive value, 
and those that are analytic are trivially true and thus thoroughly uninformative. Among 
those that are synthetic, different thoughts presumably carry different cognitive value in 
that they contain different information about their object(s) of reference. Hence, as I 
understand Frege two sentences can be informative yet differ in cognitive value. For 
example, both ‘a = b’ and Fa (assuming them true) are potentially informative for a 
                                                 
20 However, as often pointed out in the secondary literature Frege does not bother to defend this assumption 
as he takes it to be self-evident. 
21 Or what the Frege of Begriffsschrift referred to as “conceptual” or “judgeable” content. 
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subject who is ignorant of the respective truths they express. Yet because they express 
different thoughts they presumably differ in cognitive value. 
Epistemically speaking, our judgments about the truth or falsity of a given 
statement are either a priori or a posteriori. A subject who correctly judges a statement to 
be analytic is entitled to judge it true a priori, whereas statements correctly judged to be 
synthetic require a further a posteriori (i.e., empirical) judgment regarding their truth or 
falsity. In addition, I have suggested on Frege’s behalf that with respect to identity 
statements any competent speaker will pretty much know a priori whether the thought 
expressed by such statements is analytic or synthetic on the basis of their linguistic form 
alone. Specifically, any identity statement that is not a priori recognizable as an instance 
of Leibniz’s law is knowable a priori to express a synthetic thought that contains a 
potentially valuable piece of information. Curiously, Frege never returns to tells us 
precisely which thought an identity statement of the form ‘a = b’ expresses. But recall 
from the footnote above that he understands ‘a = b’ to have the same sense as ‘a is the 
same as b’ (or ‘a and b coincide’). And given what he says elsewhere I think we can 
safely take Frege as holding that the thought expressed by ‘a = b’ is the fact that the 
respective senses of the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ determine the same reference, or again that 
they present the same object in two different ways. 
To say that senses of the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ determine the same reference could be 
taken to express the thought that there is just one object/individual that is referent of both 
names. For as Frege allows, from a psychological standpoint one might grasp the sense of 
a name without thereby knowing which object/individual it refers to. Moreover, Frege 
allows that subjects who grasp the respective senses of ‘a’ and ‘b’ need not thereby 
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recognize that they determine the same reference. Indeed, Frege-cases presumably arise 
because Frege-subjects associate the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ with different senses (or modes of 
presentation). Or as a neo-Fregean would put it, Frege-cases arise because subjects assign 
to these names different meanings. I am willing to grant that this latter fact plays an 
important role in the interpretation of identity statements, yet without being committed to 
the view that meanings are Fregean senses. Rather, on my view, which is again more or 
less Chomsky’s, linguistic meanings are intrinsic properties of expression-types that are 
understood by interpreters as instructions to activate semantically related extralinguistic 
concepts. On this way of thinking, to evaluate how ordinary language users interpret 
natural language identity statements of the form ‘ is ’ we must evaluate how 
interpreters understand their lexical constituents from a purely linguistic standpoint. 
In the next section, I briefly recapitulate my assumptions about the semantics of 
proper names as developed in Chapters 1 and 2. I will then rehearse a fairly common 
analysis of how Frege-cases are generated, conceptually speaking. Once these 
preliminaries are complete, I will present my proposed solution to Frege’s puzzle of 
informativeness as cast in these terms. To repeat an earlier advertisement, I think of my 
proposal as essentially a psychologized rendering of Frege’s Begriffsschrift account of 
identity as discussed above, except again as applied to ordinary speakers of natural 
languages. Specifically, I argue that the informativeness of true identity statements of the 
form ‘ is ’ is largely determined by the logical implications of their linguistic forms—
i.e., the set of rational inferences that their presumed truth supports. As such, identity 
statements can be informative for subjects who are not antecedently en rapport with their 
relevant objects of reference. 
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7.4. A brief review of the semantics of proper names 
Recall from Chapter 2 that I am taking proper names, like other Words, to be 
Chomskyan lexical items, which is to say phonological forms paired with their 
linguistically-specified meanings. More specifically, and in line with Fiengo & May 
(2006), I have characterized lexical items as unrepeated (non-homophonous), 
syntactically primitive morphological constituents of the grammar that are statically 
recorded in a speaker’s lexicon and which appear as terminal nodes in syntactic trees. 
With respect to proper names, in particular, I have argued alongside Burge (1973) and 
others that [the meanings of] names are naturally understood as ordinary one-place 
predicates of things so-called.22 When a name is used predicatively, for example, I 
assume that it is naturally understood to express what we might think of as its context-
invariant meaning, or in conceptual terms what I have described as the fundamentally 
metalinguistic conceptW IS-CALLED(PN(w)) whose content can be characterized as the 
property of being called by the name ‘PN’. By hypothesis, the conceptual constituent 
PN(w) is a conceptW of the name itself whose content I have characterized as being the 
name ‘PN’ (as that name is encoded in its speaker’s lexicon).  
As stressed in earlier chapters, this predicative/metalinguistic construal of the 
semantics of proper names is not to deny that names can be and indeed typically are 
used/uttered in reference to specific objects/individuals. Specifically, I have again argued 
with Fiengo & May and others that names optionally combine, syntactically, with a 
referential index to form non-terminal lexical expressions (LEs) that contain those names 
as proper constituents. In these contexts the compositionally determined semantic value 
                                                 
22 As also mentioned in a footnote in Chapter 5, I bracket the expression [the meaning of] because 
technically speaking it is redundant. For as stated back in Chapter 1 I assume that to understand an 
expression just is to understand its meaning. 
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of an indexed LE relative to a context/discourse will be a specific object/individual. For 
example, when used referentially the name ‘Hesperus’ will occur as a constituent of an 
indexed LE such as (5) below, whose compositionally determined semantic value is 
specified in (6), where again g is an interpretation function that assigns values to Tarskian 
variables (i.e., indices) relative to a sequence, . 
(5) [NP [PN Hesperus][xi]] 
(6) g([NP [PN Hesperus][xi]]) = x: x satisfies ‘Hesperus’ iff x = (i) & (i) is 
called ‘Hesperus’ 
According to (6) the semantic value of the LE in (5) relative to any sequence, , of 
entities in the domain is the i-th object in , for i > 0. The category label ‘PN’ again 
ensures that name tokens apply only to entities that are in fact so called. For instance, the 
label ‘PN’ formally restricts the satisfaction conditions of the nominal LE in (5/6) to all 
and only those objects in the domain called ‘Hesperus’. 
It is important to remember, however, that in order to interpret (5) one must first (or 
also) interpret the bare (i.e., non-indexed) nominal expression ‘[NP [PN Hesperus]]’, which 
again by hypothesis expresses, and is understood to express, the conceptW IS-
CALLED(HESPERUS(w)), or what we might think of as simply its meaning. In turn, we can 
think of (5) itself as expressing the conceptW IS-CALLED(HESPERUS, HESPERUS(w)), which 
I have construed as a particular instantiation of the “doubly unsaturated” concept IS-
CALLED(C, C) where the first argument position is saturated by a contextually-salient 
singular concept of objects/individuals, and the second by a conceptW of the name itself, 
which in the present example is to say HESPERUS(w).23  In the reverse direction, a 
                                                 




referential use of the name ‘Hesperus’ will be understood as an instruction to activate its 
interpreter’s concept IS-CALLED(HESPERUS, HESPERUS(w)), which ipso facto involves 
activation of its two conceptual constituents HESPERUS and HESPERUS(w)). Thus, in short, 
a referential interpretation of the name ‘Hesperus’ will normally result in activation of all 
three concepts; i.e., HESPERUS, HESPERUS(w), and IS-CALLED(C, C), where C= HESPERUS 
and C= HESPERUS(w). 
In addition, I assume that activation of these concepts will normally be 
accompanied by the activation (or priming) of certain contextually salient beliefs that 
contain these concepts as proper constituents. For instance, coming to think about 
Hesperus with HESPERUS in consequences of having interpreted the name ‘Hesperus’ 
referentially will naturally prime certain contextually-salient beliefs about Hesperus (e.g., 
that Hesperus is a planet, that it shines brightly in the evening sky, and so forth). In turn, 
activation of HESPERUS(w) will typically prime metalinguistic beliefs about what the 
name ‘Hesperus’ means in terms of which concept (or concepts) that it is customarily 
used to express. For instance, since I customarily use ‘Hesperus’ to express HESPERUS, 
my explicit metalinguistic belief about what the name ‘Hesperus’ means is by hypothesis 
internally represented as something like (7): 
(7) w [HESPERUS(w) & EXPRESSES(w, HESPERUS)] 
But more accurately, we can say that the content of (7) reflects my tacit understanding of 
one way in particular that the linguistically-encoded meaning of the name ‘Hesperus’ in 
my idiolect constrains without fully determining which extralinguistic concepts that name 
can (and cannot) be coherently used to express in ordinary discourse. 
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As this concerns the meaning/interpretation of identity statements, what I have just 
described is what I take to be an empirically motivated account of how ordinary speakers 
understand [the meanings of] the names that occur in such statements. As previously 
advertised, in the next section I briefly examine how Frege-cases are generated. 
Afterwards, I will then turn to a full defense of my proposed solution to the puzzle 
regarding the informativeness of natural language identity statements of the form ‘ is ’. 
7.5. Generating Frege-cases 
To demonstrate how Frege-cases plausibly arise, yet without endorsing Frege’s 
distinction between sense and reference, I basically follow the diagnosis of Fodor (2008), 
which is more less the view advocated by Larson & Segal (1995), Strawson (1974), and 
certain others.24 As a kind of toy example, consider Hammurabi who together with other 
ancient Babylonians reportedly believed that Hesperus was the brightest star in the 
evening sky and that Phosphorous was the brightest star in the morning sky. As the story 
goes, however, Hammurabi and the others failed to recognize, as did the Greeks before 
them, that Hesperus and Phosphorous is/are in fact the same object. In consequence, the 
Ancients also came to believe that they were using the names ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorous’, respectively (or more precisely their Akkadian/Greek equivalents), in 
reference to two numerically distinct objects. 
More specifically, we might assume that as a young amateur astronomer 
Hammurabi acquired a singular concept of the planet Venus as it appears in the evening 
sky. Let’s again call this HESPERUS, which Hammurabi henceforth used to think about 
Hesperus as such, which is to say the planet Venus as that object appears in the evening 
                                                 
24 Though I do not recall off the top my head exactly who else defends this kind of view, yet I am certain 
that there are several others. 
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sky. Let us further assume that once acquired Hammurabi then used his concept 
HESPERUS to form the singular belief that Hesperus is the brightest star in the evening 
sky. Or to borrow a popular metaphor, we might think of Hammurabi’s concept 
HESPERUS as the name of a mental file under which the following set of belief-predicates 
are stored: 
(8) HESPERUS: {STAR(h), MAXIMALLY-BRIGHT(h), EVENING-VISIBLE(h)} 
Repeating this sequence of events with respect to Hammurabi’s acquisition of 
PHOSPHOROUS yields the set of beliefs in (9): 
(9) PHOSPHOROUS: {STAR(p), MAXIMALLY-BRIGHT(p), MORNING-VISIBLE(p)} 
Of course while we as theorists know that h = p = the planet Venus, Hammurabi and 
friends evidently did not. Thus, according to the imagined scenario Hammurabi has 
acquired two formally distinct concepts, HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS, yet without 
realizing that they are in fact content-identical, which is to say without representing them 
as being content-identical. And this fact, I take it, plausibly explains why subjects in 
Hammurabi’s condition might rationally yet mistakenly believe that that there exists two 
numerically distinct objects; one that shines brightly in the morning sky and the other that 
shines brightly in the evening sky. 
Importantly, this is not to suggest that Hammurabi failed to know (de re) what he 
was thinking about with HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS, in the sense of failing to grasp the 
contents of his own thoughts. Rather, what Hammurabi again failed to recognize is that 
he was using both concepts to think about the very same object. As such, there is a 
tolerably clear sense in which Hammurabi was not mistaken in regard to which object he 
was thinking about with his concepts HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS. However, with 
respect to his thought processes HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS are by hypothesis formally 
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distinct mental representations (i.e., mental symbols) that Hammurabi presumably used to 
generate formally disconnected beliefs about the planet Venus that in turn played 
different causal-computational roles in his cognition. Specifically, they played different 
roles with respect to the various ways (i.e., de dicto) in which Hammurabi thought about 
the planet Venus. For this reason, Hammurabi could have entertained thoughts (and 
evidently did) about the same object without thereby being consciously aware of this fact 
about his inner mental state. 
In consequence, one assumes that as a language user Hammurabi also came to 
believe that the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ (or rather again their Akkadian 
equivalents) have different meanings in the sense of being used to refer to different 
objects. Although, recall that on my view these names do in fact have different meanings, 
linguistically speaking, even for us. Specifically, I take it that the name ‘Hesperus’ is 
understood as an instruction to activate its owner’s conceptW IS-CALLED(HESPERUS(w)), 
whereas ‘Phosphorous is understood as an instruction to activate IS-
CALLED(PHOSPHOROUS(w)). However, unlike those of us who are in-the-know 
Hammurabi evidently believed that the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ had 
mutually exclusive meanings in the sense of being strictly non-coreferential. And while 
mistaken, this belief followed naturally from his mistaken belief that there exist two 
numerically distinct celestial objects; one that shines brightly in the morning sky and the 
other that shines brightly in the evening sky. Taken together, these facts stand to explain 




In short, I again agree with Fodor and others that this is a perfectly coherent story of 
how, with respect to language uses, paradigmatic Frege-cases arise. But notice that for all 
I have said, Hammurabi’s stargazing pet Sloughi (his Arabian Greyhound) may have 
found itself in more or less the same epistemic predicament, save the linguistic facts. For 
if one assumes (as I do) that any suitably sophisticated non-linguistic animal can think 
about the same object in different ways without thereby knowing/recognizing that they 
are in fact thinking about the same object, then Frege’s puzzle is not a puzzle about 
language, per se, but rather a puzzle about the nature of thought. 
To take a more realistic example, imagine Fido whose Master happens to be a 
postal delivery worker. It so happens that Master’s mail route includes his own home. 
Thus, every morning Fido sees Master leave for work dressed in plain clothes just to 
return midday dressed in postal garb to deliver the day’s mail. Suppose further that 
Master’s wide-brimmed hat cast a shadow over his face such that from Fido’s vantage 
point through the living room window he is unrecognizable as such, which is to say as 
Master. In these circumstances, it seems plausible enough to suppose that Fido is capable 
of thinking about the same object in two different ways without realizing it. Although, 
Fido might eventually intuit that Postman = Master; for instance if Master one day 
decided to pop in to say hello. The relevant point is that, in my view, not every instance 
of Frege’s puzzle can be explained by appeal to facts about natural language. In turn, not 
every instance will involve a subject’s metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC), as 
argued below. By the same token, everyone agrees that with respect to Frege-subjects 
who also happen to be language users, a sincere and forceful utterance of a true natural 
language identity statement of the form ‘ is ’ can effect the same result—i.e., it seems 
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to be a brute fact that for reasons yet to be determined such utterances can cause a subject 
to revise his/her beliefs about how many objects/individuals are the contextually-salient 
bearers of the names ‘’ and ‘’. So qualified, given that Frege’s puzzle is typically cast 
as a linguistic phenomenon, which is how Frege himself conceived the puzzle, I will 
continue to restrict discussion to the causal efficacy of statements of the form ‘ is ’ as a 
linguistic means of disabusing Frege-subjects of their mistaken beliefs. 
7.6. Addressing Frege’s puzzle 
7.6.1. The general case 
So qualified, Fodor’s way of solving Frege’s puzzle is equally straightforward. 
First, let us assume for the sake of argument that, in the general case, an utterer of ‘ is 
’ is using the names ‘’ and ‘’ referentially, and the verb ‘be’ to express a substantive 
relation of numerical identity. Thus, let us grant with Frege from above that ‘ is ’ is 
understood as elliptical/shorthand for a more fully articulated sentence of the form ‘ is 
identical to ’, or ‘ is the same as ’, or some such equivalent statement. Whatever it is, 
I will also just assume for without argument that what the English verb ‘be’ (along with 
cross-linguistic cognates) expresses in this context of ‘ is ’ is something like the 
concept IDENTICAL-TO(x, y), or perhaps SAME-AS(x, y), which again by assumption 
expresses a substantive (i.e., meaningful) relation of numerical identity that holds 
between the referents of the names ‘’ and ‘’. 
Granted these assumptions, we might represent the thought expressed by (10) as 
one of either (11) or (12): 
(10) Hesperus is Phosphorous 
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(11) x y [(x=Hesperus) & (y=Phosphorous) & IDENTICAL-TO(x, y)] 
(12) x y [(x=Hesperus) & (y=Phosphorous) & SAME-AS(x, y)] 
However, the question I am most interested in is how a subject in Hammurabi’s condition 
will understand an utterance of (10). As a baseline, let us assume for the moment that 
what Hammurabi represents in consequence of grasping the meaning of (10) is the 
thought/proposition in either (13) or (14): 
(13) x y [(x=HESPERUS) & (y=PHOSPHOROUS) & IDENTICAL-TO(x, y)] 
(14) x y [(x=HESPERUS) & (y=PHOSPHOROUS) & SAME-AS(x, y)] 
For purposes of describing Hammurabi’s psychological state, I will use the concept-
names ‘HESPERUS’ and ‘PHOSPHOROUS’ to stand proxy for their representational contents 
such that: (x=HESPERUS)  (x=the planet Venus qua Hesperus), and (x=PHOSPHOROUS)  
(x=the planet Venus qua Phosphorous). Notice again that while HESPERUS and 
PHOSPHOROUS are formally distinct mental representations, by assumption they are 
content-identical; they both “refer to” the object that is the planet Venus. 
More specifically, granted assumptions about the semantics of proper names from 
above, if Hammurabi understands the name ‘Hesperus’ in an utterance of (10) as being 
used referentially, by hypothesis he will understand it as instruction to activate his 
conceptW IS-CALLED(HESPERUS, HESPERUS(w)). Likewise, if he understands 
‘Phosphorous’ referentially, he will understand it as an instruction to activate IS-
CALLED(PHOSPHOROUS, PHOSPHOROUS(w)). In turn, I am assuming that Hammurabi will 
understand the verb ‘be’ (or again its Akkadian equivalent) as expressing, let’s say, the 
concept IDENTICAL-TO(x, y).  
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Now, what this suggests is that Hammurabi and others alike will understand an 
utterance of (10), ceteris paribus, as expressing the thought/proposition that Hesperus is 
[numerically identical to] Phosphorous. However, following Evans (1982) and others, it 
seems reasonable to assume that one cannot, in the general case, think about something as 
such without thinking about that thing in some way or another, which is to say under 
some description (or guise, or mode of presentation, or what have you). For example, 
thinking about Hesperus as the evening star is to think about Hesperus under a particular 
description. Thus, I will assume that activation of Hammurabi’s concepts HESPERUS and 
PHOSPHOROUS in consequence of his interpretation of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ will 
normally result in the activation of beliefs such as (15) and (16) below:25 
(15) x [x=HESPERUS & STAR(x) & EVENING-VISIBLE(x)] 
(16) x [x=PHOSPHOROUS & STAR(x) & MORNING-VISIBLE(x)] 
Keep in mind that at present we are still assuming that Hammurabi does not believe that 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ corefer and, correlatively, that he is unaware of the fact 
that his concepts HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS are content-identical. 
As a result, I take it that Hammurabi will initially be confused by his informant’s 
utterance of (10). Specifically, given what Hammurabi believes to be mutually exclusive 
facts about Hesperus and Phosphorous, an utterance of (10) will strike him initially as 
being false if not incoherent. Alternatively, it might be the case that subjects in 
Hammruabi’s position will understand (10) as expressing what Strawson (1950) referred 
to as qualitative identity between its two NP/DP-referents—i.e., that Hesperus and 
Phosphorous are merely qualitatively indistinguishable, which does not entail their 
                                                 
25 I allow that activation of HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS might also normally be accompanied by activation 
of some sort of mental imagery of the planet Venus under different visual modes of presentation. 
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numerical identity. But in either case, as a way of bringing out the point more clearly 
consider (17) as addressed to Lois Lane: 
(17) But Lois, Clark Kent is Superman 
At least anecdotally speaking, one can imagine Lois pausing a moment, confusedly, and 
then replying: “Wait? Are we talking about the same Clark Kent?” This remark, in my 
estimation, is really just an abbreviated way of asking “Are we talking about the same 
person that I know by the name ‘Clark Kent’?” In other words, in the face of an apparent 
absurdity my hypothesis is that Lois’ thoughts will immediately turn metalinguistic. Yet 
this should be unsurprising given that her conceptsW of the names ‘Clark Kent’ and 
‘Superman’ are alit in virtue of having interpreted those names. Something similar can be 
said of Hammurabi.  
Indeed, I suspect that Hammurabi’s initial perplexity will cause him to briefly step 
back and consider the logical implications of the linguistic/grammatical form of his 
informant’s utterance in search for clues as to how to make sense of it. This exercise can 
be revealing, however. First of all, given Hammurabi’s belief that ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorous’ are type-distinct names he will not perceive his informant’s utterance of 
(10) as an instance of Leibniz’s law. And from this he can justifiably infer, given Gricean 
principles of charity, that it contains a potentially valuable piece of information.26 Yet 
given that Hammurabi believes that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ do not corefer, (10) 
will appear to him to express a logical contradiction. As a competent speaker, however, 
Hammurabi also knows (at least tacitly) that nothing in the rules of his grammar (i.e., his 
I-language) prohibits their coreference. Given this much, Hammurabi can deduce from its 
                                                 
26 Much of this should sound familiar from my discussion of Frege above, which is largely what justified 
my inclusion of that rather lengthy discussion in this chapter. 
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linguistic form that in order for the utterance to be true, it must be the case that the names 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ are in fact being used in reference to the same object. And 
if true, this further implies that his conceptsW HESPERUS(w) and PHOSPHOROUS(w) are 
conceptsW of coreferential names. Now, should Hammurabi come to accept this much on 
authority of his informant’s testimony, he will be rationally compelled to conclude that 
there exists just one contextually-salient individual who is a (or perhaps the) bearer of 
both names, and not two as he previously believed. 
In short, given his mutually exclusive beliefs about Hesperus and Phosphorous, 
Hammurabi has good reason to reject his informant’s assertion. At the same, Gricean 
principles push in the other direction—that he should assume that his informant is 
speaking truthfully and informatively. Indeed, if Hammurabi takes his informant to be 
knowledgeable and trustworthy, her testimony alone may be sufficient to justify his 
acceptance of her utterance as true. Yet whatever evidence Hammurabi brings to bear on 
his judgment, should he accept his informant’s testimony he will (or should) feel 
rationally obliged to bring his beliefs into alignment with hers regarding how many 
objects are referred to with the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’. In consequence, 
Hammurabi will also be compelled to accept that his concepts HESPERUS and 
PHOSPHOROUS are in fact content-identical. And in consequence of this epiphany, he will 
thereby be rationally compelled to integrate his preexisting beliefs about Hesperus and 
Phosphorous such that whatever he believes true (in a de re sense) about the one object 
must also be true of the other. 
But even granted this much, I have not yet hazarded a guess as to precisely which 
property of (10), or perhaps rather the thought that it expresses, renders that statement 
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informative in the relevant sense. To repeat, Frege held that the cognitive value of an 
identity statement is determined by the thought that it expresses—a view designed to 
preserve the objectivity of thought. Thus, on Frege’s view, to grasp the cognitive value of 
an identity just is to grasp the thought that it expresses. And so we might conclude that an 
utterance of (10) is informative to a subject in Hammurabi’s epistemic condition only to 
the extent that he is capable of grasping the thought expressed. Counterfactually 
speaking, we can suppose that if Hammurabi were not in possession of the singular 
concepts HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS he would be incapable of thinking about either 
Hesperus or Phosphorous as such. And if he is incapable of thinking of thinking about 
Hesperus and Phosphorous as such, it would seem to follow that Hammurabi is thereby 
incapable of grasping the thought expressed by (10). And if he failed to grasp the thought 
expressed by (10), he would by Frege’s lights be incapable of grasping its cognitive 
value. In turn, if Hammurabi failed to grasp either the thought expressed or its cognitive 
value, he would not thereby feel rationally obliged to revise his beliefs about how many 
objects are the bearers of the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’.27 If correct, it would 
appear that the informativeness of (10) for Hammurabi depends on his possession of 
HESPERUS and PHOSPHOROUS. 
I wish to challenge this conclusion, however, by demonstrating that a competent 
speaker can perfectly well understand the meaning of an identity statement of the form ‘ 
is ’ without having singular concepts of the referents of the names ‘’ and ‘’. If 
successful, I take this result to show that a competent subject can understand the meaning 
of ‘ is ’ without thereby grasping, or anyhow fully grasping, the thought that it 
                                                 
27 Though he may have had independent reason for doing so. 
 321 
 
expresses. I will at once attempt to demonstrate that an utterance of ‘ is ’ can be 
informative in the relevant sense merely by understanding its meaning. My hypothesis, in 
other words, is that subjects need not fully grasp the thought expressed by ‘ is ’ in 
order for its utterances to informative. And if that’s correct, this result would at least 
suggest that the informativeness (or cognitive value) of a true identity statements of the 
form ‘ is ’ is not, as Frege held, determined (or at least not fully determined) by the 
thought that it expresses.28 
As a way of motivating the view, I will first attempt to make the case with respect 
to the informativeness of simple predicative statements containing proper names. This 
result will then serve as a baseline for what I take to be general conditions on the 
informativeness of any declarative statement. I will then later attempt to run a similar 
argument specifically with respect to the informativeness of identity statements. But first 
I want to very briefly establish a methodological principle advanced by Strawson (1974) 
who argues that we should attempt to locate that which is informative for any competent 
speaker regardless of what they may or may not know/believe about the relevant objects 
of reference. For otherwise, the informativeness of an identity statement would, as 
Strawson (ibid: 44) observes, be listener-dependent: 
…different audiences, variously equipped, might learn various different things from one 
and the same identity statement. It might have different informative values, so to speak, 
for each of them. 
He rejoins (ibid), however: 
But the question is really about the constant informative value, if any, which it has for 
everyone who learns anything from it. 
                                                 
28 Alternatively, one might argue that while the cognitive value of the statement may in fact be determined 
by the thought expressed, one’s grasp of the former does not depend on one’s grasp of the latter. 
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In short, Strawson concludes that like that of ordinary predicative statements, the 
informativeness of identity statements cannot be listener-dependent. Thus, the 
informativeness of identity statements cannot depend on what listeners antecedently 
know/believe about the relevant object of reference. 
Now, like Frege, Strawson seems to assume that the proposition expressed by an 
identity statement is that which determines its cognitive value, which is again a 
conclusion I wish to reject. However, as general methodological principle one can 
nevertheless agree with Strawson that what we want from a theory of informativeness is a 
theory of what any competent subject stands to learn from an identity statement insofar as 
they both understand what those statements mean and accept them as true. As an 
advertisement, my argument to this conclusion has the general shape of a reductio. As in 
the end, I will not be taking a firm stance on the question of what ‘ is ’ expresses other 
than to demonstrate that its utterance can be informative in the relevant sense for subjects 
who understand what it means yet fail to fully grasp the proposition expressed. 
Ultimately what we want is a causal explanation for why any competent speaker might, 
merely in virtue of having understood its meaning and having accepted his informant’s 
statement as true, feel rationally persuaded to revise his belief about how many objects 
are under discussions. Cast in these terms, my conclusion is that the informativeness of 
an identity statement is tied to the logical and/or semantic implications of its linguistic 
form. 
7.6.2. General conditions on informativeness 
I would like to begin here by building a toy theory about how knowledge and/or 
concept acquisition occurs that runs parallel to remarks made in Chapter 3. But in this 
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case I focus on how we come to acquire new knowledge and/or concepts on the basis of 
expert testimony. For I assume that what such a theory will deliver is at once a theory of 
how, or in what way, utterances of true declarative sentences of natural language, 
including identity statements, can be informative for competent yet otherwise 
uninformed/misinformed interpreters. As a starting point, I take for granted that 
competent listeners can learn substantive (i.e., material) facts about the world simply by 
understanding and accepting as true the verbal testimony of knowledgeable and 
trustworthy informants—i.e., on the basis of what those who know better than us say. 
A paradigm example of how we come to learn about the existence of things, for 
example, is by way of a demonstrative sentence such as (18): 
(18) That is Hesperus 
Suppose the addressee of (18) is Max, who by assumption has no clue as to who or what 
Hesperus is and has never before encountered the name ‘Hesperus’. While at a 
conference of amateur astronomers, Max overhears the name ‘Hesperus’ mentioned in 
conversation. Out of curiosity he asks his friend Minnie, who Max takes to be a 
knowledgeable and trustworthy informant, “Who is Hesperus?” To which Minnie replies: 
“Well, first of all Hesperus is not a who but a what. But let me just show you.” Minnie 
then marches Max onto the veranda, points to Venus shining brightly in the evening sky 
and utters (18).  
Traditionally, philosophers of language would classify (18) as a “genuine” identity 
statement—i.e., a statement according to which the verb ‘be’ expresses a relation of 
numerical identity between its two NP-arguments (or DP-arguments, depending on one’s 
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theoretical commitments).29 However, many linguists these days classify (18) as an 
identificational copular sentence, or ICS for short. Eliding several important details, ICSs 
are so-called because they provide addressees with a linguistic means of identifying (i.e., 
picking out, referring to, etc.) the object referred to by the grammatical subject. 
Specifically, according to this conception Minnie is using the demonstrative ‘that’ in (18) 
referentially and the name ‘Hesperus’ predicatively. And what she thereby expresses with 
her utterance is the proposition that the object demonstrated is called ‘Hesperus’. That is, 
Minnie is using (18) to at once refer to the planet Venus and to share with Max a 
customary way of identifying that object by name. 
Now, however we classify it, if any statements of natural language are informative 
they surely include Minnie’s utterance of (18). For by accepting her utterance as true 
Max will have learned about the existence of a hitherto unknown object. In consequence 
of his experience, Max will have also acquired a crude mental model of Hesperus (e.g., 
that it is the brightest object in the evening sky) that will aid in his describing and/or re-
identifying Hesperus in the future. In fact, it strikes me as plausible to suppose that this 
experience alone is sufficient for Max to acquire the singular concept HESPERUS, which 
will henceforth allow him to think about Hesperus as such, which is to say the planet 
Venus qua Hesperus. In short, it seems quite clear in this case that Max has acquired a 
substantive piece of knowledge about the world, and hence that Minnie’s utterance of (1) 
is informative in the relevant sense. 
                                                 
29 Many language theorists nowadays accept some version of Abney’s (1987) DP-Hypothesis according to 
which all NP projections are dominated by a determiner, D. These NPs therefore occur as complements of a 
higher determiner phrase (DP) projection. With respect to proper names, I am again inclined to follow 
Burge (1973) according to which NPs headed by bare proper names (in English) are dominated by a covert 
D which behaves semantically like a demonstrative element more or less equivalent to the English ‘that’. 
Specifically, we might think of this covert D as playing the role of a referential index in an LE such as 
[that1 [PN Aristotle]]. 
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In addition, I take it Max’s experience is sufficient to have acquired the name 
‘Hesperus’. I further assume, as argued back in Chapters 3 and 4, that Max will have at 
once acquired a conceptW of that name, which is to say HESPERUS(w). He will then have 
at once used HESPERUS(w) to form the explicit metalinguistic belief in (19), which can be 
read as stating that there is Word (or name), w, that is ‘Hesperus’: 
(19) w [HESPERUS(w)] 
Moreover, given his core linguistic competence I take it that in addition to having 
become directly acquainted with its referent, Max will in a sense know a priori what the 
name ‘Hesperus’ means. Specifically, he will know that ‘Hesperus’ expresses the 
property of being called ‘Hesperus’. Or put in conceptual terms, Max knows that 
‘Hesperus’ expresses the metalinguistic conceptW IS-CALLED(HESPERUS(w)). Of course, 
since what Max learns in virtue of having acquired the name ‘Hesperus’ is purely 
metalinguistic in nature, this would not, for reasons discussed in Section 7.3, pass muster 
by Frege’s criterion of cognitive significance. And with this much I can agree. But I 
again take as non-tendentious that an utterance of (18) is informative in Frege’s sense of 
making contact with the relevant object of reference. 
In addition to demonstrative constructions such as (18), other simple predicative 
statements such as (20) are also straightforwardly informative in the relevant sense: 
(20) Hesperus is a planet 
For suppose that Max, who is now duly acquainted with Hesperus and thus duly equipped 
with the concept HESPERUS, and now knows Hesperus by name, wants to know what sort 
of celestial object Hesperus is. Max once again turns to Minnie for answers and who 
dutifully responds with an utterance of (20). Let us also assume that Max knows what 
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planets are, and therefore has possession of the concept PLANET(x).30 So equipped, Max 
will presumably understand Minnie’s utterance of (20) to have expressed the thought that 
Hesperus is a planet. Under the further assumption that he accepts Minnie’s testimony as 
true, Max will have thereby acquired a true belief whose content can be represented as 
follows: 
(21) x [x=HESPERUS & PLANET(x)] 
Here again for purposes of describing a believer’s psychological state, I am using the 
concept-name ‘HESPERUS’ to stand proxy for its content. Also here again I take as non-
controversial that Max’s acceptance of Minnie’s utterance constitutes a significant 
extension in his knowledge of the world. 
To generate a more tendentious example, we need only reverse the order of events 
above such that Max first encounters an utterance of (20) followed by (18). That is, as 
before Max overhears the name ‘Hesperus’ mentioned in conversation and asks “Who is 
Hesperus?” However, this time rather than immediately demonstrating Hesperus, Minnie 
instead attempts to first describe Hesperus to Max by asserting (20). The question is 
again whether in this context Minnie’s testimony is informative, and if so in what way? 
In this case, I take it that what Max will have learned from Minnie’s utterance is that 
something called ‘Hesperus’ is a planet, which I will regiment as follows:31 
(22) w x [HESPERUS(w) & IS-CALLED(x, HESPERUS(w)) & PLANET(x)] 
In rough paraphrase, (22) reflects Max’s belief that there is Word, w, which is 
‘Hesperus’, and for some x, x is called ‘Hesperus’ and x is a planet. Observe, however, 
                                                 
30 Though I think my main point here could be made more dramatically by assuming that Max arrived at 
the table as a blank slate. Yet  for brevity, the present example should do the trick. 
31 As deployed in (5), IS-CALLED(HESPERUS(w)) is relational variant of the monadic conceptW  IS-
CALLED(HESPERUS(w)), both of which I assume competent speakers possess. 
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that while Max has clearly learned something, given that (22) is an essentially 
metalinguistic belief it would again presumably not count as informative by Fregean 
standards. In particular, I suspect that neo-Fregeans would argue that since by assumption 
Max lacks the singular concept HESPERUS he is incapable of forming and thus grasping 
the singular thought expressed by (20). And if Max fails to fully grasp the thought 
expressed by (20) he cannot fully grasp its cognitive value. 
I plan to challenge this last claim presently. But to aid in that effort suppose next 
that Max wants to know precisely which planet is called ‘Hesperus’. Again turning to 
Minnie for help, she marches Max onto the veranda and confidently asserts (18) (i.e., 
“Look up there, Max. You see? That is Hesperus”). Here again I take there to be no 
disagreement that Minnie’s utterance of (18) is informative. For under present 
assumptions Max will become directly acquainted with the planet Venus qua Hesperus 
and thereby acquire the concept HESPERUS. In this case, however, Max antecedently knew 
what the demonstrated object is called. He also knew that whatever is called ‘Hesperus’ 
is a planet. Thus, in consequence of Minnie’s utterance of (18) Max will have learned, in 
a sense without being told, that Hesperus is a planet. 
Now, we have already decided that for Max to learn that Hesperus is a planet 
constitutes a substantive extension of his knowledge. Furthermore, since we have 
tentatively decided that Minnie’s utterance of (20) is uninformative, one assumes that the 
significance of Max’s coming to learn that Hesperus is a planet must owe solely to 
Minnie’s utterance of (18). Yet notice that while Max’s acceptance of (18) contributed to 
his acquisition of HESPERUS, and thus doubtlessly contributed to his learning that 
Hesperus is a planet, (18) neither expresses nor implies the fact that Hesperus is a planet. 
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Thus, (18) alone cannot explain Max’s having learned that Hesperus is a planet. Rather, it 
seems that both (18) and (20) contributed to Max’s learning that Hesperus is a planet. But 
if that’s right then (20) must be informative after all! 
This conclusion strikes me as correct, and here is my conjecture as to why. By 
accepting (20) as true on the basis of Minnie’s authority, Max has undertaken a new 
ontological commitment regarding what there is, which is to say how many things exist in 
the world (which is one more thing than he believed prior to Minnie’s statement). Hence, 
there is an intuitively clear sense in which what Max has learned in virtue of his 
acceptance of (20) is in fact “object-involving” and therefore satisfies the spirit of Frege’s 
criterion of cognitive significance. Moreover, Max initially acquired this first piece of 
knowledge without benefit of a stable concept of Hesperus. As such, prior to his 
acquisition of HESPERUS Max was evidently unable to fully grasp the thought expressed 
by (20). Nevertheless, with respect to both (18) and (20) Max was capable of 
understanding the meaning of Minnie’s utterances. And so what this suggests, in short, is 
that Frege’s criterion of cognitive significance is too strong, or at least with respect to 
simple predicative statements. Yet as I argue below the same sort of argument can be run 
with respect to identity statements to the same conclusion: that Frege-subjects need not 
fully grasp the thought expressed by true identity statements for those statements to be 
informative insofar as subjects understand what they mean. 
7.6.3. Strawson on informativeness 
As mentioned above, I am adopting from Strawson (1974) the general 
methodological principle that what we want from a theory of the informativeness of 
identity statements is a theory of what any competent listener stands to learn from those 
 329 
 
statements insofar as listeners both understand what those statements mean and accepts 
them as true. In brief, while Strawson eschews talk of concepts, his proposed solution to 
Frege’s puzzle tracks closely with that of Fodor’s as presented above. Specifically, 
Strawson makes reference to the notion of mental files around which we form “clusters or 
bundles” of “uniquely identifying knowledge” about the relevant objects of reference. 
However, Strawson (ibid: 33-4) observes: 
But of course there is no reason in the world why a hearer should not be in possession of, 
as it were, segregated bundles or clusters of identifying knowledge which are in fact, 
unknown to him, bundles or clusters of identifying knowledge about the same thing. If this 
is so, and if one name in an identity statement invokes one such cluster, while the other 
invokes another, then indeed the hearer will learn something, and not simply something 
about expressions, from the identity-statement which couples the two expressions. 
Strawson’s proposal about the informativeness of identity statements is tied up with his 
notion of having “command” of a proper name. Specifically, and in contrast to my 
account from Section 7.6.2, he maintains that in order to understand the meaning of a 
declarative sentence containing referential uses of proper names, and hence to grasp the 
thoughts they express, interpreters must have command of the names in question. And by 
Strawson’s lights it is sufficient to have command of a name if that name evokes “some 
kind of identifying knowledge, in the hearer’s possession, of the bearer of the name.” 
Unfortunately, Strawson fails to specify exactly what counts as “some kind of identifying 
knowledge,” as this could mean several things. Yet notice that he also does not 
specifically say that such knowledge must be uniquely identifying. Indeed, given what 
Strawson says elsewhere he seems to allow for the possibility that subjects may only be 
acquainted with the object of reference by indefinite description, which is a rather weak 
condition (more on this below). 
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Given my account of the semantics of proper names, however, even this condition 
is too strong. As again on my view competent interpreters can understand what a name 
means, linguistically speaking, without having any kind of discriminating knowledge 
about its customary referent. Nevertheless, I can accept Strawson’s rather weak constraint 
on having command of a name to make the same point. And Strawson’s point is again 
that the informativeness of ‘is ’ is constant, not variable. That is, identity statements 
do not depend for their informativeness on differences between what particular subjects 
may or may not know/believe about the relevant object(s) of reference. Rather again, as 
Strawson urges, what we want is theory of what any competent subject stands to learn 
from their understanding and acceptance of ‘ is ’. My aim throughout this chapter has 
been to draw out, bit-by-bit, various features of identity statements that might help us 
determine what I will call the lowest common denominator (LCD)—that property (or set 
of properties) of identity statements that render them informative for anyone who 
understands their meanings and accepts them as true. 
Ultimately, however, my conclusion differs from Strawson’s. As again it seems to 
me that a subject need not grasp the thought/proposition expressed by an identity for that 
statement to be informative in the relevant sense. Rather, on my view the LCD principle 
has to do both with what subjects know about the meanings of proper names together 
with what they can justifiably infer from statements that contain those names on the basis 
of their logical/linguistic forms. And as mentioned in the beginning, I take it that what 
any competent speaker can justifiably infer from ‘is ’ is that there exists at most one 
contextually-salient bearer of both ‘’ and ‘’. I motioned in the direction of how a duly 
acquainted subject such Hammurabi might land on this thought. However, as a way of 
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motivating Strawson’s dictum I next examine a degenerate case where by assumption 
Frege-subjects know little more about the relevant objects of reference than their names. 
And this is to suppose that our subjects lack concepts of those objects, and are therefore 
incapable of representing/grasping the thought expressed by statements that contain 
referential uses of their names. Yet as argued in Section 7.6.2, these subjects are, in my 
view, nevertheless capable of understanding what those names mean, linguistically 
speaking. 
7.6.4. A degenerate case 
First consider Kripke’s famous Feynman/Gell-Mann example according to which a 
competent subject, again call him Max, only vaguely recalls having heard of two people 
who go by the names ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’. Apart from their names, however, 
Max only remembers hearing that both individuals are famous physicists. That is, by 
assumption Max can neither uniquely describe nor visually identify either individual. He 
obviously cannot, therefore, discriminate one individual from the other except by name. 
Under these circumstances, I think it’s safe to assume that Max lacks singular concepts of 
Feynman and Gell-Mann, which is to say FEYNMAN and GELL-MANN. As before, then, it 
seems safe to assume that Max is therefore incapable of thinking about either Feynman or 
Gell-Mann as such. However, according to Kripke Max can nonetheless succeed in using 
‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’, respectively, to refer to Feynman and Gell-Mann by name 
insofar as he intends to use those names with their customary reference. Moreover, if I 
understand Strawson correctly we can say that Max has “command” of those names, 
though again in the weak sense of merely possessing some kind of identifying knowledge; 
viz., that both are famous physicists. 
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More to my point, given that Max knows that the names ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-
Mann’ are names of famous physicists, it is not implausible to suppose that he has both 
recorded those names in his mental lexicon and also acquired conceptsW of those names; 
call the latter FEYNMAN(w) and GELL-MANN(w). In my view, it would also be 
unsurprising if, for lack of an alternative, Max has used his conceptsW FEYNMAN(w) and 
GELL-MANN(w), respectively, to form the metalinguistic beliefs that both ‘Feynman’ and 
‘Gell-Mann’ are names of famous physicists, which I will represent as (23) and (24): 
(23) w x [FEYNMAN(w) & IS-CALLED(x, FEYNMAN(w)) & PHYSICIST(x)] 
(24) w x [GELL-MANN(w) & IS-CALLED(x, GELL-MANN(w)) & PHYSICIST(x)] 
Here again, while Max may be incapable of uniquely identifying Feynman and Gell-
Mann, nor distinguishing the one man from the other, as a competent speaker he knows 
what the names ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’ mean, as expressed by his conceptsW IS-
CALLED(FEYNMAN(w)) and IS-CALLED(GELL-MANN(w)), respectively. In terms of 
comprehension, Max will therefore understand the meanings of the names ‘Feynman’ and 
‘Gell-Mann’, respectively, as instructions to activate his conceptsW IS-
CALLED(FEYNMAN(w)) and IS-CALLED(GELL-MANN(w)). In turn, activation of 
FEYNMAN(w) and GELL-MANN(w) will ceteris paribus at least prime the activation of 
Max’s metalinguistic beliefs represented by (23) and (24) (i.e., that ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-
Mann’ are names of famous physicists). In short, this sequence of interpretive events 
would explain why Max’s interpretation of the names ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’ lead 




Now, to put a hypothetical twist on Kripke’s example, suppose it turned out that, 
unbeknownst to Max, that there is just one famous physicist—Feyn-Mann—who is called 
both  ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’. Suppose further that at a physics convention Max 
overhears the names ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’ mentioned in conversation. Wishing to 
participate in the discussion, Max naively interjects: “So, who you do think has done 
more to advance modern physics, Feynman or Gell-Mann?” To which one of the 
conversational participants replies: 
(25) What do you mean, Feynman is Gell-Mann! 
As pursued above, the relevant question here is whether Max learns anything of 
substance merely by understanding [the meaning of] his respondent’s utterance of (25)? 
My claim is that he does. 
First of all, let us again assume for the sake of argument that Max understands the 
names ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’ in (25) as having been used referentially, and as 
charitably that he understands the verb ‘be’ in this context as expressing a concept of 
numerical identity. Given that Max is incapable of thinking about Feynman/Gell-Mann as 
such, by assumption he is unable to fully form the thought expressed by (25). Rather, 
under present assumptions what he will understand from his respondent’s utterance is that 
‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’ are names of the same person—Feyn-Mann. And from this 
thought he can justifiably infer that in order for (25) to be true it must be the case that 
there is just one contextually-salient individual under discussion, though again Max does 
not know precisely who that individual is. 
In purely psychological terms, my hypothesis is that Max’s interpretation of (25) 
will cause activation of his conceptsW IS-CALLED(FEYNMAN(w)) and IS-CALLED(GELL-
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MANN(w)), which again ipso facto involves activation of his conceptsW of the names 
‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’, which is to say FEYNMAN(w) and GELL-MANN(w). That is, 
by merely understanding the meaning of (25), Max’s thoughts will naturally gravitate 
toward the metalinguistic aspects of the utterance, as by assumption he lacks the singular 
concepts FEYNMAN and GELL-MANN. However, as with Hammurabi from above Max can 
nonetheless read quite a lot off of the linguistic form of the utterance. Glossing past 
certain details, Max will know more or less a priori that in order for his interlocutor’s 
utterance to be true, it must be the case that the names ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’ 
corefer. This further implies that his conceptsW FEYNMAN(w) and GELL-MANN(w) are, 
contrary to prior beliefs, conceptsW of coreferential names. Moreover, should Max come 
to accept this much on authority of his informant’s testimony, he will be rationally 
compelled to conclude that there exists just one contextually-salient individual who is a 
(or perhaps the) bearer of both names, and not two as he previously believed. 
Here again the upshot is that merely by understanding the meaning of (25), and 
accepting it as true, Max will feel rationally compelled to revise his ontological 
commitments regarding how many individuals are the bearers of ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-
Mann’. Now, if you bought the argument of Section 7.6.2 above, then I think you ought 
to agree that what Max has learned from his acceptance of (25) constitutes a substantive 
advance in his knowledge of the world. And if that’s right, then identity statements can 
be informative for competent subjects despite not fully grasping the thoughts/propositions 
that those statements express. 
As a way of cementing the point, suppose that Max becomes intrigued by this 
famous physicist and goes on to learn more about him. Eventually, Max acquires a 
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singular concept of this individual; call it FEYN-MANN (recall that for illustrational 
purposes we are imagining that there exists just one person called by the names 
‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’). Since Max antecedently believes that someone called 
‘Feynman’ and someone called ‘Gell-Mann’ are famous physicists, in virtue of having 
acquired FEYN-MANN he will in a sense “automatically” know that the referent of FEYN-
MANN, which is to say Feyn-Mann, is a famous physicist. In other words, in consequence 
of his acquisition of FEYN-MANN, together with his acceptance of (25) above, Max will 
have formed the following singular belief: 
(26) x [x=FEYN-MANN & PHYSICIST(x)] 
I again take as non-controversial that the thought/belief represented by (26)—i.e., that 
Feyn-Mann is a physicist—constitutes a substantive piece of knowledge that Max did not 
possess prior to his acceptance of (25). Rather, it is only taken together that Max’s beliefs 
in (23) and (24) that his interlocutor’s utterance of (25) culminated in Max’s belief in 
(26). It therefore seems clear that his interlocutor’s utterance of (25) was in fact 
informative in the relevant sense. 
Notice, however, that an utterance of (25) is informative only to the extent that Max 
recognizes the metalinguistic-semantic information that it pragmatically (or 
linguistically) conveys. In other words, my claim is that the informativeness of (25) rests 
not with Max’s ability to identify who or what is being referred to with ‘Feynman’ and 
‘Gell-Mann’. Rather, the informativeness of the statement lies in Max’s recognition of 
how many objects are being referred to with those names. But to grasp this thought 
required first recognizing that in order for the statement to be true it must be the case that 
‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’ are being used in reference to the same individual. 
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Notice further that it cannot be the case that the thought expressed by (25) (i.e., that 
Feynman is Gell-Mann) is logically equivalent to the thought there is just one 
contextually-salient bearer of the names ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’. For as just 
demonstrated, a subject such as Max who lacks the concepts FEYNMAN and GELL-MAN 
appears capable of grasping the latter thought but not the former. The latter thought in 
turn, if accepted as true, appears sufficient to rationally compel subjects such as Max to 
revise their beliefs about how many objects are under discussion. In Hammurabi’s case 
from earlier, given that he harbors mutually exclusive beliefs about Hesperus and 
Phosphorous he may be more reluctant to accept an utterance of (10) above as true (i.e., 
“Hesperus is Phosphorous”) than Max is to accept (25) on testimony alone. But generally 
speaking, what one understands by the utterance and one’s justification for accepting it as 
true are independent considerations. As ultimately I think that Max and Hammurabi, 
despite being in very different epistemic positions, derive basically the same conclusion, 
which is that there is just one object that is a/the bearer of two names. If correct, this 
suggests that the thought speaker express with an identity statement may not match the 
thought understood by competent yet otherwise misinformed addressees.    
Of course, a speaker would not normally assert an identity statement unless he/she 
believes that there is confusion among addressees about how many objects/individuals 
are under discussion. It might therefore be said part of what speakers are trying to 
communicate is precisely what any competent listener stands to learn from their 
utterances, which to repeat is that there is just one object/individual under discussion. 
Moreover, it might be said that identity statements of the form ‘α is β’ are not only 
informative but also carry normative force along the lines of a recommendation or, more 
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strongly, a command. For a speaker of, say, (10) is at once urging his listener to bring her 
beliefs into alignment with his own regarding how many objects are the respective 
bearers of the names in question. Thus, one can agree with Frege that (10) expresses a 
substantive thought about the relevant object of reference. However, pace Frege, my 
view is that the ability to recognize the cognitive significance of such statements requires 
the deployment of what in earlier chapters I called a speaker’s metalinguistic-semantic 
competence (MSC) regarding his/her understanding/beliefs about what the names in 
question mean.32 
In general, my claim is that the informativeness (or “cognitive significance”) of 
natural language identity statements of the form ‘α is β’ is governed by the following 
principle: 
(INF)ormativeness: A true identity statement of the form ‘ is ’, where ‘’ and ‘’ are 
lexical expressions that contain coreferential uses of proper names, is informative just in 
case its utterance expresses or otherwise pragmatically conveys information that is 
sufficient to rationally compel a linguistically competent yet otherwise misinformed 
subject who understands its meaning, and believes it true, to revise his/her mistaken 
beliefs about how many objects are the bearers of those names. Parallel remarks apply to 
statements of the form ‘ is not ’.33 
On my view, the relevant information conveyed by an utterance of ‘α is β’ is the 
metalinguistic fact that the names ‘α’ and ‘β’ corefer. A subject’s grasp of this 
proposition will in turn license what I above called the lowest common denominator 
(LCD)—that which any competent speaker stands to learn from a statement simply by 
                                                 
32 The sort of MSC alluded to here is effectively what Fiengo & May (2006) refer to as “beliefs of 
Assignment.” The main difference is that I have postulated a conceptual mechanism in attempt to explain 
how such beliefs are internally represented, processed, and the structural relation between the linguistic 
meanings of Words and corresponding metalinguistic conceptsW of those Words. 
33 As mentioned in a similar footnote in Chapter 1, (INF) is forwarded as an epistemological or pragmatic 
principle, not a semantic principle. 
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understanding what it means and accepting it as true. Specifically, I take the LCD to be 
the substantive (i.e., material) inference that there exists just one (or at most one) 
contextually-salient object/individual that is the bearer of both names (or two in the case 
of ‘ is not ’). While Frege-subjects who are suitably equipped with relevant 
concepts/beliefs such as Hammurabi may stand to learn something more from their 
acceptance of true identity statement as true, my strategy, following Strawson, has again 
been to seek the LCD—that which is common to all subjects who understand what those 
statements mean. 
To be clear, I am not claiming that this is the only way of bringing such facts to 
light. Indeed, rational agents may well arrive at the same conclusion, as it were, by 
simply connecting the dots; i.e., by adducing relevant extralinguistic evidence in the 
same way that one might, as Frege thought, independently discover “that a new sun does 
not rise every morning, but always the same one.” In general, I am again prepared to 
believe that even certain non-human animals can be Frege-subjects. But it’s important to 
keep in mind that I am forwarding an empirical hypothesis of how competent language 
users utilize inferential relations licensed by the linguistic forms of certain natural 
language sentences in attempt to grasp what their utters are trying to communicate. 
Importantly, I take myself as having arrived at this conclusion without supposing, as do 
Fiengo & May, Strawson, along with most other commentators, that the relevant 
information specified by (INF) is part of the thought expressed. 
Before concluding this chapter I wish to just briefly demonstrate how the proposal 
on offer generalizes to Kripke’s Paderewski-cases. 
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7.6.5. Paderewski revisited (just briefly) 
Recall from Chapter 6 that the special problem created by Paderewski-cases occurs 
when the names flanking the copula appear to be type-identical, as in (27): 
(27) Paderewski is Paderewski 
In this case, an interpreter’s judgment about the proposition expressed more crucially 
depends on his judgment as to whether the lexical expressions (LEs) involved are type-
identical or type-distinct, and correlatively whether they necessarily corefer (or not), as 
determined in part by whether those LEs are coindexed (or not). As in the previous 
chapter, let us assume here that Peter believes that there are two numerically distinct 
individuals, both who go by the name ‘Paderewski’. Finding full agreement with Fiengo 
& May on this point, it seems to me plausible to suppose that given Peter’s doxastic 
predilections he will naturally interpret (27) as involving type-distinct (non-coindexed) 
LEs which he believes do not corefer. Indeed, for Peter to interpret an utterance of (27) 
otherwise would be to charge his interlocutor with having uttered a triviality. Thus in 
order to make sense of its utterance, it must first occur to Peter (if only tacitly) that (27) 
might have the following (partial) grammatical form: 
(27') [NP [PN Paderewski][x1]] is [NP [PN Paderewski][x2]] 
And from this revelation I assume that Peter’s interpretation of (27/27') will proceed 
exactly as Hammurabi’s interpretation of (10) from above. For like Hammurabi, Peter 
tacitly knows that nothing in the grammar precludes the coreference of type-distinct LEs. 
And if he finds independent reason to trust the testimony of his informant, he will thereby 
be forced to conclude that there is just one contextually-salient bearer of the non-
coindexed LEs ‘[NP [PN Paderewski][x1]]’ and ‘[NP [PN Paderewski][x2]]’. 
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I have dashed through this example pretty quickly. Yet given the extension 
discussion from the last chapter, and that of the present, I trust that the key claim is clear 
enough.  
7.7. Chapter summary 
To repeat a claim mentioned in the beginning, on my view Frege’s puzzle about the 
informativeness of identity statements involving type-distinct coreferential names, and 
correlatively failures of substitution of those names salva veritate in opaque contexts, 
both arise for one of two simple reasons. Either (i) subjects do not know/believe de dicto 
that the names in question corefer (or not), or (ii) they have confused de re one individual 
for two (or vice versa). These two facts are intimately related, however, in the sense that 
ignorance of the one explains ignorance of the other.34 For in the general case, to believe 
of two names that they do not corefer is ipso facto to be committed to the belief that those 
names have numerically distinct bearers.35 Conversely, to believe de re that there exists 
two objects/individuals that are the respective bearers of type-distinct names rationally 
entails the subject’s de dicto belief that those names do not corefer. 
Similarly, there at least two ways out of the confusion. Subjects might either (i) 
learn, perhaps by being told, that the names in question corefer (or not), or (ii) infer from 
independent evidence that there exists at most one object that happens to be a (or perhaps 
the) bearer of both names (or in the reverse direction that there exists multiple bearers of 
the same name). These latter two facts are also related in the formal sense of providing 
                                                 
34 To be clear at the onset, I assume that suitably sophisticated non-linguistic animals can in principle be 
Frege-subjects. If correct, then Frege’s puzzle is not a puzzle about language, per se, but rather a puzzle 
about the nature of thought. Tis point will become clearer below. However, given that the puzzle is 
typically cast as a linguistic phenomenon, and which is how Frege himself conceived the puzzle, I will 
evaluate the phenomenon with respect to language users. 
35 By “general case” I mean to set aside instances of so-called “empty” proper names. 
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logical premises that connect one to the other such that a competent speaker who both 
recognizes and accepts the one fact will (or should), again ceteris paribus, feel rationally 
compelled to accept the other. 
Yet as has been the focus of attention in the chapter, there is by common 
assumption a third way of becoming so-informed, which is to be told by way of a true 
identity statement of the form ‘ is ’ that  and  are in fact one and the same 
object/individual. And so far as I can tell, most contemporary researchers agree that with 
respect to natural language statements of this form constitutes the core explanadum of 
Frege’s puzzle. So constrained, I have attempted to uncover which properties of such 
statements render them informative in the relevant sense. According to Frege, the 
“cognitive value” is determined by the thought/proposition that it expresses. 
However, I have argued here that competent yet otherwise uninformed/misinformed 
language users need not fully grasp the thought expressed to grasp the informativeness of 
a true identity statement of the form ‘ is ’. And while I have also tried to hedge my 
bets somewhat, if pressed for a firm answer as to what makes property of an identity 
statement renders it informative for any subject who understand what it means, my 
temptation is to say the metalinguistic fact that the names ‘α’ and ‘β’ corefer. As a 
subject’s grasp of this proposition licenses what I take to be the central informative 
feature of identity statements, which is the fact that there exists at most one contextually-
salient object/individual that is the bearer of both names (or two in the case ‘ is not ’). 
As all of this fits in with the core thesis of this dissertation, the kind of competence I have 
been ascribing to Frege-subjects who grasp the informativeness of identity is chiefly what 
I called in earlier chapters their metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC). 
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In short, I strongly suspect that anyone who has ever given Frege’s puzzle more 
than a moment’s thought has been seduced by Frege’s intuitions in the Begriffsschrift that 
the informativeness of ‘a = b’ is somehow grounded in the metalinguistic information 
that its utterance conveys. I have here attempted to demonstrate that Frege’s 
Begriffsschrift intuitions were more or less sound, or again at any rate with respect to 
natural languages along with the help of a more empirically plausible theory of the 
linguistic meanings of proper names (i.e., one that makes no direct appeal to Fregean 
senses). I have purposely avoided related questions that arise with respect to so-called 
“Mates cases” (Mates [1950]) and what Jennifer Saul calls “simple sentences,” mainly 
because I have not had the time to more carefully consider what role metalinguistic-
semantic competence might play in the interpretation of such expressions. For this 
reason, I have elected to set these cases aside for further study. By contrast, for reasons of 
time and space, readers will have noticed that I have also swept aside the phenomenon of 
substitution failure of coreferential names in the context of belief reports. However, I 
trust that my target audience will have little trouble envisioning my response to this 
question as well. As in my view substitution failure in opaque contexts and the 
informativeness of identity statements are quite obviously related phenomena, though I 
won’t pursue that argument here.  
In the final chapter of this dissertation—Chapter 8—I will summarize the central 
claims of this study while by reiterating the explanatory role of MSC in utterance and/or 
expression interpretation. I will also briefly identify related avenues of future research. 
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8. Summary and Conclusions 
8.1. Introduction 
I positioned this study back in Chapter 1 as a theory of semantic competence, which 
broadly construed I have assumed to be a theory of whatever it is that one must know, or 
cognize, or otherwise mentally represent in order to be a semantically competent speaker 
of a natural language. More specifically, against the backdrop of a Chomskyan 
conception of natural language I began with a characterization of semantic competence as 
a speaker’s ability to understand the expressions of his/her native I-language. As 
postulated by Chomsky, an I-language is an effective computational procedure 
implemented in the human mind capable of generating an endless array of meaningful 
linguistic expressions from a finite stock of lexical constituents according to a recursively 
specified set of grammatical rules. Expressions thus-generated must in turn satisfy 
legibility conditions (conditions on interpretation) at the interfaces to language-external 
consumer systems. When these conditions are met, understanding occurs (for the most 
part, but as qualified below). 
Most relevant to the present topic, generable expressions must be interpretable at 
the interface to conceptual-intentional systems (C-I). By hypothesis, interpretable 
expressions bear certain semantic properties—which following Chomsky is to say 
meanings—that constrain their possible interpretations at the interface to C-I. More 
specifically, I have argued that linguistic meanings guide and constrain without fully 
determining which extralinguistic concepts are coherently expressible with which 
expressions across the various contexts in which those expressions are customarily 
deployed. The net effect, from a user perspective, is that linguistic meanings impose 
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constraints on what their host expressions can (and cannot) be used to describe, denote, or 
otherwise talk about in ordinary discourse. With respect to comprehension, I have also 
argued alongside Chomsky that we should think of linguistic meanings as instructions to 
activate semantically related concepts. At the lexical level, the meanings of individual 
Words are normally understood as instructions to C-I to activate one of possibly several 
basic/atomic concepts. Syntactically complex expressions, on the other hand, typically 
correspond to the activation of complex (i.e., internally structured) concepts, and at the 
sentential level to complete thoughts/propositions. Or as Paul Pietroski conceives them, 
the meanings of syntactically complex expressions are understood as, and indeed just are 
instructions to build/assemble complex monadic concepts by fetching and conjoining 
formally atomic monadic concepts (see Chapter 5 for discussion).1 
Characterized in roughly this way, linguistic understanding is nothing more (and 
nothing less) than the ability to extract relevant linguistic properties from incoming 
speech signals in order to generate meaningful expressions—i.e., expressions that are 
semantically interpretable by language-external consumers. By “semantically 
interpretable,” I merely mean that expressions qua meaning-instructions are in principle 
executable by their consumers. Notice, however, that instructions can often be executed, 
which is to say satisfied, in many ways. To borrow an illustrative analogy from Pietroski 
(p.c.), suppose I instruct you to fetch a box from a room. It so happens that inside this 
room you find several boxes of various proportions and colors. Of course, your 
awareness of extralinguistic context may influence your judgment as to what sort of box 
                                                 
1 I have for the most part used the term ‘activate’ throughout as opposed to ‘fetch’ in order to remain 
relatively neutral about the exact nature of semantic compositionality. That said, I am attracted by the 
elegance and explanatory power/reach of Pietroski’s rich and empirically supported elaboration of 
Chomsky’s basic notion. 
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would best suit my needs in the situation at hand. For instance, if you know that I am in a 
rush and that any size/color box will do, you might just grab the first box in sight. And 
given that my instruction was in this respect non-specific, then strictly so long as you 
return a box you will have satisfied (i.e., executed) my request as instructed. By analogy, 
if the meaning of the Word ‘book’ is an instruction to fetch a concept of books (or 
bookings), so long as there is at least one such concept at the specified address then the 
meaning-instruction encoded by the lexical entry for ‘book’ is in principle executable and 
hence understandable (although performance limitations may, on occasion, disrupt its 
proper execution). 
Notice further that to say that an expression qua meaning-instruction is executable 
is no guarantee that its execution will result in the activation/construction of a 
comprehensible thought. For instance, while the sentence “Colorless green ideas sleep 
furiously” conjures an unintelligible thought, on the present view it conforms to 
principles of grammatical well-formedness and is therefore meaningful 
(understandable/executable) in the relevant sense. That is, from a purely formal 
standpoint this expression is “legible” at the interface to C-I. And again from a strictly 
Chomskyan perspective, this is all that’s required to understand expressions thus-
generated and to thereby be a competent language user. In short, on this view it is the 
computational resources of a speaker’s I-language that underwrites his/her linguistic 
competence, and specifically his/her linguistic-semantic competence (LSC). Thus, to 
possess an I-language is to possess a certain degree of LSC, where the “linguistic” 
modifier is added to remind ourselves that the competence in question is underwritten by 
a domain-specific faculty of the human mind dedicated to language processing. And to 
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qualify LSC as “semantic” is merely a reminder of which aspect of linguistic competence 
we are talking about.2 
LSC is to be contrasted with what in Chapter 1 I labeled a speaker’s conceptual-
semantic competence (CSC), on the one hand, and pragmatic-semantic competence 
(PSC) on the other. There I characterized CSC as comprising our general conceptual 
knowledge of things in the world that we typically use language to communicate about. 
For example, knowing that dogs are quadrupeds (or anyhow typical ones) constitutes part 
of one’s CSC, whereas understanding what the word ‘dog’ means is part of one’s LSC.  
In contrast, to recognize that by asserting the sentence “The dog is loose again!,” father is 
urging me to return Fido to his cage is part of my PSC. Explaining how general 
conceptual and pragmatic factors influence speaker-judgments about, say, the thought 
expressed by linguistic expressions is, on my view, an interesting question for 
philosophers of mind, language, and cognitive science. However, explaining the nature 
and structure of linguistic meaning is largely the purview of theoretical linguistics, and 
formal semantics in particular (although there will always be a degree of cross-
disciplinary overlap in theoretical interests/purposes). 
As a philosopher of language, my present interest lies primarily with how empirical 
findings might inform traditional philosophical questions about the relationship between 
language and thought, meaning and truth, and with respect to the present study the 
relationship between semantic theory and semantic competence. And again in my view a 
theory of core semantic competence, and LSC in particular, should be guided by our best 
                                                 
2 Keep in mind that ex hypothesi the phonological properties of expressions are also interpreted (as 
instructions) by articulatory-perceptual (or sensorimotor) systems. Thus, phonological understanding, and 
hence phonological competence, plays an important role in a general theory of linguistic competence as 
well (not to mention what one may choose to distinguish as “syntactic” competence). 
 347 
 
semantic theories for natural language. For if semantic competence is best characterized 
as the ability to understand the expressions of one’s native I-language, then a theory of 
semantic competence is, in essence, a theory of linguistic understanding (LSC)—i.e., a 
theory of a particular aspect of a speaker’s semantic psychology. In turn, if we take a 
semantic theory for natural language to be a theory of the objects of linguistic 
understanding, it follows that our best semantic theory can more or less double as a 
theory semantic competence. 
8.2. Emphasizing the explanatory role of MSC 
It has however been the central aim of this dissertation to demonstrate that a 
speaker’s core semantic competence outruns the facts explained by current theories of 
LSC. Specifically I have argued that LSC needs to be supplemented by a theory of a 
speaker’s metalinguistic-semantic competence (MSC). MSC is again so-called because 
by hypothesis it is grounded in a speaker’s explicit (consciously accessible) conceptual 
knowledge of or beliefs about the meanings of linguistic expressions, and in particular 
the meanings of individual Words. Or to put the claim differently, I have argued that a 
speaker’s explicit conception of a word’s meaning is a direct reflection of his/her tacit 
understanding of the various ways in which the linguistically-encoded meanings of words 
guide and constrain without determining what those words can and cannot be 
used/uttered to talk about in ordinary discourse. To say that explicit knowledge of (or 
beliefs about, or conceptions of) lexical meanings is consciously accessible does not 
entail that such competence always comes to mind, as it were, during utterance 
interpretation. That is, such thoughts need not become phenomenally conscious in the 
traditional sense, but rather merely consciously available to language users upon 
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reflection. However, let me qualify this claim to allow for the possibility that very young 
children (perhaps even pre-linguistic infants) possess a degree of MSC which is 
conceptual in nature though perhaps not yet consciously available. 
Now, given that MSC is grounded in extralinguistic conceptual knowledge, one 
might think that MSC belongs to a theory of CSC, properly understood. However, I have 
attempted to demonstrate that while fully conceptual in nature MSC is in fact a very close 
confederate of the non-conceptual resources that underwrite a speaker’s LSC, and which 
non-linguistic animals lack. Indeed, I think of LSC and MSC, collectively, as constituting 
what I have been loosely calling a speaker’s “core” semantic competence, which I define 
roughly as the ability to understand the meanings of expressions relative to a context of 
utterance.3 
For instance, if what I argued in Chapter 5 is correct MSC often plays an important 
role in the contextual disambiguation of polysemous Words. And from this it follows that 
MSC is subsumable under the definition of semantic competence just proffered. In 
particular, I am suggesting that a theory of MSC is needed to fully explain how 
competent speakers understand the contextually-determined meanings of inherently 
polysemous Words. I have ruled out both CSC and PSC as possible explanans of such 
facts on grounds that such competence fall outside the realm of linguistic understanding, 
narrowly construed.  Yet I again contend that a theory of I-languages/LSC cannot explain 
all the facts regarding linguistic understanding, and hence semantic competence. 
                                                 
3 I suspect that a theory of MSC may even be needed to fully explain our interpretations of of “well-
behaved” context-sensitive expressions such as indexicals and demonstratives, and indeed to represent the 
“character” (in Kaplan’s sense) of any context-sensitive expression. However, I do not at the moment have 
a specific proposal and thus leave this question open for future investigation. 
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In addition to lexical polysemy, Chapter 4 was dedicated to illustrating how a 
theory of MSC can help explain how competent language users acquire Words with their 
lexical meanings. To be clear, I concede that MSC may not always be deployed in the 
acquisition of lexical meanings, as evidenced by the phenomenon of “fast mapping” 
whereby Word-learners are often able to immediately link unfamiliar Word-sounds to the 
concepts they express, or perhaps on just a few exposures.4 In other cases, however, 
evidence suggests that Word-learning is a gradual process whereby learners often start 
out with a highly impoverished understanding of what an unfamiliar Word means in 
terms of which extralinguistic concept it is customarily used to express. In these 
circumstances, I have argued that learners use their conceptsW of those Words to form 
metalinguistic beliefs about what they mean. With respect to a theory of semantic 
competence, I have noted that Chomskyans are committed to the idea that acquiring an I-
language is part and parcel of one’s core linguistic competence. And since the lexicon is 
widely considered to be an integral component of I-languages, broadly construed, it 
follows that the ability to acquire words with their meanings constitutes part of one’s 
linguistic-semantic competence (LSC). Thus, MSC is needed to explain how learners 
acquire their lexicons. Moreover, if the acquisition of lexical meanings requires the 
exercise of one’s MSC, then once again a theory of MSC is needed to complement a 
complete theory of core semantic competence, and by parallel reasoning any 
explanatorily adequate semantic theory for natural language. 
My proposal in Chapter 7 is, admittedly, on a bit shakier ground in this regard. 
There I suggested that the role of MSC in the interpretation of identity statements is to 
                                                 




recognize the information is pragmatically conveyed by an utterance of ‘is ’, and 
specifically the metalinguistic fact that ‘’ and ‘’ are coreferential proper names (or 
again as Frege put it, “the circumstance that two names have the same content”). Thus, 
strictly speaking one might think that the competence employed in extracting this 
information from the linguistic context owes to what I have labeled pragmatic-semantic 
competence (PSC). However, even if recognition of the proposition that is  corefer 
involves recruitment of extralinguistic pragmatic processes, understanding the 
information content of this proposition requires an understanding of what the names ‘’ 
and ‘’ mean. And if the meanings of names (or proper nouns) are fundamentally 
metalinguistic in nature, then to understand the meanings of names crucially involves the 
exercise of one’s MSC. 
8.3. Avenues for future research 
It is one of my immediate future goals to close some of the gaps left open in the 
present study. In addition, I believe there is opportunity to more fully develop a theory of 
proper names whose semantics is grounded in a speaker’s MSC—one that takes seriously 
the psychological facts about our understanding of the meanings of names. Indeed, I 
suspect that MSC may also role to play in our representation of the meanings of so-called 
“empty” names; i.e., names without bearers such as ‘Pegasus’. I also think a theory of 
MSC has applicability to a theory of the semantics of so-called “quotation expressions.”5 
More confidently, I feel quite sure that MSC has application to what Fiengo & May 
(2006) distinguish as beliefs of Translation (beliefs that non-coindexed (type-distinct), 
non-homophonous lexical expressions corefer). 
                                                 
5 See Cappelen & Lepore (2007) for a thorough review of standing proposals. 
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In brief outline of the latter proposal,6 consider that native Bostonians with thick 
accents pronounce the name ‘Harvard’ as something like \'hahvad\ and which upon first 
encounter can be quite difficult for Midwesterners such as myself to discern as meaning 
what its speakers are referring to, which of course is Harvard University. And so while 
non-native speakers may naturally hear the sound \'hahvad\ as a possible Word/name of 
natural language, it may not register in their idiolect (i.e., I-language) as a token of 
‘Harvard’. Thus, whereas the natives presumably lexicalize their singular concept 
HARVARD under the Word-sound \'hahvad\, non-natives may initially lexicalize the 
ontologically “empty” concept HAHVAD—say in the false belief that Harvard boasts a 
rival somewhere up the Charles called ‘Havad University’. In other words, while the 
meaning of \'harverd\ is semantically associated with the non-native’s concept HARVARD, 
\'hahvad\ is linked to HAHVAD. For such speakers, therefore, subsequent utterances of 
\'hahvad\ will be understood as an instruction to activate HAHVAD. 
My proposal is that if/when misdirected speakers eventually come to realize that the 
sounds \'hahvad\ and \'harverd\ express the same concept, they will use their conceptW of 
the Word ‘Harvard’ to form the metalinguistic belief that \'hahvad\ is a phonological 
variant of (i.e., Translation of) the Word-sound \'harverd\—i.e., that the sounds \'harverd\ 
and \'hahvad\ are phonological variants of the same name. Or put differently, we can that 
such speakers will come to believe that the Word-sounds \'harverd\ and \'hahvad\ 
“corefer.”7 In short, the ideas mentioned in this section are among those I plan to pursue 
further as part of my follow-on research. 
                                                 
6 This topic was originally planned to occupy a chapter of the present study, but I ultimately decided to 
defer the project for further study. 
7 Though I find it plausible that over time such beliefs may become lexicalized as part of one’s linguistic 




Having made the best of the evidence available, I confess that this project wound up 
a bit overly ambitious in scope to fully flesh out the fine detail of each sub-thesis. And I 
am cognizant of other ways in which this thesis is lacking, particularly with respect to 
anticipating and responding to certain obvious objections to my view (along with certain 
difficulties that every language theorist is faced with). I am however confident that many 
such objections can, if pressed, be met, particularly if granted plausible background 
assumptions that I have helped myself to regarding the fundamental nature of language, 
thought, and the relationship between the two. 
Shortcomings aside, I feel that among the most significant contributions of this 
dissertation is having been the first (so far as I know) to sketch a serious proposal 
regarding the psychological implementation of a speaker’s MSC, which I remain 
steadfastly confident plays an important role in at least some forms of expression and/or 
utterance interpretation. Specifically, I hoped to have convinced readers that our 
conceptsW of Words and the MSC they subserve provide ordinary speakers with a view, 
albeit dimly lit, onto the intrinsic semantic properties and relations of lexical items as 
manifest by their tokens in ordinary discourse. If I have succeeded to this extent, then my 
effort will have shed some new light on the nature of the relationship between language 
and thought, as well as the nature of semantic competence. My ultimate goal in this and 
work to follow is to motivate more cross-disciplinary research on the topic—research that 
might help either confirm or disconfirm the philosophically interesting/relevant aspects of 
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